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Abstract 
In recent years, India, the world's second most populous country, has been emerging 
as one of the fastest growing economies with enormous market potential. Since the 
beginning of India's economic liberalisation in the late 1980s, it has been attracting 
foreign investment from around the world. However, for many foreign companies, 
forming international joint ventures (UVs) with a local partner remains the preferred 
international business mode for entering the Indian market. Based on nine Australian-
Indian UVs, this thesis empirically examines three major areas of the UV literature, 
viz., factors influencing the motivation to form UVs with a local partner, the 
complexity and the extent of the firm's involvement in the UV formation process and 
the factors responsible for UV success during the implementation stage. 
Multiple case study method was used to conduct the research. A combination of 
deductive and inductive processes was applied to capture the complexity and 
dynamism of the real world situation. Primarily, the context of the research is 
presented as it is reflected in the extant literature and the available market 
information. The conceptual framework, research question and proposition sets were 
framed on the basis of this research context. In-depth, face-to-face interviews were 
conducted with the management of nine UVs, their Australian parents and their Indian 
hosts. Prior theories were employed as templates for measuring outcomes. Direct 
observations, company documentation and other secondary information were used to 
assist in the interpretation of the primary data. 
This research has determined that UVs are an important means of Australian 
companies doing international business in India. It has established that the motivation 
to select IJVs as an international business mode is influenced by a host of 
environmental and organisational-specific variables. However, the extent of this 
influence varies with the relative importance of each of these variables. This study 
also has demonstrated that the UV formation process between an Australian company 
and an Indian host is a complex and time-consuming one. It is ascertained that the 
Australian-Indian IJVs face fewer difficulties during the implementation stage than 
anticipated earlier at the IJV motivation stage. Nonetheless, the research has 
confirmed the need for assistance from local partners in overcoming any 
environmental or organisational-specific difficulties. In addition, this research offers 
a range of implications relevant to policy analysis and development, management 
practice and theory development. Possibilities of further research, based on the 
findings reported here, are suggested. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Indian economy is like a sleeping giant which, if awakened, could by itself 
transform the face of the global economy. India has the potential to form an 
independent economic bloc on her own, without too much dependence on 
anybody else. 
- Senior Minister and former Prime Minister of Singapore, 
Lee Kuan Yew, at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 1994. 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
Until the late 1980s, India's economy was burdened with a constellation of highly 
interventionist and inward-looking policies governed by the Industrial Policy 
Resolution 1956, which envisaged a mixed economy and a planned development of 
industries regulated by the government in the national interest (Lall, 1985; Price 
Waterhouse, 1993). The Indian economy was more in conformity with the Soviet 
bloc than with the West (Gordon, S., 1993). The breakdown of communism in 
Eastern Europe and the demise of the Soviet Union have dramatically changed the 
international strategic order bringing an end to the Cold War era. 
This transformation has led to a redefinition of India's strategic position in both the 
global and regional contexts. Pakistan has lost its importance as the protector of 
Western interests in this region and India, with its enormous market potential, has 
become attractive to Western governments and firms ever vigilant for extended new 
markets. In addition, India has become especially important to the US in order to 
counter-balance the supremacy of China in this region (Gordon, 1993). India has 
responded to these changes positively announcing the New Industrial Policies in July 
1991. The economy has been significantly deregulated, which has allowed an 
1 
increasing role for the private sector, and emphasis has been given to foreign 
investment (Price Waterhouse, 1993). With an estimated population of 973.5 million 
persons, India has emerged as an attractive destination for foreign investment 
(Dowling et al., 1999; Tait, 1995). Since the announcement of New Industrial 
Policies in 1991, the World Bank has named India as one of the world's best 
performing economies (World Bank, 1997). 
Despite the ongoing economic liberalisation in India, a number of difficulties still 
remain. Political unrest, religious rivalry, cultural differences, relatively high interest 
rates as well as inflation rates, excessive bureaucracy, and a very large underprivileged 
segment of the population are some of the major concerns which impact foreign firms. 
Moreover, government restrictions have not altogether been withdrawn. Local 
competition, in addition to the already established foreign companies, is also to be 
considered. 
Once a firm decides to invest in a country such as India, it must select an 
internationalisation strategy which successfully matches its resources with the 
available external environmental opportunities. This strategy should be used to 
reduce, or possibly neutralise, the impact of potential threats in order that the investor 
achieves a competitive advantage and strategic fit (Porter, 1990). The choice of 
market entry mode is a core strategic decision in a firm's drive for 
internationalisation. The type of entry strategy selected will determine market entry 
success. 
2 
Among the various entry modes, international joint ventures (LIVs) have long been 
considered as a popular means of establishing cross-border business relationships as 
this entry mode enables firms to share the risks and the resources required to enter an 
international market (Enen, 1991; Hill, 1997). IJVs also assist firms overcome 
country-specific difficulties with the active participation of a local partner familiar 
with the local business environment. Thus, when managed well, joint ventures can 
increase the probability of a foreign firm's overall success in a new market 
environment (Lei & Slocum, 1992). 
In this context, India's prevailing business environment with its perceived 
attractiveness and its recognised difficulties is likely to determine that in order to 
successfully access the Indian market, formation of I.JVs with prospective local 
partners can be a considered option for an interested foreign firm. According to de 
Jonquieres (1996) and Hodgetts & Luthans (1994), for example, IJVs are particularly 
suitable as a means for doing business in emerging market economies such as India. 
These authors have also indicated a prevalence of UVs as a modus operandi used by 
the foreign firms in the newly emerging economies generally. Consistent with these 
observations, there has been a particular enthusiasm among the foreign firms investing 
in India to establish international joint ventures (I.Ws) with Indian partners (As-Saber 
et al., 1996a; Geissbauer & Siemsen, 1996; Tomassen et al., 1997). Alongside this 
trend, in 1993, laws on foreign investment in India were changed to allow greater 
ownership by foreign investors. Despite this change, for many foreign companies, 
IJVs remain a popular means of entering the Indian market (Banks & Natarajan, 
1995). 
3 
Australia, historically a Western ally, maintained a restrained political and economic 
relationship with India during the Cold War period (Gordon, A., 1993). The 
repositioning of the Indo-West relationship following the end of the Cold War has 
improved the Australian relationship with India. In addition, India's ongoing 
economic liberalisation has ushered in a more favourable investment climate for 
foreign companies, including those from Australia. Also, Australia's geographic 
proximity to India and recent emphasis by the Australian government on the potential 
of the Indian market have attracted many Australian companies to invest in India (East 
Asia Analytical Unit, 1994). Nonetheless, Australian companies, like their other 
Western counterparts, have not considered the business environment in India 
adequately supportive of direct foreign investment. This has been reflected in the 
recent trend of the reliance on UVs by Australian investors as a preferred modus 
operandi to service the Indian market (Hook, 1995). 
Despite an increasing interest from researchers in a variety of academic disciplines on 
the rapid growth of LIVs as an organisational form, "... academic understanding of 
joint ventures is still limited in scope and in depth" (Yan & Gray, 1995, p. 92). 
Moreover, there is a dearth of empirical research on LJVs located in developing 
countries, such as India (Sim & Ali, 1996). Consistent with these observations, 
studies addressing various aspects of Australian-Indian joint ventures appear to be 
relatively sparse (As-Saber et al., 1998). In addition, few studies completed in this 
area have offered adequate attention to a range of areas, such as the factors motivating 
Australian firms to joint venture in India, the UV formation process and the factors 
4 
affecting successful implementation of the Australian-Indian L1Vs (As-Saber et al., 
1996a; Dowling et al., 1996; Geissbauer & Siemsen, 1996; Vicziany 1993; 1994). 
The increasing number of Indo-Australian UNTs, in addition to the paucity of research 
on these core aspects, have motivated this study. India will remain an attractive 
destination for foreign investment, including Australian investment, and increased 
understanding of the UV mode in this context will assist in better ensuring the success 
of these ventures. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION AND OBJECTIVES 
In this study, it has been assumed that the Australian firms initially were attracted to 
invest in India in order to exploit the potential Indian market. This research aims at 
examining the influence of various factors which motivated Australian firms to joint 
venture with their local partners. It seeks to understand more about the UV formation 
process and it explores the implementation activities of the selected DVs. Given the 
above background, the major objectives of this study are to investigate: 
(a) the influence of various environmental and organisational-specific issues 
that are conjectured to impact the decision of Australian companies to 
joint venture with an Indian partner in India; 
(b) the process of forming UVs between Australian and Indian firms; 
(c) factors responsible for the successful implementation of the Australian-
Indian UVs; and 
(d) how the factors influencing the selection of the UV mode and its formation 
contribute to the effective implementation of these UVs. 
In aggregate, the general research questions framed for this study are 
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1. What are the considerations that an Australian firm will bring to bear on the 
decision to choose the IJV as an international business mode of operation in 
another country, specifically India? 
2. What are the processes of formation and implementation of that decision? 
To achieve this understanding and to identify whether the three participants in an UV, 
the two parent firms and the UV management, converge or otherwise in these matters, 
all three groups are investigated. This is a study of Australian firms joint venturing 
with Indian firms in India. 
1.3 APPROACHES AT INQUIRY 
This is an exploratory, empirical study. It is couched in a research process that is 
framed on existing knowledge and postulated relationships, yet being receptive to new 
patterns, relationships and phenomena learned through the data assembled. During 
the entire course of the study, a qualitative inquiry is adopted and implemented 
through the use of multiple case study method. As reported by Patton (1990), the 
depth and detail of qualitative methods typically derive from case studies. 
By adopting an in-depth, comparative case study method, this research investigates the 
various issues in relation to nine Australian-Indian UVs in India. This methodology is 
primarily based on direct face-to-face interviews. However, multiple sources of 
evidence are used simultaneously (Yin, 1989). Direct observation of the real-life 
situation and the use of secondary materials, such as written documents and records 
are taken into consideration. Multiple case studies are conducted in order to avoid 
possible single-case bias and to gather better insights about all relevant issues. The 
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cases were selected from different industries, rather than concentrating on one 
particular industry. This was considered appropriate as this approach would 
strengthen the possibility of generalisation from the available data. According to 
Gersick (1988), a strategy of diverse sampling should be adopted to enhance or 
improve generalisation from the research findings. 
A combination of deductive and inductive reasoning processes was used in order to 
capture the complexity and dynamism of the real life context. This permits the 
researcher to engage the scenario more realistically and with flexibility (Perry & 
Coote, 1994). Prior theories were employed as 'templates' for determining the 
empirical case study outcomes. In this sense, the existing theory helps in the 
interpretation of the results (Manicas, 1989). 
Every study has its limitations. The scope of this study is limited to 'Ws in a single 
emerging economy, India. Moreover, by its nature, this study is selective and does not 
purport to be comprehensive. That is, not all of the issues relating to IJVs between 
Indian and Australian firms are considered. A selected number of issues only are 
taken into consideration. With respect to the methodology, a number of limitations 
need be mentioned. First, selection of the cases was constrained by a relatively small 
initial population of only 17 Australian-Indian IJVs (Austrade, 1995). The choice was 
clearly limited. 
Second, because of the considerable geographic distance from the researcher to all the 
companies under investigation, only a limited amount of time could be spent in each 
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of the firms and repeated visits could not be undertaken. Third, some of the measures 
employed are perceptual in nature which could lead to a concern about the subjectivity 
of responses. However, most of the limitations including the lack of rigour and 
possible research bias can be minimised by careful case design and protocol (Yin, 
1989). In addition, multiple case studies enable analysis of each of the cases in the 
light of others to strengthen the reliability and validity of the findings (Eisenhardt, 
1989). 
1.4 INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE: DEFINITION 
"There is no single agreed-on definition of an UV" (Schuler et al., 1991, p. 53). 
According to Williamson (1975), 1.1Vs lie somewhere along a continuum with purely 
arm's length exchange at one extreme and with a fully internalised organisational 
structure at the other extreme, and while sharing features of both, this diversity makes 
UNTs difficult to define precisely. Broadly, INs may be defined as a partnership 
endeavour between two or more firms from at least two different countries, whereby 
resources, capabilities, and core competencies are shared to establish a separate 
organisational entity to pursue a common objective based on a set of mutual benefits. 
It is generally a new venture that was not a part of either partner's portfolio of 
businesses before that venture began (Hitt et al., 1995). It is "... a new legal entity 
with full status as a corporate entity in which both partners share equity" (Osborn & 
Baughn, 1990, p. 61). A joint venture parent can be an individual or a family group, 
or a legal entity such as partnership firm, company, government body, or a consortium 
of firms, governmental or financing bodies (Ali, 1995). The headquarters of at least 
one of the parent firms is located outside the country of operation of the joint venture. 
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Therefore, in an UV, "... one of the partners is an international company and the other 
is a national of the host country" (Phatak, 1997, P.  262). 
Sometimes 1.1Vs are known as "... opportunistic alliances" which are based on the 
opportunities perceived by the particular organisations to gain a competitive 
advantage through the formation of alliances (Kanter, 1989, p. 125). According to 
some network theorists, UVs are production networks where firms share resources in 
producing goods to enter a market (Sloan et al., 1994). In strict economic terms, an 
UV involves equity participation. It is a foreign subsidiary in which local 
participation in its ownership is material (Brooke & Remmers, 1970; Vicziany, 1993). 
INs are not well defined in Indian law (Price Waterhouse, 1993). In India, an UV 
generally implies an equity participation by two or more parties in a business 
operation established as a partnership or a company (SBP Board of Consultants and 
Engineers, 1995). On the basis of Indo-German joint venture experience, Geissbauer 
& Siemsen (1995, p. 32) defined an UV as 
... a company with equity participation by at least one Indian and one foreign 
partner, both of whom put together their contractually agreed shares of capital 
and services as well as know-how. The liabilities, share in profits and joint 
management rights of the two partners correspond as a rule to the proportion of 
the share capital held by each of them. 
The rights and duties of the UV partners are generally negotiated by the parties 
involved and are spelled out in the UV agreement. Any matter not covered by the 
agreement may be resolved in accordance with the Indian Partnership Act 1932 and/or 
the Indian Contract Act 1872. 
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For this study, an UV is defined as an international business operation established by 
two or more parent firms from at least two different countries, whereby they share 
resources and capabilities to create a jointly owned separate entity. This definition 
excludes pure trade agreements, technical assistance and management contracts. In 
the present Indian context, the UV will be examined as an international business mode 
for Australian firms to access and invest in the potentially lucrative Indian market. 
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
In chapter I, the research is introduced. This chapter sets out the background and 
objectives of the study and presents a preliminary framework for the adopted approach 
at inquiry. The term, 'international joint venture', as an international business mode, 
has been defined for the purposes of this study. On the basis of the extant literature 
and other available information, a conceptual framework is developed at chapter VI 
that reflects the organisation of the thesis. For an initial appreciation of the thesis 
organisation, the conceptual framework is also presented below. 
In chapters II, Ill and IV, the contextual background of this study is presented 
focussing on the conceptual developments of the various aspects of international joint 
ventures. On the basis of extant literature, these chapters provide an overview of the 
major environmental and organisational-specific variables that are likely to influence a 
firm's motivation to form an UV relationship with a local partner while investing 
overseas. Specific reference to Australian firms investing in India is maintained 
throughout these chapters. A major environmental context for this study, geopolitics, 
is introduced in chapter II, while reviews of other environmental variables which are 
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likely to influence Australian firms' decisions to joint venture are undertaken in 
chapter [11. The focus of chapter IV is upon organisational-specific variables, 
undertaken from a similar perspective. 
Figure 1.1 
Conceptual Framework 
The DV formation and implementation processes are established in chapter V with 
specific emphasis on Australian-Indian IJVs. This chapter shows the complexity of 
these processes, the basis of which is drawn from the extant literature relevant to the 
study. 
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This is important to note here that this thesis considers three different stages of DV, 
e.g., motivation, formation and implementation. During the implementation stage, it 
only considers the factors responsible for the DV success. It does not incorporate DV 
failures or termination as a part of DV evolutionary model prescribed by Aritio & de 
la Torre (1998), neither it include the concept of DV life cycle established by Kogut 
(1988). It does not consider any factor responsible for DV termination or failure. The 
body of literature (e.g., Aritio & de la tone, 1998; Dymsza, 1988; Kogut, 1988a; 
Osborn and Hagedoom, 1997; Park & Ungson, 1997), addressing these issues is not 
discussed in details. There are two main reasons behind this. First, as revealed from 
the initial information provided by the Austrade (1995), most of the LIVs between 
Australia and India had recently been formed or were still in the process of formation. 
This might, eventually, make it difficult to find any data suggesting any conclusions 
towards the failure or the termination of an DV. Second, within the limited scope of 
the thesis, it is not possible to cover the entire gamut of the DV literature. 
Based on the discussion in the preceding chapters (chapters II, DI, IV and V), a 
conceptual framework, the research question and proposition sets are established for 
the study and these are provided in chapter VI. The research design and methodology 
utilised in this study are detailed in chapter VII. 
The results of the study are presented in chapters VB1, IX, X, XI and XII. The 
empirical evidence gathered through in-depth face-to-face interviews, personal 
observation, and the examination of available documents and relevant literature is 
used in the analyses of the various issues as depicted in the research question and the 
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proposition sets. In chapter VIII, an examination is undertaken of the level of 
influence that geopolitics has had on the Australian firms' decisions to joint venture 
with a local partner while investing in India. The influences of a host of 
environmental-specific issues (other than geopolitics) are investigated in chapter lX. 
The likely impact of organisational-specific variables on the Australian firms' 
decisions to joint venture is analysed in chapter X. 
In chapter XI, an examination of the level of complexity of IJV negotiation and 
formation processes is undertaken. The various issues relevant to the implementation 
process of the Australian-Indian IJVs are addressed in chapter XII. On the basis of the 
empirical data, an examination of the difficulties faced by these MR and their 
partners are also undertaken in this chapter. In addition, the role of local Indian 
partners in overcoming these difficulties is investigated. Finally, a summary of the 
findings, implications of the outcomes, limitations of the study, and the need for 
further research are presented in the concluding chapter XBI. 
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CHAPTER II 
GEOPOLITICS AND ITS IMPACTS ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
OPERATIONS 
It is geography that determines economic and political strategy and 
geography that determines cultural and military tactics. Only geography 
provides complete models of the world in which decisions are made; only 
geography focuses on the relationships between culture, economy, society, 
and polity, to model the whole landscape (Slowe, 1990, p.1). 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Geopolitical elements constitute an important dimension of the external environment 
affecting international business operations. They may influence, in particular, the 
choice of the modus operandi of a company investing abroad. However, there appears 
to be very few studies highlighting the geopolitical milieu that affects foreign 
investment patterns. 
Much emphasised in the literature on international politics (Brucan, 1978; Dougherty 
& Pfaltzgraff, 1990; Reynolds, 1980), the term 'geopolitics' sometimes is used 
sporadically by the economic historians to explain international economic relations 
(e.g. Gordon, A., 1993; Gordon, S., 1993). In the international business literature, 
Dunning (1977; 1979; 1986; 1988; 1995; 1998) for example, while explaining the 
location of international production, has mentioned a number of the political and 
geographic tenets as country-specific determinants of location-specific advantages. 
However, it seems that he did not consider these sufficiently significant to influence 
the structure of international production. In addition, he has given little emphasis to 
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the changes that are regularly taking place in the international political as well as 
economic orders, e.g., the impact of the Cold War and the implications of colonial 
legacies that regularly influence international business dynamics. However, the 
existing international business scenario suggests that the geopolitical variables are 
important for the companies to consider while deciding on the modus operandi for 
their foreign investment. The preference of many Australian companies to form 
international joint ventures (IJVs) with the host partners while investing in India may 
be partially explained from this perspective. 
This chapter addresses the way in which the geopolitical variables contribute to the 
motivation of Australian companies to form IJVs with Indian partners. At the 
beginning, an attempt will be made to define the term 'geopolitics' that will provide a 
better understanding of the issue in the research context at hand. It will be followed 
by a discussion on the impacts of geopolitical variables from three dimensions which 
are: (a) the time dimension, highlighting the historical perspective, including such 
impacts as the colonial, Cold War and post-Cold War eras; (b) the place dimension, 
focusing on natural resources, geographic proximity and regionalism; and (c), the 
demographic dimension, emphasising the role of population size, supply of labour, 
and ethnic and religious groups. Subsequently, an attempt will be made to establish a 
geopolitical paradigm of international investments focusing the impacts of geopolitics 
on international investment patterns. Then, the role of the geopolitical variables in 
motivating Australian companies to joint venture with the local partners while 
investing in India, will be discussed. 
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2.2 'GEOPOLITICS' DEFINED 
Geography has long been considered as an important aspect of international business. 
Location, being the thrust of this consideration, asks questions, such as, "... Why are 
things located where they are? How do different places relate to each other? How have 
geographic patterns and relationships changed over time (Baerwald, 1996, p. 23)? 
Location-specific aspects as mentioned in these questions include various issues 
relevant to international business. These also provide guidance towards revealing the 
extensive nature of geography and its impact upon other environmental-specific 
variables, e.g., local politics and culture. Changing nature of these variables within a 
geographic context is also focussed in these questions. 
Nevertheless, there is no universally accepted definition of the word, 'geopolitics' 
(Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1971). Etymologically, the word denotes location-specific 
factors that affect political disposition. According to Kristof (1994), 'geopolitics 
studies the geographical aspects of political phenomena'. However, since its first use 
by a Swedish geographer, Rudolf Kjellen in 1900, the study of geopolitics has been 
viewed, evaluated and contributed to from different perspectives. Kjellen (1917) used 
the term to describe the geopolitical basis of national power. Karl Haushopher, a 
German political scientist further expanded this idea as a relationship between 
political phenomena and geography. He considered that geographic variables had a 
direct bearing on national power (Haushopher, cited in Whittlesey, 1943). 
During the inter-war period, the concept of geopolitics was used by Haushopher, Carl 
Schmitt and other German geopoliticians to develop `geostrategy' as a military 
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science. At that time, the importance of geographic location and size, and their 
impacts on the political power of a nation were at the core of the German geostrategy. 
This was reflected in the subsequent policy of expansionism by the Nazi Germany. 
Later, Harold Sprouts and Margaret Sprout further advanced the theory of geopolitics. 
According to the Sprouts, geography affects all human and nonhuman, tangible and 
intangible phenomena. They believed that every political community had a 
geographic base that might affect most of the transactions among nations (Sprout & 
Sprout, 1968). 
Merritt (1969), in his study of territorially discontiguous polities, considered physical 
distance as an external environmental factor affecting the political relationships 
among nations. According to him, there is the likelihood of greater communication 
with neighbouring than with physically distant nations. Following the oil crisis of 
1973, the emergence of a new set of geopolitical and geostrategic relationships was 
recognised by a number of political scientists (e.g., Kemp, 1977, 1978; Reynolds, 
1980). Of special importance are 
... resources and the increased vulnerability of oil supplies and vital raw 
materials to disruption either at their source or in transit from producer to 
consumer states (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1990, p. 73). 
Therefore, the controlling of resources and the resource-import relationship added a 
vital dimension to the study of geopolitics. 
Another important dimension of geopolitics is that of regionalism. In essence, at the 
end of the World War II, the geopolitical scenario of the world substantially changed. 
The colonial control around the globe declined facilitating the creation of a large 
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number of newly independent states. Consequently, the USA and the USSR emerged 
as two super powers. Both of them started expanding their sphere of influence around 
the globe to contain each other geographically, economically and politically. Such 
rivalry continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. This long span of 
time, popularly known as the Cold War period, crystalised the idea of regionalism in 
the geopolitical milieu. 
During this period, the entire world was mainly divided into two groupings under the 
two super powers (Gottmann, 1971). Each of these formed a number of regional 
blocs in the form of security pacts and/or economic associations. Primarily, these 
were aimed at containing each other's expansion in different geographic regions 
(Liska, 1977). They were motivated more by geographic importance of political 
interests than by other considerations. Nevertheless, the process of economic 
integration among regional economies started during this period. The end of the Cold 
War with the collapse of the USSR was followed by deeper regional integration in 
Europe, North America and Asia (Arndt, 1993). 
Nonetheless, in relation to the study of international business operations, the 
definition of the term geopolitics is not straightforward. Previously, it has not been 
defined from this perspective. Throughout this study, the term refers to the 
environmental geopolitics, and this emphasises physical and economic geography 
seen as opportunities or limitations affecting the political domain, that, in turn, 
influences the motivation for, and structure of an international business operation. 
Kristof (1994) defined geopolitics from a somewhat similar perspective. 
18 
2.3 THE ROLE OF GEOPOLITICS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
OPERATIONS 
A host of geopolitical variables has been playing an important role in conditioning the 
international business environment. Apart from geographic distance, these variables 
include the consequences of colonial, Cold War and post Cold War outcomes, 
regionalisation, the distribution of the global population and the impacts of these on 
international business operations. Apparently not classified as 'geopolitical', many 
writers on international business have, nonetheless, mentioned most of these variables 
in their international business research (e.g. Baerwald, 1996; Chisholm 1977; 
Dunning 1977, 1979, 1988, 1995, 1998; Dunning & Narula 1996; Mabogunje 1977; 
Morrison et al., 1991). The particular emphasis of the present discussion will be on 
the impacts of geopolitical variables as they influence the structure of international 
investments. Specifically, attention will be given to the influence of geopolitics on 
the motivation of Australian firms to form international joint ventures in India with 
Indian partners. 
In light of the above discussion, various geopolitical phenomena may be grouped into 
three different dimensions that may affect international business operations. These 
are presented in Figure 2.1. 
2.3.1 Time Dimension 
The international distribution of power among states shifts continually as one 
historical period gives way to another (Wallerstein, 1980, cited in Dougherty & 
Pfaltzgraff, 1990). Similarly, the international geopolitical environment has been 
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changing constantly (Cohen, 1963) affecting international business dynamics. Any 
'specific change in this environment at a particular point of time may influence the 
operations of international business within, as well as beyond, that time frame. It is 
important, therefore, for the international business firm to follow such changes and to 
respond to them effectively and in a timely manner. 
Figure 2.1 
Geopolitical Variables 
I. Time Dimension 
Period until the World War II 
Cold War Period 
Post-Cold War Period 
IL Place Dimension 
Natural Resources 
Geographic Proximity 
Regionalism 
III. Demographic Dimension 
Size of the Population 
Supply of Labour 
Role of Ethnic and Religious groups 
However, there is little comprehensive research investigating the importance of this 
time dimension within the domain of international business studies. Although there is 
mention of one or more of these time periods in some studies (Ball & McCulloch, 
1993; Buckley & Casson, 1981; Czinkota & Ronkainen, 1990; Dunning, 1995; 
Garnaut & Drysdale, 1994; Hadjikhani, 1997), their roles in motivating firms to 
choose a particular mode of international operation, at a particular point of time, has 
not yet been systematically explored. The following discussion will attempt to 
unravel the major time frames in a sequential manner that have long been affecting the 
international business scenario. Figure 2.2 provides a sketch of the various time 
frames discussed in this section. 
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Figure 2.2 
The Time Dimension 
I. 	Period until the World War II 
16 th Century — 1945 
H. 	Cold War Period 
1945-1991 
M. 	Post-Cold War Period 
1991- 
Period Until the World War II From the reign of Henry IV of France at the close of 
the 16th century until the First World War, the political components of power, 
external to the nation states, mainly comprised of their relationships with colonies and 
trusts. With the emergence of the Soviet Union and the formation of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations (at the outset of the decolonisation process), this 
relationship pattern began to change in terms of structure and objectives that 
embraced more extensive and varied territories than before (Cohen, 1963). However, 
the colonies and colonial legacies remained in the helm of such relationships until the 
end of the Second World War. 
In this chapter, the colonial period will broadly be extended up to the 1940s. Despite 
the existence of a few colonial territories beyond that period, it may be considered 
insignificant compared to the situation earlier to that. Also, this time frame may 
broadly be recognised as the pre-World War H period. Within the colonial setting, 
any international business was primarily performed between the colonial powers and 
the territories controlled by them. The controlling of resources and the 'resource-
import' relationship were the two most important determinants of international 
business. At that time, business operations outside the colonial relationship were 
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likely to be very limited. Therefore, most of the international investments were 
restricted to the colonial territories and were performed primarily to benefit the 
colonial powers. The economic rationale of the British and Japanese colonial 
expansions may be seen from this perspective. There were significant levels of 
British investments in India and Japanese investments in Korea during the colonial 
rules (Franko, 1976; Petri, 1994). It was difficult at that time to find local partners 
within those territories to form IJVs. 
During that period, there was a notable existence of international investments among 
the colonial powers and other developed economies, the extent of which used to 
depend on geographic proximity and political relationships. For example, during the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries, there had been a considerable number of foreign 
investments in the US by the Europeans and vice versa (Ball & McCulloch, 1993). It 
may be argued that the US's earlier colonial experience with a number of European 
countries might have influenced the establishment of such business relationships. In 
addition, the physical proximity mattered. 
In the inter-war period, the emergence of the (British) Commonwealth of Nations 
made a major breakthrough in the history of geopolitical relationships among nations. 
The colonial legacies acted as the most important determinants for its emergence, and 
this redefined the international economic order. This may be considered as one of the 
most important steps towards the formation of international cooperative frameworks 
(not as a mere security bloc). Although politically motivated, this grouping set the 
foundation for economic relationships among independent countries. During that 
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period, the need for raw materials, and trading of semi-finished and finished goods 
dominated the economic aspect of their relationships. To some extent, the 
Commonwealth was formed with a view to maintain and protect the interests of the 
previously established British investments in the newly independent countries and to 
preserve an opportunity for the future British trade and investments. 
Cold War Period At the end of the World War H, the United States emerged as a 
major power with global interests and commitments (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1990). 
A clear-cut division between the US-led Western alliance and the Soviet-controlled 
communist countries started to exist as a new geopolitical landscape. The principal 
objective of the Western alliance was to contain communism, physically and 
economically. On the other hand, the Soviets tried to extend their sphere of influence 
around the world through ideological manoeuvring. This rivalry resulted in huge but 
wasteful military build-ups by both the blocs. It was a tense situation - a war of 
nerves. 
Popularly known as the 'Cold War', this was a competition between the two blocs to 
outperform each other and to gain supremacy in terms of military capability and 
economic performance. Initially, this 'war of nerves' resulted from a myriad of 
disagreements during a number of wartime conferences among the allied powers 
regarding the future restoration of the war-torn Europe to a condition conforming to 
their perceptions of an ideal world (Graebner, 1977). Basically, Soviet concerns about 
Western supremacy and the US and British interests to safeguard the West from the 
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threats of communism led to a massive divergence in purpose that gradually 
disintegrated into the Cold War. 
The ideological struggle between the Soviet communism and the Western democracy 
had enormous impact on the growth and patterns of international business for more 
than 45 years. Being threatened by the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, the 
USSR negotiated a number of restrictive trade agreements with the countries of 
Eastern Europe in 1947. In like manner, the outflow of the US goods and dollars in 
the form of world trade and investment created an international prosperity and an 
unprecedented American influence throughout the world (Graebner, 1977). 
Nonetheless, certain percentages of the Soviet and American aid to their respective 
allies were used as investment capital in the receiver countries. 
The international business dynamics were redefined reflecting this changing scenario. 
The regional security arrangements were established to contain each other's 
supremacy. The Western sponsored international trade and investment patterns, 
instituted during this period, reflected the freedom of decision making by different 
countries, and participation by both the private and public firms, whereas under the 
Communist system, such business decisions were primarily determined by the State. 
Nonetheless, during the Cold War period, international trade, as a whole, gained 
momentum. By 1990, the volume of international trade in goods and services 
measured in current dollars had surpassed $4 trillion (Ball & McCulloch, 1993). In 
the West, there was a rapid growth of foreign investment during the first twenty years 
since the end of the World War II (Brooke & Remmers, 1970). 
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A major development during this period was the significant increase of private 
investors and the rise of multinational corporations (MNCs). By the 1980s, the annual 
volume of sales of the 10 largest MNCs was greater than the gross domestic product 
(GDP) of 87 countries (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1990). This reflects the extent of 
across-the-border trade and investments promoted by these multinationals. MNCs 
also established themselves as powerful international entities capable of influencing 
government policies in their favour. In addition, through their presence in terms of 
trade and investments, Western MNCs have become useful instruments of 
development in the developing world. IJVs, at this stage, became popular among the 
Western firms as a means of investing in the developing world (Tomlinson, 1970). 
However, during the Cold War period, there had been a number of countries that 
initially tried to uphold neutrality in the world politics. Not being involved in the 
East-West rivalry, those countries attempted to maintain an equidistant position from 
both of the super-powers in order to safeguard their interests and self-respect. As 
early as October 1949, Nehru of India outlined the program of neutrality. He declared 
the main objectives of that policy as 
... the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any major power or 
group of powers, but through an independent approach to each controversial 
or disputed issue (Nehru, cited in Graebner, 1977, p. 81). 
The spirit of neutrality was institutionalised under the banner of the 'non-aligned 
movement' in 1955. A number of countries restrained themselves from formally 
joining any of the blocs. However, almost each of them had a tilt towards either of the 
blocs. Many of the so-called non-aligned countries including India did not receive 
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any special aid package under the Truman Doctrine or Marshall Plan. Nor did they 
receive any substantial level of Western foreign investments. This positioning 
adversely affected these countries in relation to their inward foreign investments. 
The Cold War also ushered in the era of regionalism. With its roots in the regional 
security arrangements determined by the Cold War rivals, the concept of economic 
integration was established through creating regional trade blocs based on the special 
provisions to enhance intra-regional trade and investments. Regionalism will be 
elaborated upon later in this chapter. 
Post-Cold War Period The international geopolitical scenario experienced a major 
shift with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the democratisation of Eastern Europe 
putting an end to the Cold War. This particular event created enormous business 
opportunities for Western firms to invest in those markets. This geopolitical shift 
impacted on many developing economies throughout the world. With the end of the 
Cold War, these developing countries realised the need for more openness of their 
economies to attract foreign investments. Accordingly, they began to assign greater 
emphasis to economic liberalisation systematically. India, in this respect, is 
illustrative. Once a Soviet ally, India began to open its economy after the end of the 
Cold War. 
This new geopolitical order had significant impact on regional groupings. Now, 
geographic proximity, and the national as well as regional economic and political 
interests constitute the core of their cooperation instead of any competitive ideological 
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imperatives (as prevailed during the Cold War). However, in many of these 
groupings, the Cold War legacies still effect a significant role. Already established 
regional forums are in many respects reluctant to change their existing structure and to 
include new members who were not previously included due to their strategic 
positioning. The European Community's reluctance to include most of the East 
European countries is illustrative in this respect. 
Nevertheless, the present geopolitical state is not a stagnant one. It continues to 
change. For example, Naisbitt (1995) considers that the present economic, political 
and cultural trends will lead Asia, in a near future, to become the dominant region of 
the world. He, thus, indicates another major shift in the international geopolitical 
order. The rise of Japan as an economic giant, the newly industrialised countries of 
the South-East Asia, the economic boom in China, and the economic liberalisation in 
India and Vietnam are some of the recent developments in Asia that may support 
Naisbitt's views. However, this remains a mere prediction. The changing nature and 
the volatility of the present geopolitical scenario may even produce a different future - 
a new time frame. 
Overall, the changing geopolitical scenario has impacts on the structure of 
international business operations. Supporting this proposition, Buckley & Casson 
(1981) projected that firms will change entry mode over time with changes in market 
conditions. Also, it may be argued that due to the changing nature of the global 
geopolitical makeup, many firms would prefer to share the risks and uncertainties of 
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international venturing through the formation of international joint ventures while 
investing abroad, rather than 'going it alone'. 
2.3.2 Place Dimension 
From the geopolitical perspective, relationships among states are influenced by an 
area's strategic value (Cohen, 1963). This value, however, depends on the importance 
of an area in terms of its natural resources, size, proximity and future prospects in 
relation to other countries. For example, Australia's relationship with New Zealand 
bears more strategic value than its relationship with Sri Lanka. Because of the 
geographic proximity of Australia to New Zealand, their relationship in terms of each 
other's political, economic and security interests is more critical than Australia's 
relationship with many other countries. 
In addition, the size of the countries matters. Indonesia, one of the most populous 
countries in the world, and largest among Australia's neighbours is very important to 
Australia. In addition to its large population base, Indonesia is rich in natural 
resources. However, geographically, Australia belongs to the larger Asia-Pacific 
region. Geographic consideration in terms of proximity, convenience and strategic 
directions such as long-term prospects and transactions cost factors are vital in 
explaining this regional setting. Based on the ideas of Sprout & Sprout (1968), 
Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff (1990, pp. 67-68) has explained the place issue of geopolitics 
in a comprehensive manner: 
...every political community has a geographical base. 	Each political 
community is set on a territory that is a unique combination of location, size, 
shape, climate and natural resources. Thus most transactions among nations 
entail significant, even crucial, geographical considerations. 
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Three major aspects of the place dimension - natural resources, the geographic 
proximity and regionalism are discussed now. 
Natural Resources Availability of natural resources is a significant geopolitical 
variable. The primary thrust of colonial excursions was to search for and exploit these 
resources. Dunning (1979; 1988; 1998) considers the availability of natural resources 
as an important location-specific advantage that attracts above-average inward 
investments. Foreign companies find it convenient to invest in countries with these 
advantages because it significantly reduces their transactions costs of importing raw 
materials. 
Geographic Proximity Physical distance is generally considered to be one of the 
major factors that constitutes the core of the geopolitical dimension. It is likely that 
the geographic proximity enables companies from neighbouring countries to engage in 
international business activities more frequently than their physically distant 
counterparts. According to Kaynak & Stevenson (1982), the countries within a close 
proximity are considered to be psychologically 'near' to each other, facilitating trade 
and investment among themselves. That is, foreign companies often reach out to do 
business in another country that falls within a close physical proximity. 
For example, the largest and fourth largest trading partners of the US - Canada and 
Mexico are located on its borders. Many American plants are located on the Mexican 
side of the common border (Ball & McCulloch, 1993). These business arrangements 
require relatively lower transactions costs, without facing any major change of socio- 
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cultural environments. The level of investments by Australian companies in New 
Zealand are often considered as a mere extension of the Australian firms' domestic 
operations. Market similarity allows Australian firms to adopt business strategies in 
New Zealand similar to the strategies they use in their home market. Considering the 
small size of the New Zealand market, these operations are sometimes short-term and 
ad-hoc. The Australian firms know that if necessary, it should not be too difficult to 
retreat from the New Zealand market because their involvement is one of low 
transactions costs. 
Geographic distance has an impact on the ownership structure of the international 
business operation. A study undertaken by Larimo (1993) explained geographic 
distance as an expansion barrier for firms willing to operate internationally. Due to 
the lack of familiarity with the geographically distant market, firms may attempt to 
reduce the riskiness and uncertainty of such a barrier through the formation of IJVs 
with a local partner. In addition, learning how to operate in other markets can be 
enhanced through the support of a local partner. 
There are other factors that may influence these business relationships. For example, 
despite the geographic proximity, in the post World War II Europe, the relationships 
between the East and the West were primarily determined by ideological strategies. 
However, following the end of the Cold War, geographic proximity has been 
reestablished as one of the most important factors in defining the relationship 
dynamics within that region. According to Donges & Wieners (1994), with the 
continuing reform process in the Eastern Europe, the pre-socialist geographical and 
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cultural links are likely to be revived and contribute to a new engagement among the 
traditional trading partners in the region. In the subsequent paragraphs, the role of 
geographic distance will be unravelled further while discussing other geopolitical 
issues such as regionalism. 
Regionalism Despite the reality that communication has overcome many of the 
restrictions formerly dictated by distance (Cohen, 1963), regionalism has gained 
momentum during recent years. Now, the boundaries of regional entities are larger 
than before, primarily a result of improved communication and transportation 
systems. Intra-regional trade and investments are becoming increasingly popular due 
to preferential trade advantages. For example, more than 95% of the world's recorded 
foreign direct investment (KM) flows from countries that are members of the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and about three-
quarters of this total is invested in other OECD countries (Spero, 1985). Because of 
the presence of special privileges for the investors from within a regional forum, intra-
regional FDIs are also prevalent in the other regional forums, such as the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), European Union (EU) and North American free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Graham, 1997). These figures suggest that regionalism 
encourages foreign investments within the region, and that the firms are less inclined 
to invest in a country in a different region, ceteris paribus. 
Present day regionalism has its roots in the Cold War period which started with the 
formation of regional security blocs prompted by the super-power rivalry. Since the 
end of the Cold War, the US, no longer concerned with the geostrategic alignments, 
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has been insisting on more favourable trading and investment relations, creating 
special post-Cold War tensions (Falk, 1995). This is a turning point in the regional 
and bloc approaches that has ushered in the new geopolitics of inter-regional 
relationships (Huntington, 1993). From the business perspectives, growing 
regionalism may be explained as a response to the possible adverse impacts of 
increasingly volatile global market forces. Because of the presence of preferential 
trade and investment agreements among the countries within a regional grouping, the 
regional firms tend to avoid direct competition from their rivals outside the region. 
Falk (1995, p. 3) defined it as a process of "... containing negative globalism". 
2.3.3 Demographic Dimension 
Cohen (1963) described population as a geopolitical variable. He considered its 
various characteristics, particularly qualitative and ideological, as the major 
demographic factors that influence the geopolitical milieu. According to Baerwald 
(1996), the population characteristics of a place is important because the skills, 
educational qualifications, productivity and the cost of labour play a role in 
determining how a place fits into global business environment. The ethnic and 
religious features of a population may affect the bilateral or international relationships 
of a country. The Tamil movement in Sri Lanka or the Jammu and Kashmir disputes 
in India may be explained from this perspective. Also, the size of a population 
matters. These demographic factors have been contributing substantially to the 
motivation for opting for a particular mode of international business operation. 
Discussions on these issues follow. 
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Size of the Population The size of a population may be considered an important 
motivator for international business growth. With a population of around 18 million 
persons, Australian businesses have limited scope to grow domestically and this 
motivates many Australian firms to invest overseas (Edwards & Buckley, 1996). It 
may affect inward investments as well. The small population base of New Zealand 
(about 3.5 million) has been shown as the primary reason for the limited long-term 
business growth and decreasing Japanese investments in New Zealand (Task Force on 
Japanese Direct Investment in New Zealand, 1991). On the other hand, the huge 
population base in India is a motivator for foreign investors to invest there on a long-
term basis (Geissbauer & Siemsen, 1996; Jacob, 1992; Vicziany, 1993). 
Supply of labour Supply of labour is another demographic variable closely related 
to the population size. It is perceivable that a larger population will produce a larger 
supply of labour, that in turn, will create a competitive labour market and low labour 
costs. According to Dunning (1979), countries with low labour costs are regarded as 
attractive locations for foreign investors. However, labour productivity is also 
important to consider. In 1871, Ricardo (cited in Meier, 1998) identified labour 
productivity and wage rate as two determinants of a country's comparative advantage. 
Technologically developed countries have a pool of labour more productive than those 
of the developing countries, whereas, the labour force in the developed countries tend 
to be more expensive than those in the developing countries (Fatehi, 1996). The 
human development index (HDI) developed by the United Nations provides an insight 
of the quality of life across the nations of the world. Based on indicators, such as 
literacy rates, the number of people per doctor, infant mortality rates, life expectancy, 
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calorie (food) consumption per capita, car ownership per 1000 people, and education 
spending as a percentage of GDP, HDI also reflects the quality of labour in a 
particular country (Hill, 1997). 
In this context, it may be argued that because of the availability of cheaper labour in 
India, Australian companies may consider India as an attractive investment 
destination. Also, India has a big pool of technologically skilled people (Jacob, 1992). 
However, low productivity of the Indian labour forces is always a concern for the 
foreign investors (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994). In 1994, India had an HDI of 
only 31 which was much lower compared to Japan (98), Mexico (81), Malaysia (79), 
China (57) and Indonesia (51) reflecting the poor quality of its labour force (Hill, 
1997). 
Role of Ethnic and Religious Groups This is another demographic factor that may 
affect the international business environment. The conflicts between Serbs, Croats 
and Muslims in Bosnia-Harcegovina epitomises the effects of ethnic and religious 
conflicts on a national economy as well as the risks associated with international 
business ventures in such an economy. From some 180 nations in the international 
system, only a small number are ethnically homogeneous. A recent survey conducted 
by the Minorities at Risk Project (cited in Carment, 1994) indicates that the ethnic 
groups are currently involved in over 80 protracted conflicts throughout the world. 
Ethnic conflicts in a particular area may embitter the relationships between the 
countries supporting or opposing the ethnic causes. A classic example is the rivalry 
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between Greece and Turkey over the ethnic conflicts in Cyprus with consequent 
adverse effects on the business relationships between - Greece and Turkey. 
However, the ethnic population may also have positive effects on a country's 
relationships with others. It may help build business relationships among nations. 
The ethnic Chinese population in the US and the South East Asia are the major 
sources of inward foreign investments to China. A considerable share of foreign 
investments in India comes from non-resident Indians (Barnathan, 1995). The formal 
and informal contacts of the overseas Indians and Chinese immigrants with their 
countries of origin constitute the foundation of this business relationship. The cultural 
bondage is a major bedrock of this relationship pattern. 
2.4 THE ROLE OF GEOPOLITICS IN INDO-AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS 
RELATIONS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Geopolitics has been playing an important role in moulding India's international 
business relations for a long time. Geopolitics has constituted the core of the 
relationship between Australia and India (As-Saber et al., 1996b). Gordon (S, 1993, 
p. 3) described the dynamics of the relationship between these two countries as "... an 
accident of geopolitics and history". An historical perspective on the geopolitical 
realities encountered by India may be divided into three major phases: the colonial 
period under the British raj, characterised by the alignment of both India and Australia 
with their colonial master; the Cold War (post-colonial) era, influenced by the super-
power rivalry and their thrusts for security in the Asia-Pacific region; and the post- 
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Cold War period, marked by the sway of market forces and the evolution of economic 
rationalism in the domain of international business relations. 
Colonial Period India was under British colonial rule for about two hundred years 
until it became independent in 1947. As a British colony, most of India's foreign 
trade and investments were guided by British interests. In essence, India's 
commercial links were primarily maintained with its colonial master, its allies and 
other sister colonies. India's business links with British Commonwealth member, 
Australia, can be traced to 1801, when Australia's first commercial export anywhere 
was a shipment of coal to India (Gurry, 1993). Since then, a consistent trade 
relationship had been maintained between these two economies, yet, there was no 
evidence of any foreign investment flow from either of these nations towards each 
other's market during the British India period. However, throughout the period, both 
countries developed the common heritage of a business, legal and institutional setting 
through the British colonial experience (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994). Also, at 
that time, the future potential of the Indo-Australia relationship was identified. In 
1893, Alfred Deakin, before he became Prime Minister of Australia, asserted that: 
...the future relations of India and Australia possess immeasurable potencies. 
Their geographical proximity cannot but exercise a very real and reciprocal 
influence upon forces of national life in each (cited in Australian Senate 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1990, p. 10). 
Cold War Era Preceded by the termination of the second World War, the gaining 
of independence in 1947 is a turning point for India's relationships with the rest of the 
world. Subsequently, India experienced the rise of communism in China in its 
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neighbourhood within two years of its independence. Coupled with the inter-war 
development in Eastern Europe and the Korean war [1950], the world was partitioned 
into two blocs: Western liberal economies on the one hand, and the communist 
countries on the other. The rivalry between these two blocs, popularly known as the 
'Cold War', began influencing the foreign economic relations of both India and 
Australia. 
Initially, in India, the Congress Party and its leader Jawharlal Nehru took up a pro-
socialism stand. Immediately after the independence of India in August 1947, Nehru 
and the ruling Congress Party decided that the State, not the private sector, would play 
the decisive role in the production and distribution of material goods. Later, this 
message was reflected in the constitution in the form of Directive Principles of State 
Policy (Thakur, 1993). However, India did not formally join any of the political 
groupings of nations patronised by the two super-powers, viz., the US and the Soviet 
Union. Rather, India opted for the policy of non-alignment with 'a Soviet tilt'. 
There were a number of reasons which contributed to this tilt. Since the independence 
of India, Pakistan had been the greatest enemy of India. India fought two major wars 
with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971. Moreover, Pakistan joined the Western alliance, 
which made it difficult for India to maintain a non-aligned policy. At the same time, 
India's relations with the communist China were facing substantial setback. India 
fought a major war against China in 1962. This situation forced India to opt for a 
'decided tilt' to Moscow. The signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co- 
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operation between India and the Soviet Union in 1971 confirmed this position 
(Gordon, S., 1993). 
Australia was fully committed to the Western alliance under the leadership of the 
United States. Australia maintains close links with the United States through the 
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ANZUS alliance and by hosting important US facilities (Gordon, S., 1993). Australia 
has viewed India as a country not committed to the cause of anti-communism. This 
perceptual difference has contributed to a lack of enthusiasm on Australia's part for 
any sort of expanded relationship with India. According to Grant (1982), a former 
Australian High Commissioner to India, Australian responses were determined not by 
international politics, but by 'loyalty' to the West. From India's viewpoint, Australia 
was seen as "...little more than a satellite of the United Kingdom and the United 
States" (Australian Senate Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1990, p. 
11). 
In spite of this difference, both countries continued to maintain a trade relationship, 
but at a moderate level. There have been a number of important advances in the 
India-Australia trade relations since the early 1970s. A bilateral trade agreement was 
signed in 1976. Within this agreement, a Joint Trade Committee was established that, 
theoretically, meets annually to discuss bilateral trade developments (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1995). However, this trade relationship has 
not been frictionless. Australia's preoccupation with the global balance-of power has 
led Australian policy makers to consider the Indian Ocean only in global strategic 
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terms. Accordingly, priority was given to developing relations with China. In the mid 
1970s, Australia's China policy was driven by the consideration that China's 
positioning as a suitable Western ally due to its anti-Soviet attitude should be wooed 
accordingly (Gurry, 1993). Pakistan was also considered as a strategically more 
acceptable partner in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. 
However, Prime Minister Hawke's visit to India in 1989 was a turning point in the 
bilateral relationship between India and Australia. Moreover, bilateral trade increased 
substantially from a level of less than A$100 million in 1963-64 to more than A$800 
million in 1990-91 (Gordon, S., 1993). At this point, however, the relationship 
experienced a crisis with the sale of fifty Mirage jets by Australia to Pakistan in May 
1990 (Aircraft and Aerospace, 1990). India protested the sale, as the deal was directly 
against the policy thrust of improving their bilateral relationship with Australia 
(Gordon, S., 1993). Despite this temporary setback, during the last decade of the Cold 
War period, Australian investment in India registered some progress. 
The abolition of exchange controls in Australia in December 1983 contributed 
significantly to this development. It is to be noted here that Australian investment 
abroad was of minor importance prior to this regulatory change. Since then, it has 
become a major feature of the development of the Australian economy (Garnaut, 
1990). With the easing of the Indo-US relationship and the decline of the tension 
between the super-powers, Australian companies began investing in India more 
actively, raising the value of Australian investment in India significantly over the 
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period to date since 1985 (Vicziany, 1993). However, the operating mode Australian 
companies prefer in India still reflects their caution in doing business in India. During 
1985-90, most Australian investments in India have been of a collaborative nature, 
with a significant proportion being UVs. For example, the number of Indo-Australian 
collaborations was just 50 during the period 1985-90 of which around 30% were UVs 
(derived from Vicziany, 1993). The balance were mostly technical collaborations 
which are a more conservative mode of foreign investment based on the transfer of 
technological know-how only. 
Post Cold War Period The breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe and the 
demise of the Soviet Union has dramatically changed the international strategic order. 
It put an end to the Cold War era. India responded to this change immediately. 
Garnaut & Drysdale (1994) consider that India's new international orientation from 
the early 1990s was partly a response to the geopolitical realignment associated with 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. This transformation 
has redefined India's strategic position in the global, as well as the regional context. 
Pakistan has lost its importance as the local regional protector of Western interests 
and India, with its enormous market potential, has moved toward the West with 
Western governments and firms ever vigilant for extended markets. 
Recently democratised East European nations, including Russia, have become rivals 
with India in attracting Western technology and capital. However, India has attracted 
special attention from the US in order to counter-balance the supremacy of China in 
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the region. There are reasons behind the change of US attitude. Strategically, India 
holds a superior position compared to other South Asian countries, including Pakistan. 
India ranks above its South Asian neighbours both in terms of economic strength and 
military power (Gordon, S., 1993; Gordon, A., 1993; Australian Senate Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Trade 1990). The repositioning of the Indo-West 
relationship has improved the Australian relationship with India. Simultaneously, the 
cloud of mutual suspicion has disappeared. In addition, the ongoing economic 
liberalisation initiated by the Rao Government has ushered in a more favourable 
investment climate for foreign companies. Nonetheless, Australian companies, like 
their Western counterparts, have not considered the business environment in India 
adequately supportive of foreign investment. This has been reflected in the recent 
trend toward the reliance on IJVs by many Australian investors as a preferred modus 
operandi to service the Indian market (Hook 1995). 
The colonial and the Cold War legacies and the stereotypes about India in Australia 
can be advanced as two important reasons for the evolution and continuation of such a 
trend. Although geographically India and Australia both are Indian Ocean littoral 
countries, the Australian focus is often directed at its southeast and the northeast 
Asian neighbours. This observation has been supported by Vicziany & McPherson 
(1994) following the publication of an Australian Government sponsored report on 
Northeast Asia entitled, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy. Australia 
also has its traditional relationship with Europe and North America (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1994). It maintains close economic 
relationships with the West through the OECD and it has similar relationships with 
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the Asia-Pacific countries through the APEC. India is not included in any of the 
major economic/security forums in which Australia participates. In spite of its 
geographical proximity to Australia, India has not been successful in attracting the 
attention of the Australian government, nor the Australian business community, until 
recently. 
Essentially, during the Cold War, India's long isolation from the West and its allies 
has created a stereotype about the difficult investment environment in India. Also, 
despite the economy having been liberalised substantially since 1991, sentiments 
unfavourable to outsiders and foreign investment still prevail in India as a residual 
effect of the colonial as well as Cold War legacies. Such a scenario has made 
potential Australian investors extremely cautious and this has resulted in the selection 
of UVs as their preferred investment mode in India, as a mechanism to diffuse this 
riskiness. UVs with Indian partners enable foreign investors an opportunity to 
accommodate such country-specific risks through the collaboration of their local 
partners. According to Thompson & Strickland (1990, p. 168), formation of L1Vs 
with local partners is sometimes "... the only or best way to surmount nationalistic 
political interests and cultural roadblocks". 
2.5 REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND THEIR IMPACTS 
Australia and India are members of wider regional communities. These communities 
primarily serve the interests of their respective regional constituencies. Australia 
enjoys the benefits of being an active member of the Asia Pacific Economic 
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Cooperation group (APEC), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) and benefits from cooperative arrangements with New Zealand 
and the US (ANZUS). Australia has also a closer economic relations (CER) trade 
agreement with New Zealand. India, on the other hand is a member of the South 
Asian Association for the Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and a dialogue member of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). India is not a member of 
APEC, OECD or ANZUS. At the same time, Australia does not belong to SAARC. 
Another forum, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) has recently emerged with its first 
meeting held in Bangkok in March 1996. However, both Australia and India were 
excluded from this forum. 
The regional interests of these two countries are often disparate, although India is 
showing keen interests in joining with APEC. This interest was reflected in a recent 
comment by the Indian High Commissioner in Australia, in which he mentioned that 
the possible preferential trade agreements among the APEC member states will 
exclude and isolate India which will adversely affect India's interests (Parthasarathy 
1995). He also warned that as a consequence, India may join APEC's potential rival, 
the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) promoted by Prime Minister Mahathir of 
Malaysia (Barker, 1995). 
However, recently, an Indian Ocean trade group has been formed including both 
Australia and India with its first meeting in Mauritius in September, 1996 (Dwyer, 
1996). This group, identified as the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional 
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Cooperation (IOR-ARC), is still in its infancy (Australia -India Focus, 1998). The 
relationship of this group with SAARC, APEC and ASEAN is not clearly defined. 
Most of the ASEAN, APEC and SAARC members are not included in this trading 
bloc. It has been argued that the political tensions among South Asian countries may 
cause ongoing problems for any move to use the IOR-ARC to formalise trading 
relations in the Indian Ocean rim (Dwyer, 1996). Nevertheless, the formation of this 
group will usher in a new dimension in the Indo-Australian economic relationship 
which is likely to affect future investment patterns between them, and it is difficult at 
this stage to evaluate the prospects of success for this forum. 
It is apparent that regional cooperation allows the participating countries to enjoy 
some benefits in terms of region-wide lower tariffs or extended incentives such as 
taxation holidays for foreign investments within that region. Such arrangements boost 
the investors' participation in a foreign country. The absence of any effective regional 
arrangements with a common membership of Australia and India is an inhibitive 
factor for Australian investments in India. In this circumstance, it is likely that 
Australian companies will be more inclined to invest within the regional economies in 
which Australia holds regional group membership. This may be evidenced from the 
Australian foreign investment figures. For example, in 1994, Australian investment in 
India was only US$118 million which was small in relation to the Australian 
investment in any of the APEC countries (ABS, 1995). 
In an interview with Business India, Button, a former industry and trade minister from 
Australia, pointed out that Australian firms are already committing 60% of their 
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overseas business to the Asian region, whereas Australian investment in India is not 
even a minuscule percentage of that amount (cited in Rajshekar & Raman 1994). 
Outside of these regional priorities, Australian investors appear cautious toward 
extensive and deepening involvement. In the Indian context, this caution is reflected 
in Australian investors choosing to form IJVs with Indian partners. IJVs allow these 
investors to service a perceived difficult market like India without committing 
themselves entirely, through sharing the inherent risks and uncertainty. 
2.6 ROLE OF NON -RESIDENT INDIANS 
Non-resident Indians (NRIs) play an important role in investing in the Indian market. 
In terms of actual foreign investment flows to India, the NRIs were the largest 
investors in the year 1994, followed by the UK and the US (Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995). They also act as catalysts for foreign investment. 
Currently, the NRIs from around the world account for an estimated total income of 
around US$340 billion (Barnathan, 1995). The presence of a strong group of NRLs in 
a foreign country may help to augment the bilateral relations between India and their 
country of residence. The potential of the NRI network for investment in India is 
more or less similar to the overseas Chinese investment trend in China. 
In a recent interview, the author of Megatrends 2000, John Naisbitt mentioned that 
China's long-term potential is not simply as a nation state. According to Naisbitt, the 
Chinese potential rests with the overseas Chinese network which accounts for 80% of 
all foreign investment in China (Pickett, 1996). The NRIs, at present, have a strong 
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presence in the US, UK, Persian Gulf countries, South Africa and Singapore 
(Barnathan, 1995). It is revealed from the foreign investment figures that these 
investors are the leading foreign investors in India along with the NRIs (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995). 
Within the Australian domestic context, the Indian community is not as involved as 
they are in other Western economies. For example, in the US, Indians are now one of 
the most successful minority groups involved in business and other social and 
economic activities (Clad, 1990). Indians in Australia are overshadowed by far more 
numerous Chinese, Vietnamese and Philippino communities (Gordon, S., 1993). Like 
the overseas Chinese, Indian migrants, by nature, are inclined to maintain their links 
with their motherland. The experience from North America and the UK suggests that 
the maintenance of these linkages has resulted in a higher level of bilateral activity in 
trade, investment and in every area of human endeavour (Gordon, S., 1993). 
In Australia, Indian migration is growing but at a slow rate (Garnaut, 1990; Gordon, 
S., 1993). Hence, from a global perspective, the North American and other Western 
countries, and countries such as Singapore are in a more advantageous position than is 
Australia as they are utilising the NRI connections to invest in India. Nonetheless, 
Australian companies, scanning investment prospects in India, still require 
prospective Indian partners to overcome Indian country-specific difficulties if they are 
to extend their investment interests into India. 
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2.7 RISE OF THE "HINDUTVA" AND "NEO-SWADESHI" MOVEMENTS 
The recent rise of the Hindu religious fundamentalism, Hindutva, and the revival of 
the Neo-Swadeshi or indigenisation movement has adversely affected the investment 
climate in India contributing to the slow growth of foreign investment. According to 
Thakur (1995), foreign investment in India is well below the levels flowing into other 
emerging national markets. In addition, these movements are likely to influence the 
mode of foreign investment in India. Geopolitical realities have an intrinsic impact on 
the evolution of this recently emerged dimension. 
The Swadeshi movement was originally launched by Gandhi during the independence 
movement of India in the 1930s which called for non-cooperation with the British 
India Government and rejection of British goods. The advocates of the Neo-Swadeshi 
movement are spreading a similar message of rejecting foreign consumer goods (The 
Economist, 24 June, 1995, pp. 29-30). The rise of Hindu nationalism, as reflected in 
the Hindutva, has its roots both in the past and the present. The extent of intolerance 
of Hindu nationalism can be understood from the assassination of Gandhi by a Hindu 
fanatic due to his policies of non-violence and peaceful coexistence of Hindus and 
Muslims (Grant 1982). 
In essence, the end of the British colonial rule signified the establishment of two 
different countries in the sub-continent, on the basis of religion (Hindu India and 
Islamic Pakistan). Although, at independence, secularism was adopted as one of the 
State principles in the constitution of India, the Indian Hindus who constitute more 
than 80% of the population, have been favoured vis-a-vis the rest of the population 
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(Rajshekar, 1994). At the same time, a large proportion of the Hindu population is 
antagonistic to the Muslims and other minority groups. 
The geopolitical rationale of this behavioural pattern may be attributed to a number of 
past events. . India was ruled by the Muslims from Central Asia for hundreds of years, 
and then followed by the British (Taylor, 1991). Both of these periods were 
characterised by widespread humiliation of the Hindus and their mass conversion to 
Muslim and Christian religions. Moreover, the strained relationship between Hindu 
India and Muslim Pakistan has had an effect on the Hindu nationalistic revival. 
Pakistan's support for the Muslim militants in Kashmir remains another factor 
complicating these relationships (The Economist, 19 August, 1995, pp. 25-26). 
In addition, during all of the major crises between India and Pakistan (including the 
wars of 1965 and 1971), the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), including the 
oil-rich Muslim countries of the gulf, supported the Pakistani positions. Alexander 
Gordon (1993) termed it the 'Pakistan-Gulf nexus'. The alleged illegal migration of 
Muslims from Bangladesh is also a subject of irritation between India and its Islamic 
neighbour, Bangladesh (The Economist, 19 August, 1995, p. 25). All of these issues 
have assisted in India's stated principle of secularism which has been diluted into the 
emergence of Hindu nationalistic ideals. Since the 1980s, this particular sentiment 
has been capitalised upon by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 
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Since then, the BJP had been considered as the only credible alternative as a national 
government (Desai, 1994). Recently, in March, 1998, they came to power in the 
central government jointly with Shiv Shena (Soldiers of Shiva, a Hindu God) and 
other minor parties committed to Hindutva. The BJP is a right wing nationalistic 
party. Previously, they formed a minority central government in 1996 which did not 
survive. They possesses a sense of grievance against Muslims and other non-Muslim 
groups like the Anglicised upper middle class - the class of the Nehru family - which 
has long dominated the civil service and the politics of India (Mendelsohn 1991). 
Together with the Neo-Swadeshi slogans, the BJP have been espousing the Hindutva 
as a political force able to capture the Hindu majority of India. The BJP are 
describing Hinduism as a swadeshi (home-grown) religion, while most of the other 
major religions are imported ones. Along with the Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM, 
Swadeshi Revival Forum) and Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS, National Self-
reliance Party), the BJP shares the view that local investors should be given priority 
over foreign investors. SJM and RSS have the reputation of being the parties 
consisting of Hindu extremist elements. 
These parties have adopted the strategy of targeting multinationals in the sensitive 
consumer goods industries. According to the BJP, the consumer goods sectors should 
not be opened to foreign investments (The Hindu, 20 November, 1993; Patnaik, 
1998). In maintaining this position, the BJP and its allies have been seeking to draw 
the attention of the Indian consumers to the scepticism about foreign goods that 
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derived from the Swadeshi movement during the long anti-British campaign. Also, 
the Neo-Swadeshi movement has its roots in the Cold War. As a close ally of the then 
Soviet Union, an anti-West sentiment had been developed and nurtured within a vast 
majority of the Indian people (The Economist, 12 August, 1995, pp. 25-26). 
The Cold War relations between the West and India's arch rival, Pakistan are also 
vital in explaining this trend. It has been observed that many well-known Western 
consumer goods brands including McDonalds, Coca Cola, Pepsi, and KFC are facing 
problems from the proponents of the Neo-Swadeshi movement (As-Saber, Dowling 
and Liesch, 1996). However, the Neo-Swadeshi risk may be minimised substantially 
through the formation of IJVs with the Indian partners. The recent controversy of the 
BJP led Maharastra Government with the American company Enron exemplifies such 
an observation. The newly elected State government of Maharastra cancelled the 
biggest ever foreign investment in India, to be built and run by Enron, an American 
company. This cancellation was based on a number of unproven charges. Later, the 
project was revived after a number of conditions were imposed, one of which required 
Enron to operate as a joint venture with an Indian partner (The Economic Times, 1996; 
The Hindustan Times, 1996). It could be argued that Enron might not have 
encountered such problems if it had chosen an Indian partner initially. In similar 
power generation projects, IJVs entered into by Siemens, GEC, AES Transport and 
Rolls-Royce with their Indian partners survived without facing the problems 
experienced by Enron (The Economist, 29 July, 1995, p. 52; 12 August, 1995, pp. 25- 
26). 
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Hence, it might also be argued that the political uncertainty due to the rise of Hindu 
chauvinism and the Neo-Swadeshi movement is another major impediment to foreign 
investment in India. Whenever the law and order situation breaks down due to the 
rivalry between Hindus and Muslims, the country's two major religious populations, 
this impacts on the Indian investment climate. More than 60,000 people have 
reputedly been killed in communal violence since independence (Taylor, 1991). 
However, risks such as these may be minimised substantially through the formation of 
IJVs with a local partner. The local knowledge and familiarity of a partner firm may 
help overcome problems related to such religious and nationalistic intricacies. Mr. 
Jay Dubashi, a senior economic advisor of the BJP, emphasises that cooperation from 
the local people is the most important precondition for the successful operation of 
foreign investments in India (McDonald, 1995). The choice of IJVs by the Australian 
companies operating in India is, at least in part, a response to the activities of these 
local movements. 
2.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Despite significant changes in the bilateral business environment between India and 
Australia at the end of the Cold War and the subsequent liberalisation of the Indian 
economy, Australian companies have not significantly increased their investment in 
India. The Cold War legacy, along with the participation of India and Australia in 
different regional organisations with diverse interests, has made it difficult to advance 
the relationship in favour of increased business arrangements. Moreover, the small 
numbers of NRIs in Australia has not enhanced the possibility of their performing a 
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catalytic role of increasing the confidence of Australian investors in India. In 
addition, the rise of the Hindutva and the revival of the Neo-Swadeshi movement are 
concerns for Australian companies seeking to advance their interests in India. In 
response, the formation of LIVs with local Indian partners has been determined by 
many Australian companies as a preferred mode of business enterprise to service the 
Indian market. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE IMPACT OF OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES ON THE 
FORMATION OF IJVs 
Anybody can make a mistake with a gift. Letitia Balridge, who was social 
secretary to President Kennedy and assistant to ambassadors in Paris and 
Rome, once delivered six dozen signed photographs of the Kennedys to the 
U.S. embassy in New Delhi, all beautifully framed in dark blue cowhide and 
stamped with the presidential seal. They were to be presented to the officials 
all over India during the Kennedys' official visit to Prime Minister Nehru in 
1962. But the gifts were totally unacceptable. Hindu officials would have 
been aghast to receive anything made with the hides of cows (which are 
sacred in India). Within forty hours, silver frames were substituted (Copeland 
& Griggs, 1986, p. 169). 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Apart from geopolitical variables, there are various other environmental variables that 
may affect international business operations (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 1990). A 
number of these variables are considered to have the potential to contribute to a firm's 
motivation to form IJVs. These include, the economic conditions, cultural setting, 
legal structure, political situation, availability of market information and human 
resource management practices in the host-country. 
As some of these factors, such as the cultural and political variables seem to be 
overlapping with the geopolitical variables, it appears to be appropriate to focus 
separately on the bunch of literature that already exist within the domains of culture 
and politics. When these two variables (culture and politics) are dealt with 
independent of their geographic connotations, it may not affect business in the same 
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Figure 3.1 
Other Environmental Variables 
I. 	Economic conditions 
Inflation and Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
Transactions Costs Minimisation 
Market Competition 
Uncertain Demand Condition 
Market Access 
H. 	Cultural setting 
Cultural Distance and Unfamiliarity 
Dealing with Corruption and Bureaucratic Culture 
III. Legal structure 
Import Duties and Tariffs 
Taxation Laws 
Foreign Investment Policies 
Public Sector Monopoly of the Insurance Industry 
Intellectual Property Rights 
Automatic Approval Procedures 
Changing Regulatory Environment 
IV. Political situation 
Frequent Change of Governments 
Ongoing Separatist Movements 
Ongoing Religious Rivalry 
Protests from the Environmentalists 
V. Lack of market information 
Lack of necessary market information 
VI. Human resource management practices in the host-country 
Low Labour Productivity 
Lack of Consistent Exit Policy 
'Militant and Obstructionist' Nature of the Indian Labour Force 
Lack of High Quality Local Staff 
way as geopolitics does. With this view in mind, these factors are also incorporated in 
this chapter. 
In general, various environmental variables have considerable impacts on the local 
business environment that, in turn, may influence the foreign firm's modus operandi 
in that market. Various environmental variables are presented in Figure 3.1. This 
chapter will focus on the impact of these variables in motivating the Australian firms 
to joint venture while investing in India. 
54 
3.2 ECONOMIC FACTORS 
The economic environment of the host country is critical for a company's 
international market entry choice (Ball & McCulloch, Jr, 1993; Dunning, 1986; Hill, 
et al., 1990; Kim, 1993). According to Dunning (1986, P.  2), "... the level and pattern 
of international production, like trade, both influences and is influenced by country 
specific development strategies". This implies that the economic policy of a country 
is a key to create a congenial atmosphere for foreign investment. Any change in 
government policy thus affects not only the role of inward and outward investment, 
but changes the character and composition of such investment (Balassa, 1979). India 
used to maintain a set of 'highly interventionist' and 'inward-looking' policies (La11, 
1985). It has been liberalising its economy since 1991 which has increased inward 
foreign investment substantially. However, factors such as the presence of a very 
large poor segment of the population, higher inflation rate along with a relatively high 
rate of interest are still concerns for foreign investors. Also the extent of local 
competition as well as the already established foreign companies must be taken in 
account in foreign investment decisions. 
Major economic variables influencing foreign investments include the level of 
inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, transactions costs minimisation, market 
competition, uncertain demand conditions and market access. 
3.2.1 Inflation and Exchange Rate Fluctuations 
India's inflation rate has been rising during the last few years. It remained above 11% 
for most of 1994 and early 1995 (Mohan 1996; The Economist, 25 March, 1995, pp. 
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32-33). The inflation rates in the two previous years, 1992 and 1993 were 9.6% and 
7.6% respectively (Asian Business Review, June, 1995, pp. 22-24). Although it 
dropped to around 6% in January 1996, the inflation rate in India refers only to 
wholesale and not to retail prices. Consumer price inflation continues at a double 
digit level. It has been argued that the current level of inflation has been artificially 
suppressed and therefore, is not sustainable. To demonstrate a low inflation rate, 
several administered prices have not been raised. Among these, the petroleum 
product prices have not been revised for the last two years even though the rupee has 
been devaluated by 15%. Similarly, this has been the case for the pricing of a number 
of consumer items, including foodgrains, sugar and railway freight charges. It has 
been argued that once these are taken into account, there is not much scope for 
complacency about the inflationary situation (Mohan, 1996; Roy et al., 1996; The 
Economist, 25 March, 1995, pp. 32-33). Despite recent efforts by the Indian 
government, inflation remains as a problem (Aiyar, 1997). This inflationary situation 
along with a continuous devaluation of the Indian Rupee tends to put pressure on 
interest rates. Since the Indian currency, rupee (Rs.), was floated in 1993, it has 
continually been loosing value against the US dollar (Rekhi, 1997). 
As of April, 1996, India had a short term interest rate of about 13% (The Economist, 6 
April, 1996, p. 118). According to a survey of 267 Indian companies, growth of 
interest costs during the first half of 1996-97 was as high as 40% above the previous 
year (Jain, 1997). The World Bank (1997) considers high interest rates as an 
indication of stress on domestic resources. According to many, reflecting the risk, 
interest rates for Indian ventures have risen (Hirsh & Majumdar, 1995; The 
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Economist, 6 April, 1996, P.  118). Formation of UVs may reduce the level of 
borrowing requirements by the foreign companies from Indian financial institutions. 
Such borrowing can be perceived to be risky with the existing high rate of interest. 
3.2.2 Transactions Costs Minimisation 
According to Hennart (1991). and Williamson (1994), transactions costs is an 
important factor that affects the governance of any contractual relationships such as an 
UV. In general, every international business operation involves transactions costs. 
UVs may substantially minimise environmental-specific transactions costs through 
sharing them between partners. According to Root (1990), transactions costs include, 
but are not limited to, the costs of physical transfer and costs associated with 
government regulation of international trade. Generally, physical transfer costs are 
transportation costs for raw materials, machineries and industrial parts. Costs 
associated with government regulations are tariffs, import duties and quotas. Also, 
the bureaucratic costs and the cost to overcome cultural barriers should be included as 
transactions costs. 
Following Dunning (1988), these costs may result from two types of structural market 
failures, (a) natural which include transportation costs; and (b) artificial which include 
import controls. The firm is said to economise on transactions costs once it 
internalises transactions (Koenig & Thietart, 1990). However, the process of 
internalisation itself may involve substantial levels of costs. Dunning (1995) suggests 
that internalisation costs may be lower with cooperative modes, such as joint ventures, 
than with either independent or integrated modes. This is particularly critical for 
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medium and small firms operating internationally. Australian firms, in this respect, 
tend to be smaller than the average Western firms, such as those from the US and the 
UK (Dunning, 1979). It is difficult for these firms to incur the huge capital 
requirements to internalise transactions costs substantially. Sharing these costs with 
the local DV partners is likely to minimise such costs. However, Dunning & Pearce 
(1985) argue that the level of internalisation will be higher for the firms with more 
international experience and capacity. According to these authors, the more 
multinational a firm becomes, the more it is inclined to engage in internalised trade. 
For Australian companies investing in India, the costs of internalising environmental-
specific transactions costs are substantial. Transportation costs from Australia to 
India are considerable. In addition, tariffs, import duties and quotas are still high 
despite the presence of an ongoing economic liberalisation in India (As-Saber et al., 
1996a). These can be minimised substantially through incorporating an Indian partner 
for investing in India. This may offer access to the local partner's resources, reducing 
the need to transport production materials as an example. In addition, through these 
arrangements the foreign firms may share other transactions costs with the local 
partner. 
3.2.3 Market Competition 
Another macroeconomic variable is the extent of competitive forces in the Indian 
market. It is difficult for a foreign company to earn above-average profits in a volatile 
competitive market (Ball & McCulloch, 1993). Since the beginning of the reform 
process in 1991, foreign investments in India have been increasing at an accelerating 
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pace (Asian Business Review, June, 1995, pp. 22-24). Foreign as well as local 
investors have been jockeying hard to survive amidst an intense competitive 
atmosphere. 
Many of the Indian companies such as Tata have been facing serious challenges from 
both foreign and local competitors (The Economist, 9 April, 1994, pp. 76-78). For 
foreign companies, formation of IJVs with a local partner represents an effective way 
of coping with such competitive challenges (Perlmutter & Heenan, 1986). It may also 
be considered as a way for a company to switch an adversary to an ally and therefore 
"... avoid predator and/or wasteful competition within a new market" (Hitt, et al., 
1995, p. 152). The host firm's knowledge of the local competitive conditions and the 
synergy created by the pooling of both partners' resources and capabilities enable the 
entity to compete more effectively. 
3.2.4 Uncertain Demand Conditions 
Consumer demand conditions are another vital economic issue. Although India has a 
large middle class, the disposable income level of this emerging class is still quite low 
compared with the more developed countries in the Asia-Pacific region (Asian 
Business Review, June, 1995, pp. 22-24). In 1995, the Indian GDP per capita was 
US$370 (Asia & Pacific Review, 1997). India has a very large poor segment. About 
80% of its total population falls into the low or lower middle income group (East Asia 
Analytical Unit, 1994, p. 32). The number of jobless people, officially estimated at 30 
million (which is widely regarded as substantially underestimated) is as high as that of 
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the whole OECD (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994, P.  32; The Economist, 9 April, 
1994, pp. 76-78). 
According to a recent business survey, India's GDP per head at purchasing power 
parity (PPP), is significantly lower. The survey found that India's GDP at PPP was 
lower than countries such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Philippines (The 
Economist, 9 March, 1996, pp. 1-34). These findings point to a high level of market 
demand uncertainty in India. Research has shown that I.Ws are often used to reduce 
such demand uncertainty (Burgers et al., 1993). Foreign companies, along with the 
local UV partners may try to influence market demand through improving product 
quality, or creating products which are more market-oriented, in addition to 
employing intensive advertising campaigns. Howarth etal. (1995) considers that such 
alliances help to increase response to consumer demands. 
3.2.5 Market Access 
Another element of competitive dynamics is the timing of entering a foreign market. 
In the global economy, speed in entering an emerging market like India is critical to a 
firm's efforts to establish a sustainable competitive advantage and superior profits 
(Hitt, et al., 1995). Beamish, et al. (1994, p. 126) defined these emerging economies 
as the "... markets of the future". They considered UVs as a way to establish an early 
market position in these "...attractive" markets (Beamish, et al., 1994, p. 126). UVs 
may provide immediate availability of specialised skills, technology and 
organisational structure to access an unfamiliar overseas market like India 
(Anderson, 1995; Lewis, 1991). 
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PepsiCo's entry into the Indian market in 1990 with a local partner substantiates this 
argument. However, the experience of PepsiCo indicates that gaining market share in 
India is not easy as the local companies defend market share vigorously (Financial 
Times, 17 April, 1991, p. 18). Speed of entry may help offset the future prospect of 
another foreign company in the same industry. Rapid market entry is especially 
important for organisations whose major products have short life cycles (Howarth, et 
al., 1995). Formation of IJVs helps foreign firms to gain rapid market access and to 
withstand intense market competition (Berlew, 1984; Tichy, 1988). It may also 
benefit a foreign firm to establish its position with a comfortable market share prior to 
the entry of other major international competitors. Therefore, the UV mode may be 
considered as one of the best early market development tactics within an emerging but 
highly competitive market, such as India. 
3.3 POLITICAL FACTORS 
Political factors may have enormous impact on the international business 
environment. According to Hadjikhani & Hakansson (1996, p. 431), "...an important 
aspect of international business is the interplay between political and business 
dimensions." Political turmoil in the host country may greatly affect business and 
investment conditions (Boddewyn, 1988; Hadjikhani, 1997; Jeannet & Hennessey, 
1992; Schneider & Frey, 1985; Solnik, 1991). In a study of nine Swedish MNCs in 
Iran, Hadjikhani (1997) has indicated that political instability and turbulence in the 
host country are likely to influence the level of commitment by the MNCs, which, in 
turn, impact upon the extent of their involvements in such a market. There is a 
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negative correlation between the level of turbulence and the extent of involvement. 
The more turbulent is the market, the less is the level of involvement by the foreign 
firms that impacts upon their modus operandi. Cosset & Suret (1995), in a 
longitudinal study involving thirty six countries, found India as a country with 
considerable political risk. Thakur (1993) has described India as a country with a 
hostile political culture which is volatile, anti-growth, anti-technology and anti-
investment. In the World Economic Forum (VVEF) meeting held in December, 1997 
in New Delhi, political uncertainty and slow policy change were identified as two 
major irritants for foreign investors in India (Rekhi, 1997). Major political factors 
affecting foreign investment in India are frequent change of governments, ongoing 
separatist movements, ongoing religious rivalry and protest from the 
environmentalists. 
3.3.1 Frequent Change of Governments 
Political uncertainty due to frequent change of State and Central governments has 
recently evolved as a major issue (Zubrzycki, 1995). According to the Political and 
Economic Risk Consultancy (cited in The Economist, 27 May, 1995, p. 71), the 
biggest risk firms face in a country like India is its changing politics. In a recent 
election held in March 1998, an alliance led by the Bharatya Janata Party (BJP) came 
to power. It is the fifth government in India in the last two years. However, such 
uncertainty and riskiness may be shared through forming an UV relationship with a 
local Indian partner. The local partner's familiarity and experience may be used to 
understand and overcome any complexity derived from this changing political 
scenario. 
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3.3.2 Ongoing Separatist Movements 
Separatist movements are present in a number of Indian states, and their presence 
impacts on the business environment. One of the former Prime Ministers of India, 
Indira Gandhi was assassinated by the Sikh (Punjabi) separatists who were demanding 
their own homeland independent of India. The Punjab Chief minister was killed by 
the same group of militants on 31 August, 1995 (The Economist, 9 September, 1995, 
p. 35). In the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the separatist militants have kidnapped 
six tourists as hostages (of whom, one was murdered) to compel the government to 
fulfill their demands (The Economist, 19 August, 1995, pp. 25-26). Recently, these 
separatists have killed twenty-three innocent Hindu pundits to demonstrate their wrath 
and strength (Nandi and Baweja, 1998). To reinforce their demands, the separatists 
militants may pose a threat to foreign businesses as well. Expatriates, in particular, 
are at considerable risk. Establishing IJVs with local partners may minimise these 
risks. Because of the familiarity and involvement of the local partner with the local 
political conditions, any such threat from the militants may be prevented. 
3.3.3 Ongoing Religious Rivalry 
Religious and ethnic rivalry has long been a major concern in India (Ansari, 1989; 
Bharucha, 1998; McDonald, 1995; Nauriya, 1996; Philip, 1995). As mentioned 
previously, the followers of two major religions, Hindus and Muslims, frequently 
engage in rivalries resulting in killings and creating panic among the business people. 
The emergence of Hindutva in recent years has worsened the situation (Bharucha, 
1998; Nauriya, 1996). The religious sentiment of the Hindus (the majority of the 
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Indian population) has been capitalised upon by the BJP through the spreading of the 
ideals of Hindutva and using anti-Muslim rhetoric. The formation of IJVs may assist 
the foreign investors to manage any such problems with assistance from their local 
partners familiar with the local religious sentiments. 
3.3.4 Protest from the Environmentalists 
Environmentalists in India are active in safeguarding their environment. In 1984, in 
the Union Carbide (India) Limited (UCL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, leakage of a large 
amount of a lethal gas, methyl isocyanate, caused havoc in the plant's 
neighbourhoods, injuring and killing people (Srivastava, 1997). Since this tragic 
incident, the environmentalists in India are much more concerned about the 
environmental degradation caused by the multinationals. The environmentalists and 
social activists have forced DuPont to relocate a nylon plant, and are agitating against 
a paper plant being built by Sinar Mas, an Indonesian company (The Economist, 12 
August, 1995, pp. 25-26). Under constant threats from the environmentalist groups, 
the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) of India has told more than 9,000 
factories either to shut down or move out of New Delhi, the world's fourth most 
polluted city (International Business Asia, 1995). India has enacted environmental 
legislation for water, air, hazardous waste and industrial effluent (Australia-India 
Focus, 1998a). A local partner may substantially minimise the risks from the 
environmentalists through their familiarity and access to these groups. 
In a report published in July 1995, Hong Kong's Political and Economic Risk 
Consultancy ranked India a higher investment risk than China and 10 other Asian 
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countries. "... India's social situation is much more volatile than China's", the report 
noted (Hirsh & Majumdar, 1995, P.  67). According to The Economist (16 September, 
1995, p. 78), "... American and Japanese companies do not find India an easy place to 
do business. Both expect a more ordered society than India provides". Despite the 
existence of this scenario, foreign companies do undertake business in India, but with 
necessary caution. In such a context, it is always prudent for a foreign company to 
team up with a strong local partner capable of managing the changing political 
scenario (Thompson & Strickland, 1990). 
It may help the joint venture entity to maintain good relationships with the major 
stakeholders such as the governments, political parties, labour unions, customer 
groups, environmentalists and social activists (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 1990). 
Formation of LIVs with the host partners may also reduce the possibility of excessive 
political influence on the part of the foreign investors (Carbaugh, 1989). To rely on 
local partners with excellent contacts to the host country governing elite is a strategy 
that has been used effectively by many companies (Jeannet & Hennessey, 1992). 
According to Backman (cited in Kim, 1993), such a strategy helps to avoid local 
discrimination against foreign companies. India is no exception. 
3.4 LEGAL AND REGULATORY FACTORS 
India's regulatory environment is a complex one with a myriad of rules and 
regulations controlling foreign investments. A survey, conducted by Banks and 
Natarajan (1995), indicates that despite a considerable change in the foreign 
investment laws in India, many companies entering India opt for IJV arrangements 
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because IJVs help in dealing with the numerous government organisations and 
regulations that still impede entry to the Indian economy. Major regulatory factors to 
be considered while investing in India are, import duties and tariffs; taxation; foreign 
investment policies; public sector monopoly of the insurance industry; intellectual 
property rights; automatic approval procedures; and the constantly changing 
regulatory environment. These are discussed next. 
3.4.1 Import Duties and Tariffs 
A survey by Banks & Natarajan (1995) found the level of import duties, tariffs and 
quotas to be highly restrictive in India. According to another recent survey on the 
Indian economy, it is found that India has one of the highest merchandise trade tariffs 
with an average of around 45% (The Economist, 22 February, 1997, pp. 13-19). Long 
customs clearance time is also a problem. Moreover, it is currently difficult to be 
competitive with products possessing low local content due to import duties that must 
be paid. In the recent budget [1996-97], a 2% surcharge on all imports has been 
declared increasing the rate of maximum import duties from 50% to 52% (The 
Economist, 27 July, 1996, p. 26). In addition, due to import delays, higher than 
normal stock levels must be maintained, adding to the cost of doing business in India 
(Banks & Natarajan, 1995). According to Carbaugh (1989), INs may be viewed as a 
means of forestalling protectionism against such imports. IJVs may be regarded as an 
effective way to overcome tariffs and other import barriers in India. 
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3.4.2 Taxation Laws 
Indian taxation law is another concern for foreign companies. Despite ongoing 
reforms, taxation remains an extremely complex area (East Asia Analytical Unit, 
1994). There is no tax concession especially enacted to attract foreign investors to 
India (Price Waterhouse, 1993; Srinivasan, 1996). Taxes and levies are payable both 
to the federal government and to the states (Banks & Natarajan, 1995). The World 
Bank (1997) recommended an extensive taxation reform to make the business 
environment in India more attractive to foreign investment. Local UV partners, 
through their experience and expertise may provide substantial help in dealing with 
the complex mix of Indian taxation laws. 
3.4.3 Foreign Investment Policies 
Since the late 1980s, the Indian government has been gradually liberalising its 
economy to attract more foreign investment (Dunung, 1995). Still, numerous 
government organisations and regulations impede entry to the Indian economy (Banks 
and Natarajan, 1995). Moreover, the economic reform process is considered to be 
slow and piecemeal (Rekhi, 1997). In addition, the reform process across the country 
is not a uniform one. It has been centred on the central or the federal level, with little 
being done to reform policy at the state level (Asian Business Review, 1995). That is, 
policies and laws welcoming foreign investors at the national level have not always 
been so warmly embraced by state governments (The Economist, 9 April, 1994, pp. 
76-78). 
67 
The Indian government's rule limiting foreign equity to 51% in a number of industries 
means investors are still required to joint venture with local companies while 
investing in selected industries (Banks & Natarajan, 1995; East Asia Analytical Unit, 
1994; Jacob, 1992; Thakur, 1993). In other industries, where this limitation does not 
apply, most of the foreign companies still prefer to enter the market via an UV mode 
because of the assistance provided from the Indian partners in overcoming policy-
related problems (As-Saber et al., 1996a). 
3.4.4 Public Sector Monopoly of the Insurance Industry 
There remains certain areas completely untouched by regulatory reforms. The 
insurance industry is one example. India's insurance market was closed to private and 
foreign participation after nationalisation in the 1950s (Australia -India Focus, 1997). 
Since then, India's insurance industry has been an inefficient public sector monopoly 
with strong trade union workplace practices (The Economist, 27 May, 1995, pp. 70- 
71). There are only two insurance service providers, viz., the Life Insurance 
Corporation of India (LIC) and the General Insurance Corporation of India (GIC). 
Because of the lack of competition in this important sector, it is not cost-effective for 
foreign investors to maintain insurance in India (Letiche, 1996). This is one of the 
major concerns for foreign companies. However, foreign companies may minimise 
such a risk by sharing it with their local partners who are familiar with this industry. 
3.4.5 Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectual property rights involve the protection of intangible assets such as know- 
how, processes, trade names and trade secrets (Khambata & Ajami, 1992). A major 
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concern for foreign investors in India is the lack of enforcement of intellectual 
property rights (IEPRs). India's failure to effectively enforce IPRs is reflected in a 
formal complaint by the US and EU involving patent protection for pharmaceuticals 
and agricultural chemicals which has recently been referred to the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (Asian Development Bank, 1997). The absence of effective 
enforcement of IPRs in India inhibits foreign investment in high-tech and advanced 
knowledge projects (Banks & Natarajan, 1995). 
It may, however, be argued that the establishment of an IJV may help guard these 
rights more efficiently than other arm's-length arrangements, such as licensing and 
technical collaboration. A strong and reliable UV partner may assist the foreign firm 
to safeguard its intellectual property through its familiarity and influence in the local 
market. A local partner, being one of the beneficiaries of such a proprietary interest, 
is likely to protect it from being pirated. Hence, IJVs, with a joint control, are in a 
position to safeguard intellectual property rights more effectively in a country such as 
India. 
3.4.6 Automatic Approval Procedures 
Another regulatory factor to be considered by foreign investors is government 
approval for foreign investment. All foreign investments in India require government 
approval (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994). Due to excessive bureaucracy, it may 
sometimes become very difficult and time-consuming to obtain the necessary 
approvals. However, from January 1993, Indian firms have been enjoying the right to 
enter into UVs without requiring government permission (Thakur, 1993). In addition, 
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foreign companies are allowed an automatic approval of up to 51% equity 
participation in a number of selected industries (Asian business Review, 1995). These 
two regulatory changes have made the formation of I.JVs even more attractive than 
they were previously. 
3.4.7 Changing Regulatory Environment 
Overall, because of the constantly, albeit slowly, changing regulatory environment in 
India (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994; Rekhi, 1997), it has always been a difficult 
task for foreign companies to keep themselves abreast of the day-to-day changes and 
implications of these. Teaming up with local partners gives foreign companies the 
ability to know, understand and interpret the changing scenario more effectively. 
In addition, if the local partner can bring political influence to the undertaking, the 
new venture may be eligible for government support (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 1990), 
and may sometimes help influence the government to change or amend regulations in 
favour of such an entity (Bradley, 1977). Formation of IJVs with local partners may 
offer the foreign companies a significant advantage in overcoming the regulatory and 
legal environment in an emerging economy such as India. Harrigan (1986) considers 
the formation of UNTs by foreign companies, as they enter such markets, 'insurance' 
against domestic trade barriers. 
3.5 HUMAN RESOURCES ISSUES 
Human resource management (HRM) practices have increasingly been recognised as a 
critical segment influencing international business operations (As-Saber et al., 1998; 
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Dowling, 1999; Dowling et al., 1999; Milliman et al., 1991; Schuler et al., 1993). 
Local HR issues, in this respect, are important to consider. This section will deal 
with the HR issues external to an organisation and how these impact upon the 
organisational decision making process in selecting a modus operandi while investing 
overseas. In the Indian context, the regulatory environment is a major concern for 
foreign investors with a relatively large number of laws regulating HRM practices. 
Major issues with respect to the HRM practices are low labour productivity, the lack 
of a consistent exit policy, the 'militant and obstructionist' nature of Indian labour 
forces and the lack of high quality local staff. 
3.5.1 Low Labour Productivity 
Although India has a large pool of educated people (Asian Business Review, June, 
1995, pp. 22-24; Jacob, 1992), the proportion of unskilled labour is high (East Asia 
Analytical Unit, 1994). A poor labour market selection decision may result in low 
productivity and administrative problems. According to the Australian Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (1996) and India Today (1996), poor productivity is a 
common complaint amongst existing manufacturers in India. The low levels of 
capital employed per worker and a work culture which does not encourage high 
performance work practice are mainly responsible for the low labour productivity 
(Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995). 
3.5.2 Lack of Consistent Exit Policy 
For any company operating in India, it is difficult to dismiss workers in order to 
become more efficient. According to the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 
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1974, it is illegal in India to close a business with more than 100 employees without 
official approval, even if it is bankrupt (The Economist, 9 April, 1994, pp. 15, 76-78). 
However, such approval is very difficult to obtain (Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, 1995). The Board of Industrial and Financial Restructuring (BIFR) 
is entrusted with the responsibility of handling the exit of 'sick' (struggling) firms in 
the private as well as public sector (Letiche, 1996). However, BIFR cannot intervene 
unless an industrial unit is seven years old and the net worth of an enterprise is 
negative (Ratnam, 1995). Moreover, it is not straightforward to wind up any such 
business operation. As observed by Sen and Vaidya (1997, p. 128), 
BIFR rarely suggests winding up a sick unit. Even if winding up is 
recommended this is an extremely time-consuming and complicated process 
which could take as long as ten years. 
This is ironic that such exit restrictions are still in place in a country, such as India. 
Despite the Indian government's recent attempts to create an investment-friendly 
business environment, an absence of a consistent exit policy seems to be a real 
impediment to foreign as well as domestic investments. Although there are legal 
loopholes to overcome these inconsistencies, it is not easy to understand and manage 
these legal matters (Ratnam, 1995). Especially for a foreign firm, it is more difficult 
to understand these intricacies while investing in India as a stand-alone company. A 
local partner, familiar with the Indian labour relations may assist in managing such 
issues, while sharing the risks and uncertainties derived from such complexities. 
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3.5.3 'Militant and Obstructionist' Nature of Indian Labour Forces 
The labour force in India has a reputation of being militant and obstructionist (Thakur, 
1993). In addition, most of the Indian labour unions have strong links with political 
parties and many politicians are current or former union leaders (Clarke & Von 
Glinow, 1996). National and state-wide calls for strikes (popularly known as Bandhs) 
by the trade unions are common in highlighting trade union demands (India Today, 
1997). Moreover, often several trade unions compete for the loyalty of the same body 
of workers in a particular workplace and their rivalry usually ends up being bitter and 
sometimes violent (International Labour Organisation, 1992). In addition, the unions 
sometimes bring pressure to wrest undue advantages from the employers. For 
example, 
...when a company becomes bankrupt due to mismanagement etc., employers 
have to yield to union pressure to give up control and may be forced to accept 
employee buy-outs by worker cooperatives (Ratnam, 1995, p. 293). 
Dealing with these labour union demands may require familiarity and skills. To this 
end, the local firm's expertise may be of substantial importance for a foreign firm 
confronted with trade union demands. 
3.5.4 Lack of High Quality Local Staff 
Despite the fact that India has a pool of competent managers able to handle 
complicated company matters (Jacob, 1992), it is not easy to find and recruit high 
quality local staff. Since the initiation of economic liberaMation in the early 1990s, 
there has been an unprecedented rise in demand for quality people. A rapid rise in 
investment by foreign as well as local investors during the recent years is mainly 
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responsible for this increased demand. This, in turn, is putting increased and upward 
pressure on the compensation packages of the qualified managers and skilled workers. 
According to a survey conducted in October, 1996, Indian managers' real salary rises 
(adjusted for expected inflation) were forecast to be 23% in 1997 (Business Week, 
1996). This trend is also reflected in a recently published report by the International 
Labour Organisation (1998). 
Because of their experience with the Indian labour market, it is easier for the local 
companies to identify a suitable workforce. Also, the UV may use the existing human 
resources (the internal labour market) of the local partner which has a known 
efficiency level. In utilising this opportunity, this may, in turn help minimise the need 
for sending high-cost expatriate managers to India. Also, with the active collaboration 
of the local partner, it should be easier to resolve other HR-related problems, such as 
training requirements, wage disputes, labour unrest and working hours. According to 
Dowling et al. (1996), I.Ws may work as an ideal vehicle to offer a skills-based 
approach that contributes to an improved HR management. 
3.6 LACK OF INFORMATION 
The lack of relevant information is an important factor to be considered by foreign 
investors. Drucker (cited in Schuler et al., 1991, p. 53) has argued that the recent 
popularity of UVs is "... not because of cost, but because of information". In India, 
according to Rajshekar & Raman (1994), information barriers are a difficulty for 
foreign companies. Foreign investors in India do not always get a helpful response 
when they ask for information (Rajagopal, cited in Rajshekar & Raman, 1994). A 
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survey conducted by the East Asia Analytical Unit (1994) suggests that it is a very 
difficult task for a foreign company to collect necessary market information in India. 
The government sources are often not reliable. Government agencies sometimes 
publish data contradictory to each other. 
For example, while the Ministry of Commerce showed India's trade deficit to be 
US$4,539 million on merchandise account for the fiscal year, 1995-96, the Reserve 
Bank of India (RBI) puts it at US$8,983 million, almost twice as reported by the 
former (The Daily Investor, 1996). Even an institution such as the Foreign Investment 
Promotion Board (FIPB) did not have any published guidelines until January 1997 
(World Bank, 1997). It may be a costly as well as time-consuming exercise for 
foreign companies to assemble necessary information on their own. However, 
collaboration through the formation of IJVs can give foreign firms the opportunity to 
access information more easily. This can be particularly helpful because of the local 
partner's knowledge of the market, expertise and capacity to interpret day-to-day 
market information. Howarth, et al. (1995, p. 166) have described such a process as 
"...learning through alliances" for foreign companies. 
3.7 CULTURAL FACTORS 
Cultural differences among nations are important for managers to understand while 
engaging in international business. Despite the presence of numerous definition, of 
culture, it is not easy to define culture from a cross-cultural perspective (Hill, 1997). 
From this context, Hofstede (1984, p. 21) defined culture as 
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'...the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members 
of one human group from another...Culture, in this sense, includes systems of 
values; and values are among the building blocks of culture'. 
Hofstede (1980; 1984; 1994) argues that culture-specific attributes have significant 
impacts on management practice. According to Kogut and Singh (1988), cultural 
difference and national attitude towards uncertainty avoidance influence international 
business entry mode choice. It is important for foreign companies to develop an 
understanding of cultural differences and learn how to take advantage of the 
opportunities that cultural diversity may provide. In the relatively unfamiliar and 
culturally distant locations, investing firms are likely to adopt the UV mode as a 
preferred entry option (Awadzi, 1987; Barkema et al., 1996; Benito & Welch, 1994; 
Dowling et al., 1999; Kogut & Singh, 1988). According to Benito & Welch (1994, p. 
11), "... in the culturally less familiar locations there tends to be less confidence and a 
stronger feeling of needing local partners in order to successfully adapt". 
In the Indo-Australian context, there are a number of cultural issues that may 
influence the investment pattern of foreign companies in India. These may be 
grouped into two different sets of variables - favourable and inhibitive. The 
favourable issues, in brief, include the strong influence of Western culture in many of 
the Indian cities; a growing Western-style business culture in the aftermath of 
economic liberalisation; cultural as well as business links established by the non-
resident Indians (NRIs) and their extended family members (Barnathan, 1995; 
Motwani, 1993, cited in East Asian analytical Unit, 1994); and widespread use of 
English (East Asia Analytical unit, 1994). In Bombay, for example, Western 
influences are already strong as can be seen by the thriving, Western-style 
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entertainment industry (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994). A Financial Times (24 
February, 1994) article, 'Indian Yuppies' noted the changing lifestyles among the 
Indian middle-class in response to the liberalisation policy. It illustrated the 
increasing popularity of Western-style shopping centres, apartments and the demand 
for Western consumer goods. 
The inhibitive issues, on the other hand, are numerous. They include the presence of 
ethnocentrism and the rise of Hindu religious fundamentalism, Hindutva; widespread 
corruption as a cultural norm; and the revival of the neo-Swadeshi (indigenisation) 
movement. Ethnocentrism has been defined as an exaggerated tendency to believe 
that one's own way of doing things is superior to that of others (Hodgetts & Luthans, 
1994). A recent revival of Hindu nationalism or Hindutva is an ominous sign of 
ethnocentrism in modern India (Desai, 1994). Most of these issues have been 
introduced in the previous chapter. The focus of this section will be on the inhibitive 
issues as they hinder foreign investment in India. These issues will be considered next 
in two separate groups, viz., cultural distance and unfamiliarity; and dealing with 
corruption and bureaucracy. 
3.7.1 Cultural Distance and Unfamiliarity 
India has one of the largest and most diverse populations in the world. Racially, the 
bulk of the population is descended from Caucasoid (white), Negroid (black), Proto-
Australoid and Mongoloid (yellow) stocks. They represent both the pre-historic 
native population and later mass migrations from other areas (Katz, 1967). It consists 
of a variety of social types and languages. There are 14 principal languages spoken in 
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India, with over 800 different dialects (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994). Only 3% of 
Indians speak English (Bhattacharya, cited in Australian Senate Standing Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1990, P.  40). Indeed, the many languages 
currently spoken in India are a striking reflection of the country's cultural diversity 
(Katz, 1967). Also, religion has a strong influence on social and business activities 
(Copeland & Griggs, 1986). For foreign investors, some local customs are critical as 
ignorance of them can offend people while doing business locally. Any mistake, in 
this respect, may have disastrous consequences. 
The main destination of Australian investments remain the culturally more familiar 
markets of the UK, US and New Zealand (Edwards & Skully, 1996). However, in 
recent years, Australian firms have been showing increased interests in the culturally 
less familiar markets in Asia. It may be argued that the host-country cultural 
environment is likely to influence the Australian companies in their adopting a modus 
operandi while investing in different Asian destinations, such as India. Although very 
few, there are some cultural elements which are common in both India and Australia 
and these stem from the dissemination of the British colonial culture (Nair & Schuler, 
1993). However, the extent of British influence differs. 
Indian culture is less affected by the British colonial era than is its Australian 
counterpart. Widespread use of English among the Indian business community and 
elites may be cited as an example of such influence. Also the existence of a 
significant number of Christians in the population is predominantly the product of the 
British colonial era in India. Currently, India has a Christian population of about 21 
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million (Biswas, 1995). 	However, India's geographic isolation from Australia 
remains a major contributory factor in maintaining a level of cultural divergence. 
Little interaction between these two cultures happened until the late 1980s (Australian 
Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1990) barely 
leaving any scope for convergence. According to Barkema et al. (1996), cultural 
distance is generally related to geographic distance (however, they mentioned the US-
Cuba and Australia-UK relationships as clear exceptions). 
Due to a very low level of historical interaction between Australia and India, 
perceptions about each other's countries are biased by ill-informed stereotypes. Apart 
from India's reputation for playing cricket, most of the Australians generally view 
Indians as "...supposedly lazy, religious, fatalistic, other-worldly, corrupt, poor, 
inefficient, unreliable and fertile" (Australian Senate Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs Defence and Trade, 1990, p. 8). Indians, on the other hand, generally consider 
Australia as a cricket-playing nation with an expertise for making good television 
programmes and movies. These perceptions have affected business relationships 
between these two countries. Historically, private business investors from both 
countries did not seriously consider business in each other's country. 
Since the 1980s, attempts have been made from both India and Australia to bridge this 
information gap (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994; Australian Senate Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1990). With the opening up of the 
Indian economy in the early 1990s, this information gap has started to close gradually. 
With the formation of different bilateral organisations in both India and Australia, 
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such as Australia-India Council, Australia-India Business Council and the Australia-
India Chamber of Commerce, and with the active presence of the Australian Trade 
Commission (Austrade) in India, both countries have become more knowledgeable 
about each other's culture. 
Australians, however, have received mixed impressions about India as a newly 
liberalising economy, impressions containing both positive and inhibitive cultural 
elements. Australians have realised that there are opportunities available in India, it 
being one of the world's most populated economies. At the same time there are 
endemic cultural problems that inhibit foreign investment. In this context, many 
Australian companies have considered UVs as their preferred entry mode for investing 
in India. It is argued that the UV mode serves to minimise the level of cultural 
uncertainty and riskiness (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 1990). INs allow the foreign firms 
to understand and exploit the host culture more realistically through the support and 
guidance from their local partners. 
Measuring cultural distance is a difficult task given the abstract nature of the variables 
concerned (Ali & Sim, 1996; Dowling, 1999). Hofstede's (1980) study, Culture's 
Consequences presents one of the most comprehensive attempts to measure cultural 
distance between nations. To examine its reliability, Hofstede's measurement criteria 
had already been tested and replicated on several occasions (Hofstede & Bond, 1984; 
Hoppe, 1990; Kogut & Singh, 1988; Shackleton & Ali, 1990; Shane, 1992) and this 
scrutiny has made these dimensions more acceptable to researchers. Hofstede (1980) 
referred to India as a country with large power distance (i.e., perceived high degree of 
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inequality among different social groups), weak uncertainty avoidance (i.e, more 
tolerance for future uncertainty and risk), dominant collectivism (i.e., more emphasis 
on group-orientation and hierarchical framework), and masculine dominance. India's 
bureaucracy and the social class system are two best examples in this respect. 
Hofstede's study was conducted during the 1970s (Hofstede, 1980). During the 
subsequent two decades, cultural attitudes to uncertainty and risk in India have been 
changing significantly. As previously mentioned, in a report published in July 1995, 
the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy rated India as a high-risk country with a 
substantial level of uncertainty (cited in Hirsh & Majumdar, 1995). This analysis of 
business risk may also indicate a cultural shift to a high uncertainty avoidance level 
i.e., less tolerance towards ambiguity and risk in contemporary India. According to 
The Economist (3 February, 1996, p. 22), Bal Thackeray, a 'leading Hindu chauvinist' 
and the leader of the India's ruling political party threatens the country's tradition of 
tolerance and secularism through his public criticism and antipathy towards the 
Muslim minority. He also remains equivocal about foreign investment and calls for 
protecting Indian industries. 
India's large power distance, which is reflected in the existence of social inequality 
through status hierarchies and the caste system, may further be examined in order to 
advance the rationale for the motivation of foreign companies to prefer the UV mode 
while investing in India. Shane (1994) considers that the extent of power distance to 
have a negative correlation with the level of trustworthiness, i.e., the higher the power 
distance, the lower the trust. According to him, 
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... under conditions of complete trust, no hierarchies would be needed to 
monitor workers since they would never act opportunistically. Under 
conditions of no trust, hierarchies would always be needed to monitor 
workers since workers would always act opportunistically (Shane, 1994, p. 
628). 
He further argues that licensing accepts less monitoring of people in the host country 
than does foreign direct investment (FDI) since it requires less interaction with host 
country personnel. On the basis of these premises, Shane (1994) suggests that in high 
trust cultures (where monitoring is less necessary), there should be the presence of 
more licensing relative to FDI. If Shane's correlation is measured through a 
continuum using Hofstede's power distance indices, then three distinct groups may be 
identified. Countries such as Austria, Israel, New Zealand and Sweden will fall 
within the group where power distance is very low, while countries such as Malaysia, 
Mexico and Venezuela have relatively high power distance societies. 
However, countries such as India, Nigeria and Yugoslavia fall between these two 
groups. Although, according to Hofstede's (1980) study, India's power distance index 
(77) is much higher than the mean (56.8), during the past few years it might have been 
reduced to a certain extent with the influence of the imported Western culture and its 
liberalising economy. Nevertheless, India's holding a medium rank in terms of power 
distance, may not represent total trustworthiness. It should not be considered as a 
country without trust either. With partial trustworthiness, India, in that case, may be a 
suitable destination for 1.1Vs as foreign companies will require to monitor their Indian 
operation only moderately. 
82 
Another criterion for explaining the relationship of Hofstede's typology of national 
cultures is the perceived psychic distance between the countries. On the basis of 
Hofstede (1980) and Hofstede & Bond (1988), Fletcher (1996) has prepared an index 
of psychic distance of countries in relation to Australia. In this respect, he found India 
more distant from Australia than were many other countries including, New Zealand, 
the US and most of the Western European countries. This suggests that due to a 
relatively high psychic distance, Australians are likely to be reluctant to fully commit 
themselves to the Indian market. However, due to an enormous market potential of 
India it is difficult to ignore that market altogether. The trade-off is to establish DV 
operations with local partners. 
According to Czinkota & Ronkainen (1990, p. 488), 
... the greater experience - and therefore greater familiarity - with the local 
culture and environment of the local partner may enable the joint venture to be 
more aware of cultural sensitivities and benefit from greater insights into 
changing market conditions and needs. 
Harris & Moran (1987) note that recognising host cultural complexities and mixing 
with the host nationals are two major preconditions for an overseas business success. 
For foreign companies in India, these preconditions may be best achieved through the 
formation of LIVs with local partners who can assist in overcoming cultural barriers. 
3.7.2 Dealing with Corruption and a Bureaucratic Culture 
Corruption is supposedly so endemic in Asia that it has made puritanism a 
competitive issue (The Economist, 27 May, 1995, p. 71). According to a survey of 
expatriate managers (mainly from Europe and America) carried out by the Political 
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and Economic Risk Consultancy (cited in The Economist, 27 May, 1995, P.  71), India 
is among the three most corrupt countries in Asia. India's public sector suffers from 
management that is parochial and obstructionist (Thakur, 1993). In a recently 
published paper in Business India, a former Indian bureaucrat, Shantonu Sen notes, 
corruption has spread deep penetrating all segments of Indian society whether 
it is the bureaucrat, the educationist, the medical practitioner, the judge, the 
businessman or the industrialist. This dangerously afflicted society of ours 
appears to be courting disaster. Corruption among politicians is so widespread 
that no party, including the Left, is free of it (Sen, 1996, p.186). 
It is even almost impossible to punish senior bureaucrats and politicians for any of 
their wrong-doings (Economic and Political Weekly, 1997). Rather than corruption 
itself, what bothers managers most in a country such as India, are the infrastructure 
shortcomings such as the lack of a reliable legal system and a poor pay structure for 
civil servants which has allowed corruption to flourish (The Economist, 27 May, 
1995, p. 71; 15 July, 1995, P.  22). In another survey conducted by Roper Starch 
Worldwide Inc. (cited in Rajshekar & Raman, 1994), 41% of the respondents cited 
'red tape' to be the most significant problem in conducting business in India. In India, 
according to Singh (1997, p. 60), "... all progress, growth, prosperity is strangled by 
red tape". Excessive controls and unfulfilled demand for goods and services have led 
to widespread corruption in the Indian economy (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994, p. 
45). 
In an interview, India's former Finance Minister Manmohan Singh estimated 'black' 
income at 20 to 40% of GDP (cited in East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994, pp. 44-45). In 
a poll conducted by the Times of India (cited in Spaeth, 1996), 98% of respondents 
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said they thought politicians were corrupt. Due to allegations of corruptions, the 
previous Congress Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, had to quit power in 1989 (Spaeth, 
1996). More recenty, a number of cabinet ministers have had to resign due to specific 
corruption charges against them (The Economist, 2 March, 1996, P.  28). Graft, it has 
often been said, lubricates the wheels of government in India (Thakur, 1993). It is 
also a topic of public debate and widespread concern (Asian Business Review, 1995). 
Corruption, therefore, has become a norm rather than an exception in India and has 
already been ingrained into its culture. For a foreign company, it is difficult to deal 
with such corruption and bureaucratic practice. INs provide an opportunity for the 
foreign firm to understand and manage these situations with utmost caution. Dealing 
with corruption may also be considered risky as well. The local partner, through their 
familiarity and experience, may deal with this issue on behalf of the DV. 
3.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The above-mentioned environmental variables are likely to play a significant role in 
motivating Australian firms to establish IJVs with Indian partners while investing in 
India. Despite India's ongoing economic liberalisation along with the considerable 
extent of regulatory changes relaxing bureaucratic control over foreign investments, a 
number of inhibitive variables still exist as the source of concerns for foreign 
investors. India, one of the poorest countries in the world, has been encountering 
frequent political turmoils, macroeconomic problems and cultural drawbacks. Low 
labour productivity and the difficulty in accessing necessary information remain major 
concerns for foreign investors. The legal and regulatory atmosphere is yet to be 
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amenable for inward foreign investment. Apart from the fact that Australia shares 
some cultural heritage with India, Australian firms are likely to face similar cultural 
intricacies as encountered by other foreign companies investing in India. It is 
suggested that the formation of IJVs may help Australian firms to overcome the 
above-mentioned environmental-specific enigmas with the active collaboration of 
local Indian partners who are familiar with the promising but volatile business 
environment of India. 
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CHAPTER IV 
ORGANISATIONAL-SPECIFIC VARIABLES THAT INFLUENCE 
THE MOTIVATION TO FORM INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES 
In the 1990s and beyond, managers will be evaluated in terms of their ability 
to identify, nurture, and exploit finn-specific core competencies (Hitt et al., 
1995, p. 70). 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Organisational-specific variables are significant in that they affect a firm's ability to 
survive and prosper in a highly competitive global environment (Buckley & Casson, 
1995; Dunning, 1995; Lado, et al., 1992; Ulrich & Wiersema, 1989). Together with 
the previously mentioned environmental factors, these variables are likely to play an 
important role in motivating a firm to adopt the IJY mode while investing in a foreign 
market. The major organisational-specific variables that may influence the motivation 
for LlYs are economies of scale, minimisation of transactions costs, access to a 
distribution network, sharing of resources and capabilities, organisational-specific 
HRM issues, and inter-partner learning. This chapter will elaborate on these variables 
in the context of the foreign firm's joint venturing in India with their local partners. 
4.2 ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
Hill (1997, p. 363) describes the term economies of scale as "...the reductions in unit 
cost achieved by producing a large volume of a product". This is one of the major 
organisational-specific variables, which could motivate foreign companies to establish 
an UV relationship with local partners (Enen, 1991; Howarth, et al., 1995). The IJV 
could help create efficiencies of large-scale production that reduce the per-unit costs 
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(Gullander, 1976; Harrigan, 1988). It may be argued that with assistance from the 
local partners, the INs are able to reach core customers in the host markets that would 
be difficult to achieve as a stand-alone company. Moreover, there is a possibility of 
exporting a certain percentage of UV products back to the parent country. In the 
presence of an enormous market in India, foreign companies may consider large-scale 
production which, in turn, is likely to minimise per-unit production costs. This is 
especially relevant to the consumer-product market in India. 
In addition, it may also be possible to export a particular percentage of those products 
to other overseas markets at a competitive price. This should further increase the 
production volume reducing the per-unit costs. India has considerable economic links 
with other trading nations that provide a conduit for an expanded trade to a third party. 
During 1995-96 financial year, India's two-way trade was worth about US$89 billion 
(Calculated from a World Bank country study on India) (World Bank, 1997). The two-
way trade includes exports of US$40.2 billion and imports worth US$48.8 billion. 
There are, in addition, Indian government taxation incentives for export-oriented 
private investments (Government of India, 1995). The larger the export share, the 
lower the tax paid. Partially due to such economies of scale, many foreign companies 
entering India opt for joint venture arrangements. However, the bigger the 
involvement, the greater the resource commitment. As a consequence, many firms 
cannot afford to establish large-scale production facilities on their own because of 
their limited financial ability. These companies might opt for joint venturing with a 
local partner in order to share the costs and to achieve economies of scale (Anderson, 
1995). 
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For many Australian companies investing overseas, it is difficult to achieve 
economies of scale as a stand-alone company. INs are a viable option, in this respect. 
According to Howarth, et al. (1995, p. 173), the economies of scale that flow from 
such alliances are "... particularly important for Australian industries who often lack 
the size to compete in global markets". In addition, because of the economies of 
scale, it is possible to reach a break-even level of production relatively sooner. A 
survey conducted by Banks & Natarajan (1995) supports this view. At least 60% of 
the IJVs operating in India achieved break-even within a mere four years of their 
operation (Banks & Natarajan, 1995). 
4.3 MINIMISATION OF TRANSACTIONS COSTS 
Buckley & Casson (1976), Dunning (1988), Grubaugh (1987) and Solocha, et al. 
(1990) contend that transactions costs in servicing a foreign market may be 
considerable for a firm. These costs include gathering information about the foreign 
market and adapting the product to that market through resource commitments. 
Dunning (1988) included most of these organisational-specific transactions costs (e.g., 
resource commitment, search and negotiating costs) in his 'factor endowment/market 
failure' paradigm as a consequence of transactional market failure. However, he 
considered the costs of 'proprietary privileged access to inputs', (e.g., knowledge) as a 
consequence of structural market failure. 
The decision to internalise or not to internalise transactions costs is an important 
consideration for firms investing overseas (Dunning, 1979; 1988). As mentioned in 
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chapter a however, the costs of internalisation can be substantial. Nevertheless, by 
choosing the UV as their mode of entry into foreign markets, foreign companies may 
substantially reduce such transactions costs. According to Kogut (1988) and Kogut & 
Singh (1986), the possible costs of unrelated activities and the costs of internal 
development may also be minimised through the formation of joint ventures. On the 
basis of the observations made by Buckley & Casson (1976), Grubaugh (1987) and 
Solocha, et al. (1990), it may be argued that multinational firms can exploit their firm-
specific assets through I.IVs, especially if transactions costs impede exports or a 
wholly owned subsidiary, factor prices are different, or collaborative ventures are 
more profitable than other forms of international investments. According to Carbaugh 
(1989, P.  199), the UV may achieve "... cost reductions that are unavailable to either 
parent as a stand-alone company". 
The transactions-specific issue is an important issue that supports the competitive 
advantage of UVs for the Indian market. There are a number of transactions costs 
which influence the profitability of a foreign company willing to enter the Indian 
market. The major transactions costs are the costs of obtaining necessary information, 
search and negotiating costs, hiring managerial expertise, paying taxes and buying 
capital equipment and raw materials. It may be argued that a foreign company can 
substantially minimise transactions costs by adopting the UV mode to enter the Indian 
market. It may be easier for foreign companies to obtain necessary information via its 
local UV partner. Cherrett (1994) and Kogut & Singh (1988) argue that the UV option 
is less costly than acquisition in terms of organisational integration in a distant culture. 
90 
4.4 ACCESS TO A DISTRIBUTION NETWORK 
Access to the partner's existing distribution network is an important motivation for 
foreign firms to establish UVs with local partners (Anderson, 1995). A distribution 
network is critical for doing business in India. India has a population of around 900 
million living in 3,700 towns and 560,000 villages (Jacob, 1992). It also has a 
fragmented market with a number of large regional markets. Each of these regional 
markets has different characteristics with different cost implications. The distribution 
of product from state to state and throughout India is not a straightforward matter. 
Lack of infrastructure along with tariff barriers between regions, municipal taxes, 
differential sales tax, and packaging requirements are some of the major internal 
market factors that must be taken into consideration while investing in India (Banks & 
Natarajan, 1995). 
In these circumstances, it is difficult to reach a target market in India without an 
established and well-organised distribution channel. Accessing the existing 
distribution channels of the Indian partners is another incentive for a foreign company 
to operate as an UV in India. Moreover, a new distribution network may be 
developed jointly by the UV partners. In either case, the familiarity and expertise of 
local partners are important considerations. Local partners may assist in identifying 
the most efficient way of distributing the products. Distribution channel maintenance 
costs in a vast country such as India may be substantial as well. By establishing an 
UV, the foreign companies can share these costs with its local Indian partner. 
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4.5 SHARING OF RESOURCES AND CAPABILITIES 
The sharing of resources and capabilities with local partners is one of the major 
motivations for firms to joint venture (Anderson, 1995; Beamish, 1994; Harrigan, 
1986; Roulac, 1980). These resources and capabilities may be grouped into two major 
areas, viz., sharing of technology, and sharing of establishment costs and research and 
development (R&D) expenses. 
4.5.1 Sharing of Technology 
Sharing technological knowhow may influence a firm to joint venture (Hagedoorn & 
Schakenraad, 1990; Harrigan, 1986; Lan, 1996; Perlmutter & Heenan, 1986). 
According to UNCTAD (1990) and Oman (1989), the formation of ITVs is one of the 
most appropriate mechanisms to transfer technology. Being the world's 9th largest 
manufacturing economy, and the home of one of the largest pools of scientists and 
engineers in the world, India has advanced technological competence in selected 
industries (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994, Mathur, 1994). 
With the availability of world-class facilities for research and engineering education, 
India has technological strength in information technology, electronic engineering, 
shipbuilding, military equipment and construction engineering (Confederation of 
Indian Industry, 1996; Kohli, 1996a; LaIcha, 1993; Mathur, 1994; Vittal, 1996). On 
the other hand, Australia, as a developed economy, has the technological expertise in 
various industries, such as telecommunications, food processing, information 
technology, mining, electrical and electronic engineering, chemical engineering, 
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storage handling and warehousing, construction and railway engineering (East Asia 
Analytical Unit, 1994). 
Nonetheless, it may be expensive as well as difficult to procure a leading-edge 
technology directly from the owner of such capabilities. IJVs may be used to share 
and/or procure such technologies while in alliance with companies having these 
capabilities (Hagedoorn & Schalcenraad, 1990). Through the formation of IjVs, 
foreign companies may also share the expenses of procuring any such technology with 
their local partners. In addition, for foreign companies, forming IJVs in an emerging 
economy often assists them to extend the life of their technology which has become 
obsolete in other developed markets. Technological contribution to the LTV can be 
regarded as a shared contribution from the parent firms, thereby requiring lower or, 
possibly no cash in consideration. Moreover, learning from each other's technological 
competence is considered as one of the major motivations for firms to joint venture 
(Hagedoom & Schakenraad, 1990). 
4.5.2 Sharing of Establishment Costs and R&D Expenses 
The sharing of establishment costs and R&D expenses is another major factor to be 
considered by foreign companies. Contractor & Lorange (1988) argue that a joint 
venture allows firms to pull assets together relatively quickly and easily. The cost of 
establishing a business in India is substantial. For example, rental costs of 
commercial property in Bombay are more expensive than they are in most of the cities 
in the world. Annual office rental rates per square foot in Bombay are higher than 
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those of Hong Kong, Tokyo, Paris, Shanghai, New York, London, Moscow, Frankfurt 
or Singapore (Business Week, 16 June, 1997, p. 28). 
Increasing business activity and a shortage of supply are driving prices and rents in 
Bombay to extreme levels. According to a recent survey, from among the world's 
emerging economies in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America, the most expensive 
space is in Bombay, followed by Hong Kong, Moscow, Delhi and Singapore (The 
Economist, 16 August, 1997, p. 82). These high establishment costs can be shared 
and minimised through partnering with a local firm. The expertise and local 
knowledge of a local partner simplifies the search for the most suitable and 
competitive prices for these facilities. 
Sharing the costs and facilities for research and development (R&D) is another critical 
factor motivating the formation of UVs (Katz, 1995). Because of the considerable 
costs involved, it is often difficult for firms to manage R&D expenses. In addition, 
combining partner's capabilities could create synergy in the area of research and 
development. A study involving 600 firms in 20 countries has found that neglecting 
R&D components may put a global firm at risk, regardless of economic region or 
industry (Ettlie, 1998). For Indian partners, access to foreign parent's R&D, design 
engineering and product innovation capability is a major motivator to form IJVs. 
Sharing the costs of R&D and using local researchers at relatively lower costs are two 
motivations for Australian firms to form UVs with Indian partners. Another incentive 
for involvement in R&D activities in India is the reduced import duties on equipment 
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associated with R&D. Commencing in 1994, the Indian government has reduced such 
duties from 50% to 25% (India News Network Digest, 1996). In addition, access to an 
existing pool of researchers from the local partner's firm may be an incentive for 
establishing an DV, an outcome which is particularly prevalent in the computer 
software industry in India, Dunning (1995) notes that in the context of vertical 
alliance building, access to R&D is important. 
4.6 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Organisational-specific HRM issues must be addressed when the firm invests 
overseas. Efficient management of these issues in a multicultural context is essential 
for the success of any international business operation (Nam, 1995). There are a 
number of HR issues which may require special attention, including, selection and 
recruitment, training and development, managing labour unrest, performance appraisal 
and compensation. However, the discussion will be based on the first three 
components. The selection is arbitrary because of the urge to limit the scope of the 
thesis (also see paragraph (c) of Chapter 13.4). 
4.6.1 Selection and Recruitment 
Appropriate staffing in sufficient numbers and quality using PCNs (parent country 
nationals), HCNs (host country nationals) and TCNs (third country nationals) is one of 
the major preconditions for the success of an international business operation 
(Dowling, et al., 1999). In India, the availability of relatively cheap human resources 
has enabled many foreign companies using HCNs to attain cost advantages over their 
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competitors (As-Saber, et al., 1998). As mentioned earlier in this thesis (chapter III), 
the productivity of the average employee in India is relatively low. 
The international Institute of Management Development (IMD), in its recent 
competitiveness report, has put India at the bottom of its human development index 
following countries such as Malaysia, Russia, Indonesia and China (IMD, 1997). This 
report examines the competitive advantage of human resources on the basis of various 
factors, such as skills level, motivation, flexibility, age structure and health of the 
people. According to the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE) (cited in 
India Today, 1996), the efficiency level of Indian industries in 1994-95 was below the 
recorded level of 1989-90 and was not showing any sign of improvement. Poor 
labour productivity may be considered as one of the major reasons for this 
disappointing performance. Accordingly, poor selection decisions may result in a 
poor performance. Formation of an UV with a local partner may assist the foreign 
firm to overcome this uncertainty. The host partner's familiarity with the local labour 
market and the possible convenience of hiring from the partner's existing pool of 
employees with proven efficiency may ameliorate this problem, at least partially 
(Dowling, et al., 1999). 
4.6.2 Training and Development 
The success of an international business operation in part depends on the efficient 
training and development of its staff. Because of the need for "... different 
perspectives and skills and much greater tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty", a 
comprehensive planning of training and development must be put in place while 
96 
managing business internationally (Dowling, et al., 1994, P. 123). In the Indian 
context, this factor requires attention from the prospective foreign investors. As 
mentioned earlier, despite the availability of cheap labour, low labour productivity is 
common within the Indian labour force. 
According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1995), the low 
levels of capital employed per worker and a work culture which does not encourage 
high performance workplace practice are mainly responsible for the low level of 
labour productivity. As a consequence, an Australian firm wishing to operate in India 
might be required to undertake extensive training and development programs for its 
local staff. It could be necessary to train the PCNs and TCNs (if any) to orient them 
toward the Indian management style and culture. A study by Sparrow & Budhwar 
(1997) on Indian human resource practices has identified the existing low provision of 
training and basic levels of education in India that may be considered as concerns for 
potential foreign investors. In order to achieve a better employee performance level, 
they have emphasised the need for assessing the employee skills and knowledge along 
with continuous training and development activities. Lei & Slocum (1991) report that 
the training and developing of managers is important for an international operation 
because it enhances managers' skills in negotiation and conflict-resolution, and 
harmonises management styles i.e., it develops flexibility in managers to cope with 
unfamiliar HR practices. 
Further, the Indian HR environment is not readily understood by a stand-alone foreign 
company. For example, a large number of laws regulating HRM practices confounds 
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employment relations in India (Lawler, et al., 1995). Technologies brought in by 
foreign investors may be completely new and unknown by the existing workforce. To 
accommodate these issues, staff training and development is an essential and ongoing 
need for the foreign business operation in India. 
A motivation for foreign companies to form IN's is to organise training and 
development activities with the active collaboration of their local partners (As-Saber, 
et al., 1996a). Their experience of the local labour market enables the Indian partners 
to identify the training and development needs required for the workforce. Local 
partners, in this respect, may assist the foreign firms with their local expertise and 
familiarity by indicating the most appropriate training and development requirements 
for the business operation within the Indian context. Moreover, these activities 
involve substantial costs. The foreign firms might minimise such costs by sharing 
these responsibilities with their local Indian partners. 
4.6.3 Managing Labour Unrest 
Labour unrest is said to be one of the major impediments of doing business in India. 
As mentioned in the earlier chapter (chapter DI), the Indian labour force has the 
reputation of being militant and obstructionist (Thakur, 1993). Underlying this 
militancy are wage demands and the demand for the lowering of working hours (Joshi, 
1995; Ratnam, 1995; Tayeb, 1996). 
Despite an increasing demand for a part-time and contractual workforce, due to the 
constant pressure from the trade unions, it is often difficult to employ and maintain 
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such a workforce (Ratnam, 1995). In these matters, state intervention is a norm in the 
Indian HRM culture (Ratnam, 1995; Tayeb, 1996). However, these interventions 
generally take the position of the labour movements. This results from the strong 
links that most of the Indian labour unions have with major political parties, including 
the party at present holding power (Clarke & Von Glinow, 1996). The relationships 
between firms and government and other major political parties, along with their 
expertise in dealing with such issues, are important for a firm's efficient HR 
management in India. As a stand-alone foreign entity, it is difficult for an Australian 
firm to manage these HR problems while investing in India. Hence, it may be argued 
that the establishment of IJVs with an experienced Indian firm may be an appropriate 
option for an Australian firm to manage these HR related issues (As-Saber, et al., 
1997). 
4.7 INTER-PARTNER LEARNING 
Learning from each other's knowledge-base is another important motivation to form 
LTVs (Kogut, 1988; Maccoby, 1997). This is critical for all LTV partners. Basically, 
any such collaboration creates the opportunities for inter-partner learning (Hamel, 
1991). Superior information exchange (Harrigan, 1986) among the partners is the 
core of these learning processes. ID/s are an appropriate vehicle through which tacit 
knowledge is transferred from one partner to another. Teece (1977) argued that the 
tacit knowledge is based on the experiential learning which is not readily well-
understood because of its intangible nature. It may, for example, relate to the mutual 
understanding of day-to-day organisational management and capabilities. Both formal 
and informal mechanisms may be used to acquire these understandings. It does occur 
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through the exchange and interaction among the technical and management staff from 
both partners. 
These understandings may also transpire through shared training activities. Harrigan 
(1986, p. 152) mentioned it as a "... cross-pollination process" whereby ideas and 
information are shared among research, manufacturing, and marketing personnel, and 
are transferred to owners' organisations as a matter of course. According to Kogut 
(1988), one of the motivations for joint venture formation is the firms' desires to 
acquire each other's organisational knowhow. Learning of, and possibly acquiring the 
other partner's technological competence often motivates the formation of INs 
(Hagedoom & Schakenraad, 1990). Dunning (1995) considers shared learning and 
training experiences as one of the key opportunities for such alliance building 
activities. 
In the Indian context, an unfamiliar culture and its impact on Indian management 
practice is important to consider. A locally-learned and practical knowledge of the 
diverse market across India is invaluable for foreign companies. Dealing with the 
bureaucracy and politics is another major learning objective for foreign investors. 
Moreover, as mentioned earlier, gathering basic market information often becomes 
difficult for foreign companies. In this context, foreign companies may come to rely 
on their UV partners to learn the art of managing these local issues more effectively. 
According to a study by Tomassen, et al. (1998) on selected Norwegian companies in 
India, accessing Indian partner's local knowledge is a major reason for forming UVs 
in India. For Indian companies, UVs are considered a source of learning and imitating 
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the superior management practices and technical abilities of their foreign partners. 
Kogut (1988) confirms INs to be a vehicle for exchanging and imitating 
organisational knowledge. 
4.8 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Organisational-specific variables influence the motivation to form IJVs. These 
variables play an important role in motivating both the host and the foreign companies 
to engage in UV relationships. It is difficult to achieve a competitive edge through 
economies of scale in the potentially vast Indian market as a stand-alone company, 
while joint venturing with a local partner may help achieve this goal in terms of 
increased production capacity, lowering marginal costs and a wider market coverage. 
Accessing the existing distribution network of the local partners in a large and diverse 
Indian market and the minimisation of transaction-specific costs may be considered 
motivations to form IJVs. 
For the Indian companies, sharing and/or accessing technology is a major motivation 
to joint venture, while for the foreign companies it often helps extend the life of their 
technology. Technology contributions can be capitalised as a formal joint venture 
share contribution from the parent firm, thereby requiring a lower or possibly zero 
cash contribution to the investment. IJVs also share other resources that reduce the 
cost commitments of both partners. Managing organisational-specific HRM issues is 
another critically important consideration which influences the firms' motivation to 
joint venture for investing abroad. The opportunity for shared learning and training 
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experiences, another organisational-specific variable, motivates companies to form 
UVs. 
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CHAPTER V 
FORMATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT 
VENTURES 
The structure of the joint venture must take on a form that is suitable to meet 
the objectives of the enterprise and those of each of the partners. Good 
business planning, effective open communication, consideration of cultural 
sensitivities, and mutual understanding of the reasons for partnership in the 
first place are essential elements of a successful joint venture. If you have 
correctly evaluated market potential, selected the right partner, and done 
your homework with respect to needs of the host country, the joint venture 
will expand market share for your goods and services and meet your 
anticipated return on your investment (Enen, 1991, p. 112). 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The formation process of an international joint venture is a critical one. Followed by 
the selection of potential partners, it begins with a series of formal negotiations 
between firms and concludes with the finalisation of the IJV agreement by signing 
legal documents based on a set of mutually acceptable terms and conditions. 
Negotiation, according to Hodgetts & Luthans (1994, p. 168), "... is the process of 
bargaining with one or more parties for the purpose of arriving at a solution that is 
acceptable to all". This is a complicated management process affected by across-the-
border cultural diversity and the vicissitudes of firm-specific bargaining styles (Fuller, 
1991). This is also the process by which the selection of a suitable partner is 
concluded. The UV is formalised through the signing of an agreement following the 
finalisation of negotiations. However, in the Indian context, it becomes operational 
only after being approved by the appropriate Indian authority. 
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Once the UV is formed and 'becomes operational, various issues require appropriate 
attention in order to make it a success. These issues include the decision-making and 
control process in the UV, managing cultural differences through inter-partner 
learning, managing human resources, maintaining a long-term commitment, and 
resolving problems through mutual support and understanding. This chapter sets out 
to focus on the UV formation and implementation process using the available 
information from the Indian context and the extant literature. The chapter begins with 
a review of the negotiation process that leads to the formation of UVs. This is 
followed by a discussion on the effective implementation of an UV arrangement and 
the factors that contribute to its success. 
5.2 NEGOTIATION AND FORMATION OF IJVs 
Negotiation is generally a lengthy as well as complicated process (Gray & Yan, 1992). 
An ideal negotiation process involves a number of stages. First, it is essential for the 
negotiating firms to prepare themselves for the negotiation through identifying their 
own needs and objectives and those of their respective counterparts. Second, a formal 
negotiation will be required to decide the mutually accepted terms and conditions. 
Third, the parties concerned must be informed of the existing laws of the host country 
regulating UV operations. In addition, they must scrutinise the agreements thoroughly 
before they finalise and sign the documents. 
In the Indian context, the signed documents come into force only after approval by the 
competent government authority. It may be a protracted process to finalise the 
negotiations and to obtain approval from the Indian government. As recognised by 
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Kohli (1996), negotiating an agreement hastily may result in disastrous consequences 
for both the parties. The negotiating parties need to understand each other's needs and 
objectives precisely before they finalise the agreement. 
It may be wise, however, to conduct preliminary negotiations with more than one firm 
in order to choose the best partner. In the Indian context, the Indo-German experience 
suggests that foreign companies should be encouraged to negotiate with the largest 
possible number of Indian firms, before deciding on one partner. According to the 
survey conducted by the Indo-German Chamber of Commerce (Geissbauer & 
Siemsen, 1996), this helps find the best possible partner with a better insight into the 
quality norms and potential promise which the potential partners might present. 
The foreign firm also needs to adequately understand the Indian laws regulating 
foreign investment along with the local customs and business culture to achieve long 
term objectives in the Indian market. Generally, it takes between 6 months to 3 years 
to conclude the negotiations and to draft the agreement (SBP Board of Consultants 
and Engineers, 1995). On the basis of the Indo-German experience, Vicziany (1993) 
mentions similar time frames. 
5.2.1 Preparing for the Negotiation 
The companies considering joint venturing need extensive preparation before they 
engage in formal negotiations to establish DV relationships. According to Richards & 
Walsh (1990, p. 7), "... effective negotiators carefully think out their own position and 
that of their opponent". Ill-prepared parties are unlikely to attain a desired 
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performance level in the negotiation process. At the negotiating table, it becomes 
difficult for them to precisely spell out their own needs and objectives. Also, they are 
likely to lack understanding of their counterpart's requirements. To overcome these 
difficulties and to obtain a desirable outcome, comprehensive and detailed planning is 
necessary (Urban, 1996; Usunier, 1996). 
Richards & Walsh (1990) identify a set of preparatory tasks, from which the following 
are worth mentioning here: (a) Determine your own needs, i.e., the negotiators require 
to choose, from a host of needs and objectives, the realistic and practical ones; (b) 
Check your assumptions, i.e., the negotiators need to assess the reliability of their 
assumptions which are guesses based on probabilities. Sometimes they tend to 
become facts or seem to be facts which may have disastrous consequences; (c) Stick to 
the facts, i.e., extensive research should be aimed at gathering reliable and relevant 
information on the ability and weaknesses of the counterparts which is the key to 
successful negotiation; (d) Define the issues, i.e., all the important issues should be 
categorised, clearly defined and understood before the negotiation starts; and (e) 
Remember your opponent's needs, i.e., the negotiators should be ready to appreciate 
the opponent's legitimate needs with due consideration. 
The negotiator should also give due consideration to the appropriateness of the 
negotiation style. It is important to choose a negotiating style beforehand from a 
range of possible negotiating styles. Three of them are widely practised (Richards & 
Walsh, 1990). These are competitive, subordinative and cooperative styles. The 
competitive style always looks for a superiority and triumph over the opponent. Very 
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often it involves egos and loss of face. Because of its rigid nature, demonstration of 
dominance by one party over the others and the lack of flexibility, this is not 
considered as an ideal mode of negotiation style. The subordinative style, on the other 
hand, is characterised by regular capitulation to the other side. The negotiators 
adopting this style are likely to offer concessions which are inappropriate and uncalled 
for. The third style is the collaborative one. This is known generally as the best 
possible negotiating style (Richards & Walsh, 1990). It aims at exploiting the 
strengths and weaknesses of both negotiating teams. This style is .characterised by the 
willingness of both parties to reach an agreement based on mutual trust and respect. 
With a readiness to offer reasonable concessions, both sides focus on the tangible 
requirements of joint venture arrangements, rather than the personalities. This style 
augments better coordination of team efforts and a more equitable distribution of risk 
and workload. 
There is a range of issues which should be considered important during the 
preparatory stage of a negotiation process. These are, the initial approach to joint 
venture, number of firms contacted, information gathering, preparation time, appraisal 
of own as well as partner's needs, the use of additional arguments, number of 
meetings, financial involvement, pre-contract training and the level of management 
involved. 
Initial Approach To joint venture, the party making the first offer to commence a 
negotiation process must be carefully scrutinised. Prior to making such an offer, a 
party must study the market and the suitability of its prospective partner. By acquiring 
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such information, the initiating party achieves a competitive edge over its counterpart. 
In addition, this demonstrates the readiness of the party in this respect. Alternatively, 
a potential partner may be chosen from among the firms with existing business 
relationships. Because of the presence of such relationships, the approaching firm 
may need to spend relatively less time and money in gathering information about the 
suitability of its prospective partner. 
Number of Firms Initially Contacted to Select a Partner Fatehi (1996), Geissbauer 
& Siemsen (1996), Harrigan (1986) and Howarth, et al. (1995) confirm that choosing 
the right partner through an extensive screening process is important for a future joint 
venture relationship. It is important to consider all possible options before selecting a 
partner. In this respect, an extensive search for an appropriate partner may involve 
contacting more than one prospective partner during the screening process. It is 
particularly important in a country, such as India because the selection of a wrong 
partner may have devastating consequences on a joint venture arrangement 
(Geissbauer & Siemsen, 1996). 
Major Sources Used to Gather Information About the Prospective Partner It is 
essential to gather relevant information about a future partner prior to the formal 
negotiation commencing (Hendon, et al., 1996; Salacuse, 1992). According to 
Salacuse (1992), a negotiator should learn as much as possible about the other party 
before making an international business deal. This allows firms to develop 
knowledge of the negotiation strength of the prospective partners as well as their 
abilities to contribute to the proposed UV operation. 
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Reputation of prospective partner, in this respect, may also be considered important. 
According to Saxton (1997), a positive reputation may be regarded as a valuable 
intangible asset for a firm to establish a sustainable competitive advantage. The 
prospective firm's reputation in the areas of management, product quality and 
financial position may be worth examining (Dollinger et a/., cited in Saxton, 1997). 
Successful negotiators, according to Gottlieb & Healy (1990), demonstrate an 
understanding of the other's position. In the Indian context, it is argued that incorrect 
or inadequate information about the prospective local partner's strength and 
weaknesses is one of the major problems faced by foreign firms' willingness to 
establish LJVs in India (Kohli, 1996). 
Period of Time Spent in Preparing for the Formal Negotiation The length of time 
to be devoted to international business negotiations should be considered carefully by 
the negotiating parties (Hendon et al., 1996; Usunier, 1996). Time spent during the 
preparatory stage of negotiations is likely to have important implications for the entire 
negotiation process because an array of factors require considerable attention at this 
stage. Among these, collecting information about the prospective partner and their 
culture, formation of one's own negotiating team, identification of an appropriate 
objective and strategy, and ensuring monetary as well as moral commitment from the 
organisation, are critical (Hendon, et al., 1996). Copeland & Griggs (1996) argue that 
a more considered preparation time allows the firms to get to know their counterparts 
better, and to revisit details again and again until a total understanding is reached. 
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Appraisal of Own as well as Partner's Needs According to Casse (1992), it is 
essential that the negotiating firm has thorough knowledge about its own requirements 
as well as the expectations of its prospective partner. This understanding helps in 
examining the objectives of the parties with respect to their respective needs and to 
determine if these are mutually supportive. Through identifying one's own and the 
other party's underlying interests, the negotiating teams may decide upon their 
respective 'bottom lines', i.e., how much they are willing to concede regarding their 
own objectives and how much they are likely to achieve from the negotiations 
(Hendon, et al., 1996). If the two parties to the negotiation have two different sets of 
needs and objectives that are not mutually supportive, the formation of UVs will not 
be a viable option. 
The Use of Additional Arguments/Resources In the event of possible failure of a 
negotiation, the use of additional arguments/resources may provide a fall-back 
situation for a firm (Dupont, 1996). The use of such additional arguments/resources 
may offer additional resources or alternative arrangements other than immediate UV 
objectives, which could see a result reached. In this circumstance, as a move to create 
a relationship to exploit the market, the parties may opt for a licensing agreement or 
other arrangements instead of establishing an UV. Moreover, the negotiating firms 
may commit additional resources to rescue a nearly failed negotiation or to gain a 
more powerful position in the proposed DV arrangement. Nonetheless, this is a vital 
part of the extensive preparatory stage of the negotiation process. 
110 
Number of Meetings Held Prior to the Final Negotiation During the preparatory 
stage, informal meetings between the prospective partners may help the negotiating 
parties to closely examine each other's position (Ghauri, 1996). These meetings may 
benefit the parties in building a social, informal relationship and to interrogate each 
other's management style and organisational culture. In addition, it may offer other 
valuable information about the prospective partners. Visits to each other's firms by 
the key negotiators may also assist in creating mutual trust and confidence. According 
to Adler (1991, p.197), 
Effective negotiators must view luncheon, dinner, reception, ceremony, and tour 
invitations as times for interpersonal relationship building, and therefore as key 
to the negotiating process ... (they must) realise that the work of conducting a 
successful negotiation has already begun, even if business has yet to be 
mentioned. 
Financial Involvements The financial investment of a negotiating firm during the 
preparatory stage of negotiations may demonstrate the firm's level of involvement at 
this stage. In general, the more a firm invests during this stage, the more it 
demonstrates the extent of involvement in the process. The costs incurred during the 
preparatory stage may include the costs of travelling, meeting with and entertaining 
the prospective partner, information gathering, training the negotiating team on the 
appropriate negotiation skills and obtaining relevant advice from financial and legal 
experts. These expenses are likely to be reflected in a firm's overall financial 
involvement during the preparatory stage of negotiation. 
Conducting Pre-Contract Training 	It is argued that the pre-contract training of 
managers entrusted with the task of negotiation is important for a successful 
negotiation process (Fuller, 1991). This training is essential to deal with the 
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complicated negotiation matters to be undertaken and to progress towards a desired 
outcome. Shaughnessy (1995) considers that such training helps improve the 
negotiation skills of the parties concerned. The training may include several briefing 
sessions that emphasise the negotiation issues, such as assigning roles to the 
individual members of the team, strategies and style to be used, legal matters and the 
management style and organisational culture of the other negotiating party (Fuller, 
1991; Hendon et al., 1996). 
For a foreign company, understanding host country culture is critical for a successful 
participation in the negotiation process (George, et al., 1998; Hendon, et al., 1996; 
Morris, et al., 1998; Tinsley & Pillutla, 1998). According to Hendon, et al. (1996, p. 
232), "... one should know sufficiently the country and the culture of those with whom 
one is going to negotiate". As discussed earlier in this thesis, India is a country with 
cultural diversity and uniqueness. It is essential for the foreign negotiators to 
understand the host-country culture while negotiating with an Indian firm. Pre-
contract training should render due importance to this issue. Prior knowledge of local 
customs is essential in this respect. 
Management Level Assigned to Negotiate 	Sometimes, the authority of the 
negotiating team may be communicated through the composition of the team. For 
example, when the team is comprised of senior managers, it may be perceived that the 
team is capable of responding to the full range of questions which may be asked, and 
in a legitimate capacity, this team is likely to be able to offer the optimum 
contribution to the negotiation. The firm's decision to assign personnel should be 
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made during the preparatory stage so that the negotiators-elect may prepare 
themselves for the final negotiation. In international business negotiations, the 
common practice is to send a powerful team to negotiate a deal. 
Ghauri (1996a) suggests five sources of power to be the attributes of the negotiators in 
relation to the UV negotiation process. These are, information power, i.e., 
information about the other party as well as the situation; expert power, i.e., 
knowledge of technology and superior know-how; legitimate power, i.e., power with 
official authority; location in structure, i.e., the position of the individual in the overall 
organisational and strategic perspective; and personal power, i.e., the personal 
integrity, attractiveness and friendliness of the negotiators. An ideal negotiating team 
will be comprised of medium to senior managers holding the above-mentioned 
sources of power, with overall authority being someone with legitimate power (e.g., 
CEO or Managing Director). This may be equally desirable for the other party as they 
would know that the team they are dealing with are the persons with authority to sign 
the contract. 
Indians normally prefer to involve senior managers during the negotiation process. 
Any major decision generally comes from the top of the hierarchy (Kohli, 1996). 
Therefore, it is better for the foreign collaborators to deal with senior management to 
reach an agreement within the shortest possible time. Likewise, the Australian firms 
necessarily need to assign senior managers to maintain a balance during the 
discussion, or alternatively, it may be that the negotiation would be constrained by the 
lower level manager's limited authority to make decisions (Copeland & Griggs, 
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1986). 
5.2.2 Formal Negotiation and the Signing of Documents 
The formal negotiation is an important stage of the UV formation process. This phase 
is a complicated one. At the negotiating table, the parties need to maintain a 
congenial atmosphere and place their respective terms and conditions in a decisive 
and thoughtful manner. The parties should be open-minded and must show mutual 
respect to each other's cultural norms and practices. They also need to be flexible to a 
certain extent. These attitudes create the basis of a future relationship between the 
partners. There are six major issues which should be taken into consideration during 
the formal negotiation process. These include, the venue of the final negotiation, 
language's used, major difficulties faced during the process, the signing of a separate 
licensing agreement, time taken to get the approval from the Indian government and 
the use of special efforts to win approval. 
Venue of the Formal/Final Negotiation 	The venue for the negotiation has 
significance to the negotiating parties (Howarth et al., 1995; Rajan & Graham, 1991; 
Usunier, 1996). In general, the venue is likely to be more convenient for the host firm 
because it does not require extra travel time. The local firm can also monitor regular 
business activities while participating in the negotiation process. Those who leave 
their home country to negotiate at their partner's location may for many reasons, both 
professional and personal, suffer a degree of anxiety. Time pressure is a major 
problem for the visiting firms. It is argued that the host firm is likely to have a 
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competitive advantage over its foreign counterparts in terms of time control (Usunier, 
1996); 
Familiarity of the venue is important, which again favours the host firm. However, 
choice of potential overseas partner's location may also be beneficial for the firms 
who leave their home country to negotiate at their partner's location. This may give 
them the opportunity to observe and understand their prospective partners more 
extensively within their own environment. In the case of UV negotiation, the location 
of the UV is vital. Both parties may prefer to formally negotiate the terms and 
conditions in the country where the future venture would be located so that they can 
closely examine the viability of the project on site. Besides choosing a formal venue, 
in recent years, negotiation by facsimile, telephone and/or letter is being practised by 
many companies (Richards & Walsh, 1990). Lately, some companies have begun to 
use video-conferencing as another way to maintain communication and to negotiate 
off-shore arrangements. 
Language/s Used 	According to Fatehi (1996), the language used during the 
negotiation process should be simple and accessible by both the parties. Confusion 
and/or misunderstanding may arise if the language of the negotiation is not understood 
by either of the parties (Ghauri, 1996; Hendon, et al., 1996). Although the majority of 
the Indian population cannot speak or write English, English is widely spoken in 
India's business community and is popularly known as 'the business language of 
India'. Therefore, using English as the language of negotiation should not be a 
problem in negotiating with an Indian company. 
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Major Difficulties Faced During the Formal Negotiation Process 	Difficulties 
must be expected during the formal negotiation process. A tremendous amount of 
effort may be required to overcome these problems. While negotiating an UV 
agreement with an Asian partner, such as an Indian business person, it is always 
advisable for any foreign firm to be flexible during the negotiation process. 
According to Lasserre & Schiitte (1995, p. 192), negotiating such an agreement 
requires an "... unusually high degree of flexibility" from foreign partners. Due to the 
existence of an often dynamic and volatile business environment and the resulting 
changes to regulatory and competitive frameworks, the joint venture agreements may 
call for frequent changes and reinterpretations throughout the negotiation process. 
Signing of Separate Licensing Agreements Signing a separate licensing agreement 
can be important for the firms contributing technological know-how to LIVs located in 
India. These agreements are likely to prevent the licensee from disclosing or making 
use of technological know-how (i.e., intellectual property) beyond the terms of the 
contract accepted by the licensee as a precondition to the disclosure of such 
information (Parker, 1996). In India, any such agreement involving intellectual 
property comes into force and becomes legally binding for the parties once it is 
approved and has been registered by an appropriate government authority (Ramaiah, 
1996). 
According to the Indian law, the formal licensing agreement must accompany the UV 
documents submitted for approval by the appropriate Indian authority (SBP Board of 
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Consultants and Engineers, 1995). This is an extensive process. The licensor, in 
particular, should be very careful in negotiating the agreement. As licensing forms a 
part of an DV agreement, it may be convenient for the parties to negotiate the 
licensing agreement simultaneously with the formal UV negotiation process. This 
may allow the parties to consider the merits and demerits of licensing as a part of a 
comprehensive negotiation mechanism. Because of the apparent risks of 
dissemination of the technologies in high-tech and advanced knowledge projects in 
India (Banks & Natarajan, 1995), it is advisable to sign a comprehensive licensing 
agreement before any form of technology transfer. 
Time and Effort Required to Obtain the Approval As a key stakeholder, the host-
country government may influence the post-negotiation outcomes (Brouthers & 
Bamossy, 1997). Before the parties sign the documents, they must scrutinise the 
agreements thoroughly. It is advantageous to initially prepare a draft of the 
documents. According to Geissbauer & Siemsen (1996), the engagement of an Indian 
law firm and a chartered accountancy firm to scrutinise the draft documents is 
advisable. Agreements may also be interpreted according to the parent-country law 
(Fuller, 1991). Such cross-interpretation of the documents leaves no room for future 
confusion and misunderstanding. 
In India, the DV agreements come into force only after approval by the relevant 
government authority. Application for approval must be lodged in a prescribed 
format (see Appendix I for the format). The letter of intent or memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) signed by the DV partners requires official approval. The 
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MOU, however, is an interim measure and is not a legal requirement of UVs 
(Howarth et al., 1995). Before consideration by the Indian Department of Industrial 
Development, finalisation of the articles of association of the joint venture company 
and conclusion of the license agreements (if any) is required (SBP Board of 
Consultants . and Engineers, 1995; Geissbauer & Siemsen, 1996). Due to excessive 
bureaucracy, it may sometimes become difficult and time-consuming to obtain official 
approvals from the Indian authority which may require about eight months on an 
average after the memorandum of understanding is signed between the parties. 
A prospective local partner with experience and understanding of Indian bureaucratic 
culture may be of immense help in augmenting the approval process. As the Indian 
bureaucracy and political institutions have a reputation for being corrupt and 
inefficient (Thakur, 1993), appropriate lobbying and/or the use of other influences 
may be required to obtain approval in a timely fashion. To rely on local partners with 
excellent contacts to the host-country governing elite is a strategy that has been used 
effectively by many companies (Jeannet & Hennessey, 1992). 
5.2.3 Legal Aspects 
The negotiating parties should be aware of the host-country legal implications in 
relation to the formation of an UV and its future operation. UVs are normally 
governed by the laws of partnership applicable in the country of operation (Howarth, 
et al., 1995). In the Indian legal system, only the documents with clearly written 
rights and duties are legally obligatory. They should also be elaborately detailed in 
conformity with Anglo-Saxon law. However, these agreements are only binding after 
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approval by the Indian authorities. The verbal 'gentleman's agreement', or the view 
that 'friends need no contracts' is not an appropriate way to do business in India 
(Geissbauer & Siemsen, 1996). 
Sergey (1993) considers it important to negotiate legal documents resolving all 
anticipated controversial present and foreseeable issues. Adequate understanding of 
the legal aspects of negotiation in the Indian legal system is essential for Australian 
firms wishing to establish an UV relationship with a host firm in India. There are 
three major legal issues which should be given appropriate consideration during the 
negotiation process. These include, the use of a legal expert/firm during the 
preparatory stage, use of a legal expert/firm to scrutinise the document and 
interpretation of documentation according to Australian law. 
The Use of Legal Expert/Firm During the Preparatory Stage 	There is an array 
of legal matters involved in the formation process of an UV (Pritchard & Fox, 1996). 
It is essential for the foreign firms to understand the host-country legal system and its 
impacts on the negotiation process before the formal negotiation begins (Howarth, et 
al., 1995; Kohli, 1996). Like other emerging economies, the Indian regulatory 
environment has been undergoing constant changes leaving the resulting legal 
framework complicated, rather than refined, for foreign investors. According to 
Webb (1996), the accessibility of existing laws is a common problem in such 
economies. Involvement of numerous regulatory agencies has made the scenario 
further complicated. These include, the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (F1PB) 
in the Office of the Prime Minister, Secretariat of Industrial Approvals (SIA) within 
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the Ministry of Industry of the central government, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), 
the Director General of Foreign Trade, the Company Law Board, the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices 
Commission (MRTPC), Ministry of Finance and the Stock Exchange authorities 
(Price Waterhouse, 1993). 
Foreign negotiators wishing to establish IJVs in India should develop an 
understanding of the intricacy of the Indian legal systems (as discussed in chapter 
during the preparatory stage of the negotiation process. Legal counsel is generally 
required for issues relating to legality of securities, intellectual property, and 
compliance with state and country laws. They should interpret the legal implications 
of different negotiation matters in the light of the existing law of the land. The 
German partners of Indo-German INs in India extensively use corporate lawyers and 
project consultants to prepare the necessary documentation in conformity with Indian 
laws (Geissbauer & Siemsen, 1996). It is customary for foreign investors to appoint 
local legal consultants familiar with the local laws, in addition to using their own legal 
department (Kohli, 1996). 
Use of Legal Expert/Firm to Scrutinise the Document An agreement should be 
comprehensive and unambiguous which anticipates all material contingencies, and 
prescribes methods for dealing with them (Howarth, et al., 1995). The parties should 
be cautious in the first instance about the substance of the documents. The use of 
legal experts/firms in formalising the final agreement is standard in the world of 
international business (Pritchard & Fox, 1996; Usunier & Ghauri, 1996). This assists 
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the concerned firms to avoid future confusion and to maintain their respective 
interests in an orderly manner. According to Copeland & Griggs (1986), the legal 
experts must be kept abreast of developments so that they can prevent later 
embarrassments. 
In the Indian context, once the agreement is signed, it becomes obligatory for both 
parties. If it is signed without necessary scrutiny by the legal experts, the party 
concerned may be at a risk of yielding too much or of signing an agreement which 
may afterwards be considered detrimental to its own interests (Usunier & Ghauri, 
1996). 
In the Indian context, Geissbauer & Siemsen (1996) consider it worthwhile to engage 
an Indian law firm and a chartered accountancy firm to scrutinise the draft documents. 
Interpretation of Document According to Australian Law Every legal system has 
its uniqueness which is influenced by the country-specific customs, traditions and 
ideology (Pritchard, 1996). Interpretations of laws and the objectives of their 
enactment may also vary from country to country because the specific laws are 
legislated to be applied in the country that enacts them (Parra, 1996). Considering 
such intricacies and to avoid possible confusion, the negotiating foreign firms may 
choose to interpret the agreements according to the laws of their own countries. It 
may provide them with a clearer understanding about the documents (Fuller, 1991). 
Without this scrutiny, the "... contracts can mark the origins of disagreement" 
(Shaughnessy, 1995, p. 15). It is advisable, therefore, that the Australian companies 
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interpret the documentation prepared in India according to Australian law to have a 
comprehensive understanding of the contents of the document. 
5.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF IJVs 
Following the formation of an UV, its implementation stage begins. This is the most 
important stage of an UV, the efficient management of which determines the success 
of the venture. At this stage, it is preferable to avoid conflict and to ensure 
maintenance of working relationships between the partners. During this process, UV 
partners may face numerous problems and only learn how to overcome them with 
mutual support and understanding. In addition, they are likely to realise the relative 
importance of various factors only on the basis of day-to-day UV operational 
experience. However, despite efforts made by various authors, factors determining 
successful UV performance remain unclear (Geringer & Hebert, 1991; Parlche, 1993; 
Yan & Gray, 1995). Now, an attempt will be made to elaborate key issues that are 
known to be primarily responsible for the success of an UV during its implementation 
stage. These are the choice of an appropriate partner, management control, HRM 
issues, inter-partner learning, building a separate UV culture and long-term 
commitment. A brief discussion on the frequency of environmental as well as 
organisational-specific difficulties faced by the 'Ws, along with the role of the local 
partners in overcoming them, will ensue. 
5.3.1 Choice of an Appropriate Partner 
The foreign company must identify a reliable partner capable of understanding the UV 
objectives and contributing to its successful operation (Fatehi, 1996; Geissbauer 8z 
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Siemsen 1996; Harrigan, 1986; Howarth et a/. 1995). Although the IJV partners 
would know of the importance of choosing a suitable partner beforehand (during the 
DV formation process), they may realise the importance of this factor during the 
implementation stage more so as they begin joint venturing with each other. 
Nonetheless, the choice of the right partner is considered to be critical for a successful 
joint venture relationship (e.g., Beamish, et a/., 1994). As previously introduced, in 
the Indian context, an DV may have to depend substantially on its local partner 
because of its expertise and familiarity with local market conditions (Geissbauer & 
Siemsen, 1996). 
5.3.2 Management Control 
Management control is another critical determinant of I.JV performance (Geringer & 
Hebert, 1989; Killing, 1983; Schaan, 1983, Yan & Gray, 1995). However, the degree 
of control may vary depending upon the actual arrangements made by the host firm 
and its foreign partner (Schaan, 1988). A comprehensive set of principles guiding the 
DV control mechanism should be agreed upon by both the parties for its effective 
operation. As an entry mode, the DV generally entails a medium level of management 
control exercised by its parents as compared with the other entry modes, such as 
licensing with low level of control and wholly owned subsidiary with high level of 
control (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Hill et al., 1990). In the present context, six 
major issues need be taken into consideration. These are the sharing of decision 
making, level of flexibility, level of equity, level of technology contribution, DV 
board structure and the sharing of DV personnel. 
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Sharing of Decision Making Management control through a balanced sharing of 
decision making is an important success factor for any jointly owned business 
operation (Harrigan, 1986; Radford, 1981; Yan & Gray, 1995). Decision making in 
an UV may reflect the objectives of the individual parent organisations (Geringer, 
1993; Killing, 1983; Schaan, 1983). However, once the UV is set up, the UV 
objectives should be given priority over the individual objectives of the parent firms. 
However, the reciprocity of the contributions made by each of the partners as well as 
the I.IVs during the decision making process is critical for the attainment of UV 
success. 
Level of Flexibility Level of flexibility is another important issue likely to contribute 
to UV success. Flexibility deals with the extent of freedom to be permitted to the 
joint venture management by its parents, and the management roles to be played by 
each partner. It may be argued that the provisions of a flexible UV control mechanism 
could be beneficial for the UV success. According to Bleeke & Ernst (1991), 
flexibility allows joint ventures to overcome problems and to adapt to necessary 
changes over time. They also mentioned that the link between flexibility and success 
is strong, i.e., the more flexible the UV is, the higher the chance of its success. The 
success of German firms in India, which is characterised by flexibility, suggests that 
the flexible attitude of foreign companies is a key success factor for an UV operation 
in India (Geissbauer & Siemsen, 1996). From a sample of 71 LIVs in India and 
Pakistan, Tomlinson (1970) found that UVs evidenced higher levels of profitability 
when their parents assumed a more relaxed attitude toward control. However, the 
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parents must retain a clear recognition of the ongoing performance of the venture 
(Tichy, 1988). 
Level of Equity The level of equity participation by the partners may influence the 
level of management control, which, in turn, may affect UV success (Geringer, 1993; 
Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Gullander, 1976; Tomlinson, 1970; Yan & Gray, 1995)1 
Equity level may impact on the decision of how the UV is managed. There are, 
however, contrasting views on the relationship between the probability of success and 
the level of equity participation. On the basis of previous studies, Harrigan (1986) 
introduced a controversy regarding the impact of ownership split on the UV control, 
i.e., whether a 50/50 split is a better option or an asymmetric ownership structure 
(such as 51/49 or 65/35), as a control mechanism. Phatak (1997) recognises that a 
multinational company will obviously maintain an effective control over an UV if it 
owns a majority of the venture's equity. 
Geringer (1993) suggests that many firms frequently seek majority ownership because 
of their intention of achieving substantial management control. He further mentioned 
that the majority ownership might limit unintended diffusion of technology or other 
know-how as the dominant partner exercises tighter control over the joint venture. It 
is also argued that the majority ownership might allow decisions to be made rapidly in 
response to market or product developments and thus avoid costly compromises or 
decision-making deadlocks (Banks, 1981). On the contrary, a HBR study of 49 
partnerships, suggests that because of the balance of control maintained by the 
partners, joint ventures with an even split of ownership have a higher success rate 
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(60%) than those in which one partner holds a majority stake (31%) (Bleeke & Ernst, 
1991). Nonetheless, equity level is perceived to have an impact on the management 
control of an UV, which, in turn, is likely to affect its success. Geringer (1993) and 
Habib (1987) consider any attempt made by a partner to manipulate the decision 
making process on the basis of relative equity in the joint venture may adversely affect 
mutual respect and understanding between the partners and diminishes the prospect of 
the venture's long-term survival. 
Level of Technology Contribution The level of technology contribution is another 
critical factor that may influence the management control process of an UV, which, in 
turn is likely to impact upon the UV success (Hagedoorn & Schalcenraad, 1990). In 
particular, any form of technology contribution through a licensing agreement may 
provide significant control to the contributing firm over the UV (Luostarinen & 
Welch, 1990). As Phatak (1997, p. 268) noted, 
... actual control over a joint venture can be exercised by an international 
company through a license agreement. When the joint venture cannot operate 
effectively without the license, and the license is terminable by the international 
company, the significance of the license to the control of the joint venture is 
obvious. 
IJV Board Structure The UV board structure may play an important role in the 
control of an 1JY, and thereby influence the success of the UV. According to Phatak 
(1997), one of the mechanisms to obtain management control in an UV is via a 
majority representation on the board of directors. However, Geringer (1993) argues 
that because of the tendency for making major UV decisions by consensus, majority 
representation in the UV board may be relatively unimportant with respect to 
management control. Based on a study of nearly 20 joint ventures, Gullander (1976) 
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argued that the majority equity shareholders are likely to have managerial control in a 
joint venture since they have the right to dominate the board of directors. 
Sharing of IJV Personnel Control through staffing and staff loyalty is another 
important issue to consider (Dowling et a/., 1989; Geringer, 1993; Schaan 1988). 
Negandhi (1987, P.  23) considered it as an "... indirect control through personnel". 
Key DV positions, such as the general manager may play an important role in this 
respect (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). A study by As-Saber, et a/. (1998) has found that 
many foreign companies exercise control over Indian IWs through the selection and 
recruitment of DV personnel. In this respect, influencing the DV staffing decisions 
has been considered a critical control factor. 
5.3.3 HRM Issues 
Efficient management of various HR issues is another key factor which may 
substantially contribute to DV success (As-Saber et al., 1997; Dowling, 1986; 
Schuler, et al., 1991; Sluijs & Schuler, 1994). Effective management of HR issues 
was viewed by McDonald's as one of the most important factors in achieving IJV 
success in Moscow (Geringer, 1993). In the present context, six major issues are 
taken into consideration. These include appropriate selection of DV personnel, use of 
experienced PCNs, training of expatriate managers about Indian culture, training of 
Indian managers about Australian culture, provision of special compensation to 
expatriates and using HCNs in key DV positions. 
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Appropriate Selection of IJV Personnel Sluijs & Schuler (1994) considered a 
systematic approach to the selection of UV personnel as an essential precondition for 
a successful UV. Dowling (1986) and Schann & Beamish (1988) supported this 
view. Hofstede (1994) considers the availability of suitable people at the right 
moment as the main task of multinational human resource management. Supporting 
this argument, Sluijs & Schuler (1994) report that a systematic approach to initial 
hiring and job descriptions is essential for a successful UV. The UV general 
manager's position, in particular, can affect UV performance (Schann & Beamish, 
1988) because the general manager is responsible for maintaining relationships with 
each of the partners as well as running the venture. As a consequence, the selection, 
training, evaluation and performance appraisal of UV general managers can 
significantly affect not only the venture itself, but also its relationship with each 
partner (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). This issue has been discussed in a more detail in 
chapter N. 
Use of Experienced PCNs Transferring experienced PCNs to the UV is critical for 
the success of an IJY. An experienced PCN must have managerial and technical 
competence along with the ability to cope with the foreign environment (Dowling, et 
al., 1994; Murray & Murray, 1986). According to Datta & Rasheed (1993, p. 264), 
... a venture is very unlikely to succeed if parents are hesitant to assign their 
most qualified people or, worse still, if they view the UV as a "dumping ground" 
for sidetracked or poorly performing managers. 
Therefore, employing the right expatriate in the right place is one of the importani 
preconditions for the success of an UV. It is particularly critical when HCNs lack 
technical knowhow of a technology imported from a foreign partner. As a 
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consequence, despite the involvement of a significant amount of costs and challenges, 
many parent companies continue to rely on transferring their key staff to the IJV 
(Dowling, et al., 1999). At the initial stage of IJV operation, the use of experienced 
expatriates alongside HCNs may also create rapport and assist in building mutual 
respect and understanding among staff pooled from both partners. 
Training of Expatriate Managers about Indian Culture A comprehensive cross-
cultural training programme is likely to enable the expatriate managers to understand 
and adapt to the foreign culture (Datta & Rasheed, 1993; Geringer, 1993; Tung, 
1981). India is a country with a complex cultural array with a massive population 
base which is predominantly agrarian with 14 recognised languages, seven major 
religions and numerous castes. Diversity, therefore, is the root of the complex cultural 
disposition in India that has significant impact on the Indian management style 
(Husain, 1994; Sharma, 1984). As a consequence, it is advisable for expatriates to 
learn about Indian culture prior to taking up appointments in this country. A 
comprehensive training program can be useful in this respect. 
Training of Indian Managers About Australian Culture As an industrialised 
developed country, Australia has a different cultural establishment than does India. 
According to Grant (1982, pp. 1X, 5), Australia is a nation loyal to the West and 
primarily comprised of "...convicts and immigrants". With a huge land mass and 
relatively small population, Australia is a "... Western culture - developed and 
wealthy, without a peasant class" (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 1995a, p. 7). As a consequence, the Australian management style is clearly 
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Western in nature and practice. It will be advantageous for Indian managers 
appointed to the Australian-Indian LIVs to understand Australian culture and 
management style. An extensive training program, clearly, can be useful in this 
respect. 
Provision of Special Compensation to Expatriates As was suggested earlier, the 
foreign partner firms should second their better managers to an UV (Datta & Rasheed, 
1993). However, to attract the better manager to a new environment is not necessarily 
straightforward. This may require the provision of special compensation (Dowling, et 
al., 1999). In a seminal work, Compensating Key Personnel Overseas, Teague (1972) 
noted the importance of maintaining expatriate compensation relativity with their head 
quarter-based PCN colleagues while compensating for the costs of international 
service. Expatriates are also required to be compensated for qualitative differences 
between the assignment locations (Reynolds, 1986). This is particularly relevant to 
the Australian expatriates transferred to India because of the extremely low standard 
of living in India compared with that of Australia. 
Using HCNs in Key IJV Positions There are many advantages of using HCNs in the 
key UV positions. According to Dowling, et al. (1994), these include elimination of 
language and other barriers, reduction of hiring costs, improvement in the continuity 
of management since HCNs are likely to stay longer in the position and creating high 
morale among HCNs as they can readily see the career potential. Li (1995, p. 337) 
argues that the UVs 
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... frequently assign management tasks to local partners who are better qualified 
than home country individuals to manage the local labour force and 
relationships with suppliers, buyers, and governments. 
Due to the availability of well-educated and experienced managers in India, locals 
may be used to manage the venture. Many multinationals operating in India have 
been extensively using HCNs in their Indian operations entrusting key positions to 
local management talent (Jacob, 1992; Vicziany, 1993). 
5.3.4 Inter-Partner Learning 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter IV, UVs create the opportunities for inter-partner 
learning (Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988). According to Doz and Sheun (1988), 
companies often form joint ventures to leverage their capabilities and to learn from 
one another. Superior information exchange among the partners is the core of such 
learning processes (Harrigan, 1986). Dodgson's (1993) view, in this respect, is more 
comprehensive. He noted that there are potential advantages to be gained through 
joint venturing as it performs a means of securing access to technologies, skills and 
information. 
The joint venture partners also can learn from each other about different cultural 
norms that may help gradual convergence of cultural differences and build a separate 
UV culture. Learning through the dissemination of knowledge among the members of 
an organisation is critical for achieving organisational objectives. It helps improve the 
level of mutual trust and understanding among them and creates a more favourable 
working atmosphere. Fast learning, in this respect, is very important to achieving a 
competitive advantage. According to Stata (1989, p. 64), "... the rate at which 
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individuals and organizations learn may become the only sustainable competitive 
advantage". 
5.3.5 Building a Separate UV Culture 
Building a separate UV culture is another important pre-condition for the success of 
an UV. In a cross-cultural venture, it is important to develop an integrated teamwork 
culture, rather than an `us-them' culture (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). This makes 
coordination easier and facilitates better performance. However, at the outset, some 
kind of assessment of the prevailing organisational culture may be useful for any 
future direction necessary to address the issue of cultural divergence within the 
organisation. Hofstede (1994) considers such assessment by an independent party as 
generally necessary. This helps identify different subcultures within the 1JY which 
may guide the decision makers to select appropriate approaches to bridge the 
differences and build a separate UV culture. 
Datta (1988) argues that the differences of organisational cultures may create 
misunderstandings between partners. There are various ways to moderate 
organisational cultural differences. Intensive on-the-job training for both expatriates 
and locals may reduce the psychic distance between them and help build a team spirit 
in such cross-cultural environments (Dowling, et al., 1994). This may also be done 
through reciprocal arrangements between the foreign companies and their overseas 
operations to exchange managers, engineers and others (Zeira & Pazy, 1985). These 
may help gradual convergence of cultural differences and build a separate UV culture. 
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Hofstede (1994) considers the familiar aspects of organisational life such as 
organisational structures, leadership styles, motivation patterns, and training and 
development patterns culturally relative, and these need to be reviewed when borders 
are crossed. He further argues that in such a scenario, a corporate culture needs to 
evolve with unique features. A corporate culture developed along these lines provides 
the venture with a distinctive and competitive advantage. 
For international business venturing in the Indian context, it is important to 
understand that the Indian people are culturally sensitive. The attitude of the foreign 
firm towards the venture and its Indian partner should, however, be straightforward 
and genuine. Commitments should be fulfilled without hesitation. Not delaying the 
transfer of know-how was one of the secrets of German UV success in India 
(Vicziany, 1993). 
5.3.6 Long-Term Commitment 
Long-term commitment of the UV partners is considered to be an important 
precondition for the success of an UV (Dunstan, 1995; Howarth, et al., 1995; Lasserre 
& Schiitte, 1995; Vicziany, 1993). This commitment ensures long-term gains for the 
partners as well as the UV. Frequent shifts of the UV objectives and changes to top 
level management may adversely affect the investors who hold a long-term 
commitment and strategy (Dong, et al., 1993). According to Howarth, et al. (1995, p. 
91), to make such an alliance successful, "... both parties should be prepared to make a 
consistent commitment to the alliance without expecting too much too soon". 
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A foreign company is likely to commit extensive resources of time and money to 
finalise the written UV agreement through a painstaking negotiation process. 
However, it is argued that "... negotiations never end in Asia" and "... a signature on a 
contract does not start a relationship" (Lasserre & Schiitte, 1995, p. 192). Rather, to 
successfully operate an UV in any of the Asian countries including India, requires 
constant energy and attention from both partners. Also, following the establishment 
of an UV, a long waiting period may be needed to realise a profit. Persistence, 
therefore, is important to achieve UV objectives. Experience in the foreign market is 
important. The more experienced the foreign company is with an overseas market, the 
easier it is for that company to understand and exploit the local conditions best. 
A study of the benefits of long term investing found that on an average, the annual 
return for a long term investor is likely to be more than double the return registered by 
a short term investor (Dunstan, 1995). Continuing top management attention is also 
important in this respect (Beamish, et al., 1994). Indo-German joint venture 
experience suggests that any foreign company interested in operating in India must 
have a long term conunitment to learn how to overcome difficulties in the vast but 
complicated Indian market (Vicziany, 1993; Geissbauer & Siemsen, 1996). With 
Indo-German ventures, the average time required to sign a joint venture agreement 
was 10.3 months and another 9.5 months were needed for its approval from the Indian 
government (Vicziany, 1993). These figures suggest that a foreign company must 
have a long term commitment to enter business in India. Another study reveals that 
before registering any return on invested capital in joint ventures in Russia, the 
minimum waiting period ranges from five to ten years (Enen, 1991). 
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5.3.7 Managing Problems through Mutual Support and Understanding 
During the implementation stage, both partners must be aware of the environmental as 
well as the organisational-specific problems. These may be solved through mutual 
support and understanding. In the unfamiliar and rapidly changing Indian business 
environment, assistance from the local partner is extremely important for the success 
of an UV (Tomassen et al., 1998). Also, both partners need to understand each 
other's strengths and limitations so that they can attempt to complement each other. 
This may assist in resolving the organisational-specific problems as well. According 
to Geissbauer & Siemsen (1996), each partner should have specified responsibility in 
terms of the various matters. This helps avoid misunderstandings between partners 
and facilitates speedy decision making. 
In chapters II, DI and IV, based on the extant literature and other information available 
through secondary sources, a range of environmental and organisational-specific 
difficulties have been introduced to present their likely influence on Australian firms 
in motivating them to joint venture with the local Indian firms while investing in 
India. During the implementation stage, these firms are expected to invariably face 
difficulties. Although overcoming these difficulties through mutual support and 
understanding between the UV partners is important for the success of the UV, the 
host partners may contribute significantly to the management of these issues (see 
chapters 11, 111 and IV). According to Thompson & Strickland (1990, p. 168), to 
overcome such difficulties, formation of UVs with local partners are "... sometimes 
the only or best way" to enter and operate in a foreign market. 
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5.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Negotiating an UV is an extensive and complicated management process. Successful 
negotiation that precedes the signing of agreements, on the basis of mutually 
acceptable terms and conditions, forms the basis of an efficient UV framework. There 
are several important issues which need careful attention during the entire negotiation 
process. Good preparation through systematic information gathering and emphasising 
each other's needs and objectives is the first pre-condition for a successful negotiation 
process. This is followed by the efficient management of a formal negotiation process 
to reach mutually acceptable terms and conditions. 
Finally, before signing the documents, it is advisable for the parties to understand the 
legal implications of the documents. For the foreign firm, it is important to grasp the 
host country legal matters regulating the UV operations. They also need to scrutinise 
the agreements thoroughly before finalising and signing the documents. Agreements 
should cover all contingencies to avoid any future possibility of confusion or 
misunderstanding between the parties. In the Indian context, sufficient time and 
resources must be allocated to achieve these outcomes. 
Once the UV is formed, various issues must be accommodated for the venture to have 
any chance of achieving its objectives. These include the choice of an appropriate 
partner, the level of management control, how human resources are to be managed, 
inter-partner learning, the building of a separate UV culture, maintaining a long-term 
commitment and resolving problems through mutual support and understanding. The 
UV management process must provide effective ways to manage human resources, 
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establish joint strategy formulation, create structural linkages, moderate cultural 
differences, provide adequate day-to-day coordination and communication and 
establish a win/win climate (Tichy, 1988). 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND PROPOSITION SETS 
What do these questions do for me? First, they make my theoretical assumptions 
more explicit. Second, they tell me what I want to know most or first;.! will start 
by channeling energy in those directions. My collection of data will be more 
focused and limited (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p.22). 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The contextual literature presented in previous chapters (chapters 11-V) discussed 
various issues, such as motivation, formation and implementation of IJVs in relation 
to Australian-Indian IJVs in India. It is suggested in this chapter that empirical 
inquiry dealing with these issues is still scant. The review of contextual and 
theoretical literature is fundamental to the formation of a conceptual framework that 
provides a basis for the development of the research questions and propositions 
(Babbie, 1992; Sekaran, 1992). 
6.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
According to Miles & Huberman (1994, p. 18), 
... a conceptual framework explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the 
main things to be studied - the key factors, construct or variables - and the 
presumed relationships among them. 
Establishing a conceptual framework is important because at the initial stage of the 
research, it helps to specify what will be studied. In addition, it encourages the 
identification of variables which are relevant to the study, likely relationships among 
them, and the nature of information to be collected. 
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On the basis of the extant literature and other available information, a conceptual 
framework is developed which identifies three major dimensions of Australian-Indian 
UVs to study; viz., first, to what extent do various environmental and organisational-
specific issues influence the decision of Australian companies to joint venture with an 
Indian partner to invest in India; second, what is the process of forming UVs between 
Australian and Indian firms; and third, what are the factors responsible for the 
successful implementation of the Australian-Indian UVs. The study also aims to 
examine the relationships among these constructs; i.e., how the factors influencing the 
selection of UV mode and its formation contribute to the effective implementation 
of UVs. Figure 6.1 demonstrates the conceptual framework for this study. 
Figure 6.1 
Conceptual Framework 
Australian-Indian UVs 
Implementation Motivation 
• Variables Impacting upon the UV 
Motivation: 
Geopolitical Variables 
Other Environmental-
specific Variables 
Organisational-specific 
Variables 
Formation) 
• Preparatory Stage of 
Negotiation 
• Formal Negotiation and 
Signing of the 
Documents 
• Legal Aspects 
• The Choice of an Appropriate 
Partner 
• Management Control 
• HRM Issues 
• Inter-partner Learning 
• Building Separate IJV Culture 
• Long-term Commitment 
• Managing through Mutual 
Support and Understanding 
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6.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research question aims to summarise the conceptual framework. It helps set the 
provisional boundary or operational parameters of the analysis. According to Miles & 
Huberman (1994), setting this boundary is intended to minimise the risk of the 
researcher becoming overwhelmed by the volume of data collected. It keeps the 
researcher "...on track as data collection proceeds" (Yin, 1989, p. 77). Padilla (1994), 
while supporting Miles & Huberman (1994) and Yin (1989), mentions that failure to 
establish a reasonable boundary may result in the risk of collecting unnecessary data 
while possibly overlooking the data that are essential for the study. As does the 
conceptual framework, the research question derives from the extant literature 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). As mentioned already, this is a study of Australian firms' joint 
venturing With Indian firms in India. Accordingly, the research questions framed for 
this study are: 
1. What are the considerations that an Australian firm will bring to bear on the 
decision to choose the IJV as an international business mode of operation in 
another country, specifically India? 
2. What are the processes of formation and implementation of that decision? 
6.4 RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
The conceptual framework, research questions, along with the existing literature and 
other available information were used to frame the propositions. Propositions help 
identify the relevant information about the cases to be studied. It is argued that 
without such propositions, a researcher might be tempted to collect "... everything," 
which is impossible to do (Yin, 1989, p. 31). 
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This is important to note here that the validity of these proposition sets will be 
examined through the use of multiple cases based primarily on face-to-face 
interviews. Accordingly, some of the measures employed are perceptual in nature. 
The researcher is aware that dependence on such measurement tool could lead to a 
concern about subjectivity of responses. It is also considered as one of the limitations 
of this study (see chapter 7.5). 
The propositions framed for this study are divided into five broad categories. The first 
three categories deal with the motivation to form UVs (relevant to research question 
1), the fourth category deals with the formation process and the last category deals 
with the UV implementation stage (the last two categories are relevant to research 
question 2). Each category is preceded by a general statement that broadly represents 
the entire pool of propositions that fall under that category. These categories are five-
fold, and are discussed below. 
6.4.1 Category 1: Geopolitics and its Impact on IJV Motivation 
As revealed in the literature review (chapter II), geopolitics, along with other factors, 
may influence • the motivation of a home-country firm to form an UV with a host-
country firm as a mechanism to exploit an overseas market. However, in the field of 
international business inquiry, very little emphasis has been given to date on this 
factor (As-Saber, et al., 1996b). As an environmental variable, geopolitics 
presumably has certain influences on international business operations. Accordingly, 
it is proposed that geopolitics impacts on the motivation of Australian firms to form 
UVs with Indian partners while investing in India. 
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General Proposition Geopolitical factors may be considered from three different 
dimensions. These are (a) the time dimension, highlighting the historical perspective, 
including such impacts as the colonial, Cold War and post-Cold War eras in the 
present context; (b) the place dimension, focusing on natural resources, geographic 
proximity and regionalism; and (c), the demographic dimension, emphasising the role 
of population size, supply of labour, and ethnic and religious groups. In the 
Australian-Indian business context, it is proposed that these dimensions impact on the 
motivation of Australian firms to joint venture with local partners while investing in 
India. In general, it is proposed 
Pi: Geopolitical factors which impact on the decision to enter the Indian 
market can be represented on three dimensions: a time dimension, a 
place dimension and a demographic dimension. 
Each of these factors, viz., time, place and demographic dimensions is now considered 
separately. 
The Time Dimension The time dimension, such as the impacts of colonial, Cold 
War and post-Cold War eras emphasises the impact of historical perspectives on 
international business operations. It may be argued that the constant change of 
geopolitical relationships among nations (Cohen, 1963; Wallerstein, 1980) is likely to 
affect the international business relationships among them. In the Australian-Indian 
context, the colonial and the Cold War legacies are two major issues of the time 
dimension that may affect the business relationships between these two countries. 
Despite the presence of a number of common business cultures inherited from the 
British colonial legacies, these two countries maintained considerable distance during 
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the Cold War era because of their affiliation to two different political groupings which 
were rivals. In spite of the end of the colonial subjugation and the end of the Cold 
War, their legacies might still affect Australian firms investing in India. It is proposed 
P1.1: Along the time dimension, historical events influence the decisions 
taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the 
Indian market. 
The Place Dimension 	The place dimension of a country, such as the natural 
resources, size and geographic location, has strategic importance in terms of its 
relationships with other countries (Cohen, 1963). Dunning (1977; 1986) considered 
the use of available natural resources and geographic proximity as the location-
specific advantages attracting foreign investments. Geographic size, in this respect, 
may be considered as a natural endowment. It is presumed that the place dimension of 
a host country has impacts on the entry mode decision of the foreign firms. In the 
Australian-Indian context, the geographic proximity between these two countries 
(located within the same Asia-Pacific region), the availability of natural resources in 
India and the regional political and trade arrangements may be considered from this 
perspective. It is proposed 
P1.2: Within the place dimension, the geographic location of India, vis-à-
vis Australia, influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint 
venture with Indian firms to enter the Indian market. 
The Demographic Dimension The demographic dimension is another important 
geopolitical factor. Cohen (1963) described population as a geopolitical variable and 
emphasised its qualitative and ideological characteristics. The size of the population, 
availability of labour, and the presence of ethnic and religious groups are the critical 
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demographic factors that may influence international business operations. In the 
Indian context, the huge population base containing a large middle class with 
enormous purchasing capacity, availability of cheap labour, the presence of ethnic and 
religious rivalry along with the indigenisation movement, and the existence of non-
resident Indians (NRIs) are major demographic factors that may impact on the choice 
of entry mode by Australian investors in India (As-Saber, et al., 1996b). Formation of 
'Ws may be considered as a possible option by Australian firms investing in India 
because it would be easier to manage the geopolitical environment with the active 
collaboration of the host-country partners. It is proposed 
P1.3: Within the demographic dimension, India's population 
characteristics influence the decision taken by Australian firms to joint 
venture with Indian firms to enter the Indian market. 
6.4.2 Category 2: Other Environmental Variables 
Category 2 deals with various environmental factors other than geopolitics. This was 
discussed earlier in the literature review at chapter III. These are the factors 
traditionally recognised as the most influential factors that impact upon the motivation 
to form IJVs. In this study of Australian-Indian IJVs in India, it is proposed that these 
environmental factors influence the formation of IJVs by Australian firms investing in 
India. 
General Proposition Various host-country environmental factors may influence the 
entry mode choice of foreign companies investing in India. These include the host- 
country economic, cultural, legal, political and human resource management 
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frameworks and the foreign firm's accessibility to the market information in India. In 
general, it is proposed 
P2: Host-country environmental factors, such as its economic, cultural, 
legal and political settings, the firm's access to market information and 
its human resource management practices impact on the decision making 
process of the foreign firm as it considers entry into the Indian market. 
Each of these factors, viz., economic, political, legal and regulatory, human resource 
management, availability of market information, and cultural diversity is now 
considered separately. 
Economic Factors 	The host-country economic environment is critical for a 
company's international market entry choice (Dunning, 1986; Hill, et al., 1990; Kim, 
1993). There are various issues that contribute to a country's economic environment. 
These include the level of inflation, exchange rate fluctuations, transactions and other 
costs, market competition, demand conditions, and labour productivity. 
As mentioned in the literature (chapter IQ), despite economic liberalisation through 
continuous reform measures by the Indian Government, India is still experiencing a 
very high inflation rate that is responsible for the devaluation of the Indian Rupee. 
This, in turn, is putting pressure on interest rates. In addition, since the beginning of 
the reform process in 1991, the level of foreign investment in India has been 
increasing at an accelerated pace resulting in an intensely competitive environment for 
both the local and foreign firms. Moreover, the environmental-specific transactions 
costs are substantial for investment in India (chapter 111). In addition to differential 
taxes, the tariff barriers between regions and different packaging requirements are 
concerns for foreign investors. 
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Demand conditions are another economic factor to be considered. In India, the 
demand conditions are uncertain because of the presence of a large poor segment in 
the Indian population. About 80% of its total population falls into low or lower 
middle income group (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994, p. 32). Labour productivity is 
another concern. In India, productivity of labour is known to be significantly low 
(Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995). UVs may be considered 
as a viable option for Australian companies investing in India to better understand and 
manage these matters with the active collaboration from their experienced local 
partners. It is proposed 
P2.1: The macroeconomic environment in India influences the decision 
taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the 
Indian market. 
Political Factors Host-country political factors may greatly affect a firm's choice of 
international market entry mode. India has a volatile political situation with ongoing 
political, ethnic and religious rivalries (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 1995; Hirsh & Majumdar, 1995; The Economist, 27 May, 1995, p. 71; 
Zubrzycki, 1995). The government of India lacks stability. For example, between 
1996 and 1998, India experienced a change of governments on seven occasions. 
According to Czinkota & Ronkainen (1990), the formation of I.IVs may help to 
maintain good relationships with the major stakeholders in a foreign country with 
political instability via the local partners. It is proposed 
P2.2: The political situation in India influences the decision taken by 
Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the Indian 
market. 
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The Legal and Regulatory Environment The host-country legal and regulatory 
environment is likely to have significant impact on a firm's foreign market entry mode 
decision. In the recent years, the Indian legal and regulatory environment has been 
changing constantly along with its ongoing economic liberalisation (East Asia 
Analytical Unit, 1994). This has made the Indian business environment uncertain and 
foreign investors have been finding it difficult to keep themselves abreast of the 
country's prevailing regulatory state. 
As mentioned earlier in chapter ifi, there are regulatory problems, such as high tariffs 
and taxes, the requirement of obtaining government approvals for all foreign 
investments, an over-manned inefficient public sector monopoly of the insurance 
industry with a strong trade union, and a lack of enforcement of intellectual property 
rights. In these circumstances, formation of I.Ws with Indian partners may offer the 
foreign firm a significant advantage. The prospect of drawing upon the local expertise 
of the host firms in accommodating these issues may be seen as a motivation for 
foreign investors to choose the UVs as a preferred modus operandi to enter and invest 
in the Indian market. Therefore, it is proposed 
P2.3: The legal and regulatory environment in India influences the 
decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to 
enter the Indian market. 
Human Resource Management Human resource management has increasingly been 
recognised as a critical element of international business operations (As-Saber, et al., 
1998; Dowling, et al., 1999; Milliman, et al., 1991). It may influence a firm's 
decision to choose the UV mode to invest overseas. This is one of the major concerns 
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for foreign investors wishing to operate in India. There are various HR related factors 
that should be considered by the foreign firms for their investments in India. 
As suggested earlier in chapter 111, although India has a large pool of well-educated 
people, due to the unprecedented demand for skilled workers since the economic 
liberalisation in the early 1990s, it has become very difficult to find and appoint high 
quality local staff. Labour unrest is an additional consideration for firms wishing to 
do business in India. As a consequence, one of the major motivations for foreign 
companies to form INs in India may be to manage these HR-related issues with the 
active collaboration of their local partners familiar with the Indian HR environment. 
Therefore, it is proposed 
P2.4: The nature of human resource management practices in India 
influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with 
Indian firms to enter the Indian market. 
The Lack of Necessary Market Information It is said to be difficult for foreign 
investors to obtain necessary market information in India (East Asia Analytical Unit, 
1994; Rajshekar & Raman, 1994). Formation of IJVs with local partners may be 
advantageous in this respect. The host partner's local expertise and knowledge along 
with a familiarity of possible information sources may help the foreign firm to 
overcome this problem. This assumption may influence the foreign firm to joint 
venture with an Indian partner while investing in India. Thus, it is proposed 
P2.5: The lack of necessary market information in India influences the 
decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to 
enter the Indian market. 
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Cultural Diversity In relatively unfamiliar and culturally distant locations, investing 
firms are likely to adopt the UV mode as a preferred entry option (Awadzi, 1987; 
Benito & Welch, 1994; Berkema et al., 1996; Kogut & Singh, 1988). India, as 
mentioned earlier, has one of the largest and most diverse populations in the world 
with 14 principal languages and over 800 different dialects (East Asia Analytical Unit, 
1994). Also, religions (predominantly Hinduism) have a strong influence on social 
and business activities (Copeland & Griggs, 1986). In addition, corruption being 
rampant and endemic within the Indian society has become a part of India's political, 
bureaucratic and business culture (Asian Business Review, 1995; Thakur, 1993; The 
Economist, 27 May, 1995, p. 71). 
Harris & Moran (1987) note that the recognition of host cultural complexities and 
mixing with the host nationals are two major preconditions for an overseas business 
success. For foreign companies in India, these preconditions may be best achieved 
through the formation of UVs with local partners who can assist in overcoming 
cultural barriers. It is argued that the UV mode serves to minimise the level of 
cultural uncertainty and riskiness (Czinkota & Ronkainen, 1990). This allows the 
foreign firm to understand and exploit the host culture more realistically through the 
support and guidance of their local partners. Therefore, it is proposed 
P2.6: Cultural diversity in India influences the decision taken by 
Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the Indian 
market. 
6.4.3 Category 3: Organisational - Specific Variables 
Category 3 deals with the organisational-specific variables as discussed in the 
literature review (chapter VI). It is proposed that organisational-specific variables 
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impact upon the motivation of Australian firms to form UVs with Indian partners 
while investing in India. 
General Proposition Various organisational-specific factors may influence the entry 
mode choice of foreign companies investing in India. These include economies of 
scale, minimisation of transactions costs, access to distribution networks, sharing 
technology and other resources and inter-partner learning. In general, it is proposed 
P3: Organisational-specific factors impact on the decision taken by 
Australian firms to enter the Indian market through the joint venture 
mode. 
Each of these factors, viz., economies of scale, transactions cost minimisation, access 
to distribution networks, sharing of technology and other resources, and inter-partner 
learning is now considered separately. 
Economies of Scale This is one of the most important organisational-specific 
variables that may motivate foreign firms to establish UV relationships with local 
partners. Formation of UVs through pooling resources and capabilities from two or 
more firms from across national borders is likely to create improved efficiencies of 
large-scale production that reduce per-unit production costs. 
India is a huge market with a population of over nine hundred million people. It is not 
easy to cater for this market as a stand-alone company. A foreign firm might find it 
difficult to identify the preferences of consumers and the actual demand for any 
product. Also, there are incentives for export-oriented investment in India 
(Government of India, 1995). With the cooperative efforts of the UV partners, 
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increased efficiencies can be achieved in production quality and volume. Also, 
market niches might be identified with the help of the host partner's local expertise 
that may result in the most expedient distribution of the end-products. Because of the 
improved product quality and cost-minimisation through mass production, the UV 
products are also likely to be competitive in the export market that may further reduce 
per-unit costs. Therefore, it is proposed 
P3.1: The quest for economies of scale motivates Australian firms to 
joint venture with Indian firms while entering the Indian market. 
Minimisation of Transactions Costs Organisational-specific transactions costs in 
servicing a foreign market may be considerable (see chapter IV)). By choosing the 
UV mode, foreign companies may substantially minimise transactions costs. The 
major transactions costs for the foreign firms investing in India include the costs of 
gathering necessary market information, search and negotiating costs, hiring 
managerial expertise, paying taxes and buying capital equipment and raw material 
inputs. With the active collaboration of the local UV partners, these costs may be 
minimised substantially (Cherrett, 1994; Kogut & Singh, 1988). Therefore, it is 
proposed 
P3.2: Transactions costs minimisation influences the decision taken by 
Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while entering the 
Indian market. 
Access to Distribution Networks Access to the distribution network is critical for a 
firm investing overseas. According to Anderson (1995), access to the partner's 
existing distribution networks is an important motivation for the foreign firms to 
establish UVs with local partners. In the large Indian market, the local partner's 
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existing distribution channels can minimise the costs of the operation substantially. In 
an increasingly competitive environment, this ensures the immediate access of the 
foreign firms to the Indian market. Nonetheless, to cater to the UV needs, the existing 
distribution channels of the local partner may be upgraded or a new distribution 
channel may be required. In both cases, the foreign partner might be able to share 
these costs with its local partner. It is proposed 
P3.3: Access to the distribution networks within the Indian market 
influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with 
Indian firms while entering the Indian market. 
Sharing Resources and Capabilities The sharing of resources and capabilities with 
a local partner is one of the major motivations for the foreign firm to joint venture 
with the local partner to invest in India (see chapter IV). It has been argued that the 
sharing of technological knowhow may influence a firm to joint venture (Hagedoom 
& Schakenraad, 1990; Harrigan, 1986; Lan, 1996). UVs may be used to share and/or 
procure leading-edge technologies while in alliance with companies having such 
capabilities (Hagedoom & Schakenraad, 1990). Sharing of establishment costs and 
R&D expenses are considered another reason for establishing UVs. As mentioned 
earlier, the costs of establishing a business in India are very high (chapter IV). 
Sharing the costs and facilities for research and development (R&D) is another critical 
factor for the motivation to form I.Ws (Katz, 1995). For Indian partners, backward 
access to R&D, design engineering and the capability of product innovation of the 
parent firms is a major source of motivation to form UVs. Sharing the costs of R&D 
and using local researchers at relatively lower cost are two motivations for the 
Australian firms to form UVs in India. Therefore, it is proposed 
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P3.4: Sharing technology, establishment costs and R&D expenses 
influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with 
Indian firms while entering the Indian market. 
Human Resource Management 	Organisational-specific HR issues are to be 
considered while opting for a joint venture. There are a number of such issues that 
might have the potential to influence Australian firms to joint venture with the local 
partners while investing in India. These include selection and recruitment, training and 
development, and the management of labour unrest (see chapter IV). These issues are 
difficult to deal with in a foreign environment as astand-alone company (As-Saber, et 
al., 1997). The minimisation of difficulties in dealing with these organisational-
specific HR issues with the active collaboration of the local partner might influence 
the Australian firm's decision to joint venture with an Indian partner while investing 
in India. Therefore, it is proposed 
P3.5: The organisational-specific human resource management issues 
influence the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with 
Indian firms while entering the Indian market. 
Inter-Partner Learning According to Harrigan (1986) and Kogut (1988), learning 
from each other's knowledge-base is an important motivation to form IJVs. Superior 
information exchange among the partners is the core of such learning processes. 
Typically, this learning happens through the exchange of technical and managerial 
staff between the partners and enhanced interaction among them. Also, joint training 
to learn each other's management culture and the relevant technical knowhow may 
benefit each other. Dunning (1995) considers shared learning experiences as one of 
the key opportunities for such alliance building activities. Foreign firms need to learn 
the complexities of Indian business culture and human resource practices and the 
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Indian firm's quest for learning superior technology and management style can prompt 
the need to form UVs. Therefore, it is proposed 
P3.6: Inter-partner learning influences the decision taken by Australian 
firms to joint venture with Indian firms while entering the Indian market. 
6.4.4 Category 4: I.JV Formation 
After the firm is finally motivated to form an UV, the UV formation process begins. 
This process comprises a series of formal and informal negotiations. On the basis of 
the existing literature (see chapter V for the review of relevant literature), it is 
proposed that the UV negotiation process between Indian and Australian firms is a 
complex one. 
General Proposition A complicated and extensive management process is usually 
involved to form an UV. This process is comprised of three major stages. First is the 
preparation for the negotiation through identifying the needs and requirements of both 
parties; second is the gathering of information on the host-country law regulating UV 
negotiation, with particular emphasis on the legal implications of the final agreements; 
and third is the signing of the documents following a formal negotiation process. In 
general, it is proposed 
P4: Formation of UVs involves an extensive investment in different 
stages of the negotiation process including an understanding of its legal 
aspects. 
Each of the factors involved in such a negotiation process, viz., preparing for the 
negotiation, formal negotiation and legal aspects is now considered separately. 
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Preparing for the Negotiation Once the decision is made to form an DV, and a 
potential partner is identified, an extensive preparation is necessary before the formal 
negotiation begins. Ill-prepared parties are unlikely to attain desired objectives during 
the negotiation process (Richards & Walsh, 1990). During the preparatory stage, a 
range of issues are required to be considered (see chapter V). These are, the initial 
approach, the number of firms contacted, information gathering, preparation time, 
appraisal of own as well as partner's needs, the use of additional arguments, the 
number of meetings, financial involvement, pre-contract training and the level of 
management involved. A consistent negotiation style is required. In addition, if 
possible, a negotiating team should be selected. It is proposed 
P4.1: The Australian firms undertake extensive investment in the 
preparatory stage of joint venture negotiation to arrive at a favourable 
terms of agreement with their Indian counterparts. 
Formal Negotiation The formal negotiation is a major stage of the IJV formation 
process. The appropriate management of this stage is critical for the determination of 
a future relationship between the parties. It also influences the future prospects of the 
UV. At the negotiating table, the parties must maintain a friendly atmosphere and 
place their respective terms and conditions in a thoughtful manner. At the end of the 
formal negotiation, an agreement is reached and a document is prepared for signature. 
Agreements should cover all the relevant issues without ambiguity and the potential 
for possible confusion between the parties during the course of the DV operation must 
be minimised. 
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There are six major issues which should be taken into consideration during the formal 
negotiation process (see chapter V). These include, the venue of the final negotiation, 
language/s uied, major difficulties faced during the process, the signing of a separate 
licensing agreement, the time taken to get the approval from the Indian government 
and the use of special efforts to win the approval. On the basis of this discussion, it is 
proposed 
P4.2: Extensive investment in the formal negotiation process is required 
by the Australian firm to determine the nature of the future relationship 
between the IJV partners in its Indian activities. 
Legal Aspects IJVs are normally governed by the laws of partnership applicable 
within the country of operation (Howarth, et al., 1995). In addition, the legal status 
and the structure of the IJV may vary according to its nature and purpose (Urban, 
1996). This may be reflected in the nature of its incorporation, viz., incorporation as a 
company with unlimited liability, limited partnerships, private limited liability and 
limited liability, for example. 
There are four major legal issues which should be given appropriate consideration 
during the negotiation process (see chapter V). These include, the use of a legal 
expert/firm during the preparatory stage, the use of a legal expert/firm to scrutinise the 
documents and interpretation of documents according to the Australian law. In the 
Indian legal system, only the documents with clearly written rights and duties are 
legally obligatory. They should also be elaborately detailed in conformity with the 
Anglo-Saxon law. However, these agreements are only binding on approval by the 
appropriate Indian authority. Adequate understanding of the legal aspects of 
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negotiation in the Indian legal system is essential for the Australian firms wishing to 
establish UV relationship with a host firm in India. It is proposed 
P4.3: Extensive investment in understanding the legal aspects of 
negotiation in the Indian legal system is essential for the Australian firm 
as it attempts to ensure the security of future courses of action to be 
taken by the UV and its partners. 
6.4.5 Category 5: LTV Implementation 
A variety of factors contributes to the successful implementation of any UV operation 
(see chapter V for the review of relevant literature). This is no exception in the 
context of Australian-Indian UVs in India. 
General Proposition There are various factors that impact upon the successful 
implementation of UVs. These include the choice of an appropriate Indian partner, a 
consistent UV control mechanism, efficient management of human resources, 
retaining organisational knowledge and inter-partner learning, building a separate UV 
culture, long-term commitment, and managing environmental-specific as well as 
organisational-specific inhibitive factors. In general, it is proposed 
Ps: Various environmental-specific as well as organisational-specific 
factors impact on the likelihood of success of Australian-Indian joint 
ventures in India. 
Each of these factors is now considered separately. 
Partner Selection Selection of an appropriate partner is critical for UV success (see 
chapter V). The foreign company must find a reliable partner capable of 
understanding the UV objectives and contributing to its successful operation. 
According to Howarth, et al. (1995, 175-176), "... careful thought, screening and 
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analysis may result in the right selection". Although there are many potential partners 
in India (Jacob, 1992), it is not a straightforward task to find and select them. It is 
critically important to judge the partner's capability, trustworthiness and commitment 
for the venture before the agreement is finalised because it is too late to discover that a 
major difficulty exists in the relationship after the agreement has been signed. It is 
proposed 
P5.1: The choice of an appropriate Indian partner is a pre-condition for 
UV success for Australian firms in India. 
Control 	A consistent control process is critical for a successful UV operation 
(Killing, 1983; Schaan, 1983; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Yan and Gray, 1995). There 
should be clear guiding principles in place to accommodate this matter effectively. A 
number of areas need careful examination in addressing this issue. These include, for 
instance, the extent of freedom to be allowed to the joint venture management vis-à-
vis its parents, and the management roles to be played by each partner. However, it 
remains best to maintain a flexible attitude towards this issue. The success of German 
firms in India suggests that a flexible attitude of foreign companies is a key success 
factor for an UV operation in India (Geissbauer & Siemsen, 1996). However, the 
parents must have a clear idea about the ongoing performance of the venture (Tichy, 
1988). In addition, the structures of the UV and its partners may influence the overall 
IJV control mechanism. According to Child (1972), structural configurations may 
reflect the extent of the bureaucratic strategy of control. It is proposed 
P5.2: The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian 
partners depends upon the effectiveness of the control mechanism 
adopted. 
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Human Resource Management As mentioned in chapter V, human resource 
management is another key factor which may substantially contribute to the success of 
the I.JV (As-Saber, et al., 1998; Dowling, 1986; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Schuler, et 
al., 1991; Slujis & Schuler, 1986). Various HR-related issues, such as selection and 
recruitment, training and development, and performance appraisal are important to 
consider. Another critical HR issue is the representation of managers in the UVs. It is 
important for the foreign company to come to an agreement regarding personnel 
sharing. They must hire people cautiously because once hired, it is not easy to dismiss 
employees under Indian labour law (The Economist, 9 April, 1994, pp. 15, 76-78). 
Therefore, it is proposed 
P5.3: The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners 
depends upon the efficient management of human resources. 
Inter-Partner Learning This important issue can affect UV success (see chapter 
IV). Essentially, any such collaboration creates opportunities for inter-partner 
learning (Dunning, 1995; Hamel, 1991; Harrigan, 1986; Teece, 1977). In the Indian 
context, a practical knowledge of the diverse markets across India is invaluable for 
foreign companies doing business in this country. Dealing with the bureaucracy and 
politics is another major learning hurdle for foreign investors. Moreover, as 
mentioned earlier, gathering basic market information very often becomes difficult for 
foreign companies. In this context, the foreign companies may rely on its UV partners 
to learn the art of managing these issues more effectively. For Indian companies, ITSIs 
are considered as a source of learning and imitating superior management practices 
and technical abilities from their foreign partners. It is proposed 
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P5.4: The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners 
depends upon efficient inter-partner learning. 
Building a Separate IJV Culture 	As mentioned earlier (chapter V), in a cross- 
cultural venture, it is important to develop an integrated teamwork culture, rather than 
an 'us-them' culture (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). This makes coordination easier and 
facilitates better performance. Because of the presence of cultural sensitivities in 
India, the attitude of the foreign firm towards the venture and its Indian partner should 
be straightforward and genuine and any commitments should be fulfilled without 
hesitation.(Copeland & Griggs, 1986). It is proposed 
P5.5: The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners 
depends upon the building of a separate UV culture. 
Long-Term Commitment This is another important UV success factor (see chapter 
V). A foreign company is likely to commit extensive resources of time and money to 
finalise the written UV agreement through a painstaking negotiation process which 
may only register the beginning of involvement in the Indian market. To successfully 
operate an UV in any of the Asian countries, such as in India, requires long-term 
commitment from both partners (Hendon, et al., 1996). Experience in the present, 
and other foreign markets is important. The longer the local involvement, the easier it 
is for the foreign company to understand and exploit the local conditions better. There 
is an experience curve effect in doing business in foreign countries. It is proposed 
P5.6: The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners 
depends upon a long-term commitment to the host market. 
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Managing Problems through Mutual Support and Understanding As mentioned 
in chapter V, both the partners require an awareness and understanding of the 
environmental as well as the organisational-specific problems in order to overcome 
them. This objective can only be achieved through mutual support and understanding. 
In the unfamiliar and fast changing Indian business environment, assistance from the 
local partner is critically important for the UV success. Both partners must identify 
each other's strengths and limitations so that they can truly complement each other. It 
is proposed 
P5.7: The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners 
depends upon the manner in which environmental-specific inhibitive 
factors are managed. 
P5.8: The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners 
depends upon the manner in which organisational-specific inhibitive 
factors are managed. 
6.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
It is important to decide the provisional boundary of any research undertaking. This 
assists in guiding the researcher to retain focus and to avoid taking cognisance of 
circumstances not relevant or which are loosely connected to the investigation. This 
domain may be determined through the construction of a conceptual framework and 
consequent preparation of a research question and proposition sets. 
Based on the extant literature and other available information, a conceptual 
framework is reported for this study as a primary step to assist in establishing general 
propositions in order to guide the investigation in an appropriate direction. This 
helps streamline the ideas to be developed and depicts who and what are to be studied. 
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The research question derives from the conceptual framework, which further delimits 
the specific area or the boundary of the research. Propositions are specified to focus 
the inquiry on the important issues to be investigated within the domain of the 
research interest. Each proposition directs attention to one only of these issues to be 
examined within the scope of the investigation. In this chapter, the conceptual 
framework is established, a research question is framed and proposition sets are 
prepared which are critical to guide this research investigation. 
162 
CHAPTER VII 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
There is never a single, standard, correct method of carrying out a piece of 
research. Do not wait to start your research until you find the proper approach 
because there are many ways to tackle a problem - some good, some bad but 
probably several good ways. There is no single perfect design (Simon, 1969, 
p. 4). 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The literature (chapters II-V) reviewed in this thesis reveals that LTVs, as an 
increasingly popular international business mode, are receiving growing interest from 
researchers and business practitioners from around the globe. It also demonstrates the 
existence of a wide range of theoretical and empirical studies on various IJV issues. 
However, while such contributions must not be devalued, it is argued that an 
understanding of some LTV issues is still limited in scope and in depth (Yan & Gray, 
1995). Likewise, studies addressing various aspects of Australian-Indian international 
joint ventures are relatively sparse. 
Moreover, the few studies of these IJVs (As-Saber et al., 1996, 1997, 1998; Dowling 
et al., 1996; Vicziany, 1993, 1994) that have been reported have not offered adequate 
attention to the diverse issues pertaining to Indian-Australian IJVs. The increasing 
number of Indian-Australian IJVs, along with the presence of a limited number of 
studies on them has prompted this study. In examining 'Ws from three different 
perspectives viz., the motivation to form IJVs, IJV formation and their 
implementation, this study seeks to develop a better understanding of these factors 
using a case study method. By adopting in-depth, comparative case study method, 
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this research aims to investigate various issues in relation to nine Australian-Indian 
IJVs in India. 
This chapter describes the research design and methodology applied in the research 
reported in this thesis. 
7.2 RATIONALE FOR THE CASE STUDY METHOD 
Case study method is applied to investigate research objects intensively. According to 
Stake (1994, p. 237), "... a case is both the process of learning about the case and the 
product of our learning". It helps generate comprehensive understanding about any 
particular phenomenon. Yin (1989, p. 3) considers case study method as a process to 
investigate "... a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context". It is argued 
that the case study method is rigorous and with a sound philosophical basis (Perry & 
Coote, 1994). This is an approach that yields a rich detail of activities not available 
through questionnaires (Eisenhardt, 1989; Larsson, 1993; Yin, 1989). It is a 
methodology primarily based on interviews. However, multiple sources of evidence 
are used simultaneously (Yin, 1989). 
In cross-cultural studies, researchers face problems in comparing data due to the 
variance of culture and other country-specific attributes. Also, a major 
methodological problem is to evaluate various issues within different organisational 
contexts such as size, technology, location and market position that may have 
encouraged the formation of various shared frame of references (Dowling & Nagel, 
1986; Negandhi, 1975). Accordingly, while conducting any such research, due 
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attention is required to be given to overcome these problems; otherwise, serious 
inferential and substantive errors may arise (Mullen, 1995; Singh, 1995; Yan & Gray, 
1995). However, it is likely to be more difficult to address the culture-specific 
differences and to quantify the findings through survey method because of its focus on 
minimal or an absence of real-life experiences. 
On the basis of prior research findings on selected UV issues, Yan & Gray (1995) 
revealed contradictory and inconclusive results which prompted them to conduct 
another research investigation on similar issues using a case study method. They 
asserted that this method is more able to isolate out misunderstandings and 
inconsistencies in the explanation of particular UV issues. Case study method 
provides detailed explanations that survey methods overlook and it offers the prospect 
of new insights into the relationships between different variables (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Yan & Gray, 1995; Yin, 1989). 
In the present research, emphasis is given to empirical studies primarily based on the 
information obtained through direct interviews. During the process, intensive 
investigation of the research objects is conducted. According to Valdelin (1974, cited 
in Hyder, 1988, p. 65), 
... the intensive observation of the case approach gives opportunity to study 
different aspects and to put them in relation to each other, to put the object in 
relation to its environment and also to utilize the researcher's capacity for 
understanding of the study object. 
However, an iterative process, a combination of deductive and inductive techniques, is 
used in order to capture the complexity and dynamism of the context of real life 
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situations. This allows the researcher to consider the scenario more realistically and 
with flexibility (Babbie, 1992; Hyder, 1988; Perry & Coote, 1994). Prior theories are 
employed as 'templates' for measuring the empirical case study outcomes. In this 
sense, the existing theory helps to interpret the results (Manicas, 1989). This method 
also helps determine which of the theoretically relevant similarities and differences 
are operative by examining empirical cases (Ragin, 1987). 
In addition to collecting data through in-depth interviews, emphasis is given to direct 
observation of real-life situations and written documents. Patton (1990) considers 
these as the three major components of qualitative inquiry. Qualitative methods, 
according to Strauss and Corbin (1990), are generally used to investigate and 
understand a phenomenon about which little is yet known. It was mentioned earlier 
that little investigation has been conducted to date on Australian-Indian IJVs. Also, 
any trend toward forming I.JVs by Australian firms with Indian partners is relatively 
recent. Therefore, qualitative method appears to be the best possible option to 
conduct research on this emerging area of interest. Case studies may be considered as 
the underpinning of qualitative research. Depth and detail of qualitative methods 
typically derive from case studies (Patton, 1990). 
Multiple case studies are conducted in order to avoid possible single-case bias and to 
gather better insights about relevant issues. Multiple cases allow data from the several 
cases to be examined in an iterative process, one which constantly compares theory 
and case findings to seek a close fit between a theory and the data. Eisenhardt (1989, 
p. 541) considers a close fit as an important precondition for good theory building 
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because "... it takes advantage of the new insights possible from the data and yields 
an empirically valid theory". Given the complex nature of the UV relationships, 
comparative case study method is considered particularly appropriate for the study of 
joint ventures (Parkhe, 1993; Yan & Gray, 1995). 
According to Ragin (1987), there are three basic steps in the comparative case 
research strategy. These are, a search for underlying similarities that display some 
common outcome (or characteristic of interest), an identification of the similarities 
that are causally relevant to the phenomenon of interest, and the formulation of a 
general explanation on the basis of similarities identified. Accordingly, Ragin (1987, 
p. 45) considers it as "... the method of agreement". 
7.3 CASE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION 
Nine cases provide the data for this study. Precisely, for this type of study, there is no 
ideal number of cases (Yin, 1989). However, Eisenhardt (1989) advocates between 
four and ten cases. Australian firms have been considered as foreign partners in all of 
the case studies. India was selected as the host country because of the recent interest 
of Australian companies joint venturing in India (Hook, 1995). Other considerations 
for choosing India include the end of the Cold War era and the subsequent economic 
liberalisation process transforming the Indian market into an attractive destination for 
foreign investment (Tait, 1995), Australia's geopolitical proximity to India, and 
emphasis given by the Australian government to the potential of the Indian market 
(East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994). 
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In addition, the researcher's familiarity with the Indian culture and business 
environment has significantly contributed to this decision. According to Brewster, et 
al., (1996), as each researcher brings a particular degree of cultural knowledge and 
expertise to the task in relation to his or her own society or the societies the researcher 
is familiar with, it gives the researcher easier access to understanding these societies. 
7.3.1 Case Selection 
Cases were selected from across different industries, rather than concentrating on a 
particular industry. There are two major rationales for this selection. First, from the 
list published by the Australian Trade Commission's directory (Austrade, 1995), 17 
India-based Indo-Australian UVs were selected for initial correspondence. During the 
primary investigation in early 1995, it was found that all the 'joint ventures' listed in 
the Austrade directory are not UVs according to the standard definition of UVs 
adopted in this study, e.g., the BHP-Kinhill joint venture, Vergola Ltd and BHP Steel 
Coated Product Division (for the definition of UVs, see chapter l). These are either 
technical collaborations or distribution agencies. From the remaining 14 Australian 
parent firms, positive responses to preliminary inquiries were received from eight 
firms with nine UVs (Telstra has two UVs with Indian partners). Hence, from 
information available to the researcher, all available UVs were selected for the study. 
Second, it was considered appropriate to select cases from across different industries 
because of the assumption that this would strengthen the extent of generalisability 
from the available data. According to Gersick (1988), the strategy of diverse 
sampling may be adopted to enhance or improve any generalisations from the research 
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findings. Also, the actual respondents are assumed to 'represent' the larger pool of 
potential respondents, so that data from the smaller number of respondents are 
assumed to represent the data that might have been collected from the entire pool 
(Yin, 1989). This research aims more at literal replication than theoretical replication, 
i.e., it predicts more of the similar results than the contrary ones (Perry & Coote, 
1994). 
7.3.2 Data Collection 
In the collection of data, multiple sources of evidence were used to assist in 
establishing construct validity. For each of the INs, three different entities were 
chosen to interview, viz., the parent (Australian) company, the host (Indian) company 
and the India-based IJV management. This corroboratory mode of data collection 
encouraged the development of converging lines of inquiry. The face-to-face 
interviews were conducted both in India and Australia. The researcher visited India 
twice, and over a period of two months during 1995-96, data on the research objects 
were collected. During the author's first field trip to India in late 1995, unstructured 
interviews with a number of Indian host companies and IJY managements were 
conducted which formed a pilot for the subsequent research (The Open University, 
1979). At that stage, preliminary information was compiled and access procedures 
were verified which are two important steps for case study protocol (Yin, 1989). 
During part of this field-work, the researcher's co-supervisor accompanied him and 
supervised the collection of such evidence. 
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The preliminary evidence collected at that time also helped to shape the conceptual 
framework which eventually guided the identification of the research question and 
propositions. Again, in late 1996, the researcher visited India and collected data from 
all nine IJVs and their host companies through face-to-face interviews. During the 
first two interviews, the research supervisor accompanied the author to provide 
guidance. For this phase, structured questionnaires were used (see Appendix II for 
the questionnaires). 
At the beginning of each of the interviews, the respondent was presented with a brief 
overview of the research project and its objectives. In addition, a systematic 
explanation of the questionnaire was offered to eliminate any chance of confusion and 
ambiguity. During the interviews, information was sought from the respondents on 
behalf of the firms they represent, rather than seeking their personal opinions. This 
requirement was explained and emphasised by the researcher during his introductory 
discussion with each of the respondents. 
Responses on both open-ended and close-ended questions were sought and the 
interviews were recorded on audio tapes for subsequent use in verification of the 
notes, which proved particularly useful for the responses to the open-ended questions. 
Where information was lacking on particular topics or situations, follow-up 
conversations were held by telephone or correspondence was made through facsimile 
communication or by the post. 
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Data from the parent companies were collected in a similar fashion. During the study, 
company documents were used. In addition to personal interviews, other secondary 
sources of evidence were used, such as journal and newspaper articles, company 
documents including annual reports, and information gathered from different 
institutions and personalities having contacts with, and expertise about Australian-
Indian IJVs. This mixed data collection method is also known as data triangulation 
which is used for verification of information obtained (Perry & Coote, 1994; Stake, 
1994). Throughout the study, a systematic chronological order was maintained from 
the identification of problems until the final conclusions. From the instigation of the 
study through the literature review, establishment of the research question and 
proposition sets, identification and selection of research design and methodology, data 
collection and analysis, concluding in interpretation and discussion, a strict adherence 
to order has been maintained in an orthodox fashion. Yin (1989, pp. 102-103) calls it 
the "... chain of evidence". This process further increases the level of construct 
validity. 
This study is an exploratory, empirical study. It adheres to a research process that is 
framed on existing knowledge and postulated relationships, yet being receptive to new 
patterns, relationships and phenomena. It is intended that research findings may be 
interpreted directly, without excluding any variables at the outset. This exploratory 
approach enhances flexibility in order to allow for the possible discovery of new 
relationships or even new variables (Van Maanen et al., 1982). However, based on 
the observation of real-life activities (Yin, 1989), it is recognised that the research 
findings here are more suggestive rather than conclusive. 
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Throughout the research process, a case study protocol was maintained as a tactic for 
increasing quality control and reliability of the case study research (Yin, 1989). The 
protocol includes a number of activities. These are: 
Overview of the Case Study Project An overview generally covers the background 
information about the project, the substantive issues being investigated, and the 
relevant readings about the issues (Yin, 1989). The background information about 
this project was collected at the beginning of the study. As mentioned earlier, there 
are various aspects that constitute the background information for this study. These 
include, information regarding the geopolitical atmosphere affecting Australian-Indian 
business relationships, the existing Indian business environment and its relevance to 
the Australian investment in India, and the frequency of using UVs by the Australian 
companies as an international business mode while investing in India. More detailed 
background information has already been provided in the introductory chapter of this 
thesis. The substantive issues were identified and are stated as the conceptual 
framework which is reported in chapter VI. Relevant readings are discussed in detail 
in chapters II-V. 
Field Procedures Major field procedures include gaining access to case study 
organisations or interviewees, identifying and using general sources of information, 
having sufficient resources while in the field, and making a clear schedule of the data 
collection activities (Yin, 1989). All the necessary field procedures were maintained 
during the course of this study. Initially, nine Australian parent companies were 
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identified, and through them, the UV management and host companies in India were 
accessed. Initial discussions regarding their accessibility were made by telephone, 
with letters sent by facsimile to clarify the research intent. Interviews in these entities 
were conducted and data were collected within a schedule of 14 months. Relevant 
sources of information were identified and general information was collected both in 
India and Australia. This information was used to assist in the analysis and 
interpretation of these data. 
Case Study Questions This is known as "... the heart of the protocol" (Yin, 1989, p. 
76). Questionnaires designed for the interviews were structured but comprised both 
open and close-ended questions, leaving sufficient scope for flexibility. These were 
based on the information gathered from the extant literature, the network of 
informants and the pilot studies. In addition, research supervisors were consulted 
before their finalisation. The interview questions were designed to cover selected 
areas as determined by the conceptual framework. 
Guide for the Case Study Report 	A basic outline of the case study report is 
required to be a part of the protocol (Yin, 1989). In the present study, a tentative 
outline of the report has always been maintained, which, according to Yin (1989), is 
useful for a case study research process. It helps the researchers to be more focussed 
and it facilitates the collection of relevant data rather than data that are only loosely 
related to the research objects. 
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An in-depth interview was conducted in each of the nine UVs. For the eight 
Australian parents selected, nine interviews were conducted. Two separate interviews 
with Telstra were conducted because of the inclusion of two different Telstra-
sponsored UVs in India. For the convenience of data collection and subsequent 
analysis, these responses were, therefore, regarded as responses from two separate 
parent firms, Telstra International-1 and Telstra International-2. 
Because of the involvement of two hosts in one of the LIVs (Telstra-VComm), the 
number of host firms interviewed was ten. In addition, one of the host firms, Godrej 
& Boyce sponsored two UVs. Accordingly, two separate interviews were conducted 
with this firm. For the convenience of data collection and subsequent analysis, these 
responses were, therefore, regarded as responses from two separate host firms, Godrej 
& Boyce-1 and Godrej & Boyce-2. Primarily, one senior manager was interviewed 
from each of the parent firms. However, on a number of occasions, further 
clarification and assistance was provided by other management staff. In all, twenty 
eight entities were interviewed and were visited by the researcher. They include ten 
host firms in India, nine UVs and nine Australian parent firms. 
7.4 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Maintaining an acceptable ethical standard is considered to be an important 
precondition to conducting qualitative research (Emroy & Cooper 1991; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). According to Miles & Huberman (1994, p. 288), it is important to 
... consider the rightness or wrongness of our actions as qualitative researchers 
in relation to the people whose lives we are studying, to our colleagues, and to 
those who sponsor our work. 
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During the course of this research process, ethical consideration was taken into 
account. It was made clear to the interviewees that the information obtained would be 
treated as confidential and only be used for academic purposes. They were also 
assured that the research analysis would be based on the actual interview data without 
any fabrication of information. In respect of some of the information provided by the 
respondents in face-to-face interviews, it was further assured that the sources of 
information would be kept confidential and anonymous. Nevertheless, an attempt was 
made to investigate the cases fully and to generate an authentic profile of these cases. 
7.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
There are limitations in conducting case study research (Dick 1990; Parkhe, 1993). It 
is said to be difficult to integrate the cases with each other during analysis (Yin, 
1989). Specific care was taken to integrate the cases through binding them with the 
research objectives and propositions. Moreover, there can be a lack of generalisability 
in case study analysis. However this, along with the problem of external validity, was 
overcome to some extent through the use of multiple case studies. According to Miles 
& Huberman (1994), one of the major rationales for cross-case analysis is to enhance 
generalisability. 
Moreover, in the current study, the use of diverse cases from across industries 
minimises the risk of a lack of representativeness. According to Yin (1989), careful 
case design and protocol can overcome the problems of lack of rigor and possible 
research bias. This research investigated the real-life situation. Multiple case studies 
help analyse each of the cases in the light of others to strengthen the reliability and 
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validity of the findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, this study interviewed both 
partners in order to allow cross-checking of their responses. Also, the managers of the 
I.Ws were interviewed to further strengthen the validity and reliability of the research 
findings. 
Nevertheless, the researcher faced a number of problems during the course of the 
research. First, as discussed earlier, little choice was available in selecting the cases. 
Second, none of the companies are based in Tasmania, the home of the researcher at 
the time. The parent companies are based in Sydney and Melbourne, approximately 
900 and 500 kilometers respectively from Launceston, Tasmania. The host companies 
and IJVs are located in five different cities in India — Delhi, Bombay, Pune, Calcutta 
and Bangalore. Third, it was difficult to make appointments with the Indian 
companies and the India-based IJVs. The finalisation of appointments was resource 
costly. Long distance telephone calls and faxes were used for communication. This 
was especially difficult because of the researcher's limited time and money, 
particularly for the interviews in India. 
Also, initially, one of the host companies in India and one parent company in 
Australia could not provide adequate information about the motivation and 
negotiation process because of the unavailability of key personnel who dealt with the 
negotiations. In addition, one Australian parent did not provide adequate information 
on the implementation process for confidentiality reasons. However, follow-up 
facsimiles and phone calls made it possible to fill these gaps. Finally, some of the 
measures employed are perceptual in nature which could lead to a concern about the 
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subjectivity of responses. Other difficulties faced during the process are insignificant 
and are discussed in appropriate manner in relevant sections of the analysis. 
7.6 QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 
To assemble data addressed at the above-mentioned propositions, questionnaires were 
prepared for this study (see Appendix II). An appropriate set of questionnaires is 
critical to maintain an efficient research procedure. According to Warwick & 
Lininger (1975, p. 127), the objectives of questionnaire design are to obtain relevant 
information with "... maximal reliability and validity". As this study involves three 
categories of respondents, three sets of questionnaires were prepared. These are 
home-country parent firms (throughout this research, Australian companies are 
referred to as the parent firms), host-country (Indian) firms and the managers of the 
IJVs. The questionnaires for the home-country parent and host-country firms sought 
responses on the three major issues (motivation, formation and implementation). 
However, the questionnaire for the managers of the IJVs deals with the 
implementation stage only because any involvement by the UV management during 
its motivation and formation processes is perceived to be unlikely. 
Both open-ended and closed response questions have been asked in order to collect 
best possible information from the respondents. Open-ended questions are those for 
which respondents have total freedom to provide unrestrained responses, whereas 
closed response questions are those for which the responses are limited by the 
questionnaire design. The virtues of open-ended and closed response questions, 
according to Braudburn and Sudman (1988, p. 147), have been "... one of the most 
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debated topics" in the research literature. However, they do not argue that one is 
superior to the other. The preference for using either of these categories depends on 
the nature of desired responses. Therefore, to collect a comprehensive set of 
responses, a research questionnaire may contain both types of questions. According to 
De Vaus (1986), a combination of open-ended and closed response questions is 
convenient because it helps explore the key variables in a comprehensive manner. 
Closed-ended questions are easier and quicker to address. These are also easier to 
process and facilitate readily group comparisons (Oppenheim, 1992). The chief 
advantage of open-ended or free-response questions is the freedom it provides to the 
respondents. According to Oppenheim (1992, p. 113), "... free-response questions are 
often easy to ask, difficult to answer, and still more difficult to analyse". Taking this 
into account, this research has relied more on closed response questions than open-
ended ones. Open-ended questions were used only sparingly. Davis & Cosenza 
(1988, p. 180) maintain that open-ended questions are often the only alternative when 
"... the researcher knows little of the precise nature of the subject under study". 
To make the closed-ended questions precise and to ensure the appropriateness of the 
choice of responses, utmost caution had been maintained. Relevant extant literature 
was examined. Agencies such as Australian Trade Commission (Austrade) and the 
Indian Trade Consulate in Australia were consulted, and the specialist views of the 
Asia Centre of the University of Tasmania, National Centre for South Asian Studies in 
Melbourne, Indian Institute of Management and Marketing and the Indian Institute of 
Foreign Trade were considered. The real-life situation was also taken into 
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consideration. The researcher visited a number of Australian-Indian INs in India 
prior to finalising the questionnaire in order to pilot questionnaire drafts. These 
activities improved the level of understanding and confidence of the researcher 
regarding the issues under investigation which enabled framing of the questionnaire in 
a precise manner. 
Itemised rating scales were used to frame most of the questions. According to Davis 
& Cosenza (1988), because of the simplicity and adaptability to almost any type of 
measurement situation, these scales are the most frequently used in business research. 
In responding to questions which use these scales, the respondents are to select one of 
a limited number of categories (usually between two and eleven) on a continuum 
applicable to the phenomenon being measured. This research used three point 
itemised rating scales. An example follows: 
Did geographic distance between Australia and India impact on your 
firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El Some impact LI 	No impact at an LI 
This type of scale is also known as the 'intensity' measurement scale (Schuman & 
Presser, 1981, pp. 234-243). Although no filter such as 'I don't know' was added to 
this scale while preparing the questionnaires, responses of this form were carefully 
recorded by the researcher during the interviews. The 'I don't know' responses, when 
occurring, were not overlooked. 
In addition, nominal measures were used to collect nominal or categorical data. 
Oppenheim (1992, p. 156) suggests that these data have "... no underlying continuum, 
no units or intervals which have equal or ordinal properties, and consequently cannot 
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be scaled". An example of such a case is the location of the company headquarters, or 
questions with simple 'yes/no' responses. The demographic questions such as the 
company profile are framed with nominal outcomes. On a number of occasions, an 
'Other, please specify' category was used to allow for unanticipated responses (De 
Vaus, 1986). Multiple choice questions were also used, but sparsely, as a form of 
closed-ended questions. 
Concerns such as the clarity and specificity of questions, appropriate wording, 
simplicity but accuracy, conciseness, neutrality and relevance were considered in 
preparing the questionnaires. Draft questionnaires were circulated among research 
colleagues to glean responses on these issues and subsequent feedback from them 
helped minimise the chance of ambiguity. Davis & Cosenza (1988) emphasise these 
criteria as the preconditions to preparing an ideal questionnaire which virtually leaves 
no room for misunderstandings. 
Questions were segmented into clusters according to the respective category of 
proposition sets. They were also coded to enable ease of data comparison across cases 
(Bradburn & Sudman, 1988; Oppenheim, 1992). Following each of the clusters, the 
respondents were asked for their overall comment on that cluster of questions just 
covered. This approach was included to minimise the chance of missing any vital 
information related to that particular cluster of questions. 
To help reduce errors and omissions by the respondents and the interviewer, the 
questionnaire was prepared to portray a professional appearance (Oppenheim, 1992; 
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Sudman & Bradburn, 1982). Questions were not crowded or split between pages, and 
sufficient space was used to give an uncluttered look and to allow additional room for 
comments (Sudman & Bradbum, 1982; Warwick & Lininger, 1975). Although often 
overlooked in the literature, all three sets of questionnaires finished with a note of 
appreciation (thank you) to the respondents for his/her time and patience in assisting 
the study. 
7.7 INTERPRETATION OF RESPONSES 
Because of the variety of question types used, which depend upon the requirements of 
the relevant information, it is necessary to explain the manner in which interpretation 
of responses will take place. During the discussion of the various response sets in the 
following chapters (chapters VEI-X11), the interpretation techniques will be revealed. 
However, as Australian firms' motivations to joint venture have been examined from 
a variety of perspectives covering three different chapters (chapters VIII-X), an 
explanatory note is attached as Appendix III. 
7.8 THE CASES 
A brief overview of the cases that were used during the course of the research process 
follows. More will be revealed of these cases in subsequent chapters as evidence is 
gleaned from them in addressing the research propositions. The overviews are made 
on the basis of the firms' status as at December, 1996 when the interviews were 
completed. 
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Case One: Modi-Telstra 
Modi-Telstra is a joint venture between Telstra International (Australia) and Modicorp 
(India). The UV is located in the Indian city of Calcutta. It is a cellular service 
provider for the Calcutta region. This is a two-year old UV with total assets of 
approximately A$20 million and employing 103 people. 
Case Two: Telstra-Vcom 
Telstra-Vcom is a tripartite joint venture among Telstra International (Australia), 
Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Ltd (India) and Videsh Sanchar Nigam 
Ltd (VSNL), an Indian public sector enterprise primarily responsible for the overseas 
telecommunications services. This is a service provider for India-wide voice and data 
networks using 'very small aperture terminals' (VSATs). It is a two-year old IJY 
with total assets of approximately A$10 million. Based in Delhi, the company 
employs 62 people. 
Case Three: Atco Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. 
This is a joint venture between Atco Controls Pty. Ltd. (Australia) and Harish 
Soonderji and Family of India. This is a manufacturing UV producing lighting 
control gears. Located in Mumbai (Bombay), this UV is only one year old. It 
employs 15 people. Total assets of this UV are slightly in excess of A$100,000. 
Case Four: Tech-Dry (India) Pvt. Ltd. 
This is a joint venture between Tech-Dry Building Protection Systems Pty Ltd 
(Australia) and S P Bhatnagar of India. It was formed in 1992. As a provider of 
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building protection systems, this is a manufacturing firm. Based in the Indian city of 
Bangalore, this UV employs only 7 people. It has a contract of manufacturing 
(subject to the supply of necessary raw materials by the UV) with an 'application 
company', where 30 people are employed to produce tech-dry components. With 
total assets of just over A$10,000, this UV registered annual total sales of 
approximately A$2 million in 1995-96. 
Case Five: Pioneer Friction Ltd 
This is a joint venture between Futuris Industrial Products Pty Ltd (Australia) and 
Stone India Ltd. Based in the Indian city of Calcutta, it is a manufacturing UV. The 
main product line involves the manufacture of friction materials for railway brakes. 
With an authorised capital of approximately A$4 million, this UV had not yet 
commenced its fully-fledged operation. The agreement was signed in 1995. Most of 
the UV personnel were yet to be hired. 
Case Six: Geometric Software Services Co. Ltd. (GSSL) 
GSSL is a joint venture between Moldflow Pty Ltd (Australia) and Godrej and Boyce 
Co Ltd of India. It is in the business of providing solutions in Imagineering', i.e., 
developing imaginative engineering software solutions. It also develops software in 
the mechanical CAD/CAM area and provides consultancy services in CAD/CAM 
development and re-engineering. Based in Pune, the UV employs 125 people. It has 
been operating since July 1995. With total assets of approximately A$1 million, it 
registered a total sales of A$2.4 million during 1995-96. 
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Case Seven: Godrej Pacific Technology Ltd. (GPTL) 
GPTL is a joint venture between the Tech-Pacific Group (Australia) and Godrej and 
Boyce Co Ltd of India. An information technology provider, GPTL is involved in the 
distribution of computer products and telecommunication networking. It has been 
operating since April 1995. With the UV headquarters in Mumbai, it employs 400 
people located in 24 branches throughout India. Currently GPTL holds total assets of 
approximately A$2 million. 
Case Eight: Indure Warman Ltd. 
Indure Warman is a joint venture between Warman International Ltd. (Australia) and 
Indure Ltd of India. Based in Delhi, the UV is involved in the manufacture of slurry 
pumps that are used for ash/dust handling systems for coal-based thermal power 
stations and steam generating units. The UV is four years old. The number of people 
employed is 408. With total assets of approximately A$200,000, it has annual sales 
of approximately A$550,000. 
Case Nine: ACC-CRA Exploration Ltd. 
This is a joint venture between CRA Exploration Pty Ltd (Australia) and the 
Associated Cement Companies Ltd (ACC) of India. Based in Bangalore, the UV 
involves mineral exploration and future mining. Operating for nearly one year, this 
UV employs 13 people. 
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7.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provides an overview of the research design and methodology used in 
this research. An exploratory case study procedure is followed which appears to be 
the most appropriate way of conducting this type of research with a limited population 
of its universe of interest. An attempt has been made to overcome the limitations of 
lack of generalisability, reliability and validity of data within a case study scenario. 
Throughout the process, a comparative case study method comprising a chain of 
evidence is maintained to best ensure construct validity. The generalisability of 
evidence across the cases endorses the external validity and reliability of the study. 
Nine cases selected across industries further strengthens the reliability of data 
collected. 
To progress better understanding of Australian-Indian IJVs in India, data are collected 
from three types of entities in relation to each of the case studies. These are the 
Australian parent, the Indian host and the DV management. This process allows for 
cross-checking opinions among the three groups on the particular research object. In 
addition to personal interviews, other secondary sources of evidence are used, such as 
journal and newspaper articles, company brochures and annual reports, and 
information was gathered from different institutions and personalities having contacts 
with, and expertise about Australian-Indian IJVs. 
Ethical considerations are also taken into account. Confidentiality of data, and on 
some occasions, the anonymity of the sources (when requested) is maintained. The 
interviewees were also assured that the data would not be used for commercial 
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purposes. The conceptual framework is established from the extant literature and 
information available on Australian-Indian 'Ws from various sources, which include 
the Australian Trade Commission, Australia-India Council, and the Indian Trade 
Counsellor. Subsequently, the research question and the propositions have been 
established from the conceptual framework and the available literature relevant to the 
issues. This process restricted the boundary of inquiry and assisted in overcoming a 
possible limitation of too much flexibility in the case study method of analysis. The 
content of the research questionnaires has been prepared specifically from the 
propositions to assemble appropriate data to address those propositions. 
Overall, this empirical study aims at gathering in-depth information and analysing it 
through an exploratory multiple case study method. However, it is recognised that the 
research findings are more suggestive rather than being conclusive in nature. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
ANALYSIS: IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICS ON THE MOTIVATION OF 
AUSTRALIAN FIRMS TO FORM IJVs WITH INDIAN PARTNERS 
The strategic focus of Australian policy has always been north and east, rather 
than west and north-west across the Indian Ocean. It has been the Pacific 
Ocean and the regions associated with it — South-East Asia, North-East Asia, 
the South Pacific and the Americas — that have commanded our attention ... 
But Australia does have real interests, actual and potential, in the Indian Ocean 
and South Asia — certainly no less with India than with China — and it is 
important that they not be neglected (Evans & Grant, 1991, p. 241). 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
As argued in the literature review (chapter II), geopolitical factors have the potential 
to influence a firm's motivation to opt for the UV mode while investing overseas. In 
this chapter, Australian-Indian I.Ws in India are examined from this perspective. The 
focus of the empirical work to follow in this chapter is that of the Australian firms' 
perspectives. However, to determine whether there is a convergence of views from 
both the Australian and Indian partners' perspectives, an examination of the Indian 
partners' responses are also analysed. The analysis is based on the findings in relation 
to the specific propositions P1.1, P1.2 and PI.3 established at chapter 6.4. A discussion 
emphasising the relevance as well as implications of these research findings with 
respect to the general proposition (proposition Po ensues. 
2 INTERVIEW DATA 
The data collected are presented in three sections. The first section (8.2.1) deals with 
the time dimension of geopolitics, i.e., the historical events that influenced the 
decision of Australian firms to form IJVs with Indian firms to enter the Indian market 
(proposition Pi. 0. The second section (8.2.2) deals with the findings on the role of the 
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place dimension of geopolitics, i.e., the geographic location of India vis-à-vis 
Australia and its influence on the decision of Australian firms to joint venture with a 
local partner while investing in India (proposition P1.2). The third section (8.2.3) 
considers the findings related_ to the demographic dimension of geopolitics, i.e., the 
size of population (market) size, supply of labour and the role of ethnic and religious 
groups in influencing the decision-making of Australian firms to joint venture with an 
Table 8.1 
Frequency of Responses on Geopolitical Variables which Influenced the Firm's 
Decision to Joint Venture* 
Geopolitical variables 
influencing the decision to 
form an IJV 
Level of impact on the entry mode 
decision of the Australian firm' 
Level of impact on the decision 
of Ind'an firms' to joint venture 
with Australian partners 
Signi- 
ficant2 . 
Some 
impact 
No 
impact 
N/A Signi- 
ficant2 - 
Some 
impact 
No 
impact 
N/A 
Time Dimension: 
Colonial legacies 9 1 6 3 
Cold War legacies and India's 
protectionist role in the past 4 1 3 1 1 3 4 2 
Collapse of the USSR 1 6 2 1 4 4 1 
Geopolitical realignment and 
improved relationship with the 
US and its allies 1 4 3 1 8 1 1 
Place Dimension: 
Geographic proximity 4 5 1 6 2 1 
Absence 	of 	common 
membership in regional forums 2 6 1 9 1 
Demographic Dimension: 
Large poor segment 	in the 
Indian population 9 8 2 
Relative absence of NR1s in 
Australia 2 7 8 2 
Neo-Swadeshi movement 1 1 7 2 2 5 1 
Religious 	rivalry 	and 
fundamentalism 9 9 1 
Number of firms falling within each category. 
The numbers of Australian and Indian firms vary. Explanations are already given in chapter VII 
and are also available at the end of Table-1.1 and Table-1.2. 
2 	Nomenclature used is identical to that used in the questionnaire, but for the case of the use of 
'definitely yes' in the questionnaire. For summary purposes, these responses are recorded as 
'significant' throughout this chapter. 
N/A = Not Applicable. This denotes the confidentiality of data or the unawareness of the respondents 
(viz., 'I don't know'). 
Indian partner while investing in India (proposition P1.3). A summary of the frequency 
of responses on geopolitical variables which influenced the firms' decision to joint 
venture is presented in Table 8.1. 
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8.2.1 Time Dimension 
Proposition P1.1 deals with the time dimension of geopolitics and its influence on the 
Australian firms' decisions to joint venture with an Indian partner while investing in 
India. Table 8.2 summarises the responses of Australian firms on various issues 
related to the time dimension. The Indian partners' views on these issues are 
summarised separately in Table 8.3. 
Australian Partners' Responses Table 8.2 shows the responses from each of the 
Australian parents on the impact of historical events in selecting the UV mode. It 
demonstrates that there is little support for the proposition that historical events have 
influenced the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to 
enter Indian market. While most of the Australian companies acknowledged their 
awareness of these geopolitical issues, they did not consider them as a major factor 
during the entry mode decision making process. 
All nine Australian firms interviewed indicated that colonial legacies had no impact 
on their decision to joint venture. However, in terms of the impact of the Cold War 
legacies, a mixed response set was received. Most of the respondents choose `no 
impact' or 'N/A' (recorded as 'I don't know') responses. Only one respondent 
considered this factor had some impact on the entry mode decision. However, the 
impact of the protectionist policy practised by India during the Cold War period was 
acknowledged by most of the Australian parents as being of moderate to significant 
importance. The respondents did not consider the impact of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union as being compelling enough to influence their decisions. 
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Table 8.2 
Sununary of Australian Partners' Responses on the Impact of Historical Events 
(the time dimension) 
Name of the Australian 
parent firm* 
Level of impact of historical events on choosing IJVs with 
Indian partners 
Colonial 
legacies 
Cold War legacies 
and India's 
protectionist past 
Collapse of 
the USSR 
Geopolitical realignment and 
India's improved relationship 
with the US and its allies 
1. Atco Control Pty Ltd No impact No impact No impact No impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International No impact Significant impact 
No impact No impact 
3. Moldflow International 
Pty Ltd No impact N/A N/A N/A 
4. RTZ-CRA No impact Some impact Some impact Significant impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd No impact No impact No impact No impact 
6. Tech-Pacific No impact No impact No impact Some impact 
7. Telstra International-1 
No impact 
Significant impact 
No impact Some impact 
8. Telstra International-2 
No impact 
Significant impact 
No impact Some impact 
9. Warman International 
No impact 
Significant impact 
Some impact Some impact 
For nine IJVs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two 
separate IJVs in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the IJV 
involvements, Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of 
them, Telstra might have faced a different set of environmental variables. 'Felstra International—
l' denotes the findings on the environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to form 
Modi-Telstra, and 'Telstra International-2' denotes these in relation to Telstra-VComm. 
Two of the respondents considered that this factor had some impact on their firm's 
decision to select the UV mode, while the other seven Australian parents either 
mentioned their unawareness of such an impact or considered that it had no influence 
on their decisions. 
With respect to the impact of the geopolitical realignment, a more positive response-
set was received. Five firms acknowledged that this factor had some impact on their 
decision-making. In addition, one firm mentioned that the realignment had a 
significant impact on that firm's decision-making process in selecting an appropriate 
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entry mode strategy. Only three respondents registered their unawareness or 
considered that this factor had no impact on their decision. However, the respondents 
were reluctant to consider the improved relationship between India and the US and its 
allies (e.g., Australia) during the post Cold War era as being sufficiently significant to 
influence the choice of UV mode (Table 8.2). 
Indian Partners' Responses Table 8.3 summarises the responses of each of the 
Indian partners on the time dimension. On the basis of interview data received from 
the Indian host firms, no extreme variation in response on the time dimension was 
found vis-à-vis the Australian parent firms' responses. However, the responses on the 
impacts of colonial and Cold War legacies were slightly different. With respect to the 
impact of the legacy of India's protectionist role during the Cold War period, the 
Indian partners' responses appeared to be less confirmatory than were their Australian 
counterparts. 
Major variation of responses occurred with the impact of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. While the Australian parents extended little support for this impact, half of the 
Indian firm respondents considered it to be of moderate to significant importance in 
influencing their decision to joint venture with the Australian firms. With respect to 
the impact of geopolitical realignment and the improved relationship between India 
and the US and its allies (including) Australia, more support was found from the 
Indian partners than from their Australian counterparts. 
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Table 8.3 
Summary of Indian Partners' Responses on the Impact of Historical Events 
(the time dimension) 
Name of the Indian 
host firm 
Level of impact of historical events on choosing IJVs with 
Australian partners 
Colonial 
legacies 
Cold War legacies 
and India's 
protectionist past 
Collapse of 
the USSR 
Geopolitical realignment and 
India's improved relationship 
with the US and its allies 
1.ACC No impact Some impact Some impact Some impact 
2. Dr. S. P. Bhatnagar N/A N/A Some impact Some impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1* No impact Some impact No impact Some impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2* No impact Some impact No impact Some impact 
5. Harish Sooderjee Some impact No impact Some impact Some impact 
6. IL & FS** N/A No impact No impact No impact 
7. Indure Ltd N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8. Modi Corporation No impact Significant impact Some impact Some impact 
9. Stone India Ltd 
No impact No impact 
Significant 
impact Some impact 
10.VSNL** No impact No impact No impact Some impact 
Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two I.Ws with Australian partners, both of which are 
included in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain UV-specific information. 
`Godrej & Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced during the 
motivation to form GSSL, and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
* 4. The LTV, Telsva-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL & FS, both of which are included in 
this study. 
8.2.2 Place Dimension 
Proposition P1.2 deals with the place dimension of geopolitics and its influence on the 
decision of Australian firms to form IJVs with Indian partners while investing in 
India. Table 8.4 summarises the responses of Australian parents on the impact of the 
place dimension. Indian firms' responses are summarised separately in Table 8.5. In 
the present research context, two major aspects of the place dimension are taken into 
consideration — geographic proximity of Australia to India, and the absence of 
common membership of these two countries in any of the active regional forums. 
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Australian Parents' Responses Table 8.4 summarises the responses of Australian - 
parents on the level of impact of each of the selected issues within the place 
dimension. 
Table 8.4 
Summary of Australian Partners' Responses on the Impact of Geographic 
Proximity and Regional Groupings (the place dimension) 
Name of the Australian 
parent firm* 
Level of impact of geographic proximity and 
regional groupings (the place dimension) 
Geographic 
proximity 
Absence of common 
membership 
1. Atco Control Pty Ltd Some impact No impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International No impact Some impact 
3. Moldflow International Pty Ltd No impact No impact 
4. RTZ-CRA No impact No impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd No impact No impact 
6. Tech-Pacific Some impact No impact 
7. Telstra International-1 Some impact Some impact 
8. Telstra International-2 Some impact Some impact 
9. Warman International No impact No impact 
For nine UVs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two 
separate LIVs in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the UV 
involvements, Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of 
them, Telstra might have faced a different set of environmental variables. l'elstra International-
1' denotes the findings on the environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to form 
Modi-Telstra, and 'Telstra International-2' denotes these in relation to Telstra-VConun. 
Most of the Australian firms showed some support with respect to the impact of 
geographic proximity influencing the UV decision. From the nine parent firms, five 
considered that geographic proximity had some impact on their decision, while four of 
them registered 'no impact'. In terms of the impact of the absence of common 
membership, Australian firms showed little support. Only three respondents 
considered that this factor had some impact on their decision, while six others 
experienced 'no impact' of this factor on their decision. 
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Indian Partners'-Responses Table 8.5 summarises the responses from the Indian 
partners on the impact of the place dimension on their decision to joint venture. Some 
similarities to their Australian counterparts' responses are revealed. Similar to the 
responses of the Australian parents, the majority of the Indian hosts considered 
geographic proximity to have some impact on their decision. However, the Indian 
firms offered relatively stronger support than did their Australian counterparts with 
respect to this factor. Six host firms endorsed 'some impact' and there was one 
'significant impact', while only three responded with 'no impact' or 'N/A'. 
Table 8.5 
Summary of Indian Partners' Responses on the Impact of Geographic Proximity 
and Regional Groupings (the place dimension) 
Name of the Indian 
host firm 
, Level of impact of geographic proximity and 
regional groupings (the place dimension) 
Geographic 
proximity 
Absence of common 
membership 
1. ACC Some imp[act No impact 
2. Dr. S.P. Bhatnagar Significant impact No impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1* Some impact No impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2* Some impact No impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee Some impact No impact 
6. IL & FS** No impact No impact 
7. Indure Ltd N/A N/A 
8. Modi Corporation Some impact No impact 
9. Stone India Ltd No impact No impact 
10. VSNL** Some impact No impact 
Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two IJVs with Australian partners, both of which are 
included in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain IN-specific information. 
`Godrej & Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced during the 
motivation to form GSSL, and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
* * The IJV, Telstra-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL & FS, both of which are included in 
this study. 
The data from the Indian host firms offered no support for the impact of the absence 
of a common membership in the regional groupings on their decision. Nine Indian 
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• firms indicated that this factor had no impact on their decision to joint venture:- Only 
one Indian firm registered its unawareness of such an impact ('N/A'). Although the 
data from the Australian parents are somewhat more supportive of this proposition 
than are the data from the Indian host firms, the Australian parent firms' responses in 
aggregate tend to offer only limited support. The majority of Australian parents and 
Indian host firms partially supported geographic proximity between Australia and 
India as having an impact on the decision to joint venture, whereas most of the 
respondents, both Australian and Indian, registered little or no impact in relation to the 
absence of a common membership in regional forums. 
8.2.3 Demographic Dimension 
Proposition P1.3 deals with the demographic dimension of geopolitics and its influence 
on the decision of Australian firms to form I.JVs with Indian partners while investing 
in India. Table 8.6 summarises the responses from Australian parents on the impact 
of the demographic dimension. Indian firms' responses are summarised separately in 
Table 8.7. 
Australian Parents' Responses 	Table 8.6 summarises the responses of the 
Australian parents on the level of impact of each of the demographic issues on their 
decision to joint venture with the Indian firms. All nine Australian parents indicated 
that the large poor segment in the Indian population had no impact on their decision to 
joint venture. Also, the data revealed that the relative absence of non-resident Indians 
(NRIs) in Australia had little impact on their motivation to joint venture. Of the nine 
Australian parents, seven considered that this factor had no impact on their entry 
mode decision. Just two respondents conceded that it had some impact on their 
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decision. In terms of the impact of the Neo-Swadeshi or indigenisation movement in 
India, seven Australian parents indicated that this factor did not have any impact on 
Table 8.6 
Summary of Australian Partners' Responses on the Impact of Demographic 
Characteristics (the demographic dimension) 
Name of the Australian 
parent firm* 
Level of impact of demographic characteristics on 
choosing LIVs with Indian partners 
Large poor 
segment 
Lack of NRIs 
in Australia 
Neo-Swadeshi 
movement 
Religious rivalry 
1.Atco Control Pty Ltd No impact No impact No impact No impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International No impact No impact Significant impact No impact 
3. Moldflow International Pty Ltd No impact No impact No impact No impact 
4. RTZ-CRA No impact No impact No impact No impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd No impact No impact No impact No impact 
6. Tech-Pacific No impact No impact Some impact No impact 
7. Telstra International- 1 No impact Some impact No impact No impact 
8. Telstra International -2 No impact Some impact No impact No impact 
9. Warman International No impact No impact No impact No impact 
For nine UVs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two 
separate IDA in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the UV 
involvements, Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of 
them, Telstra might have faced a different set of environmental variables. `Telstra International-
1' denotes the findings on the environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to form 
Modi-Telstra, and `TeIstra International-2' denotes these in relation to Telstra-VComm. 
their entry mode decision. Within the remaining two, one firm acknowledged that this 
factor had a significant impact while the other conceded it had only limited impact on 
their decision. All nine Australian parents indicated that religious rivalry in India had 
no impact on their decision to joint venture. 
Indian Parents' Responses Table 8.7 summarises the Indian parents' responses on 
the level of impact of each of the demographic issues on their decision to joint venture 
with the Australian firms. From the ten Indian host firms, eight indicated that the 
presence of a large poor segment in the Indian population had no impact on their 
decision to joint venture with the Australian firms. Two expressed an unawareness of 
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the issue. On the two other factors; the relative absence of NRIs in Australia and the: 
ongoing religious rivalry, nine of the Indian firms indicated that these did not have 
Table 8.7 
Summary of Indian Partners' Responses on the Impact of Demographic 
Characteristics (the demographic dimension) 
Name of the Indian 
host firm* 
Level of impact of demographic 
IJVs with Australian partners 
characteristics 
while investing 
Neo-Swadeshi 
movement 
on choosing 
in India 
Religious 
rivalry 
Large poor 
segment 
Lack of NRIs in 
Australia 
1. ACC No impact No impact Some impact No impact 
2. Dr. S.P. Bhatnagar No impact No impact Significant impact No impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1* No impact No impact No impact No impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2* No impact No impact No impact No impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee No impact No impact Significant impact No impact 
6. IL & FS** No impact No impact No impact No impact 
7. Indure Ltd N/A N/A N/A N/A 
8. Modi Corporation N/A No impact No impact No impact 
9. Stone India Ltd No impact No impact No impact No impact 
,10. VSNL** No impact N/A Some impact No impact 
Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two IJVs with Australian partners, both of which are 
included in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain UV-specific information. 
`Godrej & Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced during the 
motivation to form GSSL, and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
** The IN, Telstra-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL & FS, both of which are included in 
this study. 
any impact on their decision, while one expressed its unawareness of these issues in 
this context. The host firms responded with some support with respect to the impact 
of the Neo-Swadeshi or indigenisation movement. Four of the host firms considered 
that this factor had moderate to significant impact on their decision. Five others 
indicated that it did not have any impact on their decision to joint venture with the 
Australian partners, while the remaining one expressed its unawareness of this factor 
in the present context. 
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The responses from the Indian partners are similar to those of -their Australian 
counterparts which provides little support for proposition PI.3. However, there are a 
number of subtle variations between these two response sets. While two of the 
Australian parents indicated some support for the impact of the relative absence of 
NRIs in Australia on their decision, none of the Indian firms acknowledged this factor 
as having any impact on their decision to joint venture with the Australian partners. In 
addition, more Indian companies emphasised the Neo-Swadeshi movement as having 
an impact on their decision than did their Australian counterparts. 
8.3 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION 
On the basis of the data gathered from the nine Australian parents and their ten Indian 
partners, there appears to be limited support for propositions PI.1, P1.2 and PI.3. Most 
of the geopolitical issues across the three different dimensions were considered by 
these firms as being of no or little importance. While most of the Australian and 
Indian companies acknowledged their awareness of these geopolitical issues, they did 
not consider them as being a major factor during their IJV decision making process. 
The implications of these responses are now addressed. To facilitate the discussion, 
in addition to the primary data assembled from the direct face-to-face interviews, 
appropriate secondary data and evidence from the literature will be incorporated. 
However, prior to the evaluation of data, the respondents' contextual patterns need to 
be examined. As explained in chapter VII, it is important to provide the rationale for 
considering data collected from both the partners in order to examine the influence of 
environmental variables on the Australian firms' decision to joint venture with local 
partners while investing in India. 
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For the Australian parents, the section of the questionnaire that dealt with the 
environmental variables was aimed at focusing primarily on the inhibitive issues 
which supposedly discouraged them from investing more extensively in India. 
However, some of the positive issues were also considered to reflect the attractiveness 
of the market. The DV mode might have been chosen to minimise uncertainty and 
riskiness through the active collaboration of their local partners, and to exploit the 
opportunities available in India. 
This same section of the questionnaire was also aimed at focusing on the Indian firms' 
ease and convenience of dealing with these variables. Because of their familiarity 
with the local business environment and their experience in dealing with the 
environmental variables in the local context, the Indian firms are likely to feel more 
comfortable and confident than their Australian counterparts in doing business in 
India. Hence, the Indian firms' abilities to manage inhibitive issues, and their 
expertise in optimising on the exploitation of the favourable ones, are perceived to 
complement the limitations of the Australian firms. Such complementarity may 
reduce the level of uncertainty and riskiness for the Australian firms while investing in 
the unfamiliar Indian market. In addition, this complementarity is further extended 
when the Indian firms find Australian parents capable of contributing to their 
portfolios, e.g., sharing technology, other valuable resources and managerial expertise. 
This, in turn, will effect implications for the entry mode decision by Australian firms. 
An explanatory note on the interpretation of these response sets is included at 
Appendix III. 
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• Discussion on the interview data is now grouped into five sections. The 'first three 
sections consider the three dimensions (propositions P1.1, P1.2 and P1.3), while the 
fourth one will examine the responses with respect to the general question covering all 
three dimensions. A chapter, summary concludes with a brief examination of the. 
general proposition (proposition Pi) and the level of support it has in the data sets 
from across.the three geopolitical dimensions. 
8.3.1 Time Dimension 
Four different historical events were taken into consideration to examine the influence 
of the time dimension upon the Australian firm's motivation to form INs while 
investing in India. These include the colonial experiences of both India and Australia; 
the Cold War legacies and India's protectionist stance during the past; the collapse of 
the Soviet Union; and the geopolitical realignment after the Cold War, including 
India's improved relationships with the US and its allies, in particular Australia. 
Colonial Legacies As mentioned in chapter II, because of their prolonged British 
colonial experience (more than 130 years for Australia, and about 200 years for India), 
both Australia and India share a number of similarities. Both countries have a federal 
system of government. They share similar legal structures. While Australia is an 
English-speaking country, English is widely spoken in India, particularly in the 
business environment. In addition, both countries are members of the Commonwealth 
of Nations. These colonial legacies have long been considered important for 
Australian-Indian relations by the Australian government and business researchers 
(East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994; Gury, 1993; Vicziany, 1993). 
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However, there was no support from any of the nine Australian firms with respect to 
the influence of this factor on their decision to joint venture with their Indian partners. 
When asked for comments, all of the Australian firms expressed their awareness of 
these legacies, but mentioned that they did not consider them during their entry mode 
decision. However, most of the Australian parents indicated that widespread use of 
English and a comparable legal structure in India had some impact on choosing India 
as a possible destination for their investment. They did not consider any other factors 
in relation to their common colonial heritage during their decision to form INs. 
The Indian firms also tend not to support the impact of these factors. Only one of the 
Indian firms indicated that these factors had some impact on its motivation to joint 
venture with its Australian partner. Most of the Indian firms indicated that these 
factors had no impact on their decision while, unlike the Australian respondents, three 
Indian firms declared their unawareness of these factors in the present context. 
Nevertheless, the evidence obtained from the Australian firms does not confirm the 
influence of colonial legacies in motivating their decision to joint venture with the 
Indian partners. Likewise, responses from the Indian partners do not confirm the 
influence of these issues from their perspective. Hence, as environmental variables, 
the colonial legacies are found to be of no or little importance with respect to 
motivating Australian firms to joint venture with Indian partners while investing in 
India. 
Cold War Legacies The Cold War period is important within the time dimension 
considered here, and it might be hypothesised to have a long-term impact on the 
relationships among nations. As argued in chapter II, India's close relationship with 
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the former Soviet Union and hits long isolation from the West during the Cold War 
resulted in a limited relationship with the US and its Western allies, including 
Australia (Gordon, S., 1993; Grant, 1982). Although the end of the Cold War ushered 
in new opportunities for foreign companies considering investing in India, there are 
many aspects of the Indian economy which still reflect Cold War legacies, e.g., the 
maintenance of socialism as one of the State principles of India. For Australia, 
because of its irresolute association with India during the Cold War period, it is likely 
to take some time to improve relationships and to establish mutual trust and 
understanding. This transitional period is hypothesised to affect the Australian 
investment pattern in India. Moreover, because of the presence of 'socialism' as a 
State principle in India (Vohra, 1996), foreign firms may still perceive the threat of 
nationalisation or sequestration of assets by the Indian government. The example of 
Bangladesh, one of India's neighbours, may be relevant in this respect. The 
Bangladesh government nationalised all foreign as well as other private investments in 
the early 1970s in the name of socialism (As-Saber, 1993; Yan, et al., 1995). 
In addition, during the Cold War period, India used to maintain a protectionist policy. 
Excessive tariff and other import barriers, restrictions on currency convertibility, 
dominance of public sector enterprises and restrictions on foreign participation in 
local industries were some of the features of the highly regulated protectionist regime 
in India (As-Saber etal., 1996a; East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994; Lall, 1985). Despite 
India's ongoing economic liberalisation since the early 1990s, the restrictions on 
international business operations have not altogether been withdrawn (Australian 
Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1990; Lall, 1985; 
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McDonald, 1995). Concerns for the reversion to socialism and protectionism might 
well affect the decisions of foreign as well as local firms. 
These concerns were reflected in the responses of the Australian firms. Most of the 
Australian parents indicated that this factor had moderate to significant impact on 
their decision. The formation of 1.1Vs with local partners was seen by them as a 
mechanism to share the risk and uncertainty of any possible revival of the Indian 
government's pro-socialist and protectionist policies. From the Indian firms' 
perspectives, a different set of responses was received. Most of the Indian firms 
responded either with `no impact' or with 'N/A'. Only four considered this factor 
while deciding to choose an Australian UV partner. These firms chose to form IJVs 
with Australian firms so as to share risks and uncertainty. For example, in any 
possible case of sequestration of foreign ownership, the Indian firms involved would 
have priority to acquire the full ownership of the venture. 
However, most of the Indian firms ignored this factor while making the decision on 
joint venture formation. While the Australian firms indicated that this factor had 
moderate to significant impact on their decision to joint venture, responses from the 
Indian firms did not show adequate support for it. Most of the Indian and Australian 
firms, however, expressed their awareness of this factor during their decision making 
processes to form IJVs. A possible explanation for this varying degree of importance 
offered by the Australian firms vis-à-vis their Indian partners may be found in the 
extent of risks and uncertainties perceived by Australian and Indian firms and 
differing attitudes to risks. Accordingly, it may be argued that due to the Indian firms' 
likely exposure to India's protectionist past, they had acquired some adaptability, 
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while for most of the Australian firms, it has always been. an • area fraught with 
uncertainty and riskiness. Therefore, these experiences and the familiarity of the 
Indian partners to local conditions are likely to provide complementary support to the 
Australian parents' concerns of uncertainty and riskiness associated with the Cold 
War legacies and India's protectionist role in the past. This, in turn, motivated most of 
the Australian firms to joint venture. 
Collapse of the USSR The collapse of the Soviet Union that ended the Cold War 
had major implications for Indian as well as for Western firms. Because of India's 
close economic and political relationships with the former USSR, this event 
considerably affected the Indian business environment. Traditionally, the former 
Soviet Union and its East European allies used to occupy a special niche for India 
because trade with them was mostly conducted either by barter or in 'soft' currency 
(Gordon, A., 1993). The transformation of the former East European command 
economies into democratic nations not only largely displaced them as a source of trade 
and technology for India, but turned them into competitors for Western technology 
and capital (Gordon, A., 1993). Moreover, since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
newly emerged Russia has been undergoing a period of massive and difficult political 
as well as economic change and reorganisation. Therefore, realistically, Moscow is no 
more in a position to support any of its allies as vigorously as it could during its Soviet 
era (Singh, 1996). For example, in the area of trade with India, Russia could not keep 
a number of commitments made during the Soviet era (Gordon, A., 1993). In 
addition, Russia's recent focus is more on North Asia, Western Europe and the US 
than with its previous allies such as India. 
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Despite these developments, most of the Australian firms: did not consider-the demise 
of the Soviet Union as a factor motivating their decision to joint venture. Only two 
Australian firms indicated that this event had some impact on their decision because 
they considered the - collapse of the Soviet Union as a factor that might encourage 
India to follow more liberal foreign investment policies than before which could result 
in a better investment climate for foreign firms, including those from Australia. Half 
of the Indian respondents considered that this factor had moderate to significant 
impact on their decision to joint venture with an Australian firm. Specifically, the 
public sector enterprises, such as VSNL mentioned that because of the special trade 
agreement between India and the former Soviet Union, it would have been difficult to 
ignore the inclusion of the Soviet Union in any telecommunication deal during the 
Cold War period. The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed them to negotiate with a 
Western country, such as Australia. 
Another firm, Stone India, a supplier of railway brakes to the Indian Railways, 
indicated that this event had significant impact on choosing an Australian partner. 
The Vice President of this company argued that during the Cold War period, the 
Indian Railways (the only customer of railway brakes in India) tended to buy railway 
brakes from the Soviet Union or its East European allies. This market opened for 
competitive suppliers only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and this generated 
scope to collaborate with reputable Western firms, such as Futuris Brakes 
International of Australia. Most of the Indian and Australian firms expressed their 
awareness of this issue. 
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These data tend to indicate-. that the collapse of the Soviet Union .did not have a 
substantial influence on the Australian firms' decisions, while it had considerable 
impact on at least half of the Indian respondents. A possible explanation of this 
difference could be the influence of the immediate and direct impact of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union on the Indian firms. The Australian firms' positions, regarding this 
factor, may. be observed from a different perspective. Australian firms might have 
considered the broader implications of the end of the Cold War, such as the 
geopolitical realignment and India's subsequent improved relationship with the West 
more seriously than the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. As a consequence, most of 
the Australian respondents did not consider this factor important during the decision 
making process. 
Geopolitical Realignment and India's Improved Relationship with the US and its 
Allies, including Australia The dissolution of the Cold War dramatically changed 
the international geopolitical order. The end of the Cold War rivalry between the two 
ideological-based blocs prompted geopolitical realignment among nations. Without 
Soviet support, India suddenly found itself in a relatively insecure position in the face 
of threats from Pakistan and China. On the other hand, with the demise of the Soviet 
Union and the rise of China as a potential major power, the US started to accept the 
role of India as keeper of the peace in the South Asian region (Gordon, A., 1993). 
Therefore, India's need for technology and foreign capital and the Western responses 
to the emerging power struggle in the South and the East Asia have prompted a new 
geopolitical direction for India in the global as well as regional contexts. As a 
consequence, Pakistan has lost its importance as the protector of Western interests and 
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India, with its enormous market potential, has moved towards the West with the 
Western governments ever vigilant for extended markets. 
In this respect, Garnaut & Drysdale (1994, p. 5) argued that India's new international 
orientation from the early 1990s was partly "... a response to the geopolitical 
realignment associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold 
war". This geopolitical shift is likely to impact the decision of foreign firms willing to 
enter the Indian market. The Australian firms are no exception. Nevertheless, 
because of the ongoing but rapidly changing economic policies, foreign firms are 
likely to consider this transformation with utmost caution. Subsequently, while many 
of the foreign firms might have considered investment in India due to India's 
improved relationships with the West, they would have preferred to form IJVs with 
the local partners in order to share the risks and uncertainties still prevailing there. 
Most of the Australian as well as Indian firms indicated that geopolitical realignment 
and India's improved relationships with the West had moderate to significant impact 
on their decision to joint venture, albeit from different perspectives. The majority of 
the Australian firms mentioned that this factor had impacted because they considered 
it to have a positive influence on the Indian investment environment. In addition, with 
the improved relationship between Australia and India, the cloud of mutual suspicion 
disappeared. However, they argued that despite this improvement, knowledge about 
India remained limited among Australian entrepreneurs. As a consequence, they 
opted for UVs. 
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On the other hand, the majority of Indian firms considered this event - important 
because it assisted in the process of choosing their joint venture partners from among 
the Western countries. Some of them also mentioned that during the Cold War 
period, they knew very little about Australia and its products. An improved 
relationship between these two countries gave them a better chance to know more 
about Australia and this resulted in the choice of Australian partners. The formation of 
IJVs may create synergy to exploit the perceived opportunities created through such 
change in the geopolitical environment. 
Summary 	The interview data gathered from the respondents reflect varying 
responses on the impact of selected historical events. In terms of the colonial 
legacies, most of the Australian firms and their Indian partners indicated that this 
event had no impact on their decision. The evidence on the Cold War legacies and 
India's protectionist role in the past demonstrates the complementarity of skills which 
motivated most of the Australian firms to joint venture, and thereby offers 
considerable support for the proposition, Pi.i. The collapse of the USSR was given 
importance by most of the Indian firms, while the majority of the Australian firms did 
not consider this factor during their decision making process. The geopolitical 
realignment and India's improved relationships with the US and its allies were 
considered by most of the Australian and Indian firms as having a moderate to 
significant impact on their decision, and provide support for the proposition, Pi.i. 
From the four variables examined within the time dimension, there is insufficient 
evidence on the impact of two factors, colonial legacies and the collapse of the USSR, 
to confirm proposition P1.1. The evidence on the impact of two other factors, the Cold 
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War legacies and India's. protectionist role in the past, and the . impact of the 
geopolitical realignment and India's improved relationship with the West including 
Australia, are consistent with the proposition. On the basis of this evidence, partial 
support is established for proposition PIA, viz., along the time dimension, historical 
events influence the decisions taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian 
firms to enter the Indian market. 
8.3.2 Place Dimension 
Two major components of the place dimension were taken into consideration to 
examine the validity of proposition P1.2 that the geographic location of India, vis-à-vis 
Australia, influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with 
Indian firms to enter the Indian market. These include geographic proximity between 
Australia and India, and the absence of Common membership by both India and 
Australia in any of the active regional groupings. 
Most of the Australian firms indicated that the geographic proximity between 
Australia and India did not have any impact on their decision to joint venture, whereas 
this factor was considered by most of the Indian host companies as being of moderate 
to significant importance. The evidence showed that the other factor, the absence of 
common membership of both Australia and India in any active regional forums had 
little or no impact on the decisions of both Australian and Indian firms. 
Geographic Proximity The aerial distance between Australia and India is around 
6000 kilometres. Although, from Australia, India is a little closer than American, 
African or European destinations, it is more distant than most of the other Asia-Pacific 
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neighbours of Australia: This geographic distance may create or at least extend 
psychic distance. As described in chapter II, countries within a close proximity tend 
to treat each other as psychologically 'near' and this assists in creating better prospects 
for trade and investment among neighbouring countries (Kaynak and Stevenson, 
1982; Larimo, 1993). In other words, the closer the geographic proximity, the better 
the prospect of trade and investment because a firm is likely to feel more comfortable 
in doing business in a foreign destination that falls within a close proximity to its 
home country. 
Accordingly, the geographic positioning of Australia vis-à-vis India may incur 
significant transportation and communication costs for Australian firms wishing to 
export to India. The Indian market cannot be considered as a mere extension of the 
Australian domestic market to a geographically and psychologically near country such 
as occurs with New Zealand. The considerable geographic distance between Australia 
and India could militate against the formation of Australian wholly owned subsidiaries 
in India. As a consequence, Australian firms are more likely to form IJVs with local 
partners to minimise the transportation costs and to share such risks and uncertainties 
while investing . in the geographically and therefore, psychologically 'remote' India. 
However, most of the Australian firms interviewed indicated that this factor did not 
have any impact on their decision to joint venture with Indian partners while investing 
in India. Aware of this inhibitive factor, these firms emphasised the use of modern 
transportation and communication networks as a mechanism to overcome any such 
difficulties. Most of the Indian firms, on the other hand, gave importance to this 
factor while considering joint venturing with Australian firms. However, the Indian 
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firms' perspectives, in this respect, were not similar to those of their Australian 
counterparts. They considered Australia as a country within the same Indian ocean 
region. 
In addition, because of a substantial presence of Indians in most of the neighbouring 
countries of Australia such as, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Fiji and Indonesia, the 
geographic distance might not contribute as much to the psychological distance 
between Australia and India as one might expect. Moreover, the nearness of Australia 
to India as compared with most of the European and North American countries 
contributed positively to the decision of the Indian firms to choose Australian 
partners. These data tend to indicate that the geographic proximity between Australia 
and India did not have substantial influence on the Australian firms' decision, while it 
had considerable impact on the majority of the Indian respondents. 
Absence of Common Membership Australia and India both belong to the same Asia-
Pacific region. More precisely, both of them are Indian Ocean littoral countries with 
shared security and economic interests in the region (Gordon, S., 1993). However, as 
mentioned in chapter H, these two countries do not share a common membership in 
any effective regional arrangements. In the absence of such arrangements, Australian 
investments in India appear to be relatively lower as compared to the Australian 
investments in countries belonging to the APEC (ABS, 1995). In addition, as argued 
in chapter II, this might have resulted in a cautious approach by Australian investors 
while investing in India. For Australian companies, this consideration could be 
reflected in the prevalence of the formation of I.JVs with local partners while investing 
in India. 
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Despite the perceived importance of this factor as mentioned above, most of the 
respondents from the Australian firms indicated that this factor had no impact on their 
decision to joint venture. Likewise, this factor was not taken into consideration by 
most of the Indian respondents while deciding upon an Australian partner. However, 
all of the Australian parents and nine Indian partners expressed their awareness of this 
factor in the present context. 
Nevertheless, the evidence obtained from the Australian firms does not confirm the 
influence of this factor in motivating their decision to joint venture with an Indian 
partner while investing in India. Likewise, responses from the Indian partners do not 
confirm its influence from their perspective (while choosing an Australian partner). 
Hence, as an environmental variable, the absence of common membership by both 
Australia and India in any of the regional forums is found to be of no or little 
importance with respect to motivating Australian firms to joint venture with Indian 
partners while investing in India. 
Summary The interview data gathered from the respondents on these two variables 
within the place dimension are insufficient to confirm the proposition P1.2., viz., within 
the place dimension, the geographic location of India, vis-a-vis Australia, influences 
the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the 
Indian market. 
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8.3.3 Demographic Dimension . 
Four different factors were taken into consideration to examine the influence of the 
demographic dimension on the Australian firms' decisions to form I.Ws with local 
partners while investing in India. These include the presence of a large poor segment 
in the Indian population, the relative absence of non-resident Indians (NRIs) in 
Australia, the rise of the Neo-Swadeshi (indigenisation) movement and the ongoing 
religious rivalry in India. Within the demographic dimension, the interview data 
indicate that none of the selected demographic characteristics had considerable impact 
on the decision of Australian and Indian firms. 
Large Poor Segment in the Indian Population India is a country with most of its 
people living below the poverty line (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, 1995). With a low per capita income, about 80% of its total population falls 
into the low or lower middle income group (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994). 
Consumer demand in India is likely to be affected by this population characteristic 
(The Economist, 9 March, 1996, pp. 1-34). IJVs are often used to reduce such 
demand uncertainty (Burgers, et al., 1993). With active collaboration from 
experienced local partners, foreign companies may try to influence market demand 
through collective advertising campaigns, improved product quality, or by creating 
products which are more market-oriented. 
However, there was no support from any of the Australian firms with respect to the 
influence of this factor on their decision to joint venture with the Indian partners. 
When asked for comments, all the Australian firms expressed their awareness of this 
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factor, but mentioned that they did not consider it during -their entry- mode decision. 
The Indian firms also tend not to support the impact of this factor. 
As a possible interpretation, it may be argued that the target market of Australian as 
well as the Indian firms which are included in this study falls into the middle, higher 
middle or the affluent classes of India. A conservative estimate suggests that these 
groups, i.e., the top 10% of the Indian population or about 100 million people 
accounts for over US$100 billion of GNP (Panandiker, 1996). These firms might 
have deliberately identified their market niche without giving any importance to the 
presence of a large poor segment. Hence, as a demographic variable, a large poor 
segment in the Indian population is found to be of no or little importance with respect 
to motivating Australian firms to joint venture with Indian partners while investing in 
India. 
Relative Absence of NRIs in Australia As mentioned in chapter II, non-resident 
Indians (NRIs) play an important role in investing in the Indian market. A significant 
amount of inward foreign investment to India is made by NRLs living in various parts 
of the world (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, and Trade, 1995; Barnathan, 
1995). Moreover, the Indian Government offers preferential benefits to the foreign 
investment initiated by the NRIs (Shunglu, 1996). They also act as catalysts for 
foreign investment. The presence of a strong group of NRIs in a foreign country may 
help to augment the bilateral relations between India and their country of residence, 
which, in turn, impacts upon the volume of inbound foreign investment to India. 
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In Australia, the Indian community is not as involved as they are.in-other-Western 	 
economies (Clad, 1990; Gordon, S., 1993). Because of the relative absence of NRIs 
in Australia (Australian Indians), Australian companies are not in a position to use this 
possible -advantage while doing business in India. As a consequence, the Australian 
companies, interested in investing in India, may still require prospective• Indian 
partners to overcome Indian country-specific difficulties. Despite the importance of 
the perceived role of the Australian Indians as mentioned above, most of the 
Australian firms indicated that this factor did not have any impact on their decision to 
joint venture. The Indian firms also tend not to support the impact of this factor. All 
the Australian firms and eight Indian firms expressed their awareness of this factor, 
while two Indian firms indicated their unawareness of this factor in the present 
context. 
As a possible interpretation, it may be argued that the Australian firms are not familiar 
with, or exposed to, the presence of NRIs, as are their counterparts in Europe and the 
US. Therefore, this factor might not have affected the mindsets of Australian 
managers while deciding the entry mode to invest in India. Hence, as a demographic 
variable, the relative absence of NRLs in Australia is found to be of no or little 
importance with respect to motivating Australian firms to joint venture with Indian 
partners while investing in India. 
Neo-Swadeshi Movement It may be argued that the recent revival of the Neo-
Swadeshi or indigenisation movement has adversely affected the investment climate 
in India contributing to the slow growth of foreign investment (see chapter II). The 
Swadeshi movement was originally launched by Gandhi during the independence 
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movement of India in the 1930s which called for non-cooperation with the British 
India Government and rejection of British goods. The advocates of the Neo -Swadeshi 
movement are again spreading a similar message of rejecting foreign consumer 
goods and condemning extensive foreign investments (The Economist, 24 June, 
1995), which is likely to influence the mode of foreign investment in India. 
As mentioned in chapter II, political parties who espouse this movement share the 
view that local investors should be given priority over foreign investors. These parties 
have adopted the strategy of targeting multinationals in the sensitive consumer goods 
area (The Hindu, 20 November, 1993). It has been argued that the Neo-Swadeshi risk 
may be minimised substantially through the formation of INs with Indian partners 
(As-Saber, et al., 1996b). The local knowledge and familiarity of a partner firm may 
help overcome problems related to such nationalistic intricacies. 
Despite the rise of the Neo -Swadeshi movements in India and apparent risks and 
uncertainties associated with it, most of the Australian respondents did not consider 
this factor during the decision making process. Only two Australian firms indicated 
that it had moderate or significant impact on their decision to joint venture. Five 
Indian respondents also indicated that this factor had no impact on their decision. 
However, four of the Indian firms responded with the statement that this factor had 
significant or moderate impact on their decision. One Indian firm expressed its 
unawareness of this factor in the present context. Thus, Indian responses are disparate 
and far from conclusive. 
216 
As a possible interpretation, it may be argued that the Indian proponents of the Neo-
Swadeshi movement are likely to be relatively more antagonistic to the British or 
European companies because of their colonial past, and to US involvement because of 
their perceived 'big brother' attitude. Australia, being a middle power within the 
Asia-Pacific region, might not be considered as a threat to the Indian economy or 
culture. Two of the Indian respondents confirmed this observation during the 
interview. Hence, the option of Australia as a UV partner is likely to be more 
welcoming to the Indian counterpart than the other Western firms. This factor might 
have influenced the Australian firms while joint venturing in India. Therefore, as a 
demographic variable, the emergence of the Neo-Swadeshi movement in India is 
found to be of no or little importance in motivating Australian firms to joint venture 
with Indian partners while investing in India. 
Religious Rivalry The recent rise of the Hindu religious fundamentalism, Hindutva, 
in India might be expected to influence the level as well as the mode of foreign 
investment in India. As argued in chapter II, the rise of Hindu nationalism as reflected 
in the Hindutva has its roots both in the past and the present (Grant, 1982). India's 
colonisation by the Muslims from Central Asia for hundreds of years, followed by the 
British may be considered primarily responsible for the rise of Hindutva (Taylor, 
1991). Since the 1980s, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its allies have been 
capitalising on this religious sentiment and have finally succeeded in winning election 
and power. 
It may be argued here that the political uncertainty due to the rise of the Hindu 
chauvinism may be an impediment to foreign investment in India. However, any such 
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• risks may be minimised substantially through the formation of IJVs with a local 
partner. The local knowledge and familiarity of a partner firm are likely to help 
overcome problems related to such religious rivalries. 
There was no support from any of the nine Australian firms with respect to the 
influence of this factor on their decision to joint venture with the Indian partners. 
When asked for comments, all of the Australian firms expressed their awareness of 
this factor, but mentioned that they did not consider it during their entry mode 
decision. The Indian firms also tend not to support the impact of this factor. Most of 
the Indian firms indicated that this factor had no impact on their decision, while, 
unlike Australian respondents, one Indian firm declared its unawareness of this factor. 
When asked for an interpretation of responses, one of the Australian respondents 
mentioned that they did not consider the religious rivalry because of their perception 
that this factor might not have any significant impact on the business environment in 
India. This respondent also indicated that despite the presence of religious rivalries in 
many Asian countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and the Philippines, 
international business will continue without facing any major problem created from 
these rivalries. As a possible interpretation, it may further be argued that the 
Australians managers who are more familiar with a society with social and religious 
harmony might not have realised the possible consequences of religious rivalry in a 
country like India. Hence, as a demographic variable, the ongoing religious rivalry is 
found to be of no or little importance with respect to motivating Australian firms to 
joint venture with Indian partners while investing in India. 
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Summary The interview data gathered from the respondents indicate that none of 
the selected demographic characteristics - the presence of a large poor segment in the 
Indian population, the relative absence of NRIs in Australia, the rise of the Neo-
Swadeshi movement and the ongoing religious rivalry had considerable impact on the 
decisions of the Australian firms and their Indian counterparts to joint venture. 
Hence, the available evidence does not support proposition PI.3, viz., within the 
demographic dimension, India's population characteristics influence the decision 
taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the Indian market. 
8.3.4 Responses on the Impact of the Overall Geopolitical Environment 
In addition to the questions asked separately on the individual geopolitical 
dimensions, the respondents were asked a general question on the impact of the 
geopolitical environment as a whole on their decision to joint venture. The question 
was designed to capture the views from the respondents on the combined impact 
Table 8.8 
Frequency of the Responses on the Geopolitical Environment (Combination of 
all Dimensions) affecting the Firms' Decisions to Joint Venture 
Level of impact on the entry mode 
decision of Australian firms 
Level of impact on the decision of 
Indian firms to joint venture with 
Australian partners 
Significant Some 
impact 
No 
impact 
N/A Significant Some 
impact 
No 
impact 
N/A 
2 4 3 2 5 3 
Of all three geopolitical dimensions. When asked this question, the respondents 
tended to be more supportive of it than were the responses from the questions asked 
on each of the dimensions separately. 
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Table 8.8 lists the responses of both the Australian and Indian firms on the overall 
impact of the geopolitical environment on their decision to joint venture. Most of the 
Australian as well as the Indian firms indicated that the geopolitical environment as a 
whole had moderate to significant impact on their decision. This evidence is mostly 
inconsistent with the findings on the individual dimensions. Individually, only one 
dimension, i.e., the time dimension had limited impact on the decision of the 
Australian firms to joint venture, whereas the other two dimension had little or no 
impact. 
As a possible explanation, it may be argued that the responses on the general overall 
questions might have suffered from a confounding of effects where the respondents 
had difficulties in disentangling the separate and partial effects of each of the 
dimensions. It might well be that if the respondents felt that there was some support 
for a dimension, they might have felt committed to indicating some support for the 
full grouping of dimensions. Nonetheless, the responses on the general overall 
question may have provided some global opinion about the geopolitical environment, 
but not an in-depth one specific to any particular dimension. Hence, as a key outcome 
of this particular finding, it may be implied that to obtain useable implications of the 
geopolitical environment on any international business operation, it is important to 
disagg-regate geopolitics into its various dimensions. Because of this seemingly 
ambiguous outcome, it is advisable for future research to consider each of these 
dimensions separately if the geopolitical environment and its possible implications are 
to be best captured. 
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8.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Despite the proposed influence of the geopolitical scenario in motivating the 
Australian firms to joint venture with local partners while investing in India, the 
evidence suggests that geopolitics has had limited impact on the participants' 
motivations. The evidence has only partially supported proposition Pi.t. Propositions 
P1.2 and P I .3 were not confirmed by the available data. Accordingly, only the time 
dimension had some impact on the Australian firms' motivations to joint venture, 
whereas the two other dimensions, the place dimension and the demographic 
dimension had little or no impact. According to one of the Australian parents, 
Although we knew that there was a presence of various geopolitical variables 
around us, we did not emphasise much on those factors during our decision 
making process to joint venture. We rather considered it more important to 
focus upon the other environmental-specific variables such as the economic 
and legal environments and human resource practices in India that apparently 
had immediate implications to our decision. 
However, when asked the general question on the impact of geopolitics (incorporating 
all the three dimensions globally), the responses tended to be more supportive than the 
responses were found to be on the questions asked on each of the dimensions treated 
separately. Most of the Indian and Australian firms indicated that the geopolitical 
environment, as a global construct, had moderate to significant impact on their 
decision. As a possible explanation, it has been argued that this difference in outcome 
might be possible because of a compounding of effects where the respondents had 
difficulties in disentangling the separate and partial effects of each of the dimensions. 
However, despite the.apparent lack of depth of this finding, it might be illustrative of 
a general opinion by the respondents about the geopolitical environment. In addition, 
it has assisted to generate possible guidance for future research in that it might be 
advisable to consider each of the geopolitical dimensions separately. 
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Overall, on the evidence presented in this chapter, it appears that geopolitical factors 
have only partially motivated Australian firms to choose the UV mode to enter the 
Indian market. Hence, it could be deemed that the weight of the evidence, in general, 
is only partially supportive of the general proposition (Pi), viz., the geopolitical 
factors which impact on the decision to enter the Indian market can be represented on 
three dimensions: a time dimension, a place dimension and a demographic dimension. 
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CHAPTER IX 
IMPACTS OF SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL VARIABLES ON THE 
FORMATION OF AUSTRALIAN-INDIAN IJVs 
Different countries have different political, economic, and legal systems. Cultural 
practices can vary dramatically from country to country, as can the education and 
skill level of the population, while different countries are at different stages of 
economic development. All of these differences have major implications for the 
practice of international business (Hill, 1997, p. 32). 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed earlier, apart from the geopolitical variables, other environmental factors 
might have influenced the Australian firms to establish IJVs with Indian partners to 
invest in India. These factors are economic, political, regulatory, human resource 
management related and cultural. On the basis of the data from across the nine cases, 
this chapter examines the influence of these environmental-specific variables in 
motivating Australian firms to joint venture with their Indian partners. The primary 
focus is that of the Australian firms' perspectives. However, to determine whether there 
is a convergence or complementarity of views between both partners' perspectives, an 
examination of the Indian partners' responses is undertaken. The analysis is based on the 
findings in relation to the specific propositions P2.1, P2.2, P2.3, P2.4, P2.5 and P2.6 
established at chapter 6.4. A discussion emphasising the relevance as well as 
implications of these research findings with respect to the general proposition 
(proposition P2) ensues. 
9.2 INTERVIEW DATA 
The data collected are presented in six sections. The first section (9.2.1) deals with the 
economics factors, i.e., the macroeconomic environment in India that influenced the 
decision of Australian firms to form INs with Indian firms to enter the Indian market 
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Table 9.1 
Frequency of other Environmental Variables which influenced the Firms' Decisions 
to Joint Venture* 
Environmental variables 
influencing the decision to form 
an UV 
Level of impact on the decision 
. 	of Australian firms' 
Level of impact on the decision 
of Indian firms' 	- 
Signi- 
ficant2 
Some 
impact 
No 
impact 
N/A Signi- 
ficant2 
Some 
impact 
No 
impact 
N/A 
Economic Environment: 
Level of inflation 2 1 6 7 
Exchange rate fluctuations 2 3 4 1 1 6 
Transactions cost minimisation 5 1 3 3 2 4 1 
Market competition 3 2 4 4 4 2 
Uncertain demand conditions 2 - 7 - - 7 3 
Rapid market access 5 2 2 2 5 3 
Political Environment: 
Frequent change of governments 2 4 3 - 1 6 3 
Ongoing separatist movements 1 4 3 1 - - 8 
Ongoing religious rivalry 1 - 8 8 2 
Protests from the environmentalists 1 3 5 8 2 
Regulatory Environment: 
Import duties and tariffs 5 3 - 1 3 2 4 1 
Taxation law 5 1 2 1 - - 10 
Foreign investment policies 7 2 6 4 
Public sector monopoly of 
insurance industry - - 8 1 - - 8 2 
Intellectual property rights 2 4 2 1 - - 8 2 
Automatic approval procedures 3 2 3 1 3 3 4 
Changing regulatory environment 4 4 1 5 3 2 
Human Resource Management: 
Low labour productivity in India 2 3 4 - - 7 3 
Lack of consistent exit policy 1 2 6 7 3 
'Militant and obstructionist' nature 
of Indian labour forces 2 - 7 
8 2 
Lack of high quality local staff 2 1 5 1 8 
Lack of Necessary Market 
Information 1 4 4 7 3 
Cultural Factors: 
Cultural distance and unfamiliarity 2 3 3 1 8 2 
Dealing with corruption and 
bureaucracy 6 - 2 1 1 8 1 
Number of firms falling within each category. 
The numbers of Australian and Indian firms vary. Explanations are given in chapter VII and 
are also available as notes at the end of Table 1.1 and Table 1.2. 
2 	Nomenclature used is identical to that used in the questionnaire, but for the case of the use of 
'definitely yes' in the questionnaire. For summary purposes, these responses are recorded as 
'significant' throughout this chapter. 
N/A = Not Applicable. This denotes the confidentiality of data or the unawareness of the 
respondents 	CI don't know'). 
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(proposition P2.1). The second section (9.2.2) considers the findings on the impact of 
political factors, i.e., the political environment in India that influenced that decision 
(proposition P2.2). The third section (9.2.3) deals with the legal and regulatory factors 
that influenced the decision (proposition P2.3). The fourth section (9.2.4) reflects on the 
human resource management issues (proposition P2.4). The fifth section (9.2.5) deals 
with the availability of necessary market information in India, i.e., the lack of market 
information in India that influenced the decision of Australian firms to joint venture with 
a local partner (proposition P2.5). Finally, the sixth section (9.2.6) considers the cultural 
environment in India and its impact on the decision to joint venture (proposition P2.1). A 
summary of the data forming the basis of this chapter is presented in Table 9.1. 
9.2.1 Economic Environment 
Proposition P2.1 deals with the economic environment in India. Table 9.2 summarises 
the responses of Australian firms as well as those of their Indian counterparts. 
Australian Partners' Responses Table 9.2 shows the responses from each of the 
Australian parents on the impact of the economic environment in selecting the 1JV mode. 
It demonstrates that there is some support for the proposition that the macroeconomic 
environment in India has influenced their decision to joint venture with Indian firms to 
enter the Indian market. According to the interview data on four of the six economic 
factors, considerable support for the proposition has been registered, while the remaining 
two have showed little or no support. 
Most of the respondents indicated that the level of inflation had no impact on their 
decision to joint venture. Six respondents choose 'no impact', while only three 
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respondents have acknowledged that this factor had some or significant impact on their 
decisions. In terms of the uncertain demand conditions in India, a similar response set 
was received. Seven respondents mentioned that this factor had no impact on their 
• decision, while only two indicated that it had significant impact. . 
Most of the Australian parents indicated that the four other economic factors, viz., the 
exchange rate fluctuations, transactions cost minimisation, market competition and rapid 
market access had moderate to significant impact on their decision to joint venture. 
However, responses tend to be more supportive for the relevant propositions with respect 
to the impact of transactions cost minimisation and the need for rapid market access. 
Indian Partners' Responses Table 9.2 summarises the responses of the Indian partners 
on the impact of the macroeconomic environment. Some variations in response were 
found vis-a-vis the Australian parent firms' responses. In terms of the level of inflation 
and the uncertain demand conditions, the Indian responses were less confirmatory of the 
propositions than were their Australian counterparts. No support was found from the 
Indian partners for these two factors. All ten respondents chose either `no impact' or 
'N/A' responses (Table 9.2). Contrary to the responses from the Australian parents, most 
of the Indian firms indicated that the exchange rate fluctuations did not have any impact 
on their decisions. Only two Indian firms indicated that this factor had moderate to 
significant impact on their decisions. 
The other factors, transactions cost minimisation, market competition and rapid market 
access were given some importance by most of the Indian firms. Most of the Indian 
companies responded either 'significant impact' or 'some impact' in relation to these 
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Table 9.2 
Summary of Responses on the Impact of the Economic Environment 
Name of the firm 
Level of 
inflation 
Exchange 
rate 
fluctuations 
Transactions 
cost 
minimisation 
Market 
competition 
Demand 
uncertainty 
Rapid 
market 
access 
Australian Parpnt* 
1. Atco Control Pty Ltd No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
No impact Significant 
impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International No impact Some impact Significant 
impact 
No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
3. Moldflow International Pty 
Ltd 
No impact No impact No impact No impact No impact Some 
impact 
4. RTZ-CRA Some 
impact 
Some impact No impact No impact No impact No impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd No impact Some impact No impact Some impact No impact No impact 
6. Tech-Pacific No impact No impact Some impact No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
7. Telstra International-1 Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
8. Telstra International-2 Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
9. Warman International No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
Some impact No impact Some 
impact 
Indian host 
1. ACC No impact No impact No impact Some impact N/A Some 
impact 
2. Dr. S.P. BhaMagar No impact Some impact Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
No impact Significant 
impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1** No impact No impact Some impact Some impact No impact No impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2** No impact No impact Some impact Some impact No impact No impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee N/A Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
No impact Significant 
impact 
6. IL & FS*** N/A N/A No impact Some impact No impact Some 
impact 
7. Indure Ltd No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
No impact Some 
impact 
8. Modi Corporation No impact No impact No impact No impact No impact No impact 
9. Stone India Ltd N/A N/A N/A Significant 
impact 
N/A Some 
impact 
10. VSNL*** No impact No impact No impact No impact N/A Some 
impact 
For the nine INs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two 
separate IJVs in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the IJV 
involvements, Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of them, 
Telstra might have faced a different set of environmental variables. `Telstra International-1' 
demonstrates the findings on the environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to form 
Modi-Telstra, and `Telstra International-2' records these for Telstra-VConun. 
** Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two ill's with Australian partners, both of which are 
included in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain IN-specific information. 
`Godrej & Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced during the 
motivation to form GSSL, and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
*** The IJV, Telstra-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL&FS, both of which are included in this 
study. 
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factors. However, the presence of market competition was considered more important 
than the other economic factors. Eight of the ten respondents considered that this factor 
had moderate to significant impact on their decision to joint venture with an Australian 
firm. Unlike their Australian counterparts, some of the Indian respondents registered 
their unawareness (N/A) on a number of issues (Table 9.2). In general, these data 
demonstrate that the Australian firms expressed relatively greater support than did their 
Indian counterparts on a number of economic factors that had influenced the joint 
venture decision. 
9.2.2 Political Environment 
Proposition P2.2 deals with the political environment and its influence on the decision of 
Australian firms to form IJVs with Indian partners while investing in India. Table 9.3 
summarises the responses of Australian parents as well as their Indian partners on this 
impact. In the present research context, five major aspects of the political environment 
are taken into consideration - frequent changes of governments in India, ongoing 
separatist movements in a number of Indian states, ongoing religious rivalries and 
protests from the environmentalists. 
Australian Parents' Responses Table 9.3 summarises the responses of Australian 
parents. These demonstrate some support for two political factors - frequent changes of 
governments in India and ongoing separatist movements. The response set indicated that 
the two other factors had little or no impact on the Australian firms' decisions to joint 
venture. 
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Table 9.3 
Summary of Responses on the Impact of the Political Environment 
Name of the firm 
Frequent change 
of government 
Ongoing 
separatist 
movements 
Ongoing 
religious 
rivalries 
Protests from the 
environmentalists 
Australian Parent* 
1. Atco Control Pty Ltd Significant 
impact 
Some impact No impact Some impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
3. Moldlow International Pty Ltd No impact N/A No impact No impact 
4. RTZ-CRA Some impact Some impact No impact Some impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd No impact No impact No impact No impact 
6. Tech-Pacific No impact No impact No impact Some impact 
7. Telstra International-1 Some impact Some impact No impact No impact 
8. Telstra International-2 Some impact Some impact No impact No impact 
9. Warman International Some impact No impact , No impact No impact 
Indian host 
1. ACC No impact No impact No impact No impact 
2. Dr. S.P. Bhatnagar N/A N/A N/A N/A 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1** No impact No impact No impact No impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2** No impact No impact No impact No impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee Some impact No impact No impact No impact 
6. IL & FS*** No impact No impact No impact No impact 
7. Indure Ltd No impact No impact No impact No impact 
8. Modi Corporation No impact No impact No impact No impact 
9. Stone India Ltd N/A N/A N/A N/A 
10. VSNL*** N/A No impact No impact No impact 
For the nine IJVs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two 
separate IJVs in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the LTV 
involvements, Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of them, 
Telstra might have faced a different set of environmental variables. 'Felstra International-1' 
demonstrates the findings on the environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to form 
Modi-Telstra, and 'FeIstra International-2' records these for Telstra-VCoirum 
** Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two LIVs with Australian partners, both of which are 
included in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain ITV-specific information. 
`Godrej & Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced during the 
motivation to form GSSL, and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
*** The IJV, Telstra-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL & FS, both of which are included in this 
study. 
Indian Partners' Responses Table 9.3 summarises the responses from the Indian 
partners. The data show that none of the four political factors were given importance by 
the Indian firms when the decisions were made. In terms of the frequent change of 
government, only one Indian respondent, Harish Soonderjee indicated that this factor had 
some impact on its decision to joint venture with an Australian partner. The other Indian 
firms responded with `no impact or 'N/A'. Responses on the other political factors, such 
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as ongoing separatist movements in India, and protests from the environmentalists 
indicate that these factors did not have any impact on the decisions of the Indian firms. 
All of the ten Indian firms either chose `no impact' or 'N/A' to register their responses 
on each of these issues. 
The Australian . firms' responses are somewhat more confirmatory on the impact of two 
issues - frequent changes of government and ongoing separatist movements than were 
the responses of their Indian counterparts. Most of the Australian firms indicated that 
these two factors had significant to moderate impact on their decision. However, the 
Indian firms' responses indicate that these two factors along with other political factors 
had no impact on their decisions. 
9.2.3 Legal and Regulatory Environment 
Proposition P2.3 deals with the legal and regulatory environment and its influence on the 
decision of Australian firms to form IJVs with Indian partners while investing in India. 
Table 9.4 summarises the responses of both the Australian and Indian partners on the 
impact of this environment. In the present research context, seven major aspects of the 
legal and regulatory environment are taken into consideration - import duties and tariffs; 
taxation law; foreign investment policies; the public sector monopoly of the insurance 
industry; intellectual property rights; automatic approval of up to 51% foreign equity 
participation and the changing regulatory environment. 
Australian Partners' Responses Table 9.4 summarises the responses of the Australian 
parents. These responses indicate that except for the presence of the public sector 
monopoly of the insurance industry in India, all other issues had moderate to significant 
230 
impact on the decision of most of the Australian parents. Of the nine Australian firms, 
eight indicated that the presence of the public sector monopoly of the Indian insurance 
industry had no impact on their decision to joint venture. One expressed an 
unawareness of the issue. With respect to the other factors, most of the Australian 
respondents report that these had moderate to significant impact on their decisions. 
However, overwhelming support was evidenced with respect to two factors - the level of 
import duties and tariffs in India, and Indian foreign investment policies (Table 9.4). 
From the nine Australian respondents, eight indicated that the level of import duties, 
tariffs and quotas had moderate to significant impact on their decision, while only one 
firm expressed an unawareness of the issue. All the nine Australian firms considered the 
foreign investment policies of India as being of moderate to significant importance. 
Seven firms considered the impact of this factor as significant, while the remaining two 
extended moderate ('some') support. 
Indian Partners' Responses Table 9.4 summarises the Indian partners' responses on 
the level of impact of each of the legal and regulatory factors on their decision to joint 
venture with the Australian firms. With respect to three factors, all ten Indian 
respondents responded either with `no impact' or 'N/A'. These factors are Indian 
taxation law, the public sector monopoly of the Indian insurance industry and the lack of 
enforcement of intellectual property rights. On the other hand, most of the respondents 
acknowledged the importance of the other four factors as being of moderate to significant 
importance. Among these, all of the Indian firms put special emphasis on the impact of 
the Indian foreign investment policies. Like their Australian counterparts, all ten Indian 
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Table 9.4 
Summary of Responses on the Impact of the Regulatory Environment 
Name of the 
firm 
Import 
duties and 
tariffs 
Taxation 
law 
Foreign 
investment 
policies 
Public sector 
monopoly of 
insurance 
Intellectual 
property 
rights 
Automatic 
approval 
procedures 
Changing 
regulatory 
environment 
Australian Parent* 
1. Atco Control Pty 
Ltd 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
No impact No impact Some impact Significant 
impact 
2. Futuris Brakes 
International 
Significant 
impact 
Significan 
t impact 
Significant 
impact 
No impact Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
3. Moldflow 
International Pty Ltd 
N/A N/A Some 
impact 
N/A N/A N/A Some 
impact 
4. RTZ-CRA Some 
impact 
Significan 
t impact 
Significant 
impact 
No impact Some 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd Some 
impact 
No impact Some 
impact 
No impact Some 
impact 
Some 
impact 
No impact 
6. Tech-Pacific Some 
impact 
No impact Significant 
impact 
No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
7. Telstra 
International-1 
Significant 
impact 
Significan 
t impact 
Significant 
impact 
No impact Some 
impact 
No impact Some 
impact 
8. Telstra 
International-2 
Significant 
impact 
Significan 
t impact 
Significant 
impact 
No impact Some 
impact 
No impact Some 
impact 
9. Warman 
International 
Significant 
impact 
Some 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
No impact Significant 
impact 
No impact Some 
impact 
Indian host firm 
1. ACC No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
2. Dr. S.P. 
Bhatnagar 
Significant 
impact 
No impact Significant 
impact 
N/A N/A Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
3. Godrej & 
Boyce-1** 
Some 
impact 
No impact Some 
impact 
No impact No impact Some 
impact 
Some 
impact 
4. Godrej & 
Boyce-2** 
Some 
impact 
No impact Some 
impact 
No impact No impact Some 
impact 
Some 
impact 
5. Harish 
Soonderjee 
Significant 
impact 
No impact Some 
impact 
No impact No impact No impact Some 
impact 
6. IL & FS*** No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
No impact No impact Some 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
7. Indure Ltd N/A No impact Some 
impact 
No impact No impact No impact No impact 
8. Modi Corporation No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
No impact No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
9. Stone India Ltd Significant 
impact 
No impact Significant 
impact 
N/A N/A No impact No impact 
10. VSNL*** No impact No impact Significant 
_impact 
No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
For the nine UVs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two separate 
LIVs in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the UV involvements, 
Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of them, Telstra might have 
faced a different set of environmental variables. 'Telstra International-1' demonstrates the findings on 
the environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to form Modi-Telstra, and 'Telstra 
Intemational-2' records these for Telstra-VComm. 
Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two UVs with Australian partners, both of which are included 
in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain UV-specific information. Godrej & 
Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced during the motivation to form GSSL, 
and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
*** The UV, Telstra-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL&FS, both of which are included in this study. 
232 
firms responded with 'significant impact' or 'some impact' acknowledging the 
importance of this factor. Overall, the Indian responses tend to be less supportive than 
do their Australian counterparts with respect to all seven factors within the legal and 
regulatory environment. 
9.2.4 Human Resource Management Practices in India 
Proposition P2.4 deals with the human resource management practices in India and their 
influence on the decision of Australian firms to form LIVs with Indian firms while 
investing in India. Table 9.5 summarises the responses from the Australian firms as well 
as their Indian counterparts on the impact of HRM practices in India. 
Australian Partners' Responses Table 9.5 summarises the responses of the Australian 
parents. With respect to the impact of low labour productivity in India, most of the 
Australian firms indicated that this factor had significant to moderate impact on their 
decisions to joint venture. The role of this factor during the decision making process was 
acknowledged by five respondents as being of moderate to significant importance, 
whereas the other four indicated that this factor had no impact on their decision. The 
other factors, viz., the lack of consistent exit policy, the reputation of the Indian labour 
force as 'militant and obstructionist' and the lack of high quality local staff were 
not given importance by the majority of the Australian firms (Table 9.5). Nevertheless, 
the respondents, in general, expressed their awareness of these issues. Only one 
respondent (Moldflow International Pty Ltd) indicated its unawareness of one of the 
factors - lack of high quality local staff in India. 
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Table 9.5 
Summary of Responses on the Impact of Human Resource Management Practices 
Name of the 
firm 
Low labour 
productivity 
in India 
Lack of 
consistent 
exit policy 
'Militant and 
obstructionist' nature 
of Indian labour forces 
Lack of high 
quality local 
staff 
Australian parent* 
1. Atco Control Pty Ltd Some impact No impact No impact Significant 
impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International Significant 
impact 
Significant 
impact 
Significant impact No impact 
3. Moldflow International Pty Ltd No impact No impact No impact N/A 
4. RTZ-CRA Some impact No impact No impact Some impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd Significant 
impact 
No impact No impact No impact 
6. Tech-Pacific No impact No impact No impact No impact 
7. Telstra International-1 No impact Some impact No impact No impact 
8. Telstra International-2 No impact Some impact No impact No impact 
9. Warman International Some impact No impact Significant impact Significant 
impact 
Indian host firm 
1. ACC N/A N/A No impact No impact 
2. Dr. S.P. Bhatnagar No impact No impact No impact No impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1** No impact No impact No impact No impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2** No impact No impact No impact No impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee No impact No impact No impact No impact 
6. IL & FS*** No impact No impact No impact N/A 
7. Indure Ltd No impact N/A N/A N/A 
8. Modi Corporation No impact No impact No impact No impact 
9. Stone India Ltd No impact N/A N/A N/A 
10. VSNL*** N/A No impact No impact No impact 
For the nine UVs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two separate 
UVs in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the UV involvements, 
Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of them, Telstra might have 
faced a different set of environmental variables. 'Telstra International-1' demonstrates the findings on the 
environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to form Modi-Telstra, and 'Telstra 
International-2' records these for Telstra-VComm. 
4. * Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two 11Vs with Australian partners, both of which are 
included in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain UV-specific information. 
`Godrej & Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced during the motivation to 
form GSSL, and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
*** The ITV, Telstra-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL&FS, both of which are included in this study. 
Indian Partners' Responses Table 9.5 summarises the responses of the Indian firms. 
None of the factors was considered important by the Indian host firms while deciding 
upon the selection of the Australian firms as UV partners. However, most of the 
respondents expressed their awareness of these factors. Nevertheless, no substantial 
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support was found in either of the response sets in terms of the proposed impact of the 
HR-related factors on the firms' decisions to joint venture. 
9.2.5 Lack of Necessary Market Information 
Proposition P2.5 deals with the lack of necessary market information in India and its 
influence on the Australian firms' decisions to joint venture with the Indian partners 
while investing in India. Table 9.6 summarises the responses of Australian as well as 
Indian firms on this issue. 
Table 9.6 
Summary of Responses on the Impact of the Lack of Market Information in India 
Name of the firm , Level of impact of the lack of market information 
Australian parent* 
I. Atco Control Pty Ltd Significant impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International No impact 
3. Moldflow International Pty Ltd No impact 
4. RTZ-CRA No impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd Some impact 
6. Tech-Pacific No impact 
7. Telstra International-1 Some impact 
8. Telstra International-2 Some impact 
Warman International , 9. Some impact 
Indian host 
1. ACC No impact 
2. Dr. S.P. Bhatnagar** No impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1** No impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2 No impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee No impact 
6. IL & FS*** N/A 
7. Indure Ltd N/A 
8. Modi Corporation No impact 
9. Stone India Ltd N/A 
10. VSNL*** No impact 
For the nine IJVs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two separate IJVs in 
India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the IJV involvements, Telstra was 
interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of them, Telstra might have faced a different 
set of environmental variables. 'Telstra International-1' demonstrates the findings on the environmental 
variables Telstra faced during the motivation to form Modi-Telstra, and 'Telstra International-2' records these 
for Telstra-VConun. 
** Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two IJVs with Australian partners, both of which are included in 
this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain UV-specific information. `Godrej & Boyce-1' 
records the findings on the environmental variables it faced during the motivation to form GSSL, and `Godrej & 
Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
*** The IJV, Telstra-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL&FS, both of which are included in this study. 
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Australian Partners' Responses 	Table 9.6 shows the responses from each of the 
Australian parents. Of the nine Australian respondents, five indicated that this factor had 
moderate to significant impact on their decision to choose the UV mode while investing 
in India, whereas four firms registered 'no impact' responses. 
Indian Partners' Responses Table 9.6 summarises the responses of each of the Indian 
Partners. None of the Indian partners extended a positive response. From the ten Indian 
respondents, seven indicated that this factor had no impact on their decision making 
process. The remaining three expressed their unawareness of this factor. 
9.2.6 Cultural Environment 
Proposition P2.6 considers the cultural environment and its influence on the decision of 
Australian firms to form IJVs with Indian partners while investing in India. Table 9.7 
summarises the responses from both the Australian and Indian firms. In the present 
research context, two major aspects of the cultural environment are taken into 
consideration - cultural distance and unfamiliarity between Australia and India, and 
dealing with corruption and bureaucracy. 
Australian Parents' Responses Table 9.7 summarises the responses of the Australian 
parents on the level of impact of each of the selected issues within the cultural 
environment on the decision to joint venture with Indian partners. Most of the 
respondents acknowledged the impact of these issues on their decisions. With respect to 
the impact of cultural distance and unfamiliarity, five Australian parents indicated that 
this factor had moderate to significant impact on their decisions. Three registered 'no 
impact', while one firm expressed its unawareness of the issue. The other cultural factor, 
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dealing with corruption and bureaucracy, had a stronger impact on the Australian firms' 
decisions to joint venture. Most of the firms (six out of nine) indicated that this factor 
had 'significant impact' on their decision to joint venture with Indian firms while 
investing in India. Only two firms registered a 'no impact' response, while one firm 
expressed its unawareness of the issue. 
Table 9.7 
Summary of Responses on the Impact of the Cultural Environment 
Name of the firm Cultural distance and 
unfamiliarity 
Dealing with corruption 
and bureaucracy 
Australian parent* 
I. Atco Control Pty Ltd Significant impact Significant impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International No impact Significant impact 
3. Moldflow International Pty Ltd N/A N/A 
4. RTZ-CRA Some impact Significant impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd Some impact Significant impact 
6. Tech-Pacific Significant impact Significant impact 
7. Telstra International-1 No impact No impact 
8. Telstra International-2 No impact No impact 
9. Warman International Some impact Significant impact 
Indian host firm 
1. ACC No impact No impact 
2. Dr. S.P. Bhatnagar No impact No impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1** No impact No impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2** No impact No impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee No impact No impact 
6. IL & FS*** No impact No impact 
7. Indure Ltd N/A N/A 
8. Modi Corporation No impact No impact 
9. Stone India Ltd N/A Some impact 
10. VSNL*** No impact No impact 
For the nine UVs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two separate 
UVs in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the ITV involvements, 
Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of them, Telstra might have 
faced a different set of environmental variables. 'Telstra International-1' demonstrates the findings on the 
environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to form Modi-Telstra, and 'Telstra 
International-2' records these for Telstra-VComm. 
** Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two UVs with Australian partners, both of which are included 
in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain UV-specific information. `Godrej & 
Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced during the motivation to form GSSL, 
and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
*** The UV, Telstra-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL&FS, both of which are included in this study. 
Indian Partners' Responses Table 9.7 summarises the responses from the Indian 
partners. All ten Indian firms indicated that the cultural difference and unfamiliarity did 
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not have any impact on their decision. Eight host firms endorsed `no impact' and the 
other two responded with 'N/A'. With respect to 'dealing with corruption and 
bureaucracy', eight respondents considered that it had no impact on their decision, while 
one firm expressed its unawareness of this factor. Only one firm mentioned that it 
had some impact on its decision to joint venture. 
9.3 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION 
On the basis of data gathered from the nine Australian parents and their ten Indian 
partners, there appears to have limited support for most of the propositions relating to the 
impact of various environmental factors. The implications of these responses are now 
addressed. Elaboration of the interview data is grouped into eight sections. The first six 
sections consider the six environmental groups (propositions P2.1, P2.2, P2.3, P2.4, P2.5 
and P2.6), while the seventh one will examine the responses with respect to the general 
question covering all six groupings. A chapter summary concludes with a brief 
examination of the general proposition (proposition P2) and the level of support it has in 
the data sets from across the six groupings. 
• 	9.3.1 Economic Environment 
As discussed in the literature review, the economic environment of the host country is 
critical for a company's international market entry choice (Ball & McCulloch, 1993; 
Dunning, 1986, 1995; Hill, et al., 1990; Kim, 1993). Six economic factors were taken 
into consideration to examine the impact of the economic environment upon the 
Australian firms' motivations to form I.Als while investing in India. These include the 
level of inflation, exchange rate fluctuations, transactions cost minimisation, market 
competition, uncertain demand conditions and rapid market access. 
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According to the respondents, the level of inflation in India had little or no impact on the 
decisions of both the Australian and Indian partners. Most of the Australian partners 
indicated that the exchange rate fluctuation had a moderate to significant impact on their 
decision to joint venture, while most of the Indian firms did not consider it during their 
decision making process. The factors, transactions cost minimisation, market 
competition and rapid market access were considered by most of the Indian as well as 
Australian firms as having some or significant impact upon their decision. Most of the 
Australian and Indian firms indicated that the uncertain demand conditions in India did 
not have any impact on their decisions. Each of these factors is now considered. 
Level of Inflation As mentioned earlier (chapter IQ), India has been experiencing 
relatively high inflation rate during the recent years (Aiyar, 1997; Mohan 1996; Roy, et 
al., 1996; The Economist, 25 March, 1995, pp. 32-33). This may adversely affect the 
value of capital investment in India. In addition, this inflationary situation along with a 
continuous devaluation of the Indian Rupee tends to put pressure on interest rates (Ball & 
McCulloch, 1993). As a consequence, a high inflation rate is likely to impact upon the 
prospective Australian investor's entry mode choice. They may opt for the LTV mode 
while investing in India in order to minimise this risk through sharing it with a local 
Indian partner. 
However, there was only limited support from the Australian respondents with respect to 
the influence of this factor on their decision to joint venture with Indian partners (Table 
9.2). When asked for comments, these firms mentioned that they did not consider it an 
important factor because of two reasons. First, they anticipated considerable growth and 
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profit from their proposed venture that might offset the possibility of a high inflation 
rate. Second, although the inflation rate was high, the trend appears to be almost 
predictable (approximately 10% a year) and therefore, it could be possible to offset this 
rate through maintaining an appropriate pricing policy. In terms of the level of inflation 
in India, the CEO of Futuris Brakes International mentioned, '...as long as we know the 
trend, it is unlikely to be a problem'. 
None of the Indian firms supported the impact of this factor (Table 9.3). In addition, 
unlike the response set of the Australian parents, three Indian firms declared their 
unawareness of this factor in the present context. The evidence obtained from the 
Australian as well as Indian respondents does not confirm the influence of this issue from 
their respective perspectives. Hence, as an environmental variable, the level of inflation 
is found to be of no or little importance with respect to motivating Australian firms to 
joint venture with Indian partners while investing in India. 
Exchange Rate Fluctuations In a liberalised economy, exchange rates are free to 
respond immediately to the various market forces (Root, 1990). As mentioned in the 
earlier section, India has been experiencing a high inflation rate that is partially 
responsible for the continuous devaluation of the Indian Rupee. In addition, the 
increasing level of foreign investment in India has been putting pressure on foreign 
currencies such as US$ and UKE. Unprecedented demand for these currencies also has 
contributed to the devaluation of the Indian Rupee. During the period between 
September 1994 and May 1997, the Indian Rupee was devalued by around 20% against 
the US$ (calculated from The Economist, 16 September, 1995, p. 128; 24 May, p. 122). 
It may be argued that the potential impact of the fluctuating exchange rate in India might 
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have been minimised by the Australian firms through sharing the exchange-risk with a 
local partner experienced in dealing with such adversities. 
This concern was reflected in the responses of most of the Australian firms (Table 9.2). 
Most of the Australian parents mentioned that this factor had a moderate to significant 
impact on their decision to joint venture with the Indian partners. However, it did not 
have an impact on the decision of most of the Indian partners (Table 9.2). This implies 
that the Indian firms had a considerable capability to combat such a situation. A possible 
explanation of such a response from most of the Indian firms may be revealed from the 
comments by the Director of Modi Corporation. During the interview, he mentioned, 
Exchange rate fluctuation is nothing new in India. We can adapt to this change 
either by adjusting the prices or by maintaining a forward exchange rate when 
dealing with a foreign company. 
He also argued that as long as the exchange rate fluctuation is as predictable as the 
inflation rate is, it may not be of concern for the Indian as well as Australian firms. 
Australian firms, in these circumstances, may benefit from the local expertise of their 
Indian partners. The Indian firm's position may complement the Australian firm's 
concern with respect to overcoming the problems associated with this factor. Hence, as 
an environmental variable, exchange rate fluctuations are found to be of limited 
importance with respect to motivating Australian firms to joint venture with Indian 
partners while investing in India. 
Transactions Cost Minimisation As mentioned earlier in chapter In, INs may 
substantially minimise environmental-specific transactions costs through sharing them 
between partners. These transactions costs may be associated with various structural 
market failures (both natural and artificial), such as the costs of physical transfer and 
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costs associated with government regulation of international trade (Root, 1990; Dunning, 
1988). Transportation costs from Australia to India as well as tariffs, import duties and 
quotas imposed by the Indian government are considerable (As-Saber, et al., 1996a). 
These costs can substantially be minimised through sharing them with local partners. 
Most of the Australian respondents considered this factor as being of moderate to 
significant importance (Table 9.2). The CEO of one of the respondent firms mentioned, 
'we gave importance to this issue because we estimated a substantial level of transactions 
costs involvement in doing business in India'. A mixed response set was received from 
the Indian partners (Table 9.2). Half of the Indian firms (five) indicated that this factor 
had a moderate to significant impact on their decision. From the remaining five firms, 
four endorsed 'no impact', while one expressed its unawareness of the issue in the 
present context. Nonetheless, the Indian responses are tending to support the Australian 
responses. These data imply that the DV mode is likely to create synergy and the 
Australian firms may overcome these problems with the active collaboration of their 
Indian counterparts and vice versa. 
Market Competition There has been an intense competitive atmosphere in India since 
the beginning of the Indian national economic reform process in 1990 (see chapter HI). 
This competitive environment has been affecting both the foreign as well as the local 
investors (As-Saber et al., 1996a; Asian Business Review, 1995; Dutta, 1996). For a 
foreign company, it is critical to respond to these competitive challenges effectively. The 
formation of I.JVs with a competent local partner may assist to accommodate such 
competitive challenges in a country such as India (Hitt, et al., 1995; Perlmutter & 
Heenan, 1986). The familiarity and expertise of the host firm in dealing with the local 
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competitive conditions and the synergy created by the pooling of both partners' resources 
and capabilities are likely to strengthen their competitive advantage over the other 
players within the industry. 
Consistent with the above-mentioned literature, the importance of this factor is reflected 
in the responses of both Australian and Indian firms (Table 9.2). The majority of the 
Australian as well as Indian firms indicated that this factor had moderate to significant 
impact on their decision to joint venture. These responses manifest the existence of a 
competitive market environment in India. It may be difficult to achieve a competitive 
edge as a stand-alone company. This scenario is reflected in the comments made by the 
respondent from Telstra International-1. He mentioned, 
Market competition is intense in India and it is getting worse. It is necessary to 
have a strong local partner to jointly deal with such market competition. 
These responses partially establish the significance of the impact of this factor on the 
joint venture decision of the Australian firms. 
Demand Uncertainty Because of the presence of a large poor segment in the Indian 
population, a high level of market demand uncertainty exists in India (see chapter III for 
details). Formation of an UV with a local partner may assist in overcoming this problem. 
It is argued that because of the Indian partner's familiarity with the local market, it would 
be easier to enhance the consumer demand level through identifying and penetrating the 
niche market and improving product quality, or creating products which are more 
market-oriented (Burgers, et al., 1993). 
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Despite the perceived presence of uncertain demand conditions in India, • most of the 
Australian firms indicated that this factor had no impact on their decision to joint venture 
(Table 9.2). A similar response set was received from the Indian partners (Table 9.3). A 
possible interpretation of these responses to this factor may be found in the extent of 
market segmentation and targeting by the respondent firms. Most of the firms indicated 
that they were .aware of this issue. Accordingly, they identified the niche before they 
entered the market which excluded the poor segment of the population. 
However, two Australian firms, Telstra International-1 and Telstra International-2 had 
different views. Although their initial target markets involved the upper middle class 
and above, they were interested to grow the market further. These two firms considered 
it important to link up with established Indian firms to address this issue. They 
considered that the use of expertise, market knowledge, reputation and existing 
distribution channels of the well-established host firms along with joint advertising 
campaigns are likely to create market demand for their products. Overall, drawing from 
the data collected from the Australian as well as the Indian respondents, little or no 
support was found for the impact of demand uncertainty in India on the decision to joint 
venture. 
Rapid Market Access As mentioned earlier in chapter III, timeliness in entering an 
emerging market is critical to a firm's efforts to establish a sustainable competitive 
advantage and superior profits (Hitt, et al., 1995). Early market entry in the emerging 
economies such as India may be of benefit to a foreign firm in establishing its position 
prior to its major international competitors doing so, and to do so with a comfortable 
market share. Therefore, the UV mode might be the best for early market development 
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tactics within the emerging and lucrative, but highly competitive Indian market. Foreign 
companies may use the local partners' existing resources, contacts and distribution 
channels to operationalise their presence expeditiously which is not likely to be possible 
as stand-alone companies. 
The importance of rapid market access was endorsed by both Australian and Indian 
respondents (Tables 9.2). Most of the Indian as well as Australian firms indicated that 
this factor had moderate to significant impact on their decision to joint venture. These 
responses moderately support the views that IJVs may provide immediate availability of 
specialised skills, technology and organisational structure to access an unfamiliar 
overseas market, such as India (Anderson, 1995; Lewis, 1991). 
Summary 	The interview data gathered from the respondents offer varying degrees of 
support for the proposed impact of selected economic factors. Most of the Australian as 
well as Indian respondents mentioned that two factors, the level of inflation and the 
uncertain demand conditions in India did not have any impact on their decision to joint 
venture. Most of the Australian firms indicated that the exchange rate fluctuations had 
moderate to significant impact on their decision, whereas most of the Indian firms 
endorsed a `no impact' or 'N/A' response. Transactions costs minimisation was 
considered to have 'some' to 'significant impact' by most the Australian respondents. A 
mixed response set was received from the Indian respondents with a tendency to support 
the proposition. In terms of market competition and rapid market access, most of the 
Australian as well as Indian firms indicated that these factors had moderate to significant 
impact on their decisions. 
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Of the six factors examined within the economic environment, there is insufficient 
evidence on the impact of the level of inflation and uncertain demand conditions to 
confirm proposition, P2.1. The evidence on the remaining factors seem to be consistent 
with the proposition. In general, the data collected tend to show limited evidence in 
support of proposition P2.1, viz., the macroeconomic environment in India influences the 
decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the Indian 
market. 
9.3.2 Political Environment 
Four major components of the political environment were taken into consideration to 
examine the validity of proposition P2.2. These include frequent change of governments, 
ongoing separatist movements, ongoing religious rivalry and protests from the 
environmentalists. Table 9.3 summarises the responses of both the Australian and Indian 
firms. 
Most of the Australian parents indicated that the frequent change of governments and the 
ongoing separatist movement had moderate to significant impact on their decision, 
whereas most of the Indian firms endorsed `no impact' responses for these factors. With 
respect to the other two factors, most of the Australian firms reported `no impact' 
responses, whereas each of the Indian firms responded either with `no impact' or 'N/A'. 
Frequent Change of Governments As discussed earlier, there are frequent changes of 
State as well as Central governments in India (see chapter DT). India has witnessed five 
changes of government since May 1996. The fragile state of Indian governments is a 
matter of concern for foreign investors because uncertainty in the political environment 
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may bring changes of policy directions affecting foreign investments. According to the 
Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (cited in The Economist, 27 May, 1995, p. 
71), the biggest risk firms face in a country like India is its changing politics. 
Most of the Australian firms considered this factor as being of moderate to significant 
impact, whereas responses from the Indian firms did not show support for this factor. 
Only one Indian firm indicated that this factor had some impact on its decision to joint 
venture. Considering the level of uncertainty resulting from the change of governments, 
this firm (Harish Soonderjee) suggested that it chose to share this uncertainty and 
riskiness with the Australian partner. 
A possible explanation for this varying degree of importance offered by the Australian 
firms vis-à-vis their Indian partners may be found in the differing attitudes to risks and 
uncertainties perceived by Australian and Indian firms. Accordingly, it may be argued 
that due to the Indian firms' likely exposure to the frequent changes of government, most 
of them might have considered these changes more as a routine phenomenon. This 
attitude was reflected in the comments made by one of the Indian respondents, where he 
said, 'it does not really matter who is coming into the power and who is leaving. It may 
make the reforms a little slower, but it is not a major concern'. As most of the Indian 
firms had acquired some expertise as well as adaptability, for most of the Australian 
firms, changes of government have always been the phenomenon fraught with 
uncertainty and riskiness. Australian firms, by choosing the UV mode, had made an 
effort to use the expertise of the Indian firms to overcome such uncertainties. On 
balance, the evidence tends to support the proposition P2.2. 
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Ongoing Separatist Movements 	Ongoing separatist movements in several Indian 
states, such as Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab are said to be a major concern for foreign 
business operations in India (The Economist, 19 August, 1995, pp. 25-26). In order to 
apply pressure on the government, separatist militants may pose threats to foreign 
businesses as well, particularly the expatriates working in India. It might be a better 
option for the • prospective foreign investors to establish UVs with local partners to 
minimise these risks with local involvement. 
While the majority of the Australian as well as Indian firms expressed their awareness of 
this factor in the present context, most of the Australian firms also demonstrated their 
concerns about this issue (Table 9.3). However, none of the Indian firms confirmed the 
views offered by their Australian counterparts. Nonetheless, various separatist 
movements have occurred in India since its independence in 1947 along with a series of 
destructive activities which include the killing of one of India's most popular Prime 
Ministers, Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1985 by the supporters of Punjabi separatists. Despite 
the presence of these activities, all Indian partners endorsed either a `no impact' or a 
'N/A' response. As a possible explanation, it appears that the Indian respondents have 
acquired some experience and adaptabilities to such scenarios, as they have shown with 
respect to the frequently changing governments. For most of the Australian firms, this 
remains as a concern. The Australian firms' choice of the UV mode was, therefore, 
influenced by the expectation of ameliorating this concern with the expertise of the local 
Indian partners. Hence, these data moderately support the proposition. 
Ongoing Religious Rivalry A detailed account of the background of this factor has 
already been provided at section 8.3.3. The recent rise of the Hindu religious 
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fundamentalism, Hindutva and the ongoing rivalry between the supporters of two major 
religions, Hinduism and Islam, are major concerns for the foreign investors in India. It 
might be asserted that at any time law and order situation may break down due to the 
rivalry between Hindus and Muslims, with an impact on the nation's investment climate. 
However, any such risks may be minimised through the formation of IJVs with a local 
partner. The 'local knowledge and familiarity of a partner firm are likely to help 
overcome problems related to such religious rivalries. 
Despite the concerns as mentioned above, most of the Australian firms indicated that this 
factor did not have any impact on their decision to joint venture. The Indian firms also 
tend not to support the impact of this factor. All the Australian firms and eight Indian 
firms expressed their awareness of this factor. Nevertheless, the evidence obtained from 
the Australian firms does not confirm the influence of this factor in motivating their 
decision to joint venture. Likewise, responses from the Indian partners do not confirm its 
influence from their perspective. As a possible interpretation, it may be argued that the 
Australian firms might not have considered this factor relevant to the business 
environment in India. This view is reflected in the comments by one of the Australian 
respondents, who said, 'we did not consider this factor seriously while deciding the entry 
mode because we thought that we had nothing to do with the religious rivalry in India'. 
Hence, as an environmental variable, the ongoing religious rivalry in India is found to be 
of no or little importance with respect to motivating Australian firms to joint venture 
with Indian partners while investing in India. 
Protests from the Environmentalists Environmentalists in India are becoming more 
and more active and they are launching protests through agitation against foreign 
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investments which are not environmentally friendly (see chapter DI). For foreign 
companies, this may prompt the need to use sophisticated machineries and equipment 
with minimal impact on the environment, which in turn, is likely to affect the companies 
in terms of their increased financial as well as technical involvement. This riskiness may 
be minimised substantially through the active collaboration of a strong Indian partner 
with a solid financial capability and having good existing relationships with the 
environmental groups. 
Despite a conjectured significance of this factor, most of the Australian parents and their 
Indian counterparts did not consider this factor important while making the decision to 
joint venture. However, most of them were aware of this factor. As a possible 
explanation, it may be argued that most of the firms might have considered such 
activities as normal phenomenon in countries which include India and Australia. 
Nonetheless, the possible protests from environmentalists is found to be of no or little 
importance with respect to motivating Australian firms to joint venture with Indian 
partners while investing in India. 
. 	Summary 	From the four political factors examined, two factors, viz., frequent 
change of governments and ongoing separatist movements in India were given moderate 
to significant importance by most of the Australian respondents. However, the majority 
of the Indian firms did not confirm these Australian responses. With respect to the other 
two factors, viz., ongoing religious rivalry and protests from the environmentalists, most 
of the Australian firms and their Indian counterparts indicated that these factors had no 
impact on their decision. 
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Therefore, from the four variables examined within the political environment in India, 
there is insufficient evidence on the impact of ongoing religious rivalry and protests from 
the environmentalists to confirm proposition Pit. Evidence on the impacts of the 
remaining two factors, frequent changes of governments and ongoing separatists 
movements, appears to be partially supportive of the propositions. On the basis of this 
evidence, limited support is found for proposition P2.2, viz., the political situation in 
India influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms 
to enter the Indian market. 
9.3.3 Legal and Regulatory Environment 
Seven major components of the legal and regulatory environment were taken into 
consideration to examine the validity of proposition P2.3. These include import duties, 
tariffs and quotas, taxation law, foreign investment policies, public sector monopoly of 
the Indian insurance industry, lack of intellectual property rights, automatic approval 
procedures up to 51% foreign equity and the changing regulatory environment. 
A mixed response set was received with most of the variables showing considerable 
impact on the decision of most of the Australian as well as Indian partners. As indicated 
by the respondents, four factors, viz., the presence of relatively high levels of import 
duties, tariffs and quotas in India, existing foreign investment policies, automatic 
approval procedures for up to 51% foreign equity, and the changing regulatory 
environment in India had moderate to significant impact on the decision of most of the 
Australian parents and their Indian counterparts. In terms of the complexity of the Indian 
taxation law and the lack of intellectual property rights, most of the Australian parents 
indicated that these had moderate to significant impact on their decision, while the 
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majority of the Indian respondents endorsed 'no impact' responses. As indicated by the 
response, public sector monopoly of the insurance industry had no impact on the decision 
of most of the Australian parents, while the majority of the Indian partners responded in 
a similar fashion. 
Import Duties and Tariffs 	Despite ongoing economic liberalisation to attract foreign 
investors, India is still a country with high import barriers (Banks and Natarajan, 1995; 
The Economist, 22 February, 1997, pp. 13-19). The maximum import duty of 52% 
(including 2% import surcharge) with an average tariff of around 42% are much higher 
than those of many emerging economies, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand and South Korea (The Economist, 27 April, 1996, pp. 21-23; 27 July 1996, p. 
26). Extended customs clearance time is also a problem. Therefore, products possessing 
low local content are unlikely to be competitive due to excessive rates of duties on the 
imported components. Formation of IJVs may help minimise the costs through sharing 
such expenses with local partners. In addition, local production facilities may help 
minimise the dependence on expensive import requirements. To do so as a stand-alone 
company may require the investment of extensive capital with a substantial level of risks 
and uncertainties that may be shared through establishing an UV relationship with 
prospective local partners. 
Most of the Australian respondents indicated that this factor had moderate to significant 
impact on their decision to joint venture. Of the ten Indian respondents, five considered 
this factor as being of moderate to significant importance, which tends to support the 
Australian responses. This evidence clearly manifests in the importance of this factor in 
motivating Australian firms to joint venture with local firms while investing in India. 
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Taxation law As argued earlier (chapter III), due to the presence of a complex set of 
direct and indirect taxes and relatively high rate of corporate as well as personal taxes, 
Indian taxation law is said to be a major concern for foreign companies seeking to do 
business in India. Despite ongoing reforms, Indian taxation remains an extremely 
complex area (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994; Price Waterhouse, 1993)). Local DV 
partners, through their local experience and expertise, may provide substantial help in 
dealing with this complicated area of doing business in India. 
Most of the Australian firms recognised the importance of this factor. However, Indian 
firms did not confirm the Australian firms' responses. All ten Indian firms unanimously 
indicated that this factor did not have any impact on their decision to joint venture with 
Australian partners. A possible explanation for these diverse sets of responses may be 
found in the extent of the firms' familiarity and expertise with the Indian tax system. 
Australian firms being unfamiliar with the Indian taxation laws, looked for local support 
to deal with any possible tax-related complexity, while Indian firms having experience 
and familiarity with the Indian tax system did not require any assistance from their 
foreign partners. The responses, therefore, demonstrate that the majority of the 
Australian firms were motivated by this factor in order to complement their lack of 
knowledge of Indian taxation law through the use of their local partner's expertise and 
familiarity with Indian taxation law. Overall, the responses offer partial support for the 
proposition. 
Foreign Investment Policies 	Since the late 1980s, India has been liberalising its 
economy progressively in order to attract more foreign investment. This liberalisation 
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process was formally reflected in the industrial policy announced on 24 July 1991 
(Government of India, 1994). With a number of measures, it substantially deregulated 
the economy to facilitate foreign investments and technology transfers. This was 
followed by a number of economic reforms to improve upon the situation further 
(Government of India, 1994). In addition, from 8 January 1993, Indian firms have been 
enjoying the right to enter into IJVs without requiring government permission (Thakur, 
1993). 
Despite a considerable change in the foreign investment laws in India, a recent survey 
has indicated that many companies entering India opt for IJV arrangements because IJVs 
assist in dealing with the numerous government organisations and regulations that still 
impede entry to the Indian economy (Banks & Natarajan, 1995). It seems that the 
foreign investment policy in India is yet to be fully supportive of foreign businesses. 
This scenario emphasises that foreign investors may require the assistance of local 
partners while operating in India. 
With respect to the impact of this factor on the decision to joint venture, overwhelming 
support was received from Australian as well as Indian firms. All nine Australian firms 
and ten Indian firms indicated that this factor had moderate to significant impact on their 
decisions to joint venture. However, the Australian responses (seven 'significant impact' 
and two 'some impact' responses) are slightly more confirmatory than the responses of 
their Indian counterparts (six 'significant impact' and four 'some impact' responses). 
Nonetheless, these responses manifest the importance of the foreign investment policies 
in India as mentioned above. This factor attracted considerable attention from both the 
Australian and Indian firms during their decision to joint venture. 
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There appears to be two reasons for these positive response sets. First, the ongoing 
economic reforms are considered facilitative of investment by the respondents. Second, 
despite the reforms, the presence of numerous government organisations and regulations 
controlling India's foreign investment policies and their frequent changes are considered 
inhibitive impeding expanded involvement in the Indian market. As a consequence, to 
exploit the liberalising Indian market and to overcome the inhibitive issues still impeding 
even more extensive involvement, the Australian firms have opted for the IJV mode to 
enter the Indian market. In this respect, they expected to exploit the Indian partners' 
local expertise and familiarity to optimise on the benefits of economic reforms as well as 
to overcome any problems associated with this factor. 
Another reason for establishing IJVs was indicated by one of the Australian respondents 
(who wished to remain anonymous). He mentioned that his company used the local 
partner to lobby Indian governments at the federal and state levels to change policies to 
facilitate foreign investment within their industry which ultimately benefited the 
company. This is consistent with the observation made by Khambata & Ajami (1992). 
They argued, 
... the local partner, in all likelihood, would have significant contacts in the 
appropriate quarters of the host government that could be used for intensive 
lobbying on behalf of the MNC (p. 294). 
Public Sector Monopoly of the Insurance Industry As mentioned in chapter III, the 
Indian insurance industry is said to be an inefficient public sector monopoly with strong 
trade union workplace practices (The Economist, 27 May, 1995, pp. 70-71). The absence 
of competition and the existing entry barrier for private enterprises to enter into the 
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Indian insurance industry may not provide quality insurance facilities to the local as well 
as foreign enterprises. This is one of the major concerns for foreign companies. 
However, foreign companies may minimise such concerns with the active collaboration 
of their local partners, familiar in dealing with this industry. 
Despite the reputation of the Indian insurance industry as an inefficient public sector 
monopoly, each of the Australian as well as Indian firms offered either a `no impact' or a 
'N/A' response with respect to the influence of this factor. These responses do not 
confirm significance of the impact of the public sector monopoly of the Indian insurance 
industry on the firms' decisions to joint venture. It seems possible that insurance matters 
have been considered by the respondents as a relatively minor issue and, as such, have 
not entered the decision to joint venture. 
Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement of intellectual property rights in India is of 
concern (see chapter III). These involve the protection of such intangible assets as know-
how, processes, trade names and trade secrets (Khambata & Ajami, 1992). In India, 
intellectual property rights are hardly enforced. This inhibits foreign investment in high-
tech and advanced knowledge projects in India (Banks & Natarajan, 1995). However, it 
may be argued that the formation of an IJV may help guard these rights more efficiently. 
An DV, with a joint control, is in a position to safeguard intellectual property rights with 
the active collaboration and vigilance of the local partner. 
Consistent with the proposition, most of the Australian firms gave moderate to 
significant importance to this factor. However, none of the Indian partners considered it 
important from their perspectives. Nonetheless, most of the Australian as well as Indian 
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firms expressed their awareness of this factor. As a possible explanation, it may be 
argued that this factor is likely to affect most of the Australian companies in terms of 
safeguarding their product brands and technologies. Conversely, the Indian companies, 
without any substantial contribution to these intellectual property rights, do not perceive 
any such threat as being important to them. However, a reliable and strong Indian 
partner may be of assistance in protecting such property rights from being pirated and 
used by other Indian firms. In addition, the IJV management, as a joint entity is also 
likely to safeguard the interests of both the partners. Therefore, the responses tend to 
confirm the proposition. 
Automatic Approval Procedures 	Realising the inconvenience of the prolonged and 
cumbersome approval process of foreign investments in India, in 1994, the Government 
of India promulgated a new regulation allowing automatic approval of up to 51% equity 
participation in a number of selected industries (see chapter IR). The automatic approval 
procedures are likely to attract more foreign investors in these selected industries to joint 
venture in India with local partners because these procedures expedite the approval 
process of investment proposals. 
Most of the Australian as well as Indian firms indicated that this factor had moderate to 
significant impact on their decision. Telstra International-1 and Telstra International-2 
mentioned that this factor did not have any impact on their decision because 
telecommunications was not included in the 'selected industries' category. Most of the 
Indian host companies considered it important because of the simplification of the 
approval procedures for joint venturing with a foreign partner. As a facilitative one, this 
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factor attracted considerable attention from both Australian and Indian firms during their 
decisions to joint venture, and the proposition is confirmed. 
Changing Regulatory Environment As mentioned earlier, India has been liberalising 
its economy since the late 1980s along with ongoing changes of its regulatory 
environment. Because of the constantly changing regulatory environment in India, it has 
remained a difficult task for foreign companies to maintain updatedness with the day-to-
day changes and their implications for foreign firms (see chapter Teaming up with 
local partners gives foreign companies the ability to know, understand and interpret the 
changing business scenario more effectively. 
The majority of the Australian as well as Indian firms indicated that this factor had 
moderate to significant impact on their decision with all the firms aware of the factor in 
the present context. For the majority of the Australian firms, it might be difficult to keep 
abreast of the continuous regulatory changes taking place in India. It may further be 
difficult for them to interpret these changes from the Indian firms' perspectives. With 
the assistance of the Indian partners, the Australian firms might be able to understand the 
complexity of this changing regulatory environment. On the other hand, the Indian firms 
are likely to consider the positive impacts of the ongoing changes that would create 
better opportunities and an improved investment climate to joint venture with Australian 
partners. On balance, these data tend to support the impact of this factor on the decisions 
made by the Australian firms to joint venture. 
Summary 	The interview data reflect varying responses on the impact of selected 
legal and regulatory issues. Most of the Australian firms indicated that the relatively 
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high level of import.duties, tariffs ,and , quotas had moderate to significant impact on their 
decision. The Indian partners concurred with this view with half of them endorsing 
'significant impact' or 'some impact' responses. In terms of the three other factors, 
foreign investment policies, automatic approval procedures and the changing regulatory 
environment, the majority of Australian as well as Indian partners indicated that these 
factors had moderate - to significant impact on their decision. Most of the Australian 
firms considered the complex taxation law in India and the lack of intellectual property 
rights in India to have moderate to significant impact on their decision, whereas none of 
the Indian partners considered these factors while taking the decision to joint venture. 
No support was found in the responses of the Australian as well as Indian firms with 
respect to the impact of the public sector monopoly of the Indian insurance industry. 
For the seven variables examined, there is insufficient evidence in favour of the impact 
of the public sector monopoly of the Indian insurance industry to confirm proposition 
P2.3. The evidence on the remaining factors seems to confirm the proposition to a 
considerable extent. On the basis of the above-mentioned discussion, it appears that the 
available evidence tends to support proposition P2.3, viz., the legal and regulatory 
environment in India influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture 
with Indian firms to enter the Indian market. 
9.3.4 Human Resource Management Practices in India 
Four issues were taken into consideration to examine the influence of the HRM practices 
in India upon the Australian firms' motivation to form UVs while investing in India. 
These include the low labour productivity in India, lack of a consistent exit policy, the 
'militant and obstructionist' nature of the Indian labour forces and the lack of high 
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quality local staff. Most of the Australian firms indicated that the low labour 
productivity in India had moderate to significant impact on their decision, while none of 
the Indian firms endorsed this factor. Most of the Australian as well as Indian partners 
mentioned that the remaining -three factors had no impact on their decision to joint 
venture. 
Low Labour Productivity in India Despite the availability of cheap labour, low labour 
productivity is a common complaint amongst existing manufacturers in India (Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995). A poor selection decision may result in 
poor plant productivity (see chapter III). An Australian firm may minimise this problem 
by utilising the combined resources and expertise with its local partner to train and 
upgrade the quality of the workforce. To build a performance-based work culture, it is 
important to include local inputs which may be contributed by the local partner. 
Alternatively, the local work force may not accept the new work culture as a direct input 
from a foreign firm. IJVs may work as a ideal vehicle to offer a skills-based approach 
which contributes to an improved labour productivity (Dowling, et al., 1996). 
Most of the Australian firms considered this factor to have moderate to significant 
impact on their decision to joint venture. However, none of the Indian firms confirmed 
the Australian views. One of the Indian respondents mentioned, 
The reputation of low labour productivity in India is not altogether true. It varies 
from industry to industry. Also, there is a variation between public sector 
productivity and private sector productivity. Moreover, the ownership as well as 
leadership of a firm/industry matters. 
It was also revealed during the interview that the Indian firms are well-adept at managing 
labour productivity. Because of their familiarity and experience with the Indian labour 
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market, it is not difficult for the Indian partner to find and select labour with an 
appropriate level of productivity. Moreover, the Indian partner has its existing labour 
force with a known level of productivity. The Indian firm's strength in this respect 
complements the Australian firm's wariness. Therefore, this factor had an impact on the 
motivation of the most of the Australian firms in that they could benefit from the 
association with their Indian counterparts. Hence, the evidence partially supports the 
proposition. 
Lack of Consistent Exit Policy Once hired, it is not easy to dismiss employees under 
Indian labour law (Sen & Vaidya, 1997; The Economist, 9 April, 1994, pp. 15, 76-78). 
The Industrial Dispute Act, 1974 provides strict rules for layoff, discharge and 
retrenchment. This labour legislation can make discharge and retrenchment difficult. 
The dismissal of workers may be contested through a petition to the government and can 
lead to a time consuming process of negotiation (Price Waterhouse, 1993; Sen & Vaidya, 
1997). In these circumstances, it is preferable for the foreign investors to joint venture 
with a local firm which has familiarity and expertise in selecting and retaining quality 
staff. The prolonged retrenchment process may be avoided through appropriate 
selection of staff with the active support of an experienced local partner. 
Despite the above-mentioned concerns, most of the Australian as well as Indian firms did 
not rank this factor as a significant one. However, most of the respondents from both 
countries expressed their awareness of the issue in the present context. When asked 
about the nature of responses, most of the respondents mentioned that they did not give 
any emphasis to this factor at the time of their decision to joint venture because they 
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essentially considered it a minor issue which could be dealt with at a later stage. One of. 
the Australian respondents specifically mentioned, 
We didn't consider this factor too difficult to manage at the motivation stage. This 
is a minor one. We had more important environmental issues at hand, such as 
sharing resources, intense market competition, changing regulatory environment 
and so on. Moreover, various organisational-specific issues required sufficient 
attention at that stage. 
Overall, little or no support was evidenced from the responses concerning the impact of 
the absence of a consistent staff exit policy in India. 
'Militant and Obstructionist' Nature of the Indian Labour Force As referred to in 
chapter III, labour unrest is another problem when doing business in India. The labour 
unions in India have a reputation for being 'militant and obstructionist' and they have 
strong links with the leading political parties (Clarke & Von Glinow, 1996; Thakur 
1993). Dealing with these labour unions may require familiarity and skills. The local 
firms' expertise may be of great importance for a foreign firm in managing this issue 
efficiently. 
However, most of the Australian as well as Indian firms did not consider this factor as an 
important one. Most of the respondents from both sides expressed their awareness of 
this issue in the present context. When asked about the nature of responses, most of the 
firms gave views similar to those that they had provided on the lack of consistent exit 
policy, i.e., they essentially considered this factor as a minor one, not important enough 
to be taken into consideration at the motivation stage. In general, with respect to the 
possible impact of this factor on the decision of the firms, little or no support was 
evidenced from the responses. 
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Lack of High Quality Local Staff Although India has a large pool of well-educated 
people, since the economic liberalisation in the early 1990s, it has become very difficult 
for foreign companies to find high quality local staff (see chapter III). The 
unprecedented increase in demand for skilled people following a rapid rise in the level of 
foreign and local investment in India has produced this outcome (Asian Business Review, 
1995). As argued earlier (chapter DI), it is easier for the local companies to identify a 
suitable workforce at a competitive price because of their experience and familiarity with 
the local labour market. The UV may also use the local partner's existing labour forces 
(internal labour market) with an already proven efficiency level. UVs which utilise these 
local contacts are able to minimise the need for sending high-cost expatriate managers to 
India. 
Despite the above-mentioned concern, no substantial support was received from the 
Australian as well as Indian partners with respect to the possible impact of this factor. 
Most of the Australian firms and their Indian counterparts indicated that this factor did 
not have any impact on their decision. However, most of the Australian as well Indian 
firms expressed their awareness of the factor. While explaining their responses, most of 
the Australian as well as Indian firms repeated the same argument they provided for the 
previous two factors. They did not regard this factor as important enough to be taken 
into consideration at the motivation stage. Overall, with respect to the factor's possible 
impact on the decision of the firms, little or no support was evidenced from the 
responses. 
Summary 	The interview data reflect limited support for proposition P24. With 
respect to only one factor, low labour productivity in India, most of the Australian firms 
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indicated that it had moderate to significant impact on their decision, but this was not 
confirmed by the Indian responses. The other three factors were not given importance by 
most of the Australian as well as Indian firms. While most of the firms acknowledged 
their awareness of these inhibitive issues, they did not consider them as a major factor 
while deciding upon the establishment of a joint venture. 
From the four variables examined, the evidence on the impact of low labour productivity 
in India tends to support the proposition, while the evidence on the impact of the other 
three variables is found to be inconsistent with proposition P2.4. On the basis of the 
above discussion, it appears that the available evidence provides limited support for 
proposition P2.4., viz., the nature of human resource management practices in India 
influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to 
enter the Indian market. 
9.3.5 Lack of Necessary Market Information 
As mentioned in chapter BEE, gathering necessary market information in India is not an 
easy task. For foreign investors in India, it could be difficult as well as expensive to 
collect this information (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994; Rajshekar & Raman,1994). 
However, collaboration through the formation of UNis can give foreign firms the 
opportunity to access information more easily through an experienced local partner 
familiar with the Indian market and its information sources. 
Most of the Australian firms considered this factor to have moderate to significant 
impact on their decision to joint venture. However, none of the Indian firms confirmed 
the Australian views. From the ten Indian parents, seven indicated that this factor had no 
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'impact on their decision, while the remaining respondents expressed their unawareness 
of this factor in the present context. According to one Indian respondent, 'the market 
information is not difficult for local Indian firms to access. However, it might be 
difficult for the Australian firms to locate and retrieve such information'. This implies 
the Indian partner's advantage of being familiar with the Indian market conditions. 
Therefore, the Australian firms' requirements for market information may be 
complemented by the Indian firms' local knowledge and ability to gather this necessary 
information. These responses appear to be consistent with the proposition, P2.5. 
Summary 	Most of the Australian firms indicated that the lack of necessary market 
information in India had a moderate to significant impact on their decision to joint 
venture, while none of the Indian firms admitted any impact of this factor on their 
decision. As the evidence suggests, most of the Australian parents considered this factor 
important because of their expectation of gaining benefit from the Indian partner's ability 
to access the necessary market information in India. Therefore, the evidence appears to 
be partially consistent with proposition P2.5, viz., the lack of necessary market 
information in India influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture 
with Indian firms to enter the Indian market. 
9.3.6 Cultural Environment 
Two major components of the cultural environment were taken into consideration to 
examine the validity of proposition P2.6. These include, cultural distance and 
unfamiliarity and the difficulty in dealing with corruption and bureaucracy in India. 
Most of the Australian firms indicated that cultural distance and unfamiliarity had 
considerable impact on their decision to joint venture, whereas this factor was reported as 
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having no impact on most of the Indian firms. The evidence showed that the other 
factor, difficulty in dealing with corruption and bureaucracy had significant impact on 
the decision of most of the Australian firms, whereas most of the Indian firms again 
reported no impact. 
Cultural Distance and Unfamiliarity India is a country with cultural diversity and a 
variety of social types and languages (Tayeb, 1996). Indeed, the many languages 
currently spoken in India are a striking reflection of the country's cultural diversity (Katz, 
1967). Also, religion has a strong influence in social and business activities in India 
(Copeland & Griggs, 1986). As mentioned earlier, Hofstede's (1980) study referred to 
India as a country with large power distance (i.e., perceived high degree of inequality 
among different social groups), weak uncertainty avoidance (i.e., more tolerance for 
future uncertainty and risk), dominant collectivism (i.e., more emphasis on group-
orientation and hierarchical framework), and masculine dominance (India's bureaucracy 
and the social class system are two best examples in this respect). 
There are significant differences between the Indian culture and a Western culture such 
as Australian (As-Saber, et al., 1998). It is argued that because of the perceived psychic 
distance between Australia and India, the Australians are likely to be reluctant to fully 
commit themselves to the Indian market (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede & Bond, 1988; 
Fletcher, 1996; As-Saber, et al., 1998). However, due to an enormous market potential it 
is difficult for the foreign companies to ignore that market. Joint venturing with a local 
partner may assist to understand and address these intricacies. 
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Most of the Australian firms expressed concerns about their distance from• and 
unfamiliarity with the intricate Indian culture. Emphasising the perceived complexity of 
the Indian culture, these Australian firms indicated that this factor had moderate to 
significant impact on their decision to joint venture. To the contrary, most of the Indian 
firms did not consider this factor to be sufficiently important to influence their decision. 
According to one Indian respondent, 'the Indian culture is not as complex as it is 
conceived by the 'foreigners'. People from countries like Australia are likely to find 
Indians friendly and adaptive to the foreign culture'. However, it may still be difficult 
for the Australian firms to ignore the revival of movements such as the Neo-Swadeshi 
movement and the Hindutva (as discussed in chapter 8.3.3) which have been gaining 
strength since the late 1980s. Nevertheless, the Australian firms' concerns might have 
been ameliorated by the active support of their local partners who are familiar with the 
Indian culture. This intention was reflected in the responses of the majority of the 
Australian firms. The evidence tends to confirm that this factor has had moderate to 
significant impact upon the Australian firms' decisions to joint venture. 
Dealing with Corruption and Bureaucracy As argued in chapter B1, India is considered 
as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (Sen, 1996). Corruption is so pervasive 
in India that dozens of political leaders and bureaucrats including the former Prime 
Minister Narashima Rao and several former ministers and bureaucrats underwent trials 
of late for alleged links with corrupt dealings (Way, 1996). As mentioned earlier in the 
literature review at chapter 3.7.1, corruption has become a norm in the Indian political 
and bureaucratic practices and has already been implanted into the local culture. A 
foreign company is likely to have difficulties in dealing with such corruption and 
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bureaucratic practice. IJVs provide an opportunity for the foreign firm to understand and 
manage such 'norms' with utmost caution through its association with a local partner. 
Following the perceived gravity of the corruption situation in India, most of the 
Australian parents (six out of nine) indicated that this factor had significant impact on 
their decision to joint venture. On the contrary, most of the Indian partners endorsed a 
'no impact' response. Only one Indian respondent mentioned that this factor had some 
impact on its decision, while one expressed its unawareness of the issue in the present 
context. During the interviews, it was revealed that most of the Australian firms did not 
want to confront these issues directly as a solo Australian company. They considered it 
to be one of the major reasons for forming an UV and entrusted the local partner to deal 
with this issue. 
Similar arrangements via 'middle men' are used by the US companies to circumvent the 
US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act that prohibits the payment of unrecorded bribes to 
foreign governments or officials (Way, 1996). One Indian respondent, who wanted to 
remain anonymous, mentioned that 'corruption has always been a problem in India. We 
are used to it and gain out of it, but most often we are reluctant to say anything about it'. 
This comment reflects the Indian partners' familiarity and readiness to deal with this 
factor. Australian firms' concerns, in this respect, might have been ameliorated by the 
active support from their local partners who are familiar with this issue. This intention 
was reflected in the responses of the majority of the Australian firms. The evidence 
tends to confirm that this factor has had moderate to significant impact upon the 
Australian firms' decisions to joint venture. 
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Summary 	The interview data indicate that cultural distance and unfamiliarity with 
the Indian business environment has had moderate to significant impact for most of the 
Australian firms, while most of the Indian firms endorsed a 'no impact' response. The 
other factor, difficulty in dealing with the corruption and bureaucracy was given 
significant importance by most of the Australian firms, whereas this factor was given no 
importance by most of the Indian firms while making the decision to joint venture. It is 
important to note that within the cultural environment, Australian firms' responses on 
corruption and bureaucracy were more definitive (with six 'significant impact' 
responses) than were their responses on the other factor, cultural distance and 
unfamiliarity. Nonetheless, because of the quest for assistance by the Australian firms 
from the local Indian partners to overcome these culture-specific problems in India, these 
factors influenced the decision of the majority of the Australian firms to joint venture. 
Therefore, the evidence tends to be consistent with proposition P2.6, viz., cultural 
diversity in India influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with 
Indian firms to enter the Indian market. 
9.3.7 Responses on the Overall Impact of the Selected Environmental Variables 
The responses on the general questions asked on the overall impact of the six 
environmental variables on the firms' decisions to joint venture have been found to be 
more supportive than were the responses on the impact of each of the variables 
considered individually. This trend is similar to that of the impact of geopolitical 
variables on the firms' decisions to joint venture (see chapter 8.3.4). 
Table 9.8 lists the responses of both the Australian and Indian firms on the overall 
impact of six environmental variables on their decision to joint venture. Most of the 
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Indian as well as Australian firms indicated that these factors as a whole had some to 
significant impact on their decision. In addition, all of the respondents expressed their 
awareness of 
Table 9.8 
Frequency of the Responses on the Combination of Selected Environmental 
Variables which Influenced the Firms' Decisions to Joint Venture 
Significant 
impact 
Some 
impact 
No 
impact 
Level of impact on the entry mode decision of 
Australian firms 1 7 1 
Level of impact on the decision of Indian firms 
to joint venture with Australian partners 5 3 2 
this issue. This evidence is somewhat inconsistent with the individual findings on each 
of the issues considered separately. Individually, only two factors, viz., the economic 
environment and the legal and regulatory environment were given moderate to 
significant importance by the majority of the Australian as well as Indian firms in their 
decision to joint venture. 
Evidence on the four other factors, political environment, human resource management 
practice, lack of necessary market information and cultural environment were given some 
importance by the majority of the Australian firms, whereas, most of the Indian firms did 
not attribute any importance to these factors. In contrast to the individual findings, an 
interesting outcome that is evidenced from the general question is the response set from 
the Indian firms which is more supportive of proposition P2 than it is for their Australian 
counterparts. The evidence collected individually on each of the environmental factors 
shows the Australian firms' responses to be more supportive than it is for their Indian 
partners. 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter (8.3.4), this inconsistency between the Australian 
and Indian firms' response sets on the factors treated separately and the responses on the 
general inclusive question might have occurred due to the confounding of effects where 
the respondents had difficulties in disentangling the separate and partial effects of each of 
the factors. The responses from the general inclusive question may have provided some 
'global' opinion about the combined effect of the six environmental variables, but not an 
in-depth one specific to any particular factor. Hence, as a key outcome of this particular 
finding, it seems important that if useable implications of these issues are to be obtained 
for any particular international business operation anywhere, it is necessary to 
disaggregate the survey questions into specific unidimensional factors. This ambiguity 
must be avoided to obtain accurate results. 
9.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The survey evidence presented here suggests that the variables reported on have had 
limited impact on the participants' motivations to joint venture. The evidence only 
partially supports propositions P2.1, P2.2, P2.3, P2.4, P2.5 and P2.6. For most of the 
propositions, the Australian firms' responses were found to be more supportive than 
were those of their Indian counterparts. However, when asked the general question on 
the impact of all of the six variables taken conjointly as an inclusive question, the 
responses tended to be more supportive of the propositions than was the case when each 
of the factors was treated separately. Most of the Indian and Australian firms indicated 
that the combination of the six environmental factors, as a global construct, had moderate 
to significant impact on their decision. 
271 
As a possible explanation, it has been argued that this difference in outcome might be 
possible because of a compounding of effects in the all-inclusive case where the 
respondents had difficulties in disentangling the separate and partial effects of each 
factor or they did not attempt to do so. However, despite the apparent lack of depth of 
this finding, it might be illustrative of a general opinion by respondents about the 
combined effects of these six environmental variables. In addition, it has assisted to 
generate possible guidance for future research in that it seems advisable to consider each 
of the variables separately. It could be deemed that the weight of the evidence, in 
general, is tending to be partially supportive of the general proposition (P2), viz., host-
country environmental factors, such as its economic, cultural, legal and political 
settings, the firm's access to market information and its human resource management 
practices impact on the decision making process of the foreign firm as it considers entry 
into the Indian market. 
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CHAPTER X 
ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF ORGANISATIONAL-SPECIFIC 
VARIABLES ON THE MOTIVATION TO JOINT VENTURE 
Joint ventures can offer partners many technological, financial, marketing, and 
managerial strengths, if managed effectively (Harrigan, 1986, P.  18). 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
Organisational-specific variables need be considered by the firm in its overseas 
venturing. Off-shore involvement may affect the firm's organisational capabilities. 
As discussed in the literature review (chapter IV), organisational-specific variables 
have the potential to impact on a firm's motivation to select the I.TV mode when it 
intends to invest internationally. In this chapter, Australian-Indian IJVs in India are 
examined from this perspective. Using the nine case studies, the influence of 
organisational-specific variables on the Australian firms' decisions to choose the IJV 
mode for investment in India is examined. The focus of the empirical investigation to 
follow is that of the Australian firms' perspectives. However, to determine whether 
there is a convergence of views from both the Australian and Indian partners' 
perspectives, an examination of the Indian partners' responses is also undertaken. 
This analysis is based on the findings in relation to the specific propositions P3.1, P3.2. 
P3.3, P3.4, P3.5 and P3.6 established at chapter 6.4. A discussion emphasising the 
relevance as well as implications of these research findings with respect to the general 
proposition P3 ensues. 
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10.2 INTERVIEW DATA 
The data are presented in six sections. The first section (10.2.1) deals with economies 
of scale, i.e., the possibility that the quest for economies of scale influenced the 
decision by Australian firms to form I.Ws with Indian firms to enter the Indian market 
(proposition P3.1). The second section (10.2.2) deals with the impact of transactions 
cost minimisation, i.e., the possibility that the quest for minimising the transactions-
specific costs influenced this decision (proposition P3.2). The third section (10.2.3) 
deals with the firms' access to a distribution network, i.e., the possibility that the quest 
Table 10.1 
Frequency of Organisational-specific Variables which Influenced the Firms' 
Decisions to Joint Venture* 
Organisational-specific 
variables influencing the 
decision to form IJVs 
Level of impact on the entry 
mode decision by Australian 
firms' 
Level of impact on the 
decision of Indian firms to 
joint venture with Australian 
partners' 
Signi- 
r ficant2 
Some 
impact 
No 
impact 
N/A Signi- 
ficant2 
Some 
impact 
No 
impact 
N/A 
Economies of scale 4 5 5 1 3 1 
Transactions costs 
minimisation 
5 3 1 4 2 4 
Access to a distribution 
network 6 3 5 1 4 
Sharing of resources and 
capabilities 
Sharing technology 2 7 8 2 
Sharing of establishment costs 
and R&D expenses 6 3 4 2 4 
HRM issues 
Selection and recruitment 3 5 1 1 7 2 
Training and development 3 4 2 5 4 1 
Managing labour unrest 4 3 2 1 7 2 
Inter-partner learning _ 	3 6 9 1 
Number of firms falling within each category. 
The numbers of Australian and Indian firms vary. Explanations have been given in chapter 
VII and are also available at the end of Table-1.1 and Table-1.2. 
2 	Nomenclature used is identical to that used in the questionnaire, but for the case of the use of 
'definitely yes' in the questionnaire. For summary purposes, these responses are recorded as 
'significant' throughout this chapter. 
N/A = Not Applicable. This denotes the confidentiality of data or the unawareness of the 
respondents CI don't know'). 
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for the rapid and expanded access to the distribution network influenced the decision 
(proposition P3.3). The fourth section (10.2.4) deals with the sharing of resources and 
capabilities, i.e., the possibility that the quest for sharing technology and 
establishment costs influenced the Australian firms' decisions to joint venture 
(proposition P3.4). The fifth section (10.2.5) deals with the organisational-specific 
HRM issues, i.e., the possibility that managing HRM issues within the organisational 
framework influenced the decision of Australian firms to joint venture with a local 
partner while investing in India (proposition P3.5). The sixth section (10.2.6) 
considers the impact of inter-partner learning, i.e., the possibility that the quest for 
procuring partner's knowledge and expertise influenced the decision-making of 
Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while investing in India 
(proposition P3.6). A summary of the significance of these organisational-specific 
variables on the firm's decision to joint venture is presented in Table 10.1. 
10.2.1 Economies of Scale 
Proposition P3.I deals with economies of scale and its influence on the Australian 
firms' decisions to joint venture with an Indian partner while investing in India. Table 
10.2 summarises the responses of Australian as well as Indian firms on the impact of 
their quest for economies of scale. 
Australian Partners' Responses 	As shown in Table 10.2, responses from the 
Australian parents demonstrate limited support for proposition P3.1. All nine 
Australian firms interviewed indicated that this factor had some to significant impact 
on their decision to joint venture. Four firms endorsed 'significant impact', while 
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this factor was acknowledged by the remaining four Australian parents as having 
'some impact' on their decision. 
Table 10.2 
Sununary of Responses on the Impact of the Quest for Economies of Scale 
Name of the firm Level of impact of the quest for economies of scale on 
choosing IJVs 
Australian parent* 
1. Atco Control Pty Ltd Significant impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International Si. 	ificant impact 
3. Moldflow International Pty Ltd Some impact 
4. RTZ-CRA Some impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd Some impact 
6. Tech-Pacific Significant impact 
7. Telstra International-1 Some impact 
8. Telstra International-2 Some impact 
9. Warman International Significant impact 
Indian host 
1. ACC N/A 
2. Dr. S.P. Bhatnagar** Significant impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1** No impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2 Significant impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee Significant impact 
6. IL & FS*** No impact 
7. Indure Ltd Significant impact 
8. Modi Corporation No impact 
9. Stone India Ltd Significant impact 
10. VSNL*** Some impact 
For the nine LIVs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two separate 
LIVs in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the LTV involvements, 
Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of them, Telstra might 
have faced a different set of environmental variables. 'relstra International-1' demonstrates the 
findings on the environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to form Modi-Telstra, and 
l'elstra International-2' denotes this scenario in relation to Telstra-VComm. 
** Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two UVs with Australian partners, both of which are 
included in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain LTV-specific information. 
`Godrej & Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced during the motivation 
to form GSSL, and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
*** The UV, Telstra-Vconun Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL&FS, both of which are included in this 
study. 
Indian Partners' Responses Table 10.2 shows the responses from the Indian 
partners. Most of the Indian partners indicated that this factor had some to significant 
impact on their decision. However, their responses appear to be less supportive than 
are those of their Australian counterparts. Of the ten Indian firms, five indicated that 
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it had significant impact on their decision, while only one firm endorsed a 'some 
impact' response. Three Indian firms mentioned that this factor had no impact on 
their decision while the remaining one firm expressed its unawareness of this factor in 
the present context. 
10.2.2 Transactions Costs Minimisation 
Proposition P3.2 deals with the impact of the quest for transactions costs minimisation 
on the decision of Australian firms to form INs with Indian partners while investing 
in India. Table 10.3 summarises the responses of both Australian and Indian firms. 
Australian Firms' Responses 	As shown in Table 10.3, most of the Australian 
respondents (eight out of nine) indicated that this factor had some to significant 
impact on their decision to joint venture. Five respondents considered this factor as 
being of significant importance, while three acknowledged 'some impact'. Only one 
respondent endorsed a 'no impact' response. 
Indian Partners' Responses The responses from the Indian partners are supportive 
of the proposition, but lesser so than are their Australian counterparts. Of the ten 
Indian firms, six indicated that this factor had some to significant impact on their 
decision, while the remaining four acknowledged no impact on their decision. 
However, all the Indian partners expressed their awareness of the factor in the present 
context. 
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Table 10.3 
Summary of Responses on the Impact of the Quest for Organisational-Specific 
Transactions Costs Minimisation 
Name of the firm 
Level of impact of the quest for transactions costs 
minimisation on choosing IJV mode 
Australian parent* 
I. Atco Control Pty Ltd Significant impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International Significant impact 
3. Moldflow International Pty Ltd Some impact 
4. RTZ-CRA Some impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd Some impact 
6. Tech-Pacific No impact 
7. Telstra International-1 Significant impact 
8. Telstra International-2 Significant impact 
9. Warman International Significant impact 
Indian host 
1. ACC Some impact 
2. Dr. S.P. Bhatnalar Si • nificant impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1** No impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2** No impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee Significant impact 
6. IL & FS*** No impact 
7. Indure Ltd Significant impact 
8. Modi Corporation No impact 
9. Stone India Ltd Si. nificant impact 
10. VSNL*** I 	 Some impact 
For the nine UVs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two 
separate 11Vs in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the UV 
involvements, Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of them, 
Telstra might have faced a different set of environmental variables. 'Telstra International-1' 
demonstrates the findings on the environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to form 
Modi-Telstra, and 'Telstra International-2' denotes this scenario in relation to Telstra-VCornm. 
** Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two 1.1Vs with Australian partners, both of which are 
included in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain L1V-specific information. 
`Godrej & Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced during the motivation 
to form GSSL, and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
*** The UV, Telstra-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL&FS, both of which are included in this 
study. 
10.2.3 Access to a Distribution Network 
Proposition P3.3 deals with the impact of the quest for access to a distribution network 
on the decision of Australian firms to form INs with Indian partners for investment in 
India. Table 10.4 summarises the responses of both Australian and Indian firms. 
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Table 10.4 
Summary of Firms' Responses on the Impact of the Quest for Access to a 
Distribution Network 
Name of the firm 
Level of impact of the quest for access to a 
distribution network on choosing the LTV mode 
Australian parent* 
1. Atco Control Pty Ltd Significant impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International Significant impact 
3. Moldflow International Pty Ltd Significant impact 
4. RTZ-CRA Some impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd Some impact 
6. Tech-Pacific Significant impact 
7. Telstra International-1 Significant impact 
8. Telstra International-2 Significant impact 
9. Warman International Some impact 
Indian host 
1. ACC No impact 
2. Dr. S.P. Bhatnagar Significant impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1** Significant impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2** Significant impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee Significant impact 
6. IL & FS*** No impact 
7. Indure Ltd No impact 
8. Modi Corporation No impact 
9. Stone India Ltd Some impact 
10. VSNL*** Significant impact 
For the nine IJVs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two 
separate IPA in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the IJV 
involvements, Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of 
them, Telstra might have faced a different set of environmental variables. 'Telstra International—
l' demonstrates the findings on the environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to 
form Modi-Telstra, and 'Telstra International-2' denotes this scenario in relation to Telstra-
VCornm. 
* * Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two INs with Australian partners, both of which are 
included in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain UV-specific 
information. `Godrej & Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced 
during the motivation to form GSSL, and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
*** The IN, Telstra-Vcornm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL&FS, both of which are included in this 
study. 
Australian Parents' Responses The Australian partners' responses are summarised 
in Table 10.4. The data gathered from the Australian firms demonstrate considerable 
support for the proposition. All nine Australian firms indicated that their quest for 
access to a distribution network had some to significant impact on their decision to 
joint venture. Of the nine respondents, six endorsed a 'significant impact' response, 
while the three other reported 'some impact' on their decision. 
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Indian Partners' Responses Responses from the Indian partners demonstrated 
substantial support for the proposition, although not being as definitive as those from 
their Australian counterparts. Six Indian firms mentioned that this factor had 
moderate to significant impact on their decision to joint venture, while four endorsed a 
`no impact' .response. Nevertheless, all the Australian as well as Indian respondents 
expressed their awareness of this issue. 
10.2.4 The Sharing of Resources and Capabilities 
Proposition P3.4 deals with the sharing of resources and capabilities and its influence 
on the decision of Australian firms to form IJVs with Indian partners while investing 
in India. Table 10.5 summarises the responses of Australian as well as Indian firms. 
In the present research context, two major issues are taken into consideration - sharing 
technology and the sharing of establishment costs and R&D expenses. 
Australian Parents' Responses 	Table 10.5 summarises the responses of the 
Australian parent firms. With respect to the impact of sharing technology, only two 
Australian firms indicated that this factor had some impact on their decision to joint-
venture. The remaining seven firms endorsed a `no impact' response. The other 
factor, sharing establishment costs and R&D expenses, had considerable impact on 
the Australian firms' decision to joint venture. All nine Australian firms indicated 
that this factor had 'some' to 'significant' impact on their decision. 
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Table 10.5 
Summary of Responses on the Impact of the Sharing of 
Resources and Capabilities 
Name of the firm 
Level of impact of the sharing of resources and 
capabilities on choosing the IJV mode 
Sharing technology Sharing of establishment 
costs and R&D expenses 
Australian parent* 
1. Atco Control Pty Ltd No impact Significant impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International No impact Significant impact 
3. Moldflow International Pty Ltd Some impact Significant impact 
4. RTZ-CRA No impact Significant impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd No impact Some impact 
6. Tech-Pacific Some impact Some impact 
7. Telstra International-1 No impact Significant impact 
8. Telstra International-2 No impact Significant impact 
9. Warman International No impact Some impact 
Indian host 
I. ACC Significant impact Significant impact 
2. Dr. S.P. Bhatnagar Significant impact No impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1** Some impact No impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2** Some impact Significant impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee Significant im. act Si. niflcant impact 
6. IL & FS*** Significant impact Some impact 
7. Indure Ltd Significant impact No impact 
8. Modi Corporation Significant impact Significant impact 
9. Stone India Ltd Significant impact Some impact 
10. VSNL*** Significant impact No impact 
For the nine INs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two 
separate INs in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the UV 
involvements, Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of 
them, Telstra might have faced a different set of environmental variables. 'Telstra International-
1' demonstrates the findings on the environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to 
form Modi-Telstra, and 'Telstra International-2' denotes this scenario in relation to Telstra-
VConun. 
Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two UVs with Australian partners, both of which are 
included in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain UV-specific 
information. `Godrej & Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced 
during the motivation to form GSSL, and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
The IN, Telstra-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and m&Fs, both of which are included in this 
study. 
Indian Partners' Responses Along with the responses of the Australian firms, Table 
10.5 summarises the responses from their Indian partners. With respect to the impact 
of sharing technology, all ten Indian firms indicated that this factor had some to 
significant impact on their decision to joint venture. The other factor, the sharing of 
establishment costs and R&D expenses, also received considerable support. Of the 
** 
*** 
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ten Indian firms, six mentioned that this factor had 'some' to 'significant' impact on 
their decision to joint venture while the remaining four endorsed a 'no impact' 
response. 
10.2.5 Human Resource Management Issues 
Proposition .P3.5 deals with the organisational-specific HRM issues. Table 10.6 
summarises the responses from Australian and Indian firms on this factor. In the 
present research context, three major issues are taken into consideration - selection 
and recruitment, training and development, and managing labour unrest. 
Australian Parents' Responses 	Table 10.6 summarises the responses of the 
Australian parents on the impact of organisational-specific HRM issues on their 
decision to joint venture with Indian partners. The majority of the Australian parents 
conceded that all the three HRM issues had some to significant impact on their 
decision to joint venture. 
Indian Partners' Responses The Indian partners' responses are summarised in Table 
10.6. Of the ten Indian partners, nine indicated that the appropriate training and 
development requirements had some to significant impact on their decision to joint 
venture. Unlike the responses of the Australian firms, the other two HRM issues 
were not considered important by the majority of the Indian firms with regard to their 
decision to joint venture. Nevertheless, most of the Indian firms expressed their 
awareness of these issues. 
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Table 10.6 
Summary of Responses on the Impact of Human Resource Management 
Name of the firm 
Level of impact of human resource management on 
choosing the IJV mode 
Selection and 
recruitment 
Training and 
development 
Managing labour 
unrest 
Australian parent* 
1. Atco Control Pty Ltd Significant impact Some impact Some impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International Significant impact Significant impact Significant impact 
3. Moldflow International Pty Ltd Significant impact Some impact No impact 
4. RTZ-CRA . Some impact Some impact Some impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty Ltd No impact Significant impact No impact 
6. Tech-Pacific Some impact Some impact Some impact 
7. Telstra International-1 Some impact No impact Significant impact 
8. Telstra International-2 Some impact No impact Significant impact 
9. Warman International Some impact Significant impact Significant impact 	, 
Indian host 
1. ACC N/A Some impact N/A 
2. Dr. S.P. Bhatnagar No impact Significant impact No impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1** No impact Some impact No impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2** No impact Significant impact No impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee No impact Significant impact No impact 
6. IL & FS*** N/A N/A N/A 
7. Indure Ltd No impact Significant impact No impact 
8. Modi Corporation Some impact Some impact No impact 
9. Stone India Ltd No impact Significant impact Some impact 
10. VSNL*** No impact Some impact No impact 
For the nine UVs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two 
separate UVs in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the LJV 
involvements, Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of them, 
Telstra might have faced a different set of environmental variables. 'Telstra International-1' 
demonstrates the findings on the environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to form 
Modi-Telstra, and 'Telstra International-2' denotes such scenario in relation to Telstra-VComm. 
* * Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two UVs with Australian partners, both of which are 
included in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain LTV-specific information. 
`Godrej & Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced during the motivation 
to form GSSL, and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
*** The LTV, Telstra-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL&FS, both of which are included in this 
study. 
10.2.6 Inter-Partner Learning 
Proposition P3.6 deals with inter-partner learning and its impact on the decision of 
Australian firms to form IWs with Indian partners while investing in India. Table 
10.7 summarises the responses from both the Australian and Indian firms on this 
factor. 
283 
Table 10.7 
Summary of Responses on the Impact of the Quest for 
Inter-Partner Learning 
Name of the firm 
Level of impact of the quest for inter- 
partner learning on choosing the IJV mode 
Australian parent* 
I. Atco Control Pty Ltd Some impact 
2. Futuris Brakes International Significant impact 
3. Moldflow International Pty Ltd Significant impact 
4. RTZ-CRA Some impact 
5. Tech-Dry Pty - Ltd Some impact 
6. Tech-Pacific Significant impact 
7. Telstra International-1 Some impact 
8. Telstra International-2 Some impact 
9. Warman International Some impact 
Indian host 
1. ACC Significant impact 
2. Dr. S.P. Bhatnagar Significant impact 
3. Godrej & Boyce-1** Significant impact 
4. Godrej & Boyce-2** Significant impact 
5. Harish Soonderjee Significant impact 
6. IL & FS*** Some impact 
7. Indure Ltd Significant impact 
8. Modi Corporation Significant impact 
9. Stone India Ltd Significant impact 
10. VSNL*** Significant impact 
For the nine INs, the number of Australian parent firms is eight. Telstra International has two 
separate IJVs in India, both of which are included in this study. However, for each of the IN 
involvements, Telstra was interviewed separately because it had been assumed that for each of 
them, Telstra might have faced a different set of environmental variables. 'Telstra International—
l' demonstrates the findings on the environmental variables Telstra faced during the motivation to 
form Modi-Telstra, and 'Telstra International-2' denotes this scenario in relation to Telstra-
VConun. 
** Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd is the host of two UVs with Australian partners, both of which are 
included in this study. Godrej & Boyce was interviewed twice to obtain IN-specific 
information. `Godrej & Boyce-1' records the findings on the environmental variables it faced 
during the motivation to form GSSL, and `Godrej & Boyce-2' records results in relation to GPTL. 
*** The IN, Telstra-Vcomm Ltd has two hosts — VSNL and IL&FS, both of which are included in this 
study. 
Australian Parents' Responses All nine Australian respondents indicated that this 
factor had some to significant impact on their decision to joint venture. While three 
Australian firms acknowledged that this factor had a significant impact, the remaining 
six indicated that this factor had some impact on their decision. These data tend to 
support the proposition. 
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Indian Partners' Responses As was the case with their Australian counterparts, all 
Indian respondents indicated that this factor had "some" to "significant" impact on 
their decisions to joint venture. However, the Indian partners' responses are more 
supportive than are those of the Australians. Of the ten Indian partners, nine 
acknowledged the impact of the quest for inter-partner learning as being of significant 
importance.. Only one indicated that it had some impact. 
10.3 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION 
On the basis of the data presented, there appears to be some support for each of the 
propositions P3.1, P3.2, P3.3, P3.4, P3.5 and P3.6. Discussion of the interview data is 
grouped into eight sections. The first six sections consider the six organisational-
specific variables dealing with propositions P3.1, P3.2, P3.3, P3.4, P3.5 and P3.6, while 
the seventh section will examine the responses with respect to the general question 
covering all six groupings. A chapter summary concludes with a brief examination of 
the general proposition (proposition P3) and the level of support it has in the data sets 
from across the six groupings. 
10.3.1 Economies of Scale 
One of the major proposed motivations to form INs is to achieve economies of scale 
(Anderson, 1995; Ennen, 1991; Gullander, 1976; Harrigan, 1988; Howarth et al., 
1995). With the combined resources and capabilities from each of the partners, an 
UV is likely to generate more output with greater efficiency than either of its partners 
operating as a stand-alone company. Because of the possibility of enhanced 
production through shared contributions from the partners, it is also possible to 
achieve economies of scale in obtaining raw materials and components supply, in 
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research and development, and in marketing and distribution (Beamish et al., 1994). 
As discussed in chapter IV, achieving economies of scale through the establishment of 
UNTs with local partner is especially important for Australian firms because they often 
lack the size to compete globally as stand-alone companies. 
From the evidence collected, it may be argued that achieving economies of scale had 
considerable impact on most of the Australian as well as Indian partners on their 
decision to joint venture. According to one of the Australian parents, 
it is a simple logic that the pulling of resources from both the partners will create 
synergy and help achieve economies of scale. Moreover, because of the Indian 
partner's expertise and familiarity with the Indian market conditions, it is likely 
to be much easier for the IJY to take the right decision with respect to the 
production quality and volume. 
These findings somewhat conform to the literature presented in chapter IV and tend to 
be consistent with proposition P3.1, viz., the quest for economies of scale motivates 
Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while entering the Indian market. 
10.3.2 Transactions Costs Minimisation 
The quest for transactions cost minimisation has been considered an important 
motivation to form IJVs (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Grubaugh, 1987; Kogut, 1988; 
Kogut & Singh, 1986, 1988; Solocha, et al., 1990). Solocha, et al. (1990) contend 
that organisational-specific transactions costs in servicing a foreign market may be 
considerable. These costs include gathering information about the foreign market, 
search and negotiating costs and adapting the product to that market through resource 
commitments. As mentioned in chapter IV, Dunning (1979, 1988) considers most of 
these organisational-specific transactions costs (e.g., resource commitment, search and 
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negotiating costs) in his 'factor endowment/market failure' paradigm as a 
consequence of transactional market failure. 
In the Indian context, there are a number of transactions cost factors which influence 
the profitability of a foreign company willing to enter the Indian market. The major 
transactions. cost factors are the costs of obtaining necessary market information, 
partner search and negotiating costs, the costs of hiring managerial expertise, paying 
taxes and buying capital equipment and raw materials location and their acquisition. 
By choosing the UV as their mode of entry into foreign markets, foreign companies 
may substantially reduce such costs. It may be relatively easier for the foreign 
companies to obtain necessary information via its UV partner. 
Most of the Australian (eight out of nine) as well as Indian (six out of ten) firms 
acknowledged the importance of this factor. These responses are mutually supportive 
and thus complementary to each other. Hence, the data tend to be consistent with 
proposition P3.2, viz., transactions costs minimisation influences the decision taken by 
Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while entering the Indian market. 
10.3.3 Access to Distribution Networks 
As mentioned in chapter IV, access to distribution networks is an important 
consideration for a firm which is investing in an overseas market (Anderson, 1995; 
Beamish et al., 1994). It is equally important for Australian companies seeking to 
operate in the Indian market. India, a country with over 900 million people and 
fragmented into various regional markets across 25 States, is a challenging market for 
the foreign entrant. Also fragmented through the presence of various religious beliefs, 
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regional languages, and cultural heritages, India is a difficult market to serve (Banks 
& Natarajan, 1995). In this circumstance, accessing the existing distribution channels 
of the local firms and building new distribution channels with the active collaboration 
of the host partner are likely to persuade the Australian firms to joint venture while 
investing in India. 
All nine Australian parents realised the importance of this factor during their decision 
to joint venture. This factor was also given importance by the majority of the Indian 
firms. Nevertheless, the Australian partners' responses appeared to be more definitive 
than their Indian counterparts. As a possible interpretation, it may be argued that 
while the Australian parents considered that access to the distribution networks to be a 
critical motivation to joint venture, most of the Indian respondents conceded that 
through the establishment of IJVs with the Australian partners, they would be able to 
further improve their existing distribution channels, or to establish new ones. It 
appears from the available evidence here that there is support for proposition P3.3, viz., 
access to the distribution networks within the Indian market influences the decision 
taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while entering the Indian 
market. 
10.3.4 The Sharing of Resources and Capabilities 
As mentioned in chapter IV, sharing resources and capabilities with local partners 
may persuade a foreign firm to establish international joint ventures. Proposition P3.4 
deals with the impact of this factor on the Australian firms' joint venturing in India. 
Two major components were taken into consideration to examine the validity of 
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proposition P3.4. These include the sharing of technology and the sharing of 
establishment costs and R&D facilities. 
Sharing Technology 
As elicited from the literature (chapter IV), sharing technology may affect a firm's 
decision to establish an UV relationship with a foreign partner while investing 
overseas. As the world's ninth largest manufacturing economy, and the home of one 
of the largest pools of scientists and engineers in the world, India is said to have 
technological capabilities in a range of industries (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994; 
Mathur, 1994). In addition, Indian partners can benefit from the technological 
abilities of their Australian counterpart. The costs of procuring and/or innovating new 
technologies could also be shared between partners. Consequently, it is proposed that 
the pursuit of sharing technology with local partners might have acted as a motivation 
for the Australian firms to joint venture with the Indian firms. 
However, most of the Australian firms did not agree with this premise and indicated 
that this factor did not have any impact on their decision. While seven Australian 
firms mentioned that they did not consider this factor in deciding their entry mode 
strategy, two acknowledged some impact of this variable on their decision. It is 
interesting to reveal that both of .the companies with a 'some impact' response belong 
to the information technology industry (Moldflow International and Tech-Pacific). 
India has an emerging competitive advantage in this particular industry. In India, 
information technology is one of the industries with a world-class performance 
(Lakha, 1993). Along with their own technological contributions to the respective 
UVs, these two firms acknowledged that the expectation of similar contributions from 
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their partners moderately motivated them to joint venture. Being the exclusive 
suppliers of the necessary technologies for the immediate application to the respective 
UVs, the remainder of the Australian firms considered the question of sharing 
technology as irrelevant. 
Unlike the Australian responses, this factor received overwhelming support from the 
Indian respondents. All ten Indian firms indicated that this factor had some to 
significant impact on their decision to joint venture. The Indian firms' needs as well 
as their preference for the Australian technologies, are reflected in these responses. 
As a possible interpretation, it may be argued that most of the Australian firms might 
have considered the establishment of UVs as a mechanism to protect their technology, 
rather than sharing it with their Indian partners. Due to the perceived low trust level 
among the Indian managers (Hofstede, 1980; Shane, 1994), licensing is relatively 
riskier than establishing a wholly owned subsidiary (WOS) or UV (see section 3.7 for 
a detailed discussion on this issue). Besides, a WOS involves very high establishment 
and operating costs. These views are supported by most of the Australian firms. 
One of the Australian respondents mentioned during the interview that they preferred 
UVs as a means of protecting the use of their technology, but not to share it. 
According to him, 
We are more concerned about the dissemination of our technology. India is a 
place where it may happen anytime. A strong local partner is useful in the sense 
that they can assist us in safeguarding our technology. 
Most of the Indian firms, to the contrary, were keen to derive advantage from 
technology sharing which was one of their prime motivations to joint venture with the 
Australian companies. Nonetheless, this factor, viz., the quest for sharing technology, 
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did not have any impact on the majority of the Australian firms. These responses, 
therefore, tend not to support the proposition. 
Sharing of Establishment Costs and R&D Expenses 
Sharing establishment costs is one of the major motivations for foreign companies to 
joint venture with local partners while investing in India (As-Saber, et al., 1996a). As 
discussed in chapter IV, the cost of establishing a business in India is very high. For 
example, annual office rental rates per square foot in Bombay are some of the highest 
in the world (Business Week, 16 June, 1997, p. 28). Moreover, those costs are rising 
quickly. Rents in Bombay have soared from US$91 to US$143 per square foot in the 
two years since early 1995 (Business Week, 16 June, 1997, p. 28). 
As mentioned in chapter IV, sharing the costs and facilities for research and 
development (R&D) is another critical motivator for the formation of LIVs (Katz, 
1995). India has a reputation for its world-class R&D activities in various fields 
(Mathur, 1994; Vittal, 1996; Confederation of Indian Industry, 1996). Australian 
firms may benefit from the sharing of R&D costs with their Indian partners and by 
using local researchers at relatively lower costs. They may partially recover their 
R&D expenses from their prospective partners. It was perceived that the presence of 
high establishment as well as R&D costs could be shared and minimised through 
partnering with a local firm. 
Most of the Australian and Indian firms gave importance to these factors at the time of 
making their decision to joint venture. However, the responses of Australian parents 
are more definitive than are their Indian counterparts. All nine Australian firms 
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conceded that these factors had some to significant impact on their decision. Of the 
ten Indian firms, six indicated that these factors had some to significant impact on 
their decision, while the remaining four endorsed a 'no impact' response. According 
to one Australian respondent, 
the rapidly increasing establishment costs in India and the need for ongoing 
R&D to remain competitive in the highly volatile Indian market were the two 
major concerns since we have decided to invest in India. Therefore, our quest 
for sharing the establishment costs as well as the R&D expenditure with a strong, 
local partner substantially influenced our decision to choose the UV as an entry 
mode. 
Nevertheless, from the available evidence, it may be argued that the quest for sharing 
establishment costs and R&D expenses impacted on most the Australian firms' 
decisions to joint venture with local partners. 
In brief, the evidence on the impact of the quest for sharing technology appears to lack 
sufficient support for the proposition, whereas the evidence on the other factor, the 
quest for sharing establishment costs and R&D expenses offers some support. On 
balance, these data are found to be partially consistent with proposition P3.4, viz., 
sharing technology, establishment costs and R&D expenses influences the decision 
taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian finns while entering the Indian 
market. 
10.3.5 Human Resource Management Issues 
Three major HRM issues were taken into consideration to examine the validity of 
proposition P3.5. These include selection and recruitment, training and development, 
and managing labour unrest. Most of the Australian firms indicated that each of these 
issues had "some" to "significant" impact on their decision to joint venture. To the 
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contrary, most of the Indian firms gave importance to only one issue, the training 
requirement, during their decision making process. As the evidence shows, the 
remaining two factors did not have any impact on the decision of the majority of the 
Indian firms. 
Selection and Recruitment 	This is a critical factor for efficient international 
business management (Dowling, et al., 1999). 	A good understanding between 
partners is essential to maintain a common set of selection criteria for the prospective 
candidates for different UV positions. Due consideration should also be given to 
resolving any issue such as the candidates' nationalities (HCN, TCN or PCN) and 
their existing affiliation to any of the partners. As argued in chapters DI and IV, there 
is a problem in finding quality people available for employment in India. This 
appears to be the result of an unprecedented increase in demand for skilled people 
following a rapid rise in the level of foreign and local investment in India (As-Saber, 
et al., 1998). The host partner's familiarity with the local labour market and the 
possible convenience of hiring from the partner's existing pool of skilled personnel 
may assist in resolving any such problem of labour scarcity. 
Most of the Australian firms acknowledged the importance of this factor, whereas the 
majority of the Indian firms indicated that this factor had no impact on their decision 
to joint venture. As a possible interpretation, it may be argued that while the 
Australian parents indicated some wariness toward the available information on the 
labour market, it was a nominal issue for the Indian firms because of their expertise 
and capability in dealing with the Indian labour market. In this respect, the 
Australian firm's option for establishing IJVs with local partners was to obtain 
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assistance from the experienced Indian partners. Therefore, the Indian firm's 
advantages appeared to be complementary to the Australian firm's wariness with 
respect to the selection and recruitment of appropriate UV personnel. As a 
consequence, these responses tend to support proposition P3.5. 
Training and Development As discussed in chapter IV, an efficient training and 
development programme is an important precondition for the success •of an 
international business operation. Accordingly, a comprehensive training and 
development plan must be put in place while managing business internationally 
(Dowling, et a/., 1999). 
In the Indian context, this factor requires some special qualifications. Because of the 
scarcity of quality people in India and the perceived low level of labour productivity, 
an Australian firm wishing to operate in India might be required to undertake 
extensive training and development programmes for its local staff (As-Saber, et al., 
1998; Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995). In addition, 
foreign companies may find it difficult to understand the Indian FIR environment 
because of the presence of a large number of laws regulating HR practices in India and 
their frequent changes (Lawler, et al., 1995). The existing workforce may not readily 
understand the new technologies and management style brought by the foreign 
investors. To accommodate these issues, staff training and development is an 
essential and ongoing need for foreign business operations in India. As discussed 
earlier in chapter IV, one of the major motivations for foreign companies to form UVs 
in India with a local partner is to organise such training and development activities 
with the active collaboration of their local partners (As-Saber, et al., 1998). 
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Most of the Australian as well as Indian partners indicated that this factor had "some" 
to "significant" impact on their decision to joint venture. However, the responses 
from the Indian partners appear to be more definitive than are the responses from their 
Australian counterparts. It may be argued that when making the decision to joint 
venture, the Indian firms were keen to learn Australian management style and 
technical knowhow through frequent training and development programmes. This 
was reflected in the comments of the majority of the Indian respondents during 
interviews. According to one Indian respondent, 
We are particularly interested in learning new technologies and Western 
management style from our partner. Continuous improvement of our employees 
through various training and development programmes in collaboration with our 
foreign partner helps us achieve this objective. 
The Australian parents, on the other hand, were primarily interested in sharing the 
costs as well as the responsibilities of such activities with their local partners. 
Recognising the explicit training and development requirements with the assistance of 
an experienced Indian partner was another major consideration. Nonetheless, it 
appears that the training and development requirements had impacted most of the 
Australian parent firms with their decisions to joint venture. 
Managing Labour Unrest 	As discussed in chapters ifi and IV, labour unrest is a 
major impediment to doing business in India. Underlying this state of unrest are 
higher wage demands and the demand for the lowering of working hours (Joshi, 1995; 
Ratnam, 1995; Tayeb, 1996). The major political parties often support the demands 
of labour unions, which makes the situation more complicated and difficult to manage 
(Clarke & Von Glinow, 1996). Although state intervention is a norm in managing 
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these matters, such interventions generally support the stands by the labour 
movements (Ratnam, 1995; Tayeb, 1996). Consequently, it is difficult for Australian 
firms to manage these HR problems while investing in India. Hence, it may be argued 
that the establishment of an IJV with an experienced Indian firm is likely to be an 
appropriate option for the Australian firm in order to jointly manage these issues (As-
Saber, et al.,. 1998). 
Most of the Australian firms acknowledged the importance of this factor. 
Alternatively, the majority of the Indian firms did not give any importance to this 
factor. As a possible interpretation, one of the Indian respondents mentioned during 
the interview that although managing labour unrest was recognised as an ongoing 
problem, it was never considered as a critical one requiring the assistance of a foreign 
puffier. Indian companies, according to him, are accustomed to dealing with such 
issues on a regular basis with their expertise in and familiarity of the Indian labour 
market. According to this respondent, 
Labour unrest in India is a regular phenomenon. This is nothing new and we are 
prepared to deal with it. We know what to do and whom to talk with. We 
maintain relationships with the political leaders and trade union leaders which 
make it easier to resolve any labour related problem. 
In this respect, the Australian firms' option for establishing LIVs with the local 
partners, to some extent, was to obtain assistance from the experienced Indian 
partners. Therefore, the Indian firms' advantages appeared to be complementary to 
the Australian firms' wariness with respect to the quest for managing possible labour 
unrest. As a consequence, these responses tend to support the proposition P3.5. 
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On balance, the evidence on the impact of all three organisational-specific HRM 
issues, viz., the quest for appropriate selection and recruitment, training and 
development, and managing labour unrest tends to be consistent with proposition P3.5, 
viz., the organisational-specific human resource management issues influence the 
decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while entering 
the Indian market. 
10.3.6 Inter-Partner Learning 
As discussed in chapter IV, UVs create opportunities for inter-partner learning 
(Hamel, 1991; Kogut, 1988). Accordingly, learning from each others' knowledge-
bases may be considered as an important motivation to form UVs. Superior 
information exchange among the partners is the core of such learning processes 
(Harrigan, 1986). I.1Vs are a vehicle through which knowledge can be transferred 
from one partner to another. For example, this learning may relate to the mutual 
understanding of day-to-day organisational management and technological 
capabilities. Both formal and informal mechanisms may be used to acquire 
information for this understanding. However, this exchange is likely to happen 
through the interaction among technical and management staff from both partners. 
In the Indian context, information as well as expertise in relation to its unfamiliar 
political, economic and cultural environments, diversity of regional marketplaces, and 
the different local business management practices is important to be considered by a 
prospective foreign investor. The foreign company may rely on its UV partners in 
India to learn the art of managing these issues effectively. According to Kogut 
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(1988), LIVs are viewed as an instrument by which organisational knowledge is 
exchanged and imitated. 
The support for the impact of this factor was clear. All nine Australian parents and 
their ten Indian partners acknowledged the importance of this factor. However, the 
responses from the Indian firms appear to be even more supportive than are those of 
their Australian partners. Of nine Australian parents, three conceded that this factor 
had significant impact on their decision, while the remaining six endorsed a 'some 
impact' response. To the contrary, nine out of ten Indian partners acknowledged that 
this factor had significant impact on their decision, while the remaining one endorsed 
a 'some impact' response. These responses reflect the Australian parents' desires to 
learn more about the Indian business environment through the active collaboration of 
their local partners, while the Indian companies considered LIVs as a source of 
learning and imitating the superior management practices and technical abilities of 
their Australian partners. In this respect, the inter-partner learning appeared to be 
complementary to each other. Nonetheless, these responses provide support for 
proposition P3.6. 
In brief, with respect to the impact of the quest for inter-partner learning, all nine 
Australian firms and their ten Indian partners indicated that this factor had some to 
significant impact on their decision. However, the Indian partners' responses are 
found to be more conclusive than are their Australian counterparts. On balance, the 
responses from both the partners support each other. On the basis of the above-
mentioned discussion, it appears that the available evidence is consistent with 
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proposition P3.6, viz., inter-partner learning influences the decision taken by 
Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while entering the Indian market. 
10.3.7 Responses on the Overall Impact of the Organisational -specific Variables 
The responses to the general questions asked on the overall impact of the six 
organisational-specific variables, on the firms' decisions to joint venture, were found 
to be more supportive than were the responses on the impact of each of the variables 
considered individually. The trend of these responses is similar to those of the 
impacts of the geopolitical as well as the other selected environmental variables on the 
firms' decisions to joint venture (see chapters 8.3.4 and 9.3.7). 
Table 10.8 
Frequency of the Responses on the Combination of Organisational-Specific 
Variables which Influenced the Firms' Decision to Joint Venture 
Significant 
impact 
Some 
impact 
No 
impact 
N/A 
Level of impact on the entry mode decision of 
Australian firms 
4 5 - - 
Level of impact on the decision of Indian firms 
to joint venture with Australian partners 
7 3 - - 
Table 10.8 lists the responses of both the Australian and Indian firms on the overall 
impact of the combination of organisational variables on their decision to joint 
venture; All of the Indian as well as Australian firms indicated that these factors 
taken as a whole had some to significant impact on their decision. To the contrary, 
the responses on the impact of each of the variables considered individually were 
found to be less definitive than were the responses on the overall impact of 
organisational variables. Unlike the response sets on individual categories, the 
responses on the overall impact did not receive any 'N/A' or `no impact' responses. 
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Moreover, of the six factors, the evidence on the impact of two factors, viz., the 
sharing of resources and capabilities and the HRM issues are less supportive than is 
the evidence on the remaining four factors. 
As mentioned in chapter 8.3.4, this inconsistency of responses between the response-
sets on individual factors and the responses on the general question might have 
occurred due to the confounding of effects where the respondents had difficulties in 
disentangling the separate and partial effects of each of the factors when addressing 
the general question. Nonetheless, the responses from the general overall question 
may have provided some global opinion about the combined effect of the six 
environmental variables, but not an in-depth one specific to any one particular factor. 
Hence, as a key outcome of this particular finding, it may be implied that to obtain 
useable responses on these issues, for any international business operation, it is 
important to disaggregate. Because of the seemingly ambiguous outcome, it is 
advisable for future research to consider each of these dimensions separately if the 
various organisational variables and their possible implications are to be best 
captured. 
10.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The evidence on the proposed influence of various organisational-specific variables in 
motivating Australian firms to joint venture with local partners while investing in 
India appears to be partially consistent with the respective propositions (P3.1, P3.2, P3.3, 
P3.4, P3.5 and P3.6). The evidence on propositions P3.1, P3.4, P3.5 and P3.6 was found to 
be less supportive than was that on propositions P3.2 and P3.3. Accordingly, six 
factors, viz., economies of scale, transactions costs minimisation, access to 
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distribution channels, sharing of resources and capabilities, human resource 
management and inter-partner learning had limited impact on the decision of the 
Australian firms to joint venture. 
When asked the general question on the impact of all six variables jointly (in the one 
statement), the responses tended to be more supportive than were the responses when 
the questions were asked separately. All of the Indian and Australian firms indicated 
that the combination of the six environmental factors, as a global construct, had 
"some" to significant impact on their decision. As a possible explanation, it has been 
argued that this difference in outcome might be possible because of a compounding of 
effects where the respondents had difficulties in disentangling the separate and partial 
effects of each factor. However, despite the apparent lack of depth of this finding, it 
might be illustrative of a general opinion by respondents about the combined effects 
of the six organisational-specific variables. In addition, it has assisted to generate 
possible guidance for future research in that it might be advisable to consider each of 
the variables separately. 
It could be deemed that the weight of the evidence, in general, is tending to be at least 
partially consistent with the general proposition (proposition P3), viz., organisational-
specific  factors impact on the decision taken by Australian firms to enter the Indian 
market through the joint venture mode. 
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CHAPTER XI 
FORMATION PROCESS TO ESTABLISH IJVs IN INDIA 
Trades would not have taken place unless it were advantageous to the parties 
concerned. Of course, it is better to strike as good a bargain as one's 
bargaining position admits (Benjamin Franklin, cited in McCarthy, 1989, p.1). 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
As argued in chapter V, a comprehensive and well-planned negotiation process is the 
bedrock of a successful UV operation. The effective use of the firm-specific 
negotiation skills possessed by a firm is needed to bring about an agreement that 
ensures the stability of cooperation between partners (Harrigan, 1986). In this chapter, 
the negotiation processes to form the nine Australian-Indian UVs are examined. In 
order to explore the nature of complexity involved in these processes, data gathered 
from the Australian as well as the Indian partners are taken into consideration. The 
focus of the empirical work to follow in this chapter is that of the Australian firms' 
perspectives. 
To determine whether there is a convergence of views from both the Australian and 
Indian partners' perspectives, an examination of the Indian partners' responses is also 
undertaken. Three different aspects of the negotiation are analysed. These are, 
preparing for the negotiation, the formal negotiation process leading to the finalisation 
of the UV agreements and the legal aspects of negotiation. The analysis is based on 
the findings in relation to the specific propositions (propositions P4.1, P4.2 and P4.3) 
established at chapter 6.4. A discussion emphasising the relevance as well as 
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implications of these research findings with respect to the general proposition 
(proposition P4) ensues. 
11.2 INTERVIEW DATA 
The data collected are presented in three sections. The first section (11.2.1) deals with 
the preparatory stages of negotiation, i.e., how extensive was the Australian firms' 
involvement in this stage of the joint venture negotiation (proposition P4.1). The 
second section (11.1.2) deals with the formal negotiation process which determines 
the nature of the future relationship between the UV partners in their Indian activities 
(proposition P4.2). The third section (11.1.3) deals with the findings on the legal 
aspects of negotiations, i.e., the importance to the Australian firm of understanding the 
legal aspects of negotiation in the Indian legal system as it attempts to ensure the 
security of future courses of action to be taken by the UV (proposition P4.3). 
11.2.1 Preparatory Stages 
Various questions were asked of the Australian respondents and their Indian 
counterparts to establish a comprehensive set of data with respect to their involvement 
in the preparatory stages of the negotiation process. Unlike previous chapters (VIII-
X), the interview data in this chapter are grouped according to the issues as sequenced 
in the questionnaire (Appendix II). A summary of responses is shown in Table 11.1. 
Initial Approach Joint venture negotiation normally begins with the initial approach 
made by either of the parties to form the partnership. Column I of Table 11.1 
summarises the responses from each of the firms with respect to this issue. The data 
from the Australian as well as the Indian firms have revealed that the initial approach 
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to form the UV came mostly from the Indian parents. Six Indian partners initially 
approached prospective Australian parents to establish UNTs, whereas the initial offer 
came from only three Australian firms to joint venture. 
Number of Firms Initially Contacted Column 11 of Table 11.1 shows the number 
of potential .partners initially contacted by each of the joint venture firms. The data 
demonstrate that most of the Australian parents (five out of nine) contacted more than 
one Indian firm to select an appropriate partner. None of the Indian firms initially 
contacted more than one Australian firm to choose a suitable partner. 
Information Gathering Column BEI of Table 11.1 indicates the primary sources of 
information used by the individual firms to gather information about their prospective 
partners. A set of diverse responses was received. Of the nine Australian parents, 
only two mentioned that they received primary information about their prospective 
partners from Austrade, the Australian Trade Commission. Two used prospective 
partners as the primary information source. Own company sources were used by two 
Australian parents. From the remaining three, one firm used bank reports, one used a 
third party vendor and the other utilised trade fairs as the primary information sources 
about their respective partners. 
From the ten Indian partners, four mentioned that they used prospective Australian 
partners as the primary information source. Three indicated that the Australian 
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Table 11.1 
Frequency of Variables which affected the Negotiation Process during the Preparatory Stages 
Name of the IJV 
I 
First 
approach 
made by 
II 
Number of firms 
ittitially contacted 
to select a partner 
III 
Major information 
source about pro- 
spective partner 
IV 
Preparat- 
ion time 
(in months) 
V 
Appraisal of 
partner's 
needs 
VI 
Appraisal 
of own 
needs 
VII 
Additional 
arguments 
used 
THU 
Number of 
meetings before 
final negotiation 
IX 
Financial 
involvement 
(preparation only) 
X 
Pre- 
contract 
training 
XI 
Manage-
ment revel 
involved 
ACC-CRA 
Australian Parent (AP) AP 5 Austrade 9 Yes Yes N/A 5 AUD150,000 No Senior 
Indian Host (IH) AP 1 Trade fair 8 Yes Yes No 5 AUD 75,000 No Senior 
Atco Control 
Australian Parent (AP) IH 1 Bank report 24 Yes Yes Yes 7 AUD100,000 No Senior 
Indian Host (IH) IH 1 3rd party 6 Yes Yes No 7 AUD20,000 No Senior 
GPTL 
Australian Parent (AP) AP 1 3rd party vendor 12 Yes Yes No 6 AUD100,000 No Senior 
Indian Host (IH) AP 1 Australian partner 1 Yes Yes Yes 6 AUD20,000 Yes Senior 
GSSL 
Australian Parent (AP) IH 1 Trade fair N/A Yes Yes No N/A N/A No Senior 
Indian Host (IH) IH 1 Australian partner 3 Yes Yes Yes 3 AUD20,000 Yes Senior 
Indure Warman 
Australian Parent (AP) AP 4 Austrade 3 Yes Yes Yes 5 AUD100,000 No Senior 
Indian Host (IH) AP 1 Partner's reputation 1 Yes Yes Yes 5 AUD 10,000 No Senior 
Modi -Telstra 
Australian Parent (AP) IH 3 Own source 6 Yes Yes Yes 3 AUD15,000 No Mix 
Indian Host (IH) IH 1 Partner's reputation 6 Yes Yes Yes N/A AUD75,000 No Senior 
Pioneer Friction 
Australian Parent (AP) AP 2 Local partner 8 Yes Yes Yes 15 AUD400,000 No Senior 
Indian Host (IH) AP 1 Australian partner 6 Yes Yes Yes 15 AUD40,000 No Senior 
Tech-Dry 
Australian Parent (AP) IH 1 Local partner 6 Yes Yes No 2 AUD 1 0,000 No Senior 
Indian Host (IH) IH 1 Personal knowledge 6 Yes Yes No 2 AUD4,000 No Senior 
Telstra-VConun* 
Australian Parent (AP) AP 4 Own source 6 Yes Yes Yes 4 AUD15,000 No Mix 
Indian Host-1 (IH-1) AP 1 Australian partner 1 Yes Yes No 4 AUD100,000 No Senor 
Indian Host-2 (IH-2) AP 1 Partner's reputation N/A Yes Yes No N/A N/A No Senior 
*The IJV, Telstra-VComm has two Indian hosts, VSNL ( H-1) and IL&FS (IH-2). 
N/A = Not Available 
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partner's reputation was sufficient to convince them of their prospective partner's 
worth. They did not search for any further information about the prospective partner 
to begin the formal preparation for UV negotiation. Of the remaining three firms, one 
used a third party, one used a trade fair and the other utilised personal knowledge of 
the Australian parent as the primary information sources. 
Preparation time Column IV of Table 11.1 presents the preparation time taken by 
each of the firms to ensure an effective participation in the negotiation process. 
Australian firms, on the average, spent more time than their Indian counterparts in 
preparing for the formal negotiation process. Preparation time for individual 
Australian firms reporting data ranged between three and 24 months with an average 
of 9.3 months. Indian firms reported between one and eight months, averaging only 
4.2 months. 
Appraisal of Own as well as Partner's Needs Columns V and VI of Table 11.1 
summarise responses on the appraisals of needs of the respective firms and of their 
prospective partners during the preparatory stage. All of the Australian as well as 
Indian partners indicated that they had considered the needs of their own firms as well 
as those of their partners during the preparatory stage. 
Additional Arguments/Resources Used Column VII of Table 11.1 summarises the 
firms' responses on their preparedness to use additional arguments or resources to 
conclude a deal (if necessary). These may be in the form of additional resources or a 
proposal for an alternative arrangement other than immediate UV objectives. This 
preparedness may rescue a nearly failed negotiation between the parties. Five 
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Australian and five Indian firms indicated that they were prepared for such a fall back 
situation. One Australian firm expressed its unawareness of this issue, while the 
remaining firms mentioned that they were not prepared for any such situation. 
Number of Meetings before Final Negotiation Column VIII of Table 11.1 shows 
the number. of meetings held between the partners before the final negotiation. The 
data reveal that the partners, across the nine INs met between two and fifteen times 
before the final negotiation was held. Although three of the respondents could not 
provide any information on this question, their respective partners' responses were 
taken into consideration. The average number of such meetings held between 
prospective partners in each of the UV negotiation processes was 5.6. 
Financial Involvement During the Preparatory Stage Financial involvement of the 
firms during the preparatory stage of the negotiation process is shown in Column IX 
of Table 11.1. For Australian firms reporting data, the financial involvement ranged 
from A$10,000 to A$400,000 with an average of A$111,250. The available data 
from the Indian firms show that they spent between A$4,000 and A$100,000 during 
the preparatory stage with an average of A$40,445. This is much lower, on average, 
than the expenditure of the Australian firms. 
Pre-Contract Training An indication of whether there was pre-contract training of 
the company officials involved in the negotiation process is shown in Column X of 
Table 11.1. Only two Indian firms conducted pre-contract training. None of the 
Australian firms arranged any pre-contract training for its officials participating in the 
negotiation process. 
307 
Management Level Involved 	The management levels of persons involved in the 
negotiation process are shown in Column XI of Table 11.1. Except for two Australian 
parents, all of the Indian and Australian firms engaged senior managers to negotiate 
the UV agreements. Two Australian parents used a mix of senior and middle ranked 
managers to negotiate the agreements. 
11.2.2 Formal Negotiation 
The formal negotiation is a major stage of the IJV formation process. 	The 
appropriate management of this stage is critical for the determination of the 
emergence of a future relationship between the parties. It also influences the future 
prospects of the UV. The data gathered on the importance of this aspect are directed 
at Proposition P4.3. Seven factors were taken into consideration within this category. 
These are, the venue of the final negotiation, language/s used, major difficulties faced 
during the process, signing of a separate licensing agreement, time taken to obtain 
approval from the Indian government and the use of special efforts to obtain the 
approval. A summary of responses is shown in Table 11.2. 
Venue of the Final Negotiation Venues of the final negotiations of the nine IJVs 
are shown in Column I of Table 11.2. Of the nine IJV negotiations, six were held in 
India, two in Australia and the one through faxes and teleconferences. 
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Table 11.2 
Frequency of Variables which affected the Formal/Final Negotiation Process 
Name of the IJV 
I 
Venue for the final 
negotiation 
II 
Languiage/s used 
III 
Any major difficulties 
faced during the final 
negotiation? 
IV 
Signed a separate 
licensing agreement? 
V 
Time taken to get the 
government approval 
(in months) 
'VI 
Any special efforts 
required to get the 
approval? 
ACC-CRA 
Australian Parent Mumbai, India English Yes No 3 Yes 
Indian Hosts Mumbai, India English No No 3 Yes 
Atco Control 
Australian Parent Melbourne, Australia English No Yes 18 No 
Indian Host Melbourne, Australia English No Yes 18 No 
GPTL 
Australian Parent Mumbai, India English No Yes 4 Yes 
Indian Host Mumbai, India English Yes Yes 4 Yes 
GSSL 
Australian Parent Melbourne, Australia English N/A No 3 N/A 
Indian Host Melbourne, Australia English Yes No 3 No 
Indure Warman 
Australian Parent Delhi, India English No Yes 7 Yes 
Indian Host Delhi, India English No Yes 7 No 
Modi-Telstra 
Australian Parent Delhi, India English No Yes 30 Yes 
Indian Host Delhi, India English No Yes N/A No 
Pioneer Friction 
Australian Parent Calcutta, India English Yes Yes 18 Yes 
Indian Host Calcutta, India English No Yes 18 Yes 
Tech-Dry 
Australian Parent Faxes/ teleconferences English No No 3 No 
Indian Host Faxes/ teleconferences English No No 3 No 
Telstra-VCotrun* 
Australian Parent Mumbai, India English No Yes 18 Yes 
Indian Host-1 Mumbai, India English No N/A 18 Yes 
Indian Host-2 Mumbai, India English No N/A 18 Yes 
*The UV, Telstra-VCorrun has two Indian hosts, VSNL (Indian Host-1) and IL&FS (Indian Host-2). 
N/A = Not Available. 
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Language/s Used Column LE of Table 11.2 shows the firms' selection of language/s 
during the final negotiation as well as in the joint venture documents. English was 
used in the negotiation processes by all of the firms. 
Major Difficulties during the Negotiation Process 	Column HE of Table 11.2. 
reports that most of the Australian as well as Indian firms did not face any difficulties 
during the final negotiation process. Two Indian firms and two Australian firms from 
different joint ventures indicated that they experienced major difficulties during this 
stage. 
Signing of Separate Licensing Agreement 	Column IV of Table 11.2 represents 
the firms' responses on this issue. It is revealed from the data that the partners of 
seven out of nine LIVs signed separate licensing agreements, while the remaining two 
did not sign any such documents. 
Time Taken to obtain the Approval from the Indian Government 	Column V of 
Table 11.2 demonstrates the firms' responses with respect to this issue. One 
respondent from one of the Indian firms (Indian host of the UV, Modi-Telstra) was 
reluctant to provide a response on this question because of confidentiality. However, 
the information provided by its Australian parent may be considered adequate for this 
question. The data show that it required between one and 30 months for the approval 
of individual agreements. On average, it took 11.5 months to obtain Indian 
government approval. 
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The Use of Special Efforts to obtain the Approval 	The responses on the use of 
special efforts to obtain the approval from the Indian government are represented in 
Column VI of Table 11.2. Most of the Australian firms (six out of nine) indicated that 
special efforts, such as lobbying, were required to obtain the approval from the Indian 
government, whereas just two firms indicated that no special effort was required to 
obtain the approval. One respondent from one Australian firm showed reluctance to 
give any information as to whether any such efforts were required to obtain the 
approval. Five from the ten Indian respondents indicated that special efforts were 
required to obtain such approvals, while the remaining five did not undertake special 
efforts. 
11.2.3 Legal Aspects 
Acquiring an understanding of the legal aspects of negotiation is a major precondition 
to ensuring the security of future courses of action to be taken by the IJV and its 
partner. The data gathered on the importance of these aspects are directed at 
proposition, P4.2. Three different factors were taken into consideration within this 
category. These are, the use of legal experts, engaging law firms to scrutinise the final 
documents and the interpretation of the document according to Australian law. A 
summary of responses is shown in Table 11.3. 
Use of Legal Expert/Firm during the Preparatory Stage Responses on the use of a 
legal expert/firm by the Australian firms as well as by their Indian counterparts during 
the preparatory stage of negotiation are shown in Column I of Table 11.3. The data 
reveal that from nine Australian firms only one firm did not engage a legal expert/firm 
during the preparatory stage. The remaining eight firms indicated that they employed 
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someone either from within the company or from outside to assist in understanding 
the legal aspects of negotiation during the preparatory stage. From the ten Indian 
partners, only two did not employ any legal expert/firm, whereas the remaining eight 
used this expertise during the preparatory stage. 
Table 11.3 
The Legal Aspects which affected the Negotiation Process 
Name of the IJV 
I 
Used legal expert/ firm 
during preparatory 
stage? 
II 
Engaged legal expert/law 
firms to scrutinise the 
documents? 
DI 
Interpreted documents 
according to the 
Australian law? 
ACC-CRA 
Australian Parent Yes Yes Yes 
Indian Hosts Yes No No 
Atco Control 
Australian Parent Yes Yes Yes 
Indian Host Yes Yes No 
GPI'L 
Australian Parent Yes Yes Yes 
Indian Host Yes Yes No 
GSSL 
Australian Parent Yes No No 
Indian Host Yes Yes No 
Indure Warman 
Australian Parent Yes Yes No 
Indian Host No No No 
Modi-Telstra 
Australian Parent Yes Yes Yes 
Indian Host Yes Yes Yes 
Pioneer Friction 
Australian Parent Yes Yes No 
Indian Host Yes Yes No 
Tech-Dry 
Australian Parent No No No 
Indian Host No No No 
Telstra-VComm* 
Australian Parent Yes Yes Yes 
Indian Host-1 Yes Yes No 
Indian Host-2 Yes Yes No 
* The IJV, Telstra-VComm has two Indian hosts, VSNL (Indian Host-1) and IL&FS (Indian Host-2). 
N/A = Not Available. 
Engaging Law Firm/s to Scrutinise the Final Documents Responses on the use of 
law firms to scrutinise the final documents are reported in Column DEE of Table 11.3. 
The data reveal that of the nine Australian firms, seven used this form of expertise, 
while the remaining two did not engage a law firm for this purpose. Likewise, most 
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of the Indian firms (seven out of ten) engaged a law firm, while the remaining three 
did not use them at this stage. 
Interpretation of the Documents according to the Australian Law Being the host 
country, and because the documents were signed in India, Indian law is the law 
governing the UVs. However, for a better understanding of the legal aspects of the 
documents, it may be necessary to interpret them according to the parent country law. 
This may eliminate confusion about particular legal aspects as laid down in the 
document. In addition, it may also highlight comparability of the documents with 
respect to their value within the host vis-a-vis the home country of the parent firm. 
Column IV of Table 11.3 reports the responses of the Australian as well as Indian 
firms on this point. Most of the Australian firms (five out of nine) admitted that they 
had interpreted their documents according to the Australian law, whereas the 
remaining four did not do so. Only one Indian firm had interpreted the documents 
according to Australian law, whereas the remaining nine did not consider this option. 
11.3 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
The data gathered from the nine Australian parents and their ten Indian partners tend 
to support propositions P4.1, P4.2 and P4.3. The evidence demonstrates extensive 
involvement by most of the Australian firms in negotiating the terms of agreement 
with their Indian counterparts. An explanation of the implications of these responses 
follows. To facilitate the discussion, in addition to the primary data assembled from 
the direct face-to-face interviews, appropriate secondary data are incorporated. 
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The Indian responses are taken into consideration during the discussion in order to 
incorporate a comparative scenario of the extent of involvement by the Australian 
firms vis-a-vis their Indian counterparts. As a consequence, it is also possible to 
examine the importance of the UV negotiation process in the Indian context from the 
two different perspectives. This interpretation of the interview data is grouped into 
four sections. First, three sections deal with the two stages of negotiations 
(propositions 134.1 and P4.2) and its legal aspects (proposition P4.3), while the fourth one 
will examine the general proposition (proposition 134) and the level of support it has in 
the interview data. 
11.3.1 Preparatory Stage 
Eleven issues were taken into consideration in examining the extent of the Australian 
firms' involvement in the preparatory stage of the UV negotiation process. These 
include the making of the initial approach, number of firms initially contacted to 
select a partner, major information source used to learn about the prospective partner, 
period of time spent in preparing for negotiation, appraisal of the partner's needs, 
appraisal of one's own needs, the use of additional arguments in negotiating, number 
of meetings held prior to the final negotiation, financial arrangements, the conduct of 
pre-contract training and the management level involved in the negotiation. 
Who Made the First Approach? An Australian parent firm rather than an Indian-
based host firm made the first approach to form the UV in five of nine cases (see 
Column I of Table 11.1). In this respect, a slight majority of the Australian firms were 
more proactive than their Indian counterparts in proposing a relationship. This also 
indicates a greater readiness on the part of these Australian firms than their 
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prospective local partners to joint venture. At the beginning of the informal 
negotiation process, this result also demonstrates a willingness on the part of the 
Australian firms to invest in the Indian market and it reflects their commitments to 
establish a relationship with the local partners. It is likely that in order to approach the 
local partner, these Australian firms had to study the market and the abilities of the 
prospective partners prior to the offer. Therefore, with respect to the initial approach, 
it may be argued that, on average, Australian firms invested more effort than did their 
Indian counterparts. 
Number of Firms Initially Contacted to Select a Partner As shown in Column II 
of Table 11.1, most of the Australian firms (five out of nine) initially contacted more 
than one Indian firm to choose a partner, whereas none of the Indian firms contacted 
more than one Australian firm. This implies that from the very beginning of the 
preparatory stage most of the Australian firms have been cautious in choosing the 
most appropriate partners in India. It also demonstrates a relatively more extensive 
involvement by the majority of the Australian firms in the preparatory stage than their 
Indian counterparts. As Fatehi (1996), Geissbauer & Siemsen (1996), Harrigan 
(1986) and Howarth et al. (1995) argued, choosing the right partner through an 
extensive screening process is important for a successful future joint venture 
relationship. 
Major Sources used to gather Information about the Prospective Partner 	As 
mentioned in Chapter V, one of the major preconditions for successful negotiation is 
to gather relevant information about the future partner prior to the formal 
commencement of the negotiation processes (Gottlieb & Healy, 1990; Kohli, 1996; 
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Salacuse, 1992). A variety of information sources were used by the Australian firms 
as well as their prospective Indian partners to learn about each other. The choice of a 
primary information source may indicate the level of effort made with respect to 
gathering important information about the prospective partners. 
As indicated in Column DT of Table 11.1, Australian firms used different sources to 
obtain initial information about their respective partners. These include Austrade, 
bank reports, third party vendors, trade fairs and own sources of information (e.g., 
Telstra used its South Asian headquarters based in Delhi, India as its 'own source' to 
gather information on the prospective partners for the 'Ws, Modi-Telstra and Telstra-
VComm). Only one Australian firm relied on the information provided by its local 
partner. On the other hand, three of ten Indian firms relied on sources such as trade 
fairs, third party vendors or personal knowledge about the partner. However, the 
majority of the Indian firms (seven of ten) depended either on the information 
provided by their Australian partners or on the reputation of the partner firms. 
Nonetheless, the data set indicates that the Australian partners, in general, relied less 
on the information provided by their respective partners or on the partners' reputations 
as the primary source of information. Although these sources are easier to exploit, 
they may be biased and incomplete. Since all but one Australian firm made use of 
other available sources, it may be argued that these firms enjoyed a comparative 
advantage over their Indian counterparts with respect to gathering information about 
their respective partners of the future. Australian firms, in this respect, had rendered 
more extensive efforts than did their Indian counterparts. 
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Period of Time Spent in Preparing for the Formal Negotiation As discussed in 
chapter V, the negotiating parties should be aware of the importance of the time 
aspects of international business negotiations (Copeland & Griggs, 1986; Hendon, et 
al., 1996; Usunier, 1996). It is argued that a longer preparation time allows the 
negotiating parties to familiarise themselves with one another and helps create mutual 
trust and understanding between the parties (Copeland & Griggs, 1986). This is likely 
to have important implications for the entire negotiation process. Column IV of Table 
11.1 summarises the period of time spent by individual firms in preparing for formal 
negotiations. 
Although the variability among the time periods spent by various firms is high, an 
average time spent by each of the firms from the Australian side vis-à-vis their Indian 
counterparts may indicate a comparative feature with respect to the extent of effort 
given by each partner. The data show that the Australian firms, on average, spent 
more time in preparation for the negotiation than did Indian firms reporting data. 
According to the CEO of Atco Control, who spent 24 months in preparing for the final 
negotiation, 
We initially found it difficult to negotiate with an Indian partner. We spent time 
to understand our prospective partner and to work out a future relationship. In 
addition, we could observe the performance of our future partner during that 
period and could evaluate its ability to contribute to the LTV activities. 
Altogether, it was worth spending that amount of time because it helped us to be 
familiar with all the important aspects of the negotiation process including the 
legal matters. 
The average time spent by the Australian firms in preparing for the negotiation was 
extensive (9.3 months). They also spent more time, on average, than their Indian 
counterparts (4.2 months). These data tend to support proposition 1)4.1. 
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Appraisal of Own as well as Partner's Needs 	As discussed in chapter V, the 
negotiating firm should have a thorough knowledge about its own requirements as 
well as the expectations of its prospective partner (Casse, 1992). Through the 
examination of their respective needs and objectives and the extent of fit among them, 
the viability, of the future relationships between the parties may be determined. As 
shown in Columns V and VI of Table 11.1, all of the Australian as well as Indian 
firms assessed their respective needs and those of their partners during the preparatory 
stage. These responses demonstrate the level of importance given by the Australian 
firms as well as by their Indian counterparts on these issues. These firms evaluated 
their own needs as well as those of their respective counterparts: The data tend to 
support proposition P4.1. 
The Use of Additional Arguments/Resources It is important to use additional 
arguments/resources in the negotiation in the event of possible failure of the 
negotiation to arrive at a conclusion. This enables a fall back situation for the firm 
(Dupont, 1996). As discussed in chapter V, a well-prepared negotiating firm is likely 
to retain one or more additional resources or alternative arrangements other than the 
immediate DV objectives to ensure a positive outcome. This should be considered a 
vital part of the extensive preparatory stage of the negotiation process which may 
salvage a negotiation from the brink of failure. For example, as a possible move to 
create a relationship to exploit a market, the firm may opt for a licensing agreement or 
other form of arrangement instead of establishing an DV. The majority of the 
Australian firms and half of the Indian respondents were prepared for such a situation. 
According to one of the Australian respondents, 
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we were very keen to enter into the Indian market. We evaluated our 
prospective partner's performance during the preparatory stage and we were 
convinced that we should sign a deal with this firm, even if it was not in the 
form of an UV agreement. Of course, UV was the priority. We were also ready 
to commit additional resources to reach an agreement, preferably an UV one. 
The available data partially endorse the extensive involvement of the Australian firms 
in preparing for the DV negotiations with their Indian counterparts. 
Number of Meetings Held Prior to the Final Negotiation As argued in chapter V, 
the informal meetings between the prospective partners may help the negotiating 
parties to closely examine each other's position during the preparatory stage (Adler, 
1991; Ghauri, 1996). These meetings may assist the parties to build up social, 
informal relationships and mutual trust between them and to learn of each other's 
management style and organisational cultures. 
As shown in Column VIII of Table 11.1, the Australian and the Indian firms, on an 
average met 5.6 times during the preparatory stage. Most of these meetings were held 
in India. The majority of the Australian firms visited India to meet their prospective 
partners more than once, whereas only three Indian firms visited Australia at this stage 
to meet their prospective partners. Once again, the data indicate extensive 
involvement of the Australian firms during the preparatory stage of the negotiation 
process and tend to support proposition P4.1. 
Financial Involvements 	As mentioned in chapter V, the extent of financial 
investment of a negotiating firm during the preparatory stage of negotiation may 
demonstrate the firm's level of involvement at this stage. It is perceived, in general, 
that the more a firm commits financially during this stage, the more it demonstrates 
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the extent of involvement in the negotiation process. This is also demonstrative of the 
firm's financial capability to manage the complete process and negotiate successfully. 
Column a of Table 11.1 shows the financial involvement of the Australian as well as 
their Indian counterparts during the preparatory stage. Although there is substantial 
variability among the figures, it is evident that the majority of the Australian firms 
spent more than did their respective Indian counterparts. The average amount of 
money spent by an individual Australian firm (A$111,250) during the preparatory 
stage was much higher than the average Indian expenditure (A$40,445). This 
reiterates the extensive nature of involvement by the Australian firms during the 
preparatory stage of the negotiation process and thereby tends to support proposition 
P4. I . 
Conducting Pre-Contract Training 	It is argued that pre-contract training helps 
improve the negotiation skills of the parties concerned (Fuller, 1991; Shaughnessy, 
1995). Such training, as mentioned in chapter V, is essential to deal with the 
complicated negotiation matters and to achieve a desired outcome. Despite the 
perceived importance of this factor during the preparatory stage of negotiation, none 
of the Australian firms conducted any pre-contract training for their respective 
negotiating teams. The majority of the Indian firms did not conduct any training 
either (see Column X of Table 11.1). When asked about the nature of the responses, 
one of the Australian respondents mentioned, 
We did not consider it important to conduct a pre-contract training because we 
had sufficient information about the local party and our people informally met 
the people from the other side on several occasions. Communicating with the 
Indian negotiators was not a problem as English is widely spoken among the 
Indian business community. We also found that the most of the Indian managers 
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feel comfortable to adopt and practise western business style. Moreover, we 
planned to send our senior managers to negotiate who had previous experience 
of participating in international business negotiations. So, we were confident 
about the performance of our negotiators. 
Nonetheless, as a possible interpretation, it may be argued that the Australian firms 
might have prior learned about the Indian cultural environment, management style and 
organisational culture through the informal contacts and information gathering process 
during the preparatory stage which boosted the confidence of the Australian firms. 
This confidence might have made them reluctant to conduct any pre-contract training. 
The available data with respect to the pre-contract training, therefore, does not provide 
any support for proposition P4.1. 
Management Level Assigned to Negotiate As argued in chapter V, the authority of 
the negotiating team may be understood through the composition of the team. A team 
comprised of senior managers may be perceived to possess the ability to respond to 
the full range of questions which may be asked, in a legitimate capacity, and be able to 
offer the optimum contribution to the negotiations. In international business 
negotiations, it is customary to send a powerful team to negotiate a deal. Accordingly, 
an ideal negotiating team may be comprised of medium to senior managers holding 
the above-mentioned sources of power and headed by someone with legitimate 
authority. 
Consistent with the literature, seven Australian firms nominated senior managers to 
negotiate, whereas two assigned a combination of middle and senior managers. All 
Indian firms assigned senior managers for this purpose. These response-sets indicate 
the level of importance given by both Australian and Indian firms to this particular 
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process is required by the Australian firm to determine the nature of the future 
relationship between the IJV partners in its Indian activities. 
Venue of the Formal/Final Negotiation As discussed in chapter V, the location at 
which the negotiation takes place has significance to parties involved in the 
negotiating process (Howarth, et al., 1995; Rajan & Graham, 1991; Usunier, 1996). 
Negotiations in the host country are perceived to be more convenient for the host 
firms because of their familiarity with the location. However, selection of a 
prospective overseas partner's location may also be beneficial for the firms who leave 
their home country to negotiate as this provides them with an opportunity to observe 
and understand their prospective partners more extensively. Nonetheless, it may be 
preferred by both of the parties to formally negotiate the terms and conditions in the 
country of the prospective UV so that they can both closely scrutinise the viability of 
the project. Alternatively, in recent years, many companies have begun to conduct 
negotiations by facsimile, video-conferencing, electronic mail, telephone and/or the 
post (Liesch & Knight, 1999; Richards & Walsh, 1990). 
Column I of Table 11.2 lists the venues used for formal negotiations. It demonstrates 
that most of the formal negotiations to establish I.Ws in India were held in Indian 
locations. This implies that most of the Australian firms had to be in India to 
negotiate the deals. According to one of the Australian respondents, 
We preferred the Indian venue mainly because of the location of the UV. It 
allowed us to have a closer look at our future partner, the Indian business 
environment and to decide upon the possible UV site before the agreement was 
signed. 
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The responses confirm the extensive involvement by most of the Australian firms in 
the formal negotiation process, and thereby tend to support proposition P4.2. 
Language/s Used As argued in chapter V. the language used during the formal 
negotiation process should be simple and accessible by both the parties (Fatehi, 1996; 
Ghauri, 1996). In India, English is spoken widely among the business community 
which has made it easier for the Western business firms to negotiate with the local 
firms. 
This has been reflected in the firms' responses on the use of language/s during the 
formal negotiation (Column II of Table 11.2). All of the negotiations were conducted 
in English and the documents were prepared in English. Language did not stand as a 
barrier to one's understanding of the other. The use of English during the formal 
negotiations allowed the Australian firms to clearly understand the other party and to 
submit its own opinions extensively and with assuredness. According to the 
responses, the choice of English as the language of negotiation facilitated the 
Australian firms' extensive involvement during the formal negotiation process. These 
data, therefore,. tend to support proposition P4.2. 
Major Difficulties Faced during the Formal Negotiation Process As mentioned in 
chapter V, formal negotiation may be difficult to conduct. Considerable effort may be 
required to overcome the difficulties associated with this process. However, it may be 
argued that extensive commitment, effort and preparedness helps avoid major 
difficulties during the formal negotiation process, i.e., the more extensive the 
commitment, effort and preparedness, the less is the chance of encountering major 
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difficulties. As demonstrated in Column HI of Table 11.2, it is revealed that most of 
the Australian as well as Indian firms did not face any major difficulties during the 
formal negotiation process. Accordingly, these responses highlight the extensive 
commitment put in by the Australian firms during the formal negotiation process. 
According to one of the Australian respondents, 
We were well-prepared and we sent our best people to deal with the formal 
negotiation. That's why we did not face any major problem during the 
negotiation. 
The available data, therefore, tend to support proposition P4.2. 
Signing of Separate Licensing Agreements As argued in chapter V, the signing of 
a separate licensing agreement is important for the foreign firms contributing 
technological know-how to IJYs located in India. This has the intention of preventing 
the licensee from disclosing or making any use of technological know-how beyond the 
accepted terms of the contract (Parker, 1996). For convenience, the licensing 
agreement may be negotiated simultaneously with the formal 1JY negotiation which 
may allow the parties to consider the pros and cons of licensing as a part of a 
comprehensive negotiation package. 
As shown in Column IV of Table 11.2, the majority of the IJV partners signed 
separate licensing agreements. It was further revealed from the interviews that they 
negotiated those agreements simultaneously with the formal IJV agreement, i.e., they 
considered licensing as a part of the LTV agreement. In all of the licensing agreements, 
the Australian firms negotiated the licensing agreement as the providers of the 
technological know-how. This required extensive time and other resource 
commitments for the Australian companies. It also involved risks of disseminating 
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the technology because of the reported difficulties in enforcing intellectual property 
rights in high-tech and advanced knowledge projects in India (Banks & Natarajan, 
1995). In brief, the responses demonstrate the Australian firms' extensive 
involvement in the formal negotiation process. The data therefore tend to support 
proposition P4.2. 
Time and Effort required to obtain the Approval In India, an agreement comes into 
force and becomes legally binding for the parties once it is approved by an appropriate 
authority within the Indian government (Ramaiah, 1996). The memorandum of 
understanding signed by the UV partners requires government approval (SBP Board 
of Consultants and Engineers, 1995). As argued earlier in chapter V, due to the 
presence of excessive bureaucracy, a long waiting period may be required before such 
approvals are obtained (Geissbauer & Siemsen, 1996). An experienced local partner 
with experience and an understanding of Indian bureaucratic culture may be of 
considerable assistance in hastening the approval process. 
Columns V and VI of Table 11.2 report the firms' responses on the extent of time and 
effort required in obtaining government approval. Variability within the data on the 
approval time is high. On an average, it took 11.5 months to obtain approval. Most 
of the Australian firms and the half of their Indian counterparts indicated that special 
efforts, such as lobbying, were required to obtain approval from the appropriate Indian 
authority. Understandably, most of them however did not disclose the nature of 
influence that they had used to obtain the approval. One of the Australian CEOs 
(who wished to remain anonymous) mentioned, 
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The approval time was critical. Delay in the approval process could have 
facilitated the repositioning of our competitors affecting us adversely. So, with 
the assistance of our prospective partner we lobbied the appropriate authority 
and obtained the approval pretty quickly. 
According to Pritchard & Fox (1996), the local partner of an UV provides a 
communication channel to the host government. It was revealed during the interviews 
that the Australian firms relied exclusively on their Indian counterparts for such 
lobbying. Ironically, however, the Indian firms, on a number of occasions, did not 
support the information provided by their Australian counterparts at interview (eg., 
Indure-Warman and Modi-Telstra). As a possible explanation, one remark made by 
an Indian respondent (who wished to remain anonymous) is worth reporting. He 
suggested, 
It is a common practice for the Indian firms to lobby relevant authorities to 
obtain undue privileges. However, they often don't want to offend concerned 
authorities by disclosing such information. 
The responses confirm the Australian firms' far-reaching involvement during the 
extensive waiting period, which tends to support proposition P4.2. 
Summary 	The interview data gathered from the respondents on the six different 
factors with respect to the formal negotiation process demonstrate the extensive 
involvement of Australian firms during the process. The available data-sets tend to 
support proposition P4.2, viz., Extensive investment in the formal negotiation process 
is required by the Australian firm to determine the nature of the future relationship 
between the IJV partners in its Indian activities. 
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11.3.3 Legal Aspects 
For the negotiating parties, it is important to understand the legal aspects of the 
negotiation processes. They should be aware of the host-country legal implications in 
relation to the formation of INs and their future operations. An understanding of the 
legal aspects of negotiation in the Indian legal system is essential for the Australian 
firms wishing to establish an UV relationship with a host firm in India. Three 
different issues were taken into consideration to examine the Australian firms' efforts 
in dealing with the relevant legal aspects during the entire UV negotiation process. 
These include, the use of a legal expert/firm during the preparatory stage, use of a 
legal expert/firm to scrutinise the documents and interpretation of documents 
according to Australian law. 
The Use of a Legal Expert/Firm during the Preparatory Stage It may not be easy 
to understand the legal matters involved in the negotiation processes when different 
countries, cultures and legal systems are involved. Host country legal requirements 
together with the need to interpret them according to the home country legal codes are 
likely to prompt the need to employ a corporate lawyer or local legal consultants. 
This is particularly important at the preparatory stage of negotiation because the legal 
experts may provide the concerned parties with necessary legal advice in order to 
inform parties of the local legal environment and its implications for the entire 
negotiation process. In the Indian context, with an array of laws regulating the Indian 
business environment, it is essential to employ a local legal expert. A detailed 
discussion regarding this factor is presented in chapter V. 
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As indicated in Column I of Table 11.3, most of the Australian respondents and their 
Indian counterparts used legal experts/firms during the preparatory stage of 
negotiation. The majority of the Australian firms, however, used the local law firms 
in addition to their in-house legal experts. In a number of cases, they also used 
Australian law firms for legal advice. As one of the Australian respondents noted, 
Once we had learned about the complex nature of the Indian legal system, we 
decided to employ an Indian legal expert. It was certainly a good decision. 
Without the assistance from the local legal expert, it would have been very 
difficult for us to understand the local legal complexities and to negotiate 
successfully. 
These data demonstrate the Australian firms' concerns about the legal matters 
involved in the negotiation process in the Indian context. This involvement tends to 
extend support for proposition P4.3. 
Use of a Legal Expert/Firm to Scrutinise the Document As mentioned in chapter 
V, a joint venture agreement should be comprehensive and unambiguous, and one 
which anticipates all material contingencies, with prescriptions for dealing with them 
(Howarth, et al., 1995). Accordingly, the use of legal experts/firms in scrutinising the 
final agreement is standard in the world of international business negotiation which 
may assist the negotiating firms to avoid future confusion and to maintain their 
respective interests in an orderly manner (Pritchard & Fox, 1996; Usunier & Ghauri, 
1996). 
The interviewed firms' responses on the use of law firms/experts are shown in 
Column II of Table 11.3 which demonstrate that most of the Australian and Indian 
firms used the advice of their legal experts to scrutinise the documents before they 
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signed them. These data indicate the importance given by both the Australian and 
Indian firms to this issue. Most of the Australian respondents used their legal 
departments as well as the Indian legal firms to ensure the necessary legal scrutiny of 
the documents. Legal experts usually joined the final negotiation only when the draft 
documents were prepared. 
According to Usunier & Ghauri (1996), the presence of lawyers during the drafting of 
clauses for inclusion in the documents may be interpreted by the other party as a sign 
of distrust. It is better, therefore, to keep the lawyers 'behind the scene' until the draft 
document is prepared. Until then, however, they could be consulted regularly. The 
data-set emphasises the importance of engaging legal experts/law firms to scrutinise 
the documents before they are signed. In general, the Australian firms' involvement, 
in this respect, is quite extensive. Therefore, the available responses tend to show 
support for proposition P4.3. 
Interpretation of Documents according to the Australian Law 	As mentioned 
earlier in chapter V, it is important to interpret the documents according to the home 
country law before it is signed. Because of the differences in country of origin, 
cultural background, ideology and legal environment, the interpretation as well as 
application of the same law may vary from country to country (Pritchard, 1996; Parra, 
1996). Given these intricacies and to avoid possible future confusion, the negotiating 
foreign firms may proceed to interpret the agreements according to the laws of their 
own countries. Most of the Australian firms and only one Indian firm interpreted the 
documents according to the Australian laws before they were signed (see Column HE 
of Table 11.3). This confirms the extensive effort given by the majority of the 
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Australian firms to achieving an understanding of the legal aspects of negotiation, and 
thereby, tends to support proposition P4.3. 
Summary 	The interview data gathered from the respondents on three different 
factors with respect to the legal aspects of negotiation demonstrate the extensive 
involvement of the Australian firms in understanding the intricacies of various legal 
matters and their use during the negotiation process. Therefore, the available data-sets 
tend to support proposition P4.3, viz., Extensive investment in understanding the legal 
aspects of negotiation in the Indian legal system is essential for the Australian firm as 
it attempts to ensure the security of future courses of action to be taken by the IJV and 
its partners. 
11.3.4 The Firms' Overall Involvement in the Negotiation Process 
The responses to the general question asked of all firms on the extent of their overall 
involvement throughout the negotiation process were found to be positive. Although 
this response-set is slightly more supportive than the response-set on the impact of 
each of the variables treated individually, these are somewhat corroborative of each 
other. 
Table 11.4 
Frequency of the Responses on the Firms' Overall Involvement during the IJV 
Negotiation Process 
- 	. 	. Significant Moderate Minimal N/A 
Level of involvement in the UV negotiation 
process by the Australian firms 
6 2 - 1 
Level of involvement in the UV negotiation 
process by the Indian firms 
5 4 1 - 
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Table 11.4 illustrates the responses of both the Australian and Indian firms on the 
level of their overall involvement in the DV negotiation process. Most of the 
Australian as well as the Indian firms indicated that their involvement during this 
process was moderate to mostly significant. However, the Australian firms' responses 
show greater involvement than their Indian counterparts. This variation, nonetheless, 
is consistent with the findings reflected in the response-sets on individual issues 
elaborated through sections 11.3.1 to 11.3.3. 
The responses to the general overall question may have provided a global opinion 
about the extent of the firms' involvement in the negotiation process, but not an in-
depth one specific to any particular issue. Nevertheless, this response-set reiterates 
the findings obtained individually on various issues during the negotiation process and 
tends to confirm that the Australian firms' overall involvement in the entire 
negotiation process was an extensive one. 
11.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The evidence on the proposed level of involvement by the Australian firms in the DV 
formation process appears to be consistent with the respective propositions (P4.1, P4.2 
and 134.3). Accordingly, the extensive involvement of Australian firms in different 
stages of the DV negotiation process and their efforts in understanding the legal 
matters associated with such processes were well-established. When asked the 
general question on the extent of their overall involvement in the negotiation process, 
the responses from the firms tended to be similarly supportive as they were to the 
questions asked on each of the factors treated separately. In general, it could be 
deemed that the weight of the evidence is tending to be supportive of the general 
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proposition (proposition P4), viz., Formation of 1.1Vs involves an extensive investment 
in different stages of the negotiation process including an understanding of its legal 
aspects. 
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CHAPTER XII 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF THE 
INDO-AUSTRALIAN IJVs IN INDIA 
The essence of knowledge is, having it, to apply it. 
- Confucius, 551 -479BC. 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
Once the formation of an UV is completed through an extensive negotiation process, 
the UV implementation process begins. At this stage, the success of an UV, as a 
separate entity, is influenced by numerous issues. Successful implementation of an 
UV generally depends on the efficient management of these issues. The interaction of 
the UV management with the UV partners also becomes operational at this stage. 
In this chapter, a number of selected issues are examined for their influence on the 
successful management of the Australian-Indian UVs. These are the choice of 
appropriate partner, management control, human resource management, inter-partner 
learning, building a separate UV culture and long-term commitment. In addition, an 
attempt is made to investigate the difficulties in dealing with selected environmental 
as well as organisational-specific factors and the assistance offered by the local 
partners to overcome them. 
Along with the examination of additional relevant data, these difficulties are 
compared and analysed on the basis of the earlier findings (chapters VIII-X) with 
respect to their roles in motivating the Australian firms to establish UVs with the 
Indian partners while investing in India. Similarly, the influence of human resource 
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management and inter-partner learning are compared separately and analysed vis-à-
vis the earlier findings with respect to their roles in motivating the Australian firms to 
establish IJVs. Further to the examination of the relevant data, the advantage of 
selecting an appropriate partner to achieve an UV success is compared with the 
previous findings in relation to the Australian firms' efforts in selecting such partners 
during the pv negotiation process (chapter XI). 
The data introduced in this chapter reflect the perceptions of interviewees from the 
individual firms. The focus of the empirical investigation to follow is that of the 
Australian firms' perspectives. However, to determine whether there is a 
convergence of views from the INs and their Australian parents and Indian hosts, an 
examination of responses from all of these entities is also undertaken (except for 
analysing the impact of long-term commitment where the responses only from the 
Australian parents and their Indian counterparts are taken into consideration). In this 
respect, the responses, irrespective of their origins, are given equal importance in 
examining the implementation stage because, unlike the previous discussion on 
motivation, all the entities are directly involved in the implementation stage. This 
implies that the success or failure of one entity is likely to impact upon the remaining 
entities in a similar fashion. The analysis is based on findings in relation to the 
specific propositions P5.I, P5.2, P5.3, P5.4, P5.5, P5.6, P5.7 and P5.8. 
12.2 INTERVIEW DATA 
The data are presented in eight sections. The first section (12.1) deals with the impact 
of the selection of an appropriate partner upon the success of the I.IVs between the 
Australian and Indian firms in India (proposition P5.1). The second section (12.2) 
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deals with the impact of management control on the success of the Indo-Australian 
UVs (proposition P5.2). The third section (12.3) considers the contribution of the 
management of human resources to the 1JY success (proposition P5.3). The fourth 
section (12.4) deals with inter-partner learning (proposition P5.4). The fifth section 
(12.5) considers the building of a separate IJV culture (proposition P5.4). The sixth 
section (12,6) discusses the long-term commitment of the UV partners as a success 
factor (proposition P5.6). The seventh section (12.7) considers the difficulties faced by 
the IJVs from the environmental uncertainties and risks (proposition P5.7) and the 
eighth one (12.8) deals with the difficulties in managing organisational-specific 
factors with respect to the IJV operation (proposition P5.8). 
Table 12.1 
Frequency of Various Factors which affected IJV Success 
Factors affecting LJV 
success 
Significance rating' for 
Australian parents 
Significance rating' for 
Indian hosts2 
Significance rating' for 
IJV management 
Signi- 
ficant 
Mod- 
erate 
No 
impact 
N/A Signi- 
ficant 
Mod- 
crate 
No 
impact 
N/A Signi- 
ficant 
Mod- 
orate 
No 
impact 
N/A 
1. Choice of an appropriate 
partner 
9 10 5 4 
2. Management control 
Sharing of decision making 7 2 10 9 
Level of flexibility 6 3 8 1 1 8 1 
Level of equity 2 2 5 5 1 4 2 1 6 
Level of technology contribution 5 3 1 7 3 8 1 
IJV board structure 4 4 1 10 5 4 
Sharing of IJV personnel 1 3 5 10 1 2 6 
3. HRM issues 
Appropriate selection of IN 
personnel 
8 - - 1 9 1 - - 8 - 1 - 
Use of experienced PCNs 4 2 1 2 5 1 3 1 8 1 - - 
Training of expatriate managers 
about Indian culture 
5 - 1 3 5 2 2 1 6 1 1 1 
Training of Indian managers 
about Australian culture 
4 3 1 1 - 1 9 - 1 2 6 - 
Provision of special 
compensation to expatriates 
5 - - 4 7 1 2 - 8 - 1 - 
Using HCNs in key UV 
positions 
7 1 - 1 9 - - 1 8 - 1 - 
4. Inter-partner Learning 8 1 10 9 
5. Building separate UV 
culture 
6 2 1 8 2 9 
Notes: 	Level of importance shown is on the basis of respondents' views. Numerals used denote the 
numbers of firms falling within respective categories. 
2  The number of host companies is 10 because of two host partners for Telstra-Vcomm IN. 
N/A = Not available 
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12.2.1 Choice of an Appropriate Partner 
Proposition P5.1 deals with the selection of an appropriate partner and its impact on the 
UV success. Item 1 of Table 12.1 summarises the responses from the LIVs and their 
respective partners on the possible impact of the choice of appropriate partners with 
respect to the UV success. 
All nine Australian firms as well as their ten Indian counterparts demonstrated 
unequivocal support for proposition P5.1 and considered the impact of an appropriate 
partner selection as a significant pre-condition for the UV success. The responses 
from the UVs are supportive too, but lesser so than are those from the UV partners. 
Five UVs considered this factor as a 'significant' one, whereas the remaining four 
endorsed a 'moderate' response. 
12.2.2 Management Control 
Proposition P5.2 deals with management control and its impact on the UV success. 
Item 2 of Table 12.1 summarises the responses from the UVs and their respective 
partners with respect to the possible impact of various control issues on the UV 
success. These are, sharing of decision making, level of flexibility, level of equity, 
level of technology contribution, UV board structure and sharing of UV personnel. 
Sharing of Decision Making 	All nine UVs and their ten Indian partners 
unanimously considered the sharing of decision making as a significant pre-condition 
for the UV success. The responses from the Australian parents are supportive of the 
proposition, but lesser so than are their Indian counterparts and the UVs. Of the nine 
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Australian firms, seven indicated that this factor had significant impact on the UV 
success, whereas the remaining two endorsed a 'moderate' response. 
Level of Flexibility Flexibility of control over the UV management entrusted by the 
parents is likely to affect UV success. According to the data-set, most of the I.IVs and 
their Australian as well as Indian partners considered this factor as being of moderate 
to significant importance for the UV success. However, the responses from the UVs 
and their Indian partners appears to be more positive than are those of the Australian 
parents. 
Level of Equity 	The level of equity contribution to the I.Ws may impact upon the 
level of management control which in turn, may influence the UV success. Most of 
the Indian firms indicated that this factor had moderate to significant impact on the 
UV success. Alternatively, most of the UVs and their Australian parents did not 
consider this factor important for the UV success. 
Level of Technology Contribution As demonstrated by the interview data, most of 
the UVs and their Australian as well as Indian partners endorsed moderate to 
significant importance to the level of technology contribution affecting the level of 
management control, which, in turn influenced the UV success. However, the 
responses from the UVs appear to be more positive than are those from the Australian 
firms and their Indian partners. 
IJV Board Structure 	A positive but mixed set of responses was received with 
respect to the impact of the UV board structure on the UV control. Eight of the nine 
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Australian parents indicated that the UV board structure had an influence on the UV 
success, while the remaining one did not consider it important. All of the IJVs 
considered this factor as being of moderate to significant impact on the IJV control. 
However, the Indian firms endorsed stronger support in this respect. All ten Indian 
firms unequivocally indicated that the UV board structure had significant influence on 
the IJY control, which eventually affected the IJV success. 
Sharing of IJV Personnel Most of the respondents considered control through the 
sharing of UV personnel as being of no importance on the IJV success. Indian hosts, 
in particular, unanimously maintained this view. The majority of the UVs and the 
Australian parents also expressed a similar view. However, the responses from the 
UYs tend to be less supportive than are those of their Australian parents. Only three 
IJVs and four of the Australian firms endorsed a moderate to significant impact, 
whereas the remaining six IJVs and five Australian firms did not consider this factor 
as an important one. 
12.2.3 HRM Issues 
Proposition P5.3 deals with the HRM issues and their impact on the UV success. Item 
3 of Table 12.1 summarises the responses from the IJVs and their respective partners 
with respect to the possible impact of various HRM issues on the UV success. These 
are, appropriate selection of UV personnel, use of experienced PCNs, training of 
expatriate managers about Indian culture, training of Indian managers about 
Australian culture, provision of special compensation to expatriates and using HCNs 
in key LTV positions. 
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Appropriate Selection of IJV Personnel 	Most of the respondents considered the 
appropriate selection of UV personnel as an important factor that made a significant 
contribution to the success of the UV. Of the nine Australian firms, eight indicated 
that this factor had significant impact on UV success, while only one Australian 
respondent expressed its unawareness of the factor in the present context. Nine of the 
ten Indian firms endorsed 'significant' impact, while the remaining one considered the 
factor as being of 'moderate' impact. Of the nine UVs, eight considered this factor as 
an important one, while the remaining one firm regarded it as being of no impact. 
Use of Experienced PCNs 	Most of the respondents mentioned that assigning 
experienced PCNs to the INs was an important precondition for UV success. 
However, as demonstrated by the interview data, responses from the UVs tend to be 
more positive than are those of their partners. Six Australian parents and the same 
number of Indian hosts stated that this factor had moderate to significant impact on 
the UV success. However, all nine UVs endorsed either 'significant' or 'moderate' 
response (comprising eight 'significant' and one 'moderate' response). 
Training of Expatriate Managers about Indian Culture This factor was given 
moderate to significant importance by most of the I.Ws as well as their Australian 
parents and Indian hosts. Nonetheless, the support tends to be marginal from the 
Australian parents. Of the nine Australian firms, five indicated that this factor had 
significant impact on UV success and one firm did not endorse any impact for this 
factor. The remaining three Australian firms expressed their unawareness of this 
factor in the present context. However, the responses from the LiVs as well as their 
Indian parents appears to be more positive than are the Australian firms' responses. 
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Seven I.Ws and seven Indian partners endorsed moderate to significant responses in 
this respect. 
Training of Indian Managers about Australian Culture A diverse response-set 
was received on the impact of the training of Indian managers on Australian culture. 
Contrary to the responses of the preceding section on the training of Australian 
managers about Indian culture, most of the INs and their Indian hosts did not 
consider this factor important for DV success. Nonetheless, most of the Australian 
parents (seven of nine) recognised such training as a precondition for DV success. 
Provision of Special Compensation to Expatriates 	Provision of special 
compensation to expatriates was considered important by most of the respondents. 
Five Australian firms, seven Indian firms and eight IJVs considered this factor as 
being of significant importance. Four Australian firms expressed their unawareness 
of this factor in the present context. Only one Indian firm endorsed a 'moderate' 
response, while the remaining two Indian firms and one DV did not give any 
importance to this factor. 
Using HCNs in Key IJV Positions This FIR issue was given importance by most of 
the respondents. The majority of the IJVs (eight of nine) considered this factor as 
being of significant importance for DV success, while the remaining one endorsed a 
'no impact' response. Most of the Australian parents responded in the similar 
fashion. Eight Australian firms recognised the importance of this factor endorsing 
moderate to significant responses, while the remaining one firm expressed its 
unawareness of the factor. However, the responses from the Indian firms are found to 
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be more positive than are those of their Australian counterparts and the UVs. Nine 
Indian firms regarded this factor as being of significant importance, while the 
remaining one expressed its unawareness of this factor in the present context. 
12.2.4 Inter-Partner Learning 
Proposition . P5.4 deals with inter-partner learning and its impact on the UV success. 
Item 4 of Table 12.1 summarises the responses from the IJYs and their respective 
partners on the possible impact of inter-partner learning with respect to the IJY 
success. 
All nine IJVs as well as their ten Indian counterparts demonstrated unequivocal 
support for the proposition and considered the impact of inter-partner learning as a 
significant pre-condition for IJV success. The responses from the Australian parents 
are supportive too, but slightly lesser so than are the responses from the IJVs and their 
Indian partners. However, the difference is not noteworthy. Of the nine Australian 
parents, only one firm considered this factor as being of moderate impact on UV 
success, while the remaining eight endorsed a 'significant' response. 
12.2.5 Building a Separate IJV Culture 
Proposition P5.5 deals with the building of a separate LJV culture and its impact on IJV 
success. Item 5 of Table 12.1 summarises the responses from the llYs and their 
respective partners on the perceived influence of the building of a separate UV culture 
with respect to UV success. 
342 
Most of the respondents considered the building of a separate UV culture as an 
important prerequisite for UV success. The responses from the UVs, in particular, 
are overwhelmingly supportive of the proposition. All nine I.1Vs affirmed that this 
factor had been of significant importance for UV success. Of the nine Australian 
firms, eight considered this factor as being of moderate to significant importance, 
while the remaining one Australian firm expressed its unawareness of the factor in the 
present context. All ten Indian firms indicated that this factor had moderate to 
significant impact on UV success. 
12.2.6 Long-Term Commitment 
Proposition P5.6 deals with long-term commitment and its impact on UV success. 
This time, responses only from the UV partners are taken into consideration because 
the UV partners are regarded as the deciding contributors to the future course of the 
venture. In this respect, in this study, the partners' willingness to maintain the venture 
in the long run is given preference. 
Table 12.2 summarises the responses from the Australian parents and their Indian 
counterparts on various issues relevant to the partners' long-term commitment that 
might have contributed, and that are likely to contribute, to the success of the UVs. 
These are, number of years envisaged to keep the UV operational, involvement in 
other Indo-Australian UVs and future possibilities to partner another Indo-Australian 
UV in India. 
343 
Table 12.2 
Frequency of Firms' Emphasis on Long-Term Commitment as a Success Factor* 
Name of the LTV/partner 
urns er o years envisage 	to 	eep 
the IN operational 
vo vement in any 
other Indo- 
Australian IJV in 
India 
hire possi 1 ties to 
partner another Indo- 
Australian IJV in 
India 
1. ACC-CRA (IJV) 
Australian Parent (AP) 5 No No 
Indian Host (IH) 10 No Yes 
2. Atco Control (UV) 
Australian Parent (AP) For ever No No 
Indian Host (IH) For ever No No 
3. GPTL (IN) 
Australian Parent (AP) For ever No Yes 
Indian Host (IH) 10 Yes Yes 
4. GSSL (IN) 
Australian Parent (AP) As long as both the parties are happy No N/A 
Indian Host (IH) 20 Yes Yes 
5. Indure Warman (IN) 
Australian Parent (AP) Open-ended No Yes 
Indian Host OH) Indefinitely No Yes 
6. Modi-Telstra (UV) 
Australian Parent (AP) >10 years Yes Yes 
Indian Host (IH) Until the foreseeable future No Yes 
7. Pioneer Friction (uv) 
Australian Parent (AP) For ever No Yes 
Indian Host OH) Forever No No 
8. Tech-Dry (UV) 
Australian Parent (AP) 5 years No No 
Indian Host am Forever No Yes 
9. Telstra-VComm (UV)** 
Australian Parent (AP) >10 years Yes Yes 
Indian Host-1 (IH-1) 10 years No No 
Indian Host-2 (IH-2) Indefinitely No yes 
*To analyse this issue, the responses only from the Australian parents and their Indian counterparts are taken into 
consideration. Responses from the IJVs were not sought during the interviews. 
**The IN, Telstra-VConun has two Indian hosts, VSNL (IH-1) and IL&FS (IH-2). 
N/A = Not Available 
Number of Years Envisaged to Keep the IJV Operational 	An interesting but 
diverse response-set was received in answer to the question about the envisaged 
period of IJV operations. Only four Australian parents responded in terms of number 
of years, while the remaining five declared the future plan in clear expressions 
reflecting their commitment to continue the operations. Two Australian parents 
expressed their intention to run the INs for more than ten years, while another two 
referred to five and ten years respectively. Four Australian firms expected to run the 
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UV 'for ever', while the remaining one firm expressed its desire to run the UV 'as 
long as both the parties are happy'. 
Similar to the Australian parents, Indian hosts reported mixed responses. Three 
Indian firms expressed their desire to continue the UV operation for the next ten 
years, while one firm wished it to run for twenty years. Five firms volunteered 'for 
ever' or 'indefinitely' responses, while the remaining one firm showed its interest to 
run the UV 'until the foreseeable future'. 
Involvement in Other Indo-Australian IJVs 	As demonstrated by the interview 
data, it was found that only two Australian parents and two Indian hosts had 
involvement in other Indo-Australian UVs. The remaining firms did not have any 
such involvement at the time the interviews were conducted. 
Future Possibilities to Partner Another Indo-Australian IJV in India Most of the 
respondents had considered the possibility to partner another Indo-Australian UV in 
the future. Of the nine Australian parents, five indicated their willingness for 
involvement in such a partnership. One expressed its unawareness of this factor in the 
present context, while the remaining three did not anticipate any such involvement. 
Similarly, most of the Indian firms showed their willingness to enter into another UV 
relationship with an Australian partner. Of the ten Indian hosts, seven expressed such 
a willingness, while the remaining three did not consider it an option. 
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12.2.7 Managing Environmental-Specific Difficulties 
Proposition P5.7 deals with the perceived environmental-specific difficulties 
encountered by the respondents and the assistance they required from the host 
partners to overcome those difficulties. A selection of environmental-specific 
variables are examined. These are, historical events, geographic location of India vis-
à-vis Australia, demographic characteristics in India, India's macroeconomic 
environment, the political environment in India, India's legal and regulatory 
environment, the host country HR practices, the lack of necessary market information 
in India, cultural differences between Australia and India, and the host country 
bureaucracy and corruption. 
Table 12.3 summarises the responses from the 1.1Vs and their respective partners on 
the adversity they have encountered in managing environmental-specific difficulties 
and the necessity of host partners' assistance to overcome them. Of the above-
mentioned ten environmental-specific factors, most of the respondents from each of 
the groups (UVs, Australian parents and Indian hosts) faced difficulties in dealing 
with three particular factors, viz., the host country's macroeconomic environment, its 
legal and regulatory environment, and the bureaucracy and corruption in India (see 
Columns IV, VI and X of Table 12.3). In addition, the majority of the Australian 
firms and the UVs mentioned that they faced difficulties derived from the political 
environment and cultural differences (Columns V and a of Table 12.3). In the 
remaining areas (see Columns I, II, VII and vra of Table 12.3), the majority of the 
UVs as well as the UV partners did not face any difficulties. Nonetheless, all the LINs 
and their respective partners unanimously agreed upon the necessity of the host 
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XI 
Necessity of 
host partner 
assistance 
,/ 
Table 12.3 
Frequency of Environmental-Specific Difficulties Encountered by the Firms in Managing IJVs 
Name of the UV/partner 
I 
Historical 
events 
H 
Geograph- 
ic location 
III 
Demographic 
charactens- 
tics 
IV 
Macroecon- 
mike 
environment 
V 
Political 
environment 
VI 
Legal and 
regulatory 
environment 
VII 
Host country 
HR Practices 
VIII 
Lack of neces- 
sary market 
information 
IX 
Cultural 
differences 
X 
Bureaucracy/ 
corruption 
1. ACC-CRA (UV) / i / / / 
Australian Parent / / i i i / / 
Indian Host / / ,/ i 
2. Atco Control (UV) / / / 
Australian Parent / i ,/ / 
Indian Host ,/ 
3. GPM (IN) i ,/ i ,/ (/ i 
Australian Parent / / i 1 
Indian Host / / / 
4. GSSL (IN) i ./ / / / 
Australian Parent i i 1 / 
Indian Host / / / 
5. Indure Warman (IN) i i / 
Australian Parent / / / / / ‘,/ / / i 
Indian Host 
6. Modi-Telstra (IN) i .1 / / 1 / 
Australian Parent 1 i i 
Indian Host 
7. Pioneer Friction (IJV) ./ i / 
Australian Parent i / ,/ / i / / / 
Indian Host / / 
8. Tech-Dry (IJV) 1 i / 1 / 
Australian Parent / i / / / 
Indian Host / i / / 
9. Telstra-VConun (IJV)* / / ,./ / / / 
Australian Parent i / i 
Indian Host-1 (IH-1) / / 1 
Indian Host-2 (IH-2) / 1 / ,/ 
*The IJV, Telstra-VComm has two Indian hosts, VSNL (IH-1) and IL&FS (IH-2). 
N/A = Not Available 
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VI 
Necessity of 
host partner 
assistance 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
if 
partner assistance to overcome any difficulties arising out of the environmental-
specific variables (see Column XI of Table 12.3). 
12.2.8 Managing Organisational -Specific Difficulties 
Proposition P5.8 deals with the perceived organisational-specific difficulties 
encountered by the respondents and the assistance they required from the host 
partners to overcome those difficulties. A selection of organisational-specific 
variables is examined. These are, achieving economies of scale, transactions costs 
minimisation, accessing wider distribution channels, sharing of resources and 
capabilities and HR management. 
Table 12.4 
Frequency of Organisational-Specific Difficulties Encountered by the Firms in Managing IJVs 
Name of the UV/partner 
I 
Achieving 
economies 
of scale 
n 
Transactions 
costs 
minimis- 
ation 
III 
Accessing 
wider 
distribution 
channels 
IV 
Sharing 
resources 
and capa- 
bilities 
v 
AR 
Managem-
ent 
1. ACC-CRA (IN) i i 
Australian Parent V 
Indian Host V V 
2. Atco Control (IJV) / / 
Australian Parent V 
Indian Host V 
3. GPTL (UV) / / i 
Australian Parent V V V 
Indian Host l V V V 
4. GSSL (UV) / i V 
Australian Parent V / V 
Indian Host V V l V 
5. Indure Warman (IN) i i V 
Australian Parent V V V 
Indian Host V 
6. Modi-Telstra (IN) i i 
Australian Parent V V V 
Indian Host V / 
7. Pioneer Friction (UV) / 
Australian Parent V V l 
Indian Host V / 
8. Tech-Dry (IJV) V 
Australian Parent V V V 
Indian Host if V 
9. Telstra-VConun (UV)* if if 
Australian Parent if V V / 
Indian Host-1 (IH-l) V 
Indian Host-2 (IH-2) 
* The IJV, Telstra-VComm has two Indian hosts, VSNL (IH-l) and IL&FS (IH-2). 
N/A = Not Available 
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Table 12.4 summarises the responses from the LIVs and their respective partners on 
the difficulties they have encountered in managing organisational-specific variables 
and the necessity of host partners' assistance to overcome them. Of the above-
mentioned five organisational-specific factors, most of the respondents from each of 
the groups (UVs, Australian parents and Indian hosts) faced difficulties in dealing 
with two factors, viz., transactions costs minimisation and HR management (see 
Columns II and V of Table 12.4). In addition, the majority of the LTVs (five of nine) 
mentioned that they faced difficulties in achieving economies of scale, while the 
majority of the Australian parents as well as their Indian counterparts did not admit 
any difficulties in this respect (Column I of Table 12.4). In the remaining two areas 
(see Column HI and IV), most of the ITVs as well as the UV partners did not face any 
difficulties. Nonetheless, all the respondents from across the three groups 
unanimously agreed upon the necessity of the host partner assistance to overcome any 
difficulties arising out of these organisational-specific issues (see Column VI of Table 
12.4). 
12.3 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION 
On the basis of the data presented, there appears to be some support for each of the 
propositions P5.1, P5.2, P5.3, P5.4, P5.5, P5.6, P5.7 and P5.8. Discussion of the interview 
data is grouped into nine sections. The first eight sections consider the data dealing 
with the eight propositions. A chapter summary concludes with a brief examination 
of the general proposition (proposition Ps) and the level of support it has in the data 
sets from across the eight groupings. 
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12.3.1 Choice of an Appropriate Partner 
As mentioned in chapter V, the foreign company must find a reliable partner capable 
of understanding the UV objectives and contributing to its successful operation. 
According to Fatehi (1996), Geissbauer & Siemsen (1996), Harrigan (1986) and 
Howarth, et al. (1995), choosing the right partner through an extensive screening 
process is important for a successful joint venture relationship. As demonstrated in 
Item 1 of Table 12.1, overwhelming support was evidenced from all the respondents 
with respect to the impact of an appropriate partner selection as a significant pre-
condition for IJV success. 
All of the Australian partners and their Indian counterparts considered this factor 
significant, which may be compared with their earlier efforts to select an appropriate 
partner during the UV negotiation process (see chapter XI). At that stage, it was 
found that the most of the Australian parents (five out of nine) contacted more than 
one Indian firm in the selection of an appropriate partner. None of the Indian firms 
initially contacted more than one Australian firm to choose a suitable partner. This 
suggests a relatively more cautious and extensive involvement by the majority of the 
Australian firms than their Indian counterparts in selecting the most appropriate 
partners. Likewise, with respect to the use of major sources of information about the 
prospective partners, the Australian firms' efforts were found to be more extensive 
than their Indian counterparts (see chapter XI). 
Overall, during the negotiation process more emphasis was given by the Australian 
parents to the selection of an appropriate Indian partner than the efforts rendered by 
their Indian counterparts in choosing an Australian partner. However, during the 
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implementation stage all of the Australian and Indian firms unequivocally realised the 
importance of the selection of an appropriate partner for a successful UV operation. 
As one of the respondents indicated, 
We precisely realised the importance of a good partner only when we started our 
business (UV operation). The regular interactions between us and the ongoing 
contributions from the partner obviously gave us the insights about the 
importance of having an efficient and easygoing partner for a successful IJY 
operation. 
The importance of this factor was also supported by all the IJVs as being of moderate 
to significant importance (see Item 1 of Table 12.1). These responses tend to be 
consistent with the proposition. 
Summary 	The responses from all of the UVs and their respective partners 
considered the choice of an appropriate partner as an important precondition for UY 
success. Moreover, as demonstrated by the responses, it was found that the Australian 
firms as well as their Indian counterparts offered stronger support with respect to the 
importance of the appropriate partner selection during the implementation stage 
compared with their previous efforts in choosing an appropriate partner during the UV 
negotiation stage. Nevertheless, the response-set tends to be consistent with 
proposition P5.1, viz., The choice of an appropriate Indian partner is a pre-condition 
for IJV success for Australian firms in India. 
12.3.2 Management Control 
This is another critical determinant of UV performance (Geringer & Hebert, 1989; 
Killing, 1983; Yan & Gray, 1995). As an entry mode, the UV offers a mid-level of 
management control exercised by its parents as compared with the other entry modes, 
such as licensing with a 'low' level of control and the wholly owned subsidiary with a 
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high level of control (Hill, et al., 1990). In the present context, six major issues are 
taken into consideration to examine the validity of proposition P5.2 that deals with the 
management control of the UV. These include the sharing of decision making, level 
of flexibility, level of equity, level of technology contribution, IJV board structure and 
the sharing of UV personnel. All of the Indian firms and the majority of the 
Australian firms and the UVs did not consider the sharing of UV personnel as an 
important precondition for the IJV success. Most of the Indian firms indicated that 
the level of equity had moderate to significant importance on IJV success, whereas the 
majority of the IJVs and their Australian counterparts did not consider this issue as an 
important success factor. As the evidence shows, most of the respondents indicated 
that the remaining four issues had moderate to significant impact on UV success. 
Sharing of Decision Making As mentioned in chapter V, management control 
through a balanced sharing of decision making is an important success factor for any 
jointly owned business entity (Radford, 1981). Accordingly, the reciprocity of the 
contributions made by each of the partners as well as the IJVs is critical for the 
attainment of UV success. The importance of the sharing of decision making is 
acknowledged by all of the respondents. However, there is a subtle difference of 
opinions between the Australian parents and the remainder of the respondents. The 
views of the Australian respondents are slightly less indicative than are the responses 
from their Indian counterparts and the UVs (see Item 2 of Table 12.1). Nevertheless, 
these interview data provide support for the significance of this factor as an UV 
success factor. According to the CEO of one of the Australian parents, 
Sharing of decision making is important because it creates mutual trust. It also 
makes the decisions transparent to each other leaving minimal chance for chaos 
and confusion between the parties. 
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During the interviews, it was further revealed that in six UVs major decisions are 
made/guided by the policy guidelines of the both parents, whereas in the remaining 
three, decisions are made by UVs with some policy guidelines from the parents. 
Decisions, therefore, are significantly shared between the parties. 
Level of Flexibility This is another important issue likely to contribute to the UV 
success. As mentioned in chapter V, flexibility deals with the extent of freedom to be 
extended to the venture management vis-à-vis its parents, and the management roles 
to be played by each partner. As Bleeke & Ernst (1991) suggest, flexibility allows 
joint ventures to overcome problems and to adapt to necessary changes over time. 
For example, the success of German firms in India propounds that the flexible attitude 
of foreign companies is a key success factor for an UV operation in India (Geissbauer 
& Siemsen, 1996). Consistent with the extant literature, most of the respondents 
considered this issue as an important precondition for UV success. However, the IJVs 
and their Indian partners expressed stronger support in favour of a more flexible 
attitude towards the IJVs compared with the responses from the Australian partners. 
Nevertheless, the response-set recognises the importance of this issue. 
Level of Equity As mentioned in chapter V, the level of equity participation by the 
partners may influence the level of management control affecting the UV success 
(Geringer, 1993; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Harrigan, 1986; Tomlinson, 1970; Yan & 
Gray, 1995). Ownership split, in this respect, may have impact on UV control. 
Phatak (1997) considers that a multinational company may easily maintain an 
effective control over an UV if it owns a majority of the venture's equity. It is further 
argued that the majority ownership might allow decisions to be made rapidly in 
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response to market or product developments and thus avoid costly compromises or 
decision-making deadlocks (Banks, 1981). However, a study by Bleeke & Ernst 
(1991) has found that because of the balance of control maintained by the partners, 
joint ventures with an even split of ownership have a higher success rate. 
A mixed response set was received from the I.IVs and their respective partners on this 
issue. Most of the I.Ws and their Australian partners did not consider this factor 
important for the management control process of the UVs, whereas the majority of the 
Indian hosts indicated that this factor had moderate to significant impact. Because of 
the presence of such discrepancies and the lack of support from the majority of 
respondents, the weight of evidence tends not to be consistent with proposition P5.2. 
When asked about such an outcome, one of the Australian parents argued, 
We believe in consensus and team spirit rather than competing for control over 
the equity issue. We know our strengths and those of our partners. We consider 
mutual understanding and trust more important rather than taking advantage of 
owning majority share. 
This remark is consistent with the observations made by Geringer (1993) and Habib 
(1987). They mentioned that any attempt made by a partner to manipulate the 
decision making process on the basis of relative ownership of the joint venture may 
adversely affect mutual respect and understanding between the partners and 
diminishes the prospect of the venture's long-term survival. 
Level of Technology Contribution This is another critical factor that may influence 
the management control process of an UV, which, in turn is likely to impact upon the 
UV success (Hagedoorn & Schakenraad, 1990). In particular, any form of technology 
contribution through a licensing agreement may provide significant control to the 
contributing firm over the UV. As Phatak (1997, p. 268) noted, 
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... actual control over a joint venture can be exercised by an international 
company through a license agreement. When the joint venture cannot operate 
effectively without the license, and the license is terminable by the international 
company, the significance of the license to the control of the joint venture is 
obvious. 
Most of the respondents endorsed a moderate to significant importance for this issue. 
However, the responses from the IJVs are slightly more positive than are those from 
the Australian firms and their Indian counterparts. As a possible explanation, it may 
be argued that the extent of control from the technology contribution is likely to affect 
the IJVs directly because they implement the licensing agreement and follow 
instructions from the contributors with respect to the possible implementation 
mechanisms. Nonetheless, the interview data tend to provide support for proposition 
P5.2. 
IJV Board Structure As mentioned in chapter V. the UV board structure is likely 
to play an important role in the IJY control, and thereby influence UV success 
(Geringer, 1993; Gullander, 1976; Phatak, 1997). Phatak (1997) considers a majority 
representation on the board of directors as one of the mechanisms to obtain 
management control in an UV. However, Geringer (1993) argues that because of the 
tendency for making major UV decisions by consensus, majority representation on the 
UV board may not matter much with respect to management control. Nonetheless, 
most of the respondents indicated that the UV board structure had an influence on UV 
success. However, the Indian firms endorsed stronger support for this factor. All ten 
Indian firms unequivocally indicated that the IJV board structure had a significant 
influence on UV control, which eventually affected DV success. 
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During the interviews, it was revealed that the majority of the UV boards were 
comprised of equal numbers of representatives from each of the partners. Of the nine 
UV boards, eight were chaired by HCNs at the time of interview. The only UV 
chaired by a PCN was the ACC-CRA UV. One of the respondents mentioned, 
The UV board is an important forum to exchange views, decide future directions 
and resolve problems. The authority of a firm may be exercised through its 
strong presence on the board of directors. A balanced representation is 
necessary to safeguard the interests of the respective partners and to ensure the 
UV success. 
In general, the data tend to provide support for proposition P5.2. 
Sharing of IJV Personnel As argued in chapter V, control through staffing and 
staff loyalty is another important issue to consider during the UV management 
process (As-Saber, et al., 1998; Dowling, et al., 1989; Negandhi, 1987; Schaan 1988). 
Key UV positions, such as the general manager, may play an important role in this 
respect (Geringer & Hebert, 1989). However, the available data tend not to recognise 
the impact of this factor on the management control of the LIVs and their success. 
Most of the respondents considered control through the sharing of UV personnel as 
having no impact on UV success. It was also revealed during the interviews that most 
of the UV personnel including the key UV positions were held by the HCNs. When 
asked about the rationale of such responses, one of the Australian respondents 
mentioned, 
We tried to select the best possible personnel for the UV, no matter whether they 
were Australians or local Indians. Because of the availability of cheap labour 
and skilled managers in India, we preferred to recruit most of them from India. 
In addition, maintaining expatriates in the UV is expensive. The UV board is 
there to oversee the performance of the venture, so, we didn't consider 
controlling the UV through the sharing of personnel. 
In all, the data imply that the findings on this issue do not acknowledge the necessity 
of personnel sharing in the UV as a control mechanism, nor as a success factor. 
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Summary 	Of the six factors examined within the area of management control, 
responses on the impact of four factors appear to be supportive of the proposition P5.2. 
These are, sharing of decision making, level of flexibility, level of technology 
contribution and the LIV board of structure. The responses on the remaining two 
factors, the level of equity share and the sharing of UV personnel, were not supportive 
of the proposition. The responses, in general, reflect a moderate level of partners' 
control over the UN's. The available data are partially supportive of proposition P5.2, 
viz., The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners depends 
upon the effectiveness of the control mechanism adopted. 
12.3.3 HRM Issues 
Efficient management of various HR issues may have significant impact upon the IJY 
success (Dowling, 1986; Dowling, et al., 1999; Schuler et al., 1991; Sluijs & Schuler, 
1994). In the present context, six major issues are taken into consideration to examine 
the validity of proposition P5.3 that deals with the HRM issues. These include, 
appropriate selection of UV personnel, use of experienced PCNs, training of 
expatriate managers about Indian culture, training of Indian managers about 
Australian culture, provision of special compensation to expatriates and using HCNs 
in key UV positions. The responses on the training of Indian managers about 
Australian culture were considered important by the majority of the Australian firms, 
but not supported by the majority of the UVs nor by the Indian hosts and left the 
results somewhat inconclusive. However, the remaining five factors were considered 
by the majority of respondents from across the three groups as being of moderate to 
significant importance for UV success. 
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Appropriate Selection of IJV Personnel One of the major preconditions for UV 
success is to adopt a systematic approach to the selection of UV personnel (Dowling. 
1986; Dowling et al., 1999; Schann & Beamish, 1988; Sluijs & Schuler, 1994). In 
this respect, 'the right person for the right position' policy is important to consider. 
The importance of this factor is reflected in the available data, while the majority of 
the respondents from across the three groups overwhelmingly considered this factor 
as being of significant importance for UV success (see Item 3 of Table 12.1). 
According to one respondent, 
There is no doubt about the need for quality people to make an UV successful. 
We gave real efforts to find quality personnel for the UV. We desperately 
needed good people for good performance. 
Use of Experienced PCNs As mentioned in chapter V, sending experienced PCNs 
to the host country is critical for the success of an UV. An experienced PCN must 
have managerial and technical competence along with the ability to accommodate the 
foreign environment (Datta & Rasheed, 1993; Dowling, et al., 1999; Murray & 
Murray, 1986). 
Most of the respondents from across the three groups considered this factor as being 
of moderate to significant importance for UV success. It is, however, important to 
note that only a few PCNs were working in most of the UVs at the time of the 
interviews. These were mostly technical people. According to one of the Australian 
respondents, 
Whenever we send an expatriate to a foreign operation, we try to send the best 
possible person for the job. If we don't find a suitable person, we rather depend 
on the experienced HCNs. 
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The responses tend to provide support for the significance of sending experienced 
PCNs to the DV as a precondition of UV success. 
Training of Expatriate Managers about Indian Culture 	It is argued that a 
comprehensive, cross-cultural training programme is likely to enable the expatriate 
managers to understand and adapt to a foreign culture (Datta & Rasheed, 1993; Tung, 
1981). As mentioned in chapter V, India, with a complex cultural disposition, has 
significant impact on the Indian management style (Husain, 1994; Sharma, 1984). 
Accordingly, it is advisable for the expatriates to learn about Indian culture prior to 
taking up positions there. An extensive training program can be useful in this respect. 
The majority of the respondents from across the three groups recognised the 
importance of expatriate training on Indian culture in order to achieve UV success. 
According to one of the Australian respondents, 
We are always aware of the importance of training an international manager 
about the host country culture. In the complex cultural context in India, it was 
more obvious to do. 
Despite such acknowledgments, it was revealed during the interviews that most of the 
Australian firms did not organise any comprehensive training for their expatriates. 
Rather, they organised pre-departure briefing sessions which might not be sufficient 
to serve the purpose. The responses, nonetheless, indicate support for proposition 
P5.3. 
Training of Indian Managers about Australian Culture 	Australia, being an 
industrialised developed country, has a different cultural make-up than that of India. 
As mentioned in chapter V, the Australian management style is clearly Western in 
nature (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995a; Grant, 1982). It 
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should be advantageous for the Indian managers appointed to the Australian-Indian 
I.JVs to understand Australian culture and management style. An extensive training 
program can be useful in this respect. 
However, the responses received on the importance of this factor as a success factor 
did not receive adequate support. Although this factor was acknowledged by the 
majority of the Australian parents as being of moderate to significant importance, 
most of the LIVs and the host firms did not consider it important. This has left the 
results inconclusive. However, because of the negative responses from the majority 
of respondents, the weight of evidence tends not to support proposition P5.3. As a 
possible explanation, it may be argued that the Australian managers might have faced 
difficulties in understanding Indian management style because of the lack of sufficient 
knowledge on the complex nature of the Indian culture. The findings in the previous 
section regarding the Australian firms' inability to conduct comprehensive training for 
its expatriates on the Indian culture partially support this rationale. Alternatively, the 
Indian managers, already exposed to Western culture were generally comfortable in 
dealing with their Australian counterparts. All of the UV managers had similar 
backgrounds. In both cases, they were either educated in the West or had prior 
experience in dealing with the Western business culture. 
Provision of Special Compensation to Expatriates It is not easy to attract good 
expatriate managers to an UV and to retain them (see chapter V for a detailed 
discussion). To do so may require the provision of special compensation (Dowling, et 
al., 1999; Reynolds, 1986). Most of the respondents from across the three groups 
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assigned moderate to significant importance to this factor. According to one of the 
Australian respondents, 
We are ready to pay special compensation for the expatriates. Otherwise, we 
can't send good managers for important overseas assignments. 
The available data tend to show support for proposition P5.3. 
Using HCNs in Key IJV Positions As argued in chapter V, the use of HCNs in key 
UV positions has many advantages which include, elimination of language and other 
barriers, reduction of hiring costs, improvement of the continuity of management and 
creating high morale among HCNs (Dowling, et al., 1999). Because of the 
availability of well-educated and experienced managers in India, locals have the skills 
and capabilities to manage the venture efficiently. 
Most of the respondents from across the three groups regarded this factor as being of 
significant importance for UV success. Consistent with these findings, it was 
revealed during the interviews that the key positions in the majority of the Australian-
Indian 1.1Vs were occupied by HCNs. According to one of the respondents, 
We don't see any problem in assigning locals instead of expatriates in key UV 
positions. They are well-qualified, experienced and trustworthy. We don't need 
to pay for their relocation and need not to worry about the work permits and 
their adaptation to the host country environment. 
The available data, in this respect, are inclined to support proposition P5.3. 
Summary 	Of the six factors examined within the area of human resource 
management, responses on the impact of five factors appear to be supportive of the 
proposition P5.3. These are, appropriate selection of UV personnel, use of experienced 
PCNs, training of expatriate managers about Indian culture, provision of special 
compensation to expatriates and use of HCNs in key UV positions. The impact of the 
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remaining factor, training of Indian managers about Australian culture, appears to be 
inconclusive. Although this factor was acknowledged by the majority of the 
Australian parents as being of moderate to significant importance, most of the IJVs 
and the host firms did not consider it important for IJV success. The responses, in 
general, demonstrate a moderate to significant level of impact by the majority of the 
HRM issues on IJV success. Accordingly, the available data are somewhat consistent 
with proposition P5.3, viz., The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian 
partners depends upon the efficient management of human resources. 
12.3.4 Inter-Partner Learning 
As argued in chapter V, I.Ws may be used as a vehicle for inter-partner learning 
(Dodgson, 1993; Doz & Sheun, 1988; Hamel, 1991; Harrigan, 1986; Kogut, 1988). 
Companies often form joint ventures to leverage their capabilities and to learn from 
one another through superior information exchange (Doz & Sheun, 1988). The 
respondents from across the three groups overwhelmingly indicated that this factor 
had significant impact on IJY success. According to one of the Australian 
respondents, 
Inter-partner learning is important for both partners. It is an ongoing process. 
We have learned from our partner how to cope with the rapidly changing 
business environment in India. In addition, we have acquired knowledge about 
the local management practices and business culture. On the contrary, we have 
brought with us advanced technical know-how and Western management style 
which enriched the knowledge base of the Indian partners. 
The impact of this factor on IJY success may be compared with its earlier role of 
motivating the Australian firms to joint venture with local partners while investing in 
India (see chapter X). At the motivation stage, responses were based on the level of 
expectation by the Australian firms. IJVs, at that stage, were seen as an appropriate 
mode for inter-partner learning which motivated the Australian firms to joint venture 
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with the Indian partner. The findings at the motivation stage indicated that this factor 
had strong influence on motivating Australian firms to joint venture. In the 
implementation stage, the importance of this factor was reiterated by the respondents. 
However, the Australian responses at the implementation stage were found to be 
stronger than were those at the motivation stage, i.e., during the implementation stage, 
the Australian respondents registered stronger support for inter-partner learning. As 
one of the Australian respondents indicated, 
We carefully observed the inter-partner learning scenario at the implementation 
stage and found this factor more important than we had thought before. 
Hence, these responses tend to be consistent with proposition P5.4. 
Summary 	The responses from all of the IJVs and their respective partners 
considered inter-partner learning to be an important precondition for 11V success. 
Moreover, as demonstrated by the responses, it was found that the Australian firms 
offered stronger support with respect to the importance of this factor during the 
implementation stage as compared with their responses during the motivation stage. 
Nevertheless, the response-set tends to be consistent with proposition P5.4, viz., The 
success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners depends upon 
efficient inter-partner learning. 
12.3.5 Building a Separate IJV Culture 
As discussed in chapter V, it is important to develop an integrated teamwork culture, 
rather than an "us-them" culture for the success of a cross-cultural venture (Geringer 
& Hebert, 1989). For an DV, it is critical to build a separate DV culture in order to 
make coordination easier and to facilitate better performance. Intensive on-the-job 
training may reduce the psychic distance and help build a team spirit in such cross- 
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cultural environments (Dowling, et al., 1999). Most of the Australian parents and 
their Indian counterparts indicated that this factor had moderate to significant impact 
on UV success. However, all nine LIYs expressed stronger views endorsing a 
unanimous recognition of this factor as being of significant importance. According to 
one of the respondents, 
Building a separate 1JY culture is important for the success of an UV because it 
ensures employee loyalty to the IN as a separate entity, and creates mutual trust 
and understanding among the UV personnel. It also builds teamwork spirit 
among the employees which enhances efficiency. 
As indicated by the response-set, the building of a separate UV culture had the 
tendency to impact upon UV success. 
Sununary 	On the basis of the above-mentioned finding, it was revealed that the 
building of a separate UV culture was given adequate importance by the respondents 
from across the three groups to be an important pre-condition for the success of the 
Australian-Indian UYs. Accordingly, the available data tend to be consistent with the 
proposition P5.5, viz., The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian 
partners depends upon the building of a separate IJV culture. 
12.3.6 Long-Term Commitment 
As mentioned in Chapter V, long-term commitment of the UV partners is an 
important precondition for the success of an UV (Dunstan, 1995; Howarth, et al., 
1995; Lasserre & Schiitte, 1995; Vicziany, 1993). In order to examine the long term 
commitment of the Australian parents and their Indian counterparts, a number of 
issues were taken into consideration. These are, number of years envisaged to keep 
the UV operational, involvement in other Indo-Australian INs and future possibilities 
to partner another Indo-Australian IJV in India. 
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Envisaged Period of the IJV Operation As shown in the Table 12.2, an interesting 
but diverse response-set was received on the question about the envisaged period of 
UV operation. Nonetheless, the response-set is a simple one which reflects the long-
term commitment of the majority of the Australian parents and their Indian 
counterparts to continue the UV operations. According to one of the respondents, 
We are happy with the UV performance. We are also happy with our partner. 
So, we would like to go on as long as both the parties are happy. 
The data indicate a commitment to the UV stability by the majority of the firms which 
is likely to contribute to UV success. Therefore, the responses tend to support 
proposition, P5.6. 
Involvement in Any Other Australian-Indian IJV in India 	This question was 
posed to examine the extent of the firms' current involvement in the Australian-Indian 
UVs in India. It was assumed that the greater the involvement, the greater the 
likelihood of long-term commitment rendered by the firms because any such 
involvement presumably would make it difficult for the firms (in particular, the 
foreign firms) to withdraw from the market. It was found that only two Australian 
parents and two Indian hosts had such additional involvement. Therefore, the data on 
this particular issue do not reflect a long-term commitment by the respondents and 
therefore, offer little or no support for proposition, P5.6. 
Future Possibilities to Partner another Indo-Australian IJV in India Most of the 
respondents considered the possibilities of partnering another Indo-Australian UV in 
the future. This prospect demonstrates the firms' long-term commitment to the Indian 
market. It also ensures a commitment to the existing venture because any future 
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possibilities are based on a positive evaluation of the existing venture and its future 
growth and survival. The current venture was presumably considered to be the 
platform for any new involvement in the future. According to one of the Australian 
respondents, 
India is a market of enormous potential. We are happy with our present 
involvement. We would like to further strengthen our involvement in the future. 
To do so, we would not hesitate to take part in any other Indo-Australian IJVs in 
the future. 
The data do indicate long-term commitment by the UV partners which is likely to 
contribute to UV success. As a consequence, the responses show some support for 
proposition, P5.6. 
Summary 	Of the three issues examined, responses on the impact of two issues 
appear to be supportive of proposition P5.6. These are, the number of years envisaged 
to keep the IJV operational and the future possibilities for partnering another Indo-
Australian IJV in India. Responses on the issue of the existing involvement in any 
additional Indo-Australian DV in India was not supportive of the proposition. 
Accordingly, the available data are only partially consistent with proposition P5.6, viz., 
The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners depends upon a 
long-term commitment to the host market. 
12.3.7 Managing Environmental-Specific Difficulties 
In chapters II and DI, literature on the environmental-specific difficulties was 
introduced. Later, in chapters VIII and IX, a selection of these difficulties were 
examined on the basis of the interview data obtained from the Australian parents as 
well as their Indian counterparts in order to investigate the influence of these variables 
on the Australian firms' decision to joint venture with the Indian firms while investing 
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in India. Now, in the implementation stage, a selection of these environmental-
specific difficulties are taken into consideration to examine the extent of difficulties 
actually encountered by the INs and their respective partners in dealing with these 
variables. The need for local partners' assistance in overcoming these difficulties is 
also investigated. 
On the basis of the assembled data (see Table 12.3), it was revealed that none of the 
three geopolitical variables (Columns I-III) caused any difficulties for the Australian 
parents at the implementation stage. When compared with the responses at the 
motivation stage, it was found that only the historical events (such as colonial and 
Cold War legacies) received some attention from the Australian parents with respect 
to motivating the Australian firms to joint venture. This suggests that during the 
implementation stage most of the firms did not encounter any major difficulties from 
any such historical events. 
The remaining environmental variables, as was established in chapter IX, partially 
impacted upon the Australian firms' decision to joint venture during the motivation 
stage. However, during the implementation stage the majority of the 1.1Vs and their 
Australian parents encountered difficulties only from a number of selected issues, 
such as, the macroeconomic environment, the legal and regulatory environment, 
cultural differences and bureaucracy and corruption (it is to be noted here that the 
cultural differences and bureaucracy and corruption are segments of the broader 
cultural environment. For the sake of analysis, these are considered separately). The 
majority of the Indian hosts faced problems only in areas such as the macroeconomic 
environment, the legal and regulatory environment and bureaucracy and corruption. 
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However, in terms of the number of respondents, the Indian firms' responses were 
less conclusive than were the IJYs and their Australian partners. The response-set 
reports the Indian firms' relative advantage over their Australian partners and the IWs 
in managing the environmental-specific difficulties because of their familiarity with 
the host-country environment. 
Although overcoming these difficulties through mutual support and understanding 
between the IJY partners is important for IJY success, the host partners may 
contribute significantly to the management of these issues. All nine 1.1Vs and their 
respective partners unanimously agreed upon the necessity of the host partner 
assistance to overcome any difficulties arising out of the environmental-specific 
variables (see Column XI of Table 12.3). This finding reiterates that one of the major 
motivations for the Australian firms to opt for the IJY mode was to get assistance 
from the experienced local partners to overcome these problems. At the 
implementation stage, the need for such assistance has become established. This is 
consistent with the observations made by Thompson & Strickland (1990, p. 168) 
where they argued that to overcome such difficulties, formation of IJVs with local 
partners are "... sometimes the only or best way" to enter and operate in a foreign 
market. 
It was further revealed during the interviews that each of the IJYs had been frequently 
drawing upon the assistance of the host partner during the implementation stage. 
According to one of the Australian respondents, 
Our major motivation to joint venture was to get necessary assistance from the 
local partner in running the business. We have been using such assistance 
regularly since the IJV is operational. 
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Summary 	The interview data demonstrate that the majority of the LIVs and their 
Australian parents encountered difficulties derived from several environmental-
specific variables. Indian firms also faced some difficulties but in fewer areas and to 
a lesser extent than the DVs and their Australian counterparts. The majority of the 
respondents from across the three groups did not face any difficulties in managing 
geopolitical variables. However, during the motivation stage, one of the geopolitical 
variables was given some importance. Five of the remaining seven issues caused 
some difficulties, whereas during the motivation stage, all these issues were 
considered as being of moderate to significant importance in motivating the 
Australian firms to joint venture. 
Nonetheless, all of the respondents unanimously indicated that assistance from the 
local partners is important in overcoming these difficulties. This is consistent with the 
major thrust of the Australian firms' motivation to joint venture, i.e., to obtain 
assistance from the experienced local partners. In order to overcome such difficulties 
and to achieve DV success, the contributions from the local partners were considered 
necessary along with the support and expertise of the Australian parents. Therefore, 
the responses tend to be partially consistent with proposition P5.7, viz., The success of 
Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners depends upon the manner in 
which environmental-specific inhibitive factors are managed. 
12.3.8 Managing Organisational -Specific Difficulties 
In chapter IV, literature on the organisational-specific difficulties was introduced. 
Later in chapter X, a selection of these difficulties was examined on the basis of the 
interview data obtained from the Australian parents as well as their Indian 
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counterparts in order to investigate the influence of these variables on the Australian 
firms' decision to joint venture with the Indian firms while investing in India. Now, 
in the implementation stage, a selection of these variables is taken into consideration 
to examine the extent of difficulties actually encountered by the IJVs and their 
respective partners in dealing with these difficulties. The need for local partners' 
assistance in overcoming these difficulties is also investigated. 
On the basis of the reported data (see Table 12.4), it was revealed that only two 
organisational-specific variables, viz., transactions costs minimisation and HRM 
issues (Columns II and V), caused some difficulties for the majority of the 
respondents from across the three groups. In addition, the majority of the IJVs 
mentioned that they faced difficulties in achieving economies of scale (Column D. 
When compared with the responses at the motivation stage, it was found that all of 
these issues were given some importance by the Australian parents with respect to 
motivating the Australian firms to joint venture. This implies that during the 
implementation stage the extent of difficulties faced by the firms was less than 
anticipated by the firms during the motivation stage. One interesting finding in 
relation to the HR issues was revealed during the implementation stage, i.e., on 
average, firms encountered more difficulties from the organisational-specific HR 
issues than from the environmental ones. 
The management of such difficulties through mutual support and understanding 
between the DV partners is important for DV success. Along with the foreign 
parents, host partners may contribute significantly to the management of these issues. 
All nine LIVs and their respective partners unanimously agreed upon the necessity of 
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the host partner assistance to overcome any difficulties arising out of the 
organisational-specific variables (see Column VI of Table 12.4). This is consistent 
with the major thrust of motivation for the Australian firms to form INs while 
investing in India. 
One of the major motivations for the Australian firms in opting for the UV mode was 
to obtain assistance from the experienced local partners to overcome these problems. 
At the implementation stage, the need for such assistance has been established. It was 
also revealed that assistance from the local partners has been used frequently since the 
beginning of the UV operation in order to manage these difficulties. However, unlike 
dealing with the environmental-specific difficulties, more emphasis was given by 
most of the respondents to the mutual contribution from both of the partners to 
overcome the organisational-specific difficulties. 
As a possible interpretation, it may be argued that the Australian partners might have 
found the environmental-specific variables more complex and unfamiliar than the 
organisational-specific variables. Therefore, they could contribute more to the 
resolution of the organisational-specific difficulties than the environmental ones. One 
of the Australian respondents mentioned, 
We are much more comfortable in dealing with the organisational-specific 
difficulties than in managing the environmental ones. The business environment 
in India is volatile and complex. That's why we strongly need assistance from 
an experienced local partner familiar with the local environment. 
Organisational-specific variables are not as complex as the environmental ones 
are. These are more specific and readily understandable. So, we can easily 
contribute to the management of these variables. However, we are not 
undermining the importance of the contribution made by the local partners. 
These are important too. We have already used their assistance. An UV can 
only be successful when such problems are jointly managed by its partners. 
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Summary 	The interview data demonstrate that the majority of respondents from 
across the three groups encountered difficulties derived from two organisational-
specific variables, viz., transactions costs minimisation and HRM issues. Another 
factor, achieving economies of scale caused some problems for the majority of the 
LIVs. The remaining two issues, accessing wider distribution channels and sharing 
resources and capabilities did not create problems for the majority of the respondents. 
However, during the motivation stage, all of these issues were considered as being of 
moderate to significant importance in motivating the Australian firms to joint venture. 
Nonetheless, all the respondents unanimously indicated that assistance from the local 
partners is important in overcoming these difficulties. This is consistent with the 
major thrust of the Australian firms motivation to joint venture, i.e., to obtain 
assistance from the locally experienced partners. 
It was also disclosed that assistance from the local partners had been used regularly to 
overcome these difficulties. However, unlike the resolution of the environmental-
specific difficulties, the respondents placed emphasis on the contribution from both of 
the partners to resolve these problems. Relatively more emphasis was given to the 
local partners' contributions in overcoming environmental-specific difficulties. The 
responses suggest a concerted effort in order to successfully overcome the 
organisational-specific difficulties. Therefore, the responses tend to be partially 
consistent with proposition P5.8, viz., The success of Australian firms joint venturing 
with Indian partners depends upon the manner in which organisational-specific 
inhibitive factors are managed. 
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12.4 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Evidence from the nine UVs and their respective partners was examined to analyse 
the impact of various factors on UV success. Eight propositions were considered. 
Evidence on the impact of the choice of an appropriate partner (P5.1), inter-partner 
learning (P5.4) and building a separate UV culture (P5.5) appeared to be consistent with 
the respective propositions. Evidence on the remaining five factors, a consistent UV 
control mechanism (P5.2), efficient management of human resources (P5.3), long-term 
commitment (P5.6) and the efficient management of environmental as well as 
organisational-specific difficulties (P5.7 and P5.8) was found to be partially consistent 
with the respective propositions. 
Moreover, as demonstrated by the responses, it was found that the Australian firms as 
well as their Indian counterparts offered stronger support with respect to the 
importance of the appropriate partner selection during the implementation stage as 
compared with their previous efforts in choosing an appropriate partner during the UV 
formation stage. Similar evidence was recorded with respect to the inter-partner 
learning. It was found that the Australian firms offered stronger support with respect 
to the importance of this factor during the implementation stage compared with their 
responses during the motivation stage. 
When considering the management of environmental as well as organisational-
specific difficulties, an interesting fact was revealed. The assembled evidence 
suggests that the UNs, their Australian parents and Indian hosts encountered fewer 
difficulties during the implementation stage than were anticipated at the motivation 
stage. Of the ten environmental-specific variables which were taken into 
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consideration, only five posed some difficulties during the implementation stage. 
However, eight of these factors were considered important at a moderate to significant 
extent during the motivation stage, i.e., the majority of the Australian firms 
considered opting for the UV in order to overcome these difficulties with the 
assistance from their future partners. Similarly, the responses on managing 
organisational-specific difficulties showed that during the motivation stage, all the 
organisational-specific issues moderately or significantly contributed to the 
motivation of the Australian firms' decision to joint venture, whereas, during the 
implementation stage, only two variables caused some difficulties for the majority of 
the firms. 
All the respondents unanimously indicated that the assistance from the local partners 
is important in overcoming any environmental as well as organisational-specific 
difficulties. This is consistent with the major thrust of the Australian firms' 
motivation to joint venture, i.e., to obtain assistance from the experienced local 
partners. It was also disclosed that assistance from the local partners had been used 
regularly to overcome these difficulties. However, relatively more emphasis was 
given to the local partners' contributions in overcoming environmental-specific 
difficulties. The respondents, on the other hand, placed considerable emphasis on the 
contribution from both of the partners to resolve organisational-specific difficulties. 
On the basis of this discussion, it could be deemed that the weight of the evidence, in 
general, is tending to be at least partially consistent with the general proposition 
(proposition P5), viz., Various environmental-specific as well as organisational- 
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specific factors impact on the likelihood of success of Australian-Indian joint ventures 
in India. 
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CHAPTER XIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
Each morning sees some task begin, 
Each evening sees it close; 
Something attempted, something done, 
Has earned a night's repose. 
- Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, 
"The Village Blacksmith". 
13.1 INTRODUCTION 
The major objective of this study was to broaden understanding of various issues 
relevant to the motivation for establishing IJVs, the formation of LIVs and their 
implementation. Nine cases of Australian-Indian UVs have been investigated to 
better understand why these Australian companies have chosen UVs as a preferred 
international business mode for investing in India. The study identifies a number of 
factors, both environmental-specific and organisational-specific, which were 
responsible for the motivation of the Australian firms to joint venture with their Indian 
partners. This research also reports on the complex nature of the UV formation 
process undertaken by the Australian and Indian partners. In addition, the study 
reveals a set of factors which are deemed responsible for ITV success. It also 
identifies major problems faced by the UVs during the implementation stage. The 
need for assistance from the local partners in overcoming these problems is 
highlighted. 
This chapter reports the major conclusions of this research. First, an overview of the 
thesis is presented followed by a summary of the research findings. Then, the 
limitations of the study are addressed followed by a discussion on the implications of 
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the findings for policy analysis, management practice and theory development. 
Finally, future research directions are suggested. 
13.2 OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
This thesis began with a set of objectives that aims at better understanding of the 
various issues involving Australian-Indian UVs. In doing so, the context for the study 
has been established on the basis of the extant literature at chapters II, III, Wand V. 
Emphasis is given to three major areas, viz., the extent of the influence from 
environmental-specific as well as organisational-specific variables in motivating a 
foreign firm to joint venture with a local firm, the level of complexity in managing the 
UV formation process, and the UV implementation process including problems which 
might arise and the assistance provided by the host firms to overcome these problems. 
For analysis, specific consideration is given to Australian firms joint venturing in 
India with Indian partners. 
Following this general introduction to set the context, a conceptual framework along 
with the research question and objectives are presented in chapter VI. Indicating the 
major areas to be covered by the study, the conceptual framework depicts the 
presumed relationships among the key factors, constructs or variables of interest 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Based on the research objectives and extant literature, a 
research question and a set of propositions are specified to guide the analysis. 
Chapter VII elaborates on the research design and the method of inquiry. A multiple 
case study method is used to conduct the research. Yin (1989, p. 3) considers the case 
study method as a process to investigate "...a contemporary phenomenon within a 
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real life context". A combination of deductive and inductive analysis is used in order 
to capture the complexity and dynamism of the processes investigated. This allows 
the researcher to observe the real life scenario more objectively but with flexibility 
(Perry & Coote, 1994). Prior theories are employed as 'templates' for measuring the 
empirical case study outcomes. In this sense, the existing theory helps to explain the 
results (Manicas, 1989). Multiple sources of evidence are used in order to develop 
construct validity. 
For each of the INs selected, three different entities are chosen for the data 
collection, viz., the Australian parent company, the Indian host company and the 
India-based UV management. This is a feature of this study. Through this 
corroboratory mode of data collection, converging lines of enquiry were constantly 
sought. Primarily, the data were collected during face-to-face interviews in various 
locations in India and Australia. The researcher visited India twice, and remained 
there for about two months during 1995-96. In late 1995, unstructured interviews 
were conducted in India with a number of Indian host companies and IJV managers 
which formed the basis of further research. The researcher's co-supervisor 
accompanied him to supervise this process. At that stage, the researcher reviewed the 
preliminary interview information and verified the access procedures which are 
considered as two important steps for case study protocol (Yin 1989). 
In late 1996, the researcher along with his research supervisor visited India and the 
researcher collected data from all nine UVs and their Indian host companies through 
face-to-face interviews. At this time, structured questionnaires were used during face-
to-face interviews. Both open-ended and close-ended questions were asked and the 
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interviews were recorded on audio tapes for use in validating the notes after the 
interviews (This proved particularly useful for the responses of the open-ended 
questions). Subsequently, interview data from the parent companies in India were 
collected in a similar fashion. The in-depth interviews were conducted with at least 
one senior manager from each of these respondent firms. 
Throughout the study, a systematic chronological order was maintained from the 
identification of problems until the final conclusions. Yin (1989, pp. 102-103) refers 
to this as the "...chain of evidence". Based on the respondents' views, the data 
gathered were categorised according to the major components relevant to each 
respective proposition. Direct observations as well as secondary information were 
used while analysing these findings to provide elicitation. 
• The results of the study are presented in chapters VIII-X11. The empirical evidence 
gathered through in-depth face-to-face interviews, personal observation, and 
secondary information is used to analyse the various issues as laid out in the research 
question and the proposition sets. Discussion and interpretation is presented in these 
chapters. 
13.3 SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 
A summary of the major research findings will be presented in four different sections. 
The first section will deal with the possible impacts of environmental as well as 
organisational-specific variables on the Australian firms' motivations to joint venture 
with Indian partners while investing in India. This will be followed by a section 
reporting the formation process of the Australian-Indian llVs. The third section 
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considers the implementation stage of these IJVs. The fourth section deals with the 
relevance of the conceptual framework during the entire research process. The 
framework was previously developed at chapter VI (see Figure 6.1). A summary of 
major findings related to each specific proposition is presented in Table 13.1. 
13.3.1 Motivation Stage 
As mentioned earlier in the introduction of this thesis, it has been assumed that the 
Australian firms initially decided to invest in India in order to exploit the potential of 
the Indian market. This research sought to understand why an Australian firm would 
opt for an IJV mode for investing in India. In order to explain this, various factors 
were taken into consideration which might have influenced the motivation of the 
Australian firms. These include both environmental-specific and organisational-
specific factors. The major findings are summarised below. 
The Impact of Geopolitical Variables From among the environmental-specific 
factors, geopolitical variables were examined separately (chapter VIII). Geopolitics 
has long been considered as an important environmental variable (As-Saber, Liesch & 
Dowling, 1996; Brucan, 1978; Garnaut & Drysdale, 1994; Kristof, 1994; Reynolds, 
1980). Because of this perceived importance, various geopolitical aspects were 
examined in order to determine the level of influence they had in motivating the 
Australian firms to joint venture with the Indian partners while investing in India. 
However, despite the proposed influence of the geopolitical scenario in motivating the 
Australian firms, the evidence suggests that geopolitics has had only limited impact 
on the participants' motivations. 
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Table 13.1 
Summary of Findings Related to the Research Propositions 
Research Propositions Under Investigation 
• 
Extent of support found 
Signi- 
ficant 
Some 
support 
No /little 
support 
Pi Geopolitical factors which impact on the decision to enter the Indian market can be represented on three dimensions: a time dimension, a place 
dimension and a demographic dimension. V 
pH Along the time dimension, historical events influence the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the Indian market. V 
Pi .2 Within the place dimension, the geographic location of India, vis-a-vis Australia, influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with 
Indian firms to enter the Indian market. V 
P1.3 Within the demographic dimension, India's population characteristics influence the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms 
to enter the Indian market. I/ 
P2 Host-country environmental factors, such as its economic, cultural, legal and political settings, the firm's access to market information and its 
human resource management practices impact on the decision making process of the foreign firm as it considers entry into the Indian market. V 
P2.1 The macroeconomic environment in India influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the Indian market. V 
P2.2 The political situation in India influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the Indian market. V 
P2.3 The legal and regulatory environment in India influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the Indian 
market. 
V 
P2.4 The nature of human resource management practices in India influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter 
the Indian market. V 
P2.5 The lack of necessary market information in India influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the Indian 
market. V 
P2.6 Cultural diversity in India influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms to enter the Indian market. v 
p3 Organisational-specific factors impact on the decision taken by Australian firms to enter the Indian market through the joint venture mode. V 
P3.1 The quest for economies of scale motivates Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while entering the Indian market. V 
P3.2 Transactions cost minimisation influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while entering the Indian market. V 
p3 . 3 Access to the distribution network within the Indian market influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while 
entering the Indian market. 
V 
pig Sharing technology, establishment costs and R&D expenses influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while 
entering the Indian market. V 
p3 . 5 The organisational-specific human resource management issues influence the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while 
entering the Indian market. V 
P3.6 Inter-partner learning influences the decision taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms while entering the Indian market. V 
Table 13.1 (Contd.) 
Summary of Findings Related to the Research Propositions 
Research Propositions Under Investigation 
Extent of support found 
Signi- 
ficant 
Some 
support 
No/little 
support 
1)4 Formation of IJVs involves an extensive investment in different stages of the negotiation process including an understanding of its legal aspects. 6, 
P4.1 The Australian firms undertake extensive investment in the preparatory stage of joint venture negotiation to arrive at a favourable terms of agreement 
with their Indian counterparts. V 
P4.2 Extensive investment in the formal negotiation process is required by the Australian firm to determine the nature of the future relationship between the 
UV partners in its Indian activities. 
V 
p4.3 Extensive investment in understanding the legal aspects of negotiation in the Indian legal system is essential for the Australian firm as it attempts to 
ensure the security of future courses of action to be taken by the UV and its partners. V 
p5 Various environmental-specific as well as organisational-specific factors impact on the likelihood of success of Australian-Indian joint ventures 
in India. 
V 
P5.1 The choice of an appropriate Indian partner is a pre-condition for UV success for Australian firms in India. V 
P5.2 The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners depends upon the effectiveness of the control mechanism adopted. V 
P5.3 The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners depends upon the efficient management of human resources. V 
p5 .4 The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners depends upon efficient inter-partner learning. V 
P5.5 The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners depends upon the building of a separate UV culture. V 
P5.6 The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners depends upon a long-term commitment to the host market. V 
P5.7 The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners depends upon the manner in which environmental-specific inhibitive factors are 
managed. V 
P5.8 The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners depends upon the manner in which organisational-specific inhibitive factors are 
managed. V 
The available evidence has partially supported proposition P1.1. Propositions P1.2 and 
P1.3 were not confirmed by the available data. Accordingly, only the time dimension 
had some impact on the Australian firms' motivations to joint venture, whereas the 
two other dimensions, the place dimension and the demographic dimension had little 
or no impact. However, when respondents were asked the general question on the 
impact of geopolitics (incorporating all three dimensions globally), the responses 
tended to be more supportive than they were found to be on the questions asked of the 
dimensions treated separately. 
Despite the perceived importance of the various geopolitical factors as detailed in 
chapter II, the evidence suggests that these factors had little or no influence in 
motivating firms to joint venture. These findings may call for some explanations. 
First, during the interviews, it was revealed that the term, 'geopolitics' was not 
familiar to most of the business executives in the context of international business. 
Despite the researcher's efforts to explain this environmental factor, it might still 
remain a vague domain of knowledge to them. In addition, because of the coverage of 
a wide range of geopolitcal issues, the respondents might have become confused 
about them. 
Second, geopolitics as a factor was not given much emphasis by the Australian firms 
while deciding upon their modus operandi in India because most of these factors were 
not regarded as immediate considerations by the Australian firms. Most of the 
Australian firms, for example, expressed their awareness about these factors. 
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However, they gave less priority to them because of the urgency to attend factors with 
an immediate importance. According to one of the Australian parents, 
We did not emphasise much on those factors during our decision making 
process to joint venture. We rather considered it more important to focus upon 
the other environmental-specific variables such as the economic and legal 
environments and human resource practices in India that apparently had 
immediate implications to our decision. 
Third, as most of the "Ns studied were at their early stage of operation at the time of 
interviews, they were yet to be fully exposed to the various geopolitical factors. This 
was evident from their responses to the frequency of environmental-specific 
difficulties encountered by them in managing INs in India (see Table 12.3). It may, 
however, be anticipated that they are likely to face more of these difficulties 
(especially geopolitical ones) over the period of next few years. The future research 
may warrant a longitudinal study to examine the importance of these factors for 
international business operations. 
The Impact of Other Environmental Variables The environmental variables other 
than geopolitics were examined in chapter IX. The variables examined are, 
macroeconomic (proposition P2.1), political (proposition P2.2), legal and regulatory 
(proposition P2.3), human resource management practices (proposition P2.4), lack of 
necessary market information (proposition P2.5), and cultural diversity in India 
(proposition P2.6). The evidence suggests that these variables had limited impact on 
the participant's motivation to joint venture. However, P2.1, P2.3, P2.5 and P2.6 appear 
to have been more supported than the remaining two. Overall, the evidence only 
partially supported propositions P2.I through P2.6. The Australian firms' responses, 
however, were found to be more supportive of the propositions than were those of 
their Indian counterparts. 
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Similar to the responses on the impact of the geopolitical variables, responses to the 
general question were more supportive of the proposition than was the case when each 
factor was treated separately. Most of the Indian and Australian firms indicated that 
the combination of the six environmental factors, as a global construct, had moderate 
to significant impact on their decision. The weight of the evidence, in general, is 
tending to be at least partially supportive of the general proposition Pz. 
The Impact of Organisational -specific  Variables The evidence on the proposed 
influence of various organisational-specific variables in motivating the Australian - 
firms to joint venture with local partners while investing in India appears to be 
consistent with the respective propositions (P3.1 through P3.6). However, evidence 
pertinent to propositions P3.1, P3.4, P3.5 and P3.6 was found to be less supportive than 
was that for propositions P3.2 and P3.3. Accordingly, six factors, viz., economies of 
scale, transactions costs minimisation, access to distribution channels, the sharing of 
resources and capabilities, organisational-specific human resource management and 
inter-partner learning had only limited impact on the decision of the Australian firms 
to joint venture. 
Similar to the responses on the impact of the environmental variables, responses to the 
general question on the impact of all of the six organisational-specific variables 
jointly (in the one statement) tended to be more supportive than were the responses 
when the questions were asked separately. Nonetheless, the weight of the evidence, 
in general, appears to be at least partially consistent with proposition P3. 
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A General Outcome During the investigation, one similar outcome was evidenced 
across the findings involving the impact of the environmental as well as 
organisational-specific variables on the Australian firms' motivation to joint venture. 
It was found that the responses to the general questions (relevant to the general 
propositions, Pi, P2 and P3) each dealing with the impact of a set of variables jointly, 
tended to be more supportive of the respective proposition than was the case when 
each of the variables was treated separately. Most of the Indian and Australian firms 
indicated that each of the groupings, geopolitical environment (Pi), other 
environmental-specific variables (P2) and organisational-specific variables (P3) as a 
global construct, had moderate to significant impact on their decision. As a possible 
explanation, it has been argued that this difference in outcome might be possible 
because of a confounding of effects where the respondents had difficulties in 
disentangling the separate and partial effects within each of the groupings. However, 
despite the apparent lack of depth of this finding, it might be illustrative of a general 
opinion by the respondents about each of these groupings. 
13.3.2 The Formation Process 
Evidence on the level of involvement by the Australian firms in the IJV formation 
process appears to be consistent with the respective propositions (P4.1, P4.2 and 134.3). 
Accordingly, the extensive involvement of the Australian firms in different stages of 
the LW negotiation process and their efforts in understanding the legal matters 
associated with such processes were well-established. When asked the general 
question on the extent of their overall involvement in the negotiation process, the 
responses from the firms tended to be equally supportive as they were to the questions 
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asked on each of the factors treated separately. The weight of the evidence, therefore, 
appeared to be consistent with the general proposition (proposition P4) as well. 
13.3.3 Implementation Stage 
Eight different propositions were taken into consideration to analyse the impact of 
various factors on the success or otherwise of the LTV. Of these, evidence on the 
impact of the choice of an appropriate partner (P5.1), inter-partner learning (P5.4) and 
building a separate LTV culture (P5.5) appeared to be consistent with the respective 
propositions. Evidence on the remaining five factors, a consistent DV control 
mechanism (P5.2), efficient management of human resources (P5.3), long-term 
commitment (P5.6) and the efficient management of environmental as well as 
organisational-specific difficulties (P5.7 and P5.8) was found to be partially consistent 
with the respective propositions. 
With respect to a number of issues, the nature of responses was found to be different 
at different stages. For example, Australian firms as well as their Indian counterparts 
offered stronger support for the importance of the appropriate partner selection during 
the implementation stage as compared with their previous efforts in choosing an 
appropriate partner during the IJV negotiation stage. Similar evidence was recorded 
with respect to the inter-partner learning. It was found that the Australian firms 
offered stronger support for the importance of this factor during the implementation 
stage compared with their responses for the motivation stage. 
The assembled evidence also suggests that the I.JV managers and their Australian 
parents and Indian hosts encountered fewer difficulties during the implementation 
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stage than were anticipated by them at the motivation stage. Nonetheless, all the 
respondents unanimously indicated that assistance from the local partners is important 
in overcoming any environmental as well as organisational-specific difficulties. This 
is consistent with the major thrust of the Australian firms' motivation to joint venture, 
i.e., to obtain assistance from the experienced local partners. It was also disclosed 
that assistance from the local partners had been used regularly to overcome these 
difficulties. However, relatively more emphasis was given to the local partners' 
contributions in overcoming environmental-specific difficulties than resolving the 
organisational-specific ones. Nevertheless, based on the evidence gathered, the 
general proposition (proposition Ps) appears to be partially supported. 
13.3.4 Relevance to the Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework as detailed in chapter VI (see Figure 6.1) appears to be 
generally consistent with the study. Conceptual framework represents the main focus 
of the study — the key factors and the postulated relationships among them (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). During the entire research process, the conceptual framework 
tended to guide the study towards the right direction. Although one major factor, 
geopolitics, was found to be of little importance with respect to motivating firms to 
joint venture (see chapter 13.3.1), it was worth exploring. Because of an apparent 
dearth of research on the impact of geopolitics on international business in general, 
the inclusion of this factor revealed some of its practical aspects that influence 
international business management. This will also help guide the future researchers in 
exploring geopolitics and its importance to international business. 
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13.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
At the beginning of this thesis, limitations in undertaking this case study research 
were acknowledged (see chapter 1.3). Later, while discussing the research design and 
methodology, these limitations were further discussed and elaborated upon (chapter 
7.5). At the same time, the possible ways of overcoming these limitations were 
addressed. Briefly, these limitations may be summarised as follows: 
(a) The scope of this study is limited to IJVs in a single emerging economy — India; 
(b) This study is also limited to a particular time frame. The business environment 
until the end of data collection in December, 1996 was pertinent to this study. 
Events in India and other areas affecting the Australian-Indian business 
relationships post December, 1996 had no impact on the decisions which were 
taken up until the conclusion of the data collection phase; 
(c) By its nature, this study is selective and does not purport to be comprehensive, 
i.e., not all of the issues relating to IJVs between Indian and Australian firms are 
considered; 
(d) Selection of the cases was constrained by a relatively small initial population of 
only 17 Australian-Indian IJVs. The sampling frame was limited and 
insufficient to conduct quantitative research based on a survey design; 
(e) Because of the considerable geographic distance of all the companies under 
study from the researcher's place of residence, only a limited amount of time 
could be spent in each of the firms; 
(0 It was difficult to make appointments with the Indian companies and the India-
based IJVs. The finalisation of appointments was resource costly. Long 
distance telephone calls and faxes were used for communication. This was 
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especially difficult because of the researcher's limited time and finance, 
particularly for the interviews in India; 
(g) Some of the measures employed are perceptual in nature which could lead to a 
concern about the subjectivity of responses; 
(h) The researcher also faced difficulties in gathering necessary contextual and 
interview information. Initially, one of the host companies in India and one 
parent company in Australia could not provide adequate information about the 
motivation and negotiation process because of the unavailability of key 
personnel who dealt with the motivation and negotiation processes. In addition, 
one Australian parent did not provide adequate information on the 
implementation process for the sake of confidentiality. However, follow-up 
facsimiles and phone calls made it possible to fill these gaps. Other difficulties 
faced during the process are not significant and are discussed in relevant 
sections of the analysis. 
As suggested by Yin (1989), most of the limitations including the lack of rigour and 
possible research bias can be overcome by careful case design and protocol. 
Accordingly, utmost care and effort was taken to overcome the limitations. Specific 
care was taken to integrate the cases through binding them with the research 
objectives and propositions. Moreover, the possible lack of generalisability in case 
study analysis and the problem of external validity were overcome, to some extent, 
through the use of multiple case studies. According to Miles & . Huberman (1994), a 
major rationale for cross-case analysis is to enhance generalisability. Moreover, in 
the current study, the use of diverse cases minimises the risk of a lack of 
representativeness. 
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Through the selection of cases from across different industries, industry variation has 
been accommodated. This research has investigated real-life situations. Multiple case 
studies assist in analysis of each of the other cases in order to strengthen the reliability 
and validity of the findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). Moreover, in addition to the face-to-
face in-depth interviews, direct observation and other secondary information 
including company documents and relevant extant literature were used to analyse the 
issues in order to overcome the limitations as much as possible. 
13.5 IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 
This thesis has various implications for both Australian and Indian policy makers. 
These implications may, however, focus on a broader policy prescription not limited 
to the UV-related matters exclusively. These are presented as follows. 
13.5.1 Implications for Australian Policy Makers 
Given the potential of the Indian market, Australian policy makers might give greater 
emphasis to encouraging local Australian businesses to invest in India. This study, 
however, suggests that Australian companies might operate there as UVs sharing their 
resources, capabilities and risks with Indian partners. Accordingly, well-articulated 
and comprehensive guidelines should be prepared by the Australian government 
which could be used by Australian companies interested in doing business in India. 
According to a report published by the Australian Senate Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (1990, p. xi), there has been a "... generally poor 
state of information policy in Australia where India is concerned". Although this 
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deficiency has been improving since then, it does require further attention by the 
Australian government. 
Among Australians, stereotypes abound about the Indian business environment 
portraying it as a more difficult market than other Asian countries, and India has 
become known as the land of problems and poverty (Gurry, 1993). These stereotypes 
have been responsible for building a negative image of India. India, as the world's 
ninth largest manufacturing economy with a huge middle class and a large pool of 
cheap labour could not attract Australian business attention until recently. Similarly, 
Indians, in general, have considered Australia reputable at playing cricket and 
producing television programmes and movies only (Australian Senate Standing 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1990). 
Indians have not considered Australia to be a country technologically and industrially 
as advanced as other Western countries (e.g., Germany, the UK and the USA) 
(Vicziany, 1993). These mutually negative images should be redressed and the 
Australian government has a role to play in these image building activities. However, 
an accurate representation should be presented rather than an exaggerated one. 
Although India is gradually liberalising its economy and the geopolitical situation is 
improving, there are still difficulties in doing business in India. Information should be 
packaged for prospective Australian investors with advice on how to manage this 
complex Indian business environment. 
It was revealed during this study that the then Australian public sector company, 
Telstra, was relatively slower to reach agreement with its Indian counterparts than 
392 
might be considered reasonable. Bureaucratic delay in decision making could be one 
of the reasons for this delay. Specific public policy, for example, could be aimed at 
monitoring such delays and to identify possible remedies. With respect to the 
rampant patent piracy in India, the Australian government should maintain close 
contact with the Indian government to assist in formulating appropriate remedies. The 
Australian government may persuade the Indian government to liberalise the Indian 
economy further through the opening of the Indian insurance industry which remains 
a public sector monopoly; to introduce a consistent exit policy for closures, lay-offs 
and redundancies; and to lower or eliminate tariff barriers. Institutional linkages 
between selected Australian government departments and their Indian counterparts 
could be established to assist each other in resolving such problems and to explore 
opportunities beneficial to both countries. 
As revealed in this study, one problem in the Australian-Indian business relationship 
is the lack of common membership in any of the active regional economic groupings. 
The Australian government should actively explore possibilities for common 
membership. Recent formation of the IOR-ARC (Indian Ocean Rim Association for 
Regional Cooperation) has ushered in a new hope for both of these nations to become 
members of a common regional forum. Australia should promote and support this 
forum as actively as possible. At the same time, Australia should support India's 
membership in APEC. Australia might also devote effort to become a member of the 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). 
As discussed in this thesis, the presence of NRIs (Non-resident Indians) is important 
to maintaining a healthy business relationship with India. Australia should be more 
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forward-looking to encourage Indian emigration to Australia. Finally, the Australian 
Trade Commission (Austrade) should be more active in guiding Australian companies 
interested in doing business in India by providing them with appropriate up-to-date 
market information and advice regarding the appropriate entry mode for their 
enterprises. 
13.5.2 Implications for Indian Policy Makers 
There are a number of issues which Indian policy makers should consider. First, the 
Indian corporate taxation rate is very high with a maximum marginal rate of 55% 
(Srinivasan, 1996). In addition, there is no taxation concession especially made 
available to attract foreign investors to India (Price Waterhouse, 1993; Srinivasan, 
1996). The absence of such a taxation concession was regarded by respondents to be 
a major factor inhibiting foreign investment in India. The Indian government may 
consider such taxation incentives to attract more foreign investment, including UVs. 
The World Bank (1997), in its recent report on India, has recommended extensive 
taxation reform for India. 
As mentioned in the thesis, it is difficult to obtain necessary market information for 
India. The Government, in this respect, has a role to ensure the free flow of 
information from the various government departments to be made available to the 
business community. The Indian government might establish an 'information bank' 
making it accessible through the interne. This will facilitate foreign investors' 
decision making, including the selection of mode of entry to the Indian market. 
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As revealed in this study, and well-reported generally, bureaucracy and. corruption are 
the two major impediments to doing business in India. According to the World Bank 
(1997), in order to establish 'an investor-friendly environment', India requires 'a 
business-friendly public administration'. Throughout the present study, it was found 
that similar to its Australian counterparts, Indian public sector companies (e.g., 
VSNL) were slow to make decisions which had resulted in a longer negotiation period 
to form the LIVs. In addition, the average approval time for foreign investments from 
the Indian government authority was substantial. In the light of these findings, the 
Indian government might be advised to take the necessary measures in order to ensure 
its bureaucracy is more people-oriented, business-friendly, corruption-free, less 
hierarchical and quicker to respond. 
Since India commenced its economic liberalisation, the foreign investment 
environment in India is gradually improving. However, as articulated in this thesis, 
numerous problems still remain which include relatively high levels of tariff and other 
import restrictions, public monopoly of the insurance industry and the lack of a 
consistent exit policy with respect to lay-offs, closures and redundancies. In line with 
falling trade and investment barriers worldwide, India might consider reducing the 
general levels of such barriers further. It should privatise the insurance industry and 
simplify the personnel exit policy. These reforms will assist the Indian economy to 
become more vibrant, investor-friendly and more competitive globally. 
This study also reports that despite the abundance of cheap labour, low labour 
productivity is a common complaint from foreign investors in India. The Indian 
government might redress this problem by allocating more of its budget for education 
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and vocational training to improve the average productivity of its labour market 
resources. I.Ws are, however, a major vehicle for transferring technology, skills sets 
and Western management culture. India might achieve benefits by simplifying the 
UV formation procedure and allowing special taxation and other incentives for M/s. 
Finally, the Indian government should continue its institutional reform process in 
order to position India as a more attractive environment for doing international 
business. Observations made by Bhagawati & Srinivasan (1993), in this respect, are 
noteworthy. They recommended a two-step-process to maintain the continuity and 
effectiveness of the reform direction. These are, actions to consolidate reforms 
already taken and to correct mistakes revealed through experience, and 
implementation of new reform measures which would complement as well as enhance 
the efficiency of measures already taken (Bhagawati & Srinivasan, 1993). 
13.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 
The findings of this research have various implications for managers dealing with 
cross-cultural business management, particularly in UVs. These implications may be 
relevant to each of the three major stages of an international business operation, viz., 
motivation, formation and implementation. 
For international business managers, generally, the findings on the motivation to 
select LIVs as an entry mode strategy might be considered. It was found in this study 
that various environmental and organisational-specific variables were influential in 
motivating Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms when investing in India. 
A checklist of factors was provided in the study which could be useful to managers of 
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foreign companies when taking an entry mode decision to service the Indian market. 
On the basis of the evidence gathered, it was also found that each of the factors was 
not considered equally important. Among the environmental factors, geopolitical 
variables, in general, appeared to have less influence than the remaining 
environmental variables in motivating the Australian firms to joint venture. 
The organisational-specific variables appeared to have relatively more influence than 
the environmental-specific variables in motivating the Australian firms. The 
assembled evidence also suggests that the management of the IVs, their Australian 
parents and their Indian hosts encountered fewer difficulties during the 
implementation stage than were anticipated at the motivation stage. These findings 
provide management with knowledge of which factors are to be dealt with, on a 
priority basis. Managers would also benefit from the findings on the importance of 
the assistance from the local partners in overcoming any environmental as well as 
organisational-specific difficulties. With this knowledge, managers may better 
understand the need for an efficient and experienced local partner for doing business 
in India. 
The case evidence suggests that the formation of IJVs with an Indian partner involves 
an extensive and complex negotiation process. It also emphasises the importance of 
extensive investment in the preparatory phase as well as the formal negotiation 
process to ensure that the terms of agreement are favourable. A clear understanding 
of the legal aspects of the negotiation process was also given considerable importance. 
Accordingly, international business managers might give these aspects utmost 
attention while engaged in a negotiation process with an Indian business counterpart. 
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13.7 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY DEVELOPMENT 
The findings from this study have raised several implications for theory development. 
This research has contributed to the UV literature by providing empirical evidence to 
confirm some of the theoretical expectations on a selection of issues involving UV 
motivation, UV formation and the implementation process. As demonstrated in Table 
13.1, this study provided significant support for a number of propositions (P3.2, P3.3, 
P4, P4.I, P42, P4.3, P5.1, P5.4 and P5.5) framed from expectations based on the extant 
literature. Limited support was gleaned for propositions Pi, PI.1, P2, P2.1, P2.3, P2.5, P2.6, 
P3, P3.1, P3.4, P3.5, P3.6, P5, P5.2, P5.3, P5.6, P5.7 and P5.8, whereas the remaining 
propositions, P1.2, P1.3, P2.2 and P2.4, received little or no support in the data assembled 
for this study. 
13.7.1 Motivation Stage 
There is an array of literature emphasising the factors motivating a firm to form an 
UV (e.g., Anderson, 1995; Awadzi, 1987; Benito & Welch, 1994; Chenett, 1994; 
Contractor, 1984; Harrigan, 1987, 1988; Hill, et al., 1990; Katz, 1995; Kim, 1993; 
Kogut & Singh, 1988; Porter & Fuller, 1986; Shane, 1994; Thompson & Strickland, 
1990). In a deductive process, propositions were framed on the basis of the likelihood 
of various outcomes as reported in the extant literature. These propositions were 
grouped into three different categories in chapter V in order to deal with the impact of 
geopolitical variables (Category 1), the impact of other environmental-specific 
variables (Category 2), and the impact of the organisational-specific variables 
(Category 3). Subsequently, these propositions were examined through use of 
evidence from the empirical case studies. 
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With respect to the Australian firms' motivation to joint venture with Indian partners, 
two general conclusions were drawn from these findings, which are not covered by 
the extant UV literature. These are, 
(a) Geopolitical variables have less influence than other environmental variables in 
motivating firms to joint venture; and 
(b) The environmental-specific variables, in general (including geopolitical variables), 
have less impact than the organisational-specific variables on a firm's motivation 
to joint venture. 
In an international business context, these findings are likely to add new dimensions 
to the theory of the firm's motivation to joint venture. Because of the limited scope of 
the present research endeavour, it was not possible to examine the importance of these 
findings in a greater depth. However, the future researcher may find these issues 
interesting and may devote themselves in identifying the implications of these 
findings for international business management. 
13.7.2 Formation Stage 
Once a firm is finally motivated to form an UV, the I.IV formation process begins. 
There is a host of literature on various aspects critical to this process (e.g., Contractor, 
1984; Copeland & Griggs, 1986; Geissbaur & Siemsen, 1996; Prichard & Fox, 1996; 
Richards & Walsh, 1990; Shaughnessy, 1995; Urban, 1996; Usunier & Ghauri, 1996). 
In a deductive process, propositions were framed on the basis of the likelihood of 
various outcomes from the extant literature. These propositions were assembled into 
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one single category in chapter V (Category 4). Subsequently, these propositions were 
examined through the empirical case study data. 
Similar to the examination of the factors motivating foreign firms to joint venture, 
these data, with the assistance of the extant literature, were then used to reach 
conclusions. Most of the data were found to be confirmatory of the proposition set 
and, therefore, have strengthened the existing theoretical foundation of the UV 
formation process. However, during the research, it was found that the foreign 
partners tend to render more extensive efforts during the entire UV formation process 
than do their local counterparts in accessing an emerging economy such as India. 
13.7.3 Implementation Stage 
As mentioned earlier in this thesis (chapter V), there are various factors which 
contribute to the successful implementation of UVs. UVs may face difficulties from 
environmental as well as organisational-specific intricacies. Assistance from the local 
UV partner may be critical to resolving difficulties which may jeopardise success. 
There is a host of literature focusing upon these issues (e.g., As-Saber, et al., 1998; 
Beamish et al., 1994; Dowling, 1986; Geringer & Hebert, 1989; Hamel, 1991; 
Harrigan, 1986; Howarth et al., 1995; Killing, 1983; Kogut, 1988; Schaan, 1983; 
Tichy, 1988; Yan & Gray, 1995). Propositions were framed on the basis of the 
likelihood of various outcomes as reported in the extant literature. These propositions 
were assembled into one single category in chapter V as Category 5. Subsequently, 
these propositions were examined through the empirical case studies in order to reach 
conclusions. The research findings relevant to the motivation as well as formation 
stages were also used during this investigation. This inductive process generated a 
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number of interesting conclusions not generally covered by the extant UV literature. 
These are: 
(a) In this emerging economy (India), the UVs studied tended to encounter fewer 
difficulties during the implementation stage than were anticipated at the 
motivation stage; 
(b) The importance of a factor such as the need for an appropriate local partner is felt 
more so during the implementation stage as compared with its perceived 
importance during the motivation and formation stage. 
(c) The need for inter-partner learning is given more importance during the 
implementation stage as compared with its perceived importance during the 
motivation stage; 
(d) For a foreign partner in an UV, it is easier to manage organisational-specific 
variables than it is to manage the environmental-specific ones. Therefore, in an 
emerging market such as India, the foreign partner needs more assistance from its 
local partners to overcome environmental-specific difficulties than to overcome 
organisational-specific difficulties. 
Overall, this study has contributed to the UV literature by offering a number of new 
ideas. At the same time, it has strengthened a host of existing principles by 
confirming them during the research process. The findings of this study also provide 
further empirical evidence to verify similar findings as advanced by other UV studies 
(e.g., Ali, 1995; Awadzi, 1987; Berlew, 1984; Brouthers & Bamossy, 1997; Dowling, 
et al., 1989; Dussauge & Garrette, 1995; Geissbauer & Siemsen, 1996; Hyder, 1988; 
Katz, 1995; Kim, 1993; Kogut & Singh, 1986; Lawrence & Vlachoutsicos, 1993; 
Nam, 1995; Shan, 1991; Tomlinson, 1970; Yan, et al., 1995). 
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Previously, most UV studies have individually dealt with a particular aspect of the 
UV (e.g., partner selection, implementation, inter-partner learning). This study, 
however, has incorporated major aspects of all three stages (motivation to joint 
venture, UV formation and its implementation) which allowed the researcher to 
compare variables across the stages and to make some judgements on the 
relationships among them. This process, therefore, has tended to build an integrated 
approach to investigating major UV issues across these three different stages. 
Nonetheless, further refinement of these implications will be necessary. 
13.8 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
The empirical evidence derived from this study postulates the need for an expanded 
future research agenda in order to consolidate the findings and to further advance 
theories reported in the UV literature. There are a number of areas which may need 
particular attention in future research. Primarily, future research could be directed at 
addressing the limitations of this research. Other UV issues, not covered in this 
thesis, could also be taken into consideration. 
First, this research was limited to the investigation of I.Ws situated in a single 
emerging economy, India. Future research may attempt to validate these findings in 
the contexts of other emerging economies. Such comparative analyses will give these 
findings a new dimension and approach with respect to substantiating existing 
theories and building new theories. This may also enhance the generalisability, 
reliability and validity of the findings derived from this study. 
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Second, this study is not limited to a single industry. Cases were selected from across 
different industries. Future research may choose to investigate UVs within a 
particular industry to examine the variables from a relatively homogenous industrial 
background. Third, the findings of this study are perceptual in nature. Possible 
subjectivity of responses is a major limitation of this case study research. Future 
research may choose to examine the research question of this study through 
quantitative as well as qualitative analytical methods. This would contribute to a 
consistent data triangulation process by comparing and contrasting the findings 
gathered through each of these techniques. 
Fourth, this study dealt with a selection of issues relevant to Australian-Indian UVs 
and did not purport to be comprehensive, even over this domain. Based on the 
findings of this research, future research may conduct more detailed investigations of 
each of these issues which will enhance the validity of this study. For example, a 
study could focus on the UV negotiation process involving two or more firms from 
other than Australian or Indian origins. Fifth, with the rapidly changing global 
environment, the nature of the UV relationship is likely to change over time. Future 
research may be aimed at assessing the impact of environmental changes on the UV 
relationship. Thus, a longitudinal study to examine UV motivation, formation and 
implementation is suggested, although this would be resource costly. 
Sixth, this study identified that the responses to questions asked on individual 
motivational factors are somewhat different than the responses on a global question 
(taken as a group of factors jointly). It may be argued that the respondents might have 
found it difficult to disentangle the separate and partial effects of each factor from a 
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set of factors while considering a group of variables together. Therefore, as suggested 
in chapters VIII and IX, future research should consider each of the environmental 
variables (including each of the geopolitical dimensions) separately to assess their 
impact upon the motivation to joint venture. 
Finally, it is the view of the writer that, thus far, geopolitics, as a separate set of 
dimensions (time, place and demography), has never before been considered in 
international business investigations of Infs. This research could act as a guide for 
future researchers in examining these constructs in more depth and detail, as they 
relate to the study of UVs. As suggested earlier in this chapter, a longitudinal study 
would be helpful to further reveal the extent of influence of the geopolitical factors on 
international business operations over time. This thesis, at least, has tried to extend the 
domain of international business studies through incorporating geopolitics as an 
international business component and has created a scope for further research on this 
area. 
13.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The major objective of this research was to broaden understanding of the determinants 
of the motivation to joint venture, ITV formation and the UV implementation 
processes. In particular, the scarcity of research involving Australian-Indian UVs 
prompted the need for this study. Using multiple case research, this research 
examined the factors responsible for the motivation of Australian firms to joint 
venture with a local Indian partner while investing in India, the complexity of the UV 
formation process and the success factors as evidenced in the implementation phase of 
Australian-Indian UVs. It also investigated the problems faced by these INs and the 
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role of the local partners in overcoming them. This thesis has endeavoured to address 
the dearth of research on these selected aspects of Australian-Indian IJVs. 
During the research process, the researcher was aware of the presence of several 
limitations. Most of the limitations, however, appeared to be overcome by careful 
case design i and protocol. In addition to the face-to-face in-depth interviews, direct 
observation and other secondary information including company documents and 
relevant extant literature were also used to analyse the issues in order to overcome the 
limitations as much as possible. 
The results reported indicate that UNTs are an important means for Australian firms to 
do business in India. It has been established that the motivation to select IJVs as an 
international business mode is influenced by a host of environmental and 
organisational-specific variables. However, the extent of this influence varies from 
variable to variable. The research also shows that the UV formation process between 
an Australian firm and an Indian host is a complex and time-consuming one. The 
research further ascertained that Australian-Indian IJVs face fewer difficulties during 
the implementation stage than was anticipated earlier at the motivation stage. 
Nonetheless, the research confirmed the need for assistance from local Indian partners 
in overcoming any environmental or organisational-specific difficulties that were 
country-specific. 
The final chapter of this thesis has provided a brief overview of the thesis, a summary 
of the research findings and a discussion of the limitations of the study. In addition, it 
has offered a range of implications relevant to policy analysis and development, 
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management practice and theory development. Based on the findings, this study also 
has suggested some possibilities for future research involving various aspects of 
international joint ventures. Thus, the writer would argue that this study has enriched 
the literature on international joint ventures. 
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Appendix I 
PRESCRIBED FORMAT TO APPLY FOR FOREIGN 
COLLABORATIONS (INCLUDING IJVs) 
FORM F. C. 
APPLICATION FORM FOR FOREIGN COLLABORATION 
(To be submitted to the Secretariat for Industrial Approvals (SIA) Department of Industrial Development. Udyog Bhavan. 
New Delhi-110011 with 15 spare copies! 
(Applicants may go through Part E I & E 2 of the Application before filling up the Form. The application shall be legible 
and complete in all respects to avoid correspondence/delays and rejection) 
1. (a) Nanie of Indian Company which will implement the 00000000000000000000 
project 
(b) Registered office address of the Indian Company 
(i) Postal Address 
00000000000000000000 
0000000=0000000000 
000000000=00000000 
(ii) District 00000000000000000000 
(iii) State 000,00000000000=000 
• (iv) Pin Code 0000000 
• If the company is proposed to be formed then kindly fill up the name(s) and address(es) of the promoter(s) against I (a) & (b) 
above: 
2. Whether the proposed company will be: . 
(a) Private/Public Limited Company 
(Please indicate '1' for Pvt. Ltd. and '2' for Public 
Limited, '3' for others). . 
(b) Central/State or Joint Public Sector Unit 
(Please indicate l' for Central '2' for State and '3' for 
• Joint Sector). 
(c) Is the proposal from a non-resident Indian 
(if so. indicate "Y" else "N") 
3 - (a) Whether the applicant or the implementing company 
is registered under the M.R.T.P. Act. 1969? ( if so, 
indicate "Y" else "N") 
(b) lithe answer to 3(a) is yes, then please indicate "Y" if 
the clearana required for implementing the proposed 
scheine tinder the M.R.T.P. Act has been obtained else 
indicate "N" 
0 
0 
0 
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Preference 
0000000000 
•cioccaciocco 
cn00000mo 
• Amount (Rs.) Percentage 
0000000000 0000 
0000000000 0000 
0000000000 0000 
0000000000 0000 
4. Names of the Directors of the Board: 
(i) Foreign. Nationals 
(ii) Indian Nationals 
5. Existing Capital structure of the company (in Rupees) 
Equity 
(a) . .Authorised 	0000000000 
(b) Subscribed 0000000000 
(c) Paid-up 	0000000000 
6. Foreiga holding component of existing capital structure 
(a) Direct participation 
(b) Indicate beneficial participation i.e. in the list of share-
holders are there any components/companies which 
•themselves have non-resident shareholding (particu-
lars of major shareholdings of5% and above of capital 
• alone may be taken for this purpose). 
(c) Nonresident Indian. 
(i) Company/Individual(s) 
(ii) If NRI Co. Please indicate NRI equity in that 
company 
(d) Total (please exclude c (ii)) 
7. Indian holding in existing capital structure. 
8. (a) Existing quantum of borrowings 
(b) Existing debt equity ratio in the company 
Amount (Rs.) 
0000000000 
Amount (Rs.) 
0000000000 
Percentage 
0000 
Percentage 
0000 
0000 
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Amount (Rs.) 
0000000000 
•0000000000 
0000C100000 
Amount (Rs.) 
0000000000 
Amount (Rs.) 
00001200000 
C1C100000i1 
0000000C.CiL 
Percentage 
000.0 
0000 
0000 
•Percentage 
0000 
Percentage 
0000 
0000 
71000 
9. proposed capital structure of the company (Excluding existing capital) 
Equity (Rs.) 
0000000000 
C1000000000 
00C10000CIOCI 
Preference 
0000000000 
0C100000000 
0000000000 
(a) Authorised 
(b) Subscribed 
(c) Paid-up 
10. Foreign holding in proposed Equity 
(a) Direct participation 
(b) Indirect beneficial non-resident participation 
(c) Total 
11. (A) Indian holding in proposed equity. 
(B) Non-resident Indian(s) holding in'proposed equity 
(a) Repatriable 
(b) Non-repatriable 
(c) Total 
12. Does the proposal contain any provisions which attract 
M.R.T.P. Act. (If so "Y" else "N-) 
13. Does the proposal contain any provisions which attract the 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 
If so, please indicate "Y" else . "N" 
Note: If you have indicated "Y" in column 12 or 13 or 
both then please attach a spare sheet indicating the 
steps the company has taken or proposes to take in 
this connection as Annexure 1. 
14. (a) Existing business of the company 
(Please indicate the relevant N I C Code). 
If the business covers more than one type of activity 
then the relevant codes may please be entered in 
additior41 boxes provided below the first set. 
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14. (b) ITEM OF MANUFACTURE 
(No. and Date of I.D.R. Act Licence, D.G.T.D. Regis- 
tration, S.S.I. Registration etc. whichever applicable.) 
Name of Item 
(1) 
MC Code of Item 
(2) 
Name of Authority 
M 
No. of Sanction 
(4) 
• 
00E000 0E0 
O 
DDUD00000u 00 00 
0E0 OPEC 
rncorn.orn  
0000000000 
0000000.00  
00000 	. 01110•0 0 gm 
..cJ.orn000 • Os 
• sa 0 	. 0000050005 
000500 D0•0000000 
00100 0 0•0111 m 0 • • 0 
Name of Item 
(1) 
Date of Sanction 
(5) 
No. of Foreign Collaboration 
Agreement (6) 
Date of Foreign 
Collaboration(7) 
000000 
000000 
• 000E1000E0 
DD.EIJurn.EJ 
DEJDUDEJU m m 
000 
• 0 si• 
0000 
DO DD.. 0 ON • D •DSEJUEJDEJ  
50050.0000 00000D0000 0 Omm 
•• •• .o.000cjoo. p • 
(20••• • • s• •(:)• ClOss• C] III II 
• Name of Item 
( 1) 
Name of Foreign Collaborator 
(8) 
Counrry. of Foreign Collaboration 
(9) 
Type of Col 
laboration 
(10) 
• 
oo 000 • DODD 
UEJu00000000UDD
0..00000.0•••• 
0 00•••0•••••0000..0.0•••00. 
um. o on DODD 
.ocj.000cJoo DODD 
000000uDu000sD  
cm. • mom 
D
o
o
D
o
b
 
..0.•00 00..0 
oim000moopoo on 
oi. Dom coo 
Note 	1: Please furnish complete technical specifications and relevant catalogues of the products proposed to be 
manufactured and the end use of the product as Annexure to this Application Form. 
2: Please furnish brief description of the technology and other relevant techno-economic studies as Annexure to this 
Application Form. 
3: Where the letter of intent/industrial licence has been obtained under the Industries (Development and Regulation) 
Act. 1951 for the items of manufacture for which the Foreign Collaboration application has been made, please 
furnish a photocopy of the same. 
4: In case where the application for industrial licence under the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act. 1951 
has been made, please indicate in the boxes under Column 3,4 and 5 of the table above the legend "APPLIED 
For" an also indicate the reference number and date. 
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15. .Estimated value of annual production with proposed foreign collaboration. 
Item of Manufacture 
MC Code • 
  
000000 
Year 
• 
(0 
Unit** 
M 
Quantity 
M 
Ex-factory value net 
of excise duties (Rs.) 
.(4) 
Ex-factory value after de- 
ducting landed cost of.im- 
ported components (Rs.) 
(5) 
1st year DO 0
0
0
0
0
 
OE 0 1E000E000E MO 	0 i•00000000 
2nd year 00 00E 0 0E0E 00E0E•• E0 0 0 0 II. OE 
3rd year CO 000E000000 0000000000 DDDDDDDDD 
4th year 00 0000000000 0000000 00 0000000000 
5th year 00 DDDDUD0DD 0000.00000 . 000E15E00E0 
** The units may kindly be indicated as follows:1- Numbers per annum;2- Tonnes per annum;3- Metres per annum 
16. Location of the Factory. 
(a) Tehsil 00000000000000000000 
(b) District 00000000000000000000 
(c) State 0000000000 0000000000 
(d) If the location is in a backward district/area qualifying 
for Central Scheme of Investment Subsidy, indicate 
whether the District is category "A","B" or "C". Else 
indicate 'N'. 
(e) If the location is in a 'no-industry district', please 
indicate "Y" else indicate "N". 
17. Proposed capital cost of the Project (Rs.) 
(a) Cost of capital equipment 
(i) Imported (landed cost) 
(ii) Indigenous 
. 0000000000 
0000000000 
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(b) Cost of other items of capital nature: 
(i) Land 	 0000000000 
(ii) Building 	 0000000000 
(c) Working Capital 
(d) Additional staff and labour propOsed to be employed: 
(i) Managerial 
(ii) Supervisory 	- 
Technical . 
Head Office 
0000 
0000 
-0000 
Factory 
00C10 
.0000 	• 
C1000 
Non-technical DODD 0000- 
(iii)Clerical 0000 0000 
. 	- 
(iv) Labour f3C100 0000 
Skilled •0000 0000 
0000 0C100 
Unskilled 0000 0000 
(v) Others O. 000 0000 
Total 
000000 . 
000000 
006000 
. hoacm 
000000 
000000 . 
000000 
000000 
00C1C300 - 
000000 
Note: If imported equipment is required, has the Capital 
goods application been submitted. Furnish Refer-
ence No. and date of application/approvaL 
18. Estimated annual requirement of raw materials and components after going into full production. 
S.No. Name of raw 
material/corn- 
ponents 
NIC Code If indigenous 
please indicate 
'1' if imported 
indicate '2' 
Unit • Quantity 
• • 
• 
Value (cif value 
if imported) 
. 
.1 :7 
• 110 0 0 
0
0
0
1
  
00 0E00000 0 	mOmOlm 
0 .0000 0 •00C1 00000 • • •00 
•000•0 El DDDDaDDDDDDuuDuDDD D. m 
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t 	._.. 	• 
g.g...; . 0 0 0 0 	O . :0 00 	 • 0 O. 0 0 0;'D U. s • .0 	0 	0:0 	 0 	. 0 0 0 0 0.0 0 
v . •t - 
8A 
Es •-,R, 0 .., . g 
> 
s 	0 	11-- • • 	. 
• 000 	ODD. 	• . • 0 0 N. DODD. 
	
0000 	'DOD  • 0 U000 - 	•• 	. 	0 	. 	. 	0 	. • • 	• 0 . • 0 • • 	0 • .0 0 • 0 • 0 DODD 
 	0 El • • 	000u 
.  E
x-
fa
c t
or
y  
va
lu
e  
(R
s.
) 
(6
).
 • 
• 0 • • 	0 • 0 0 	• 0 0.• • 0 0 	0 • A 1 	N 	0 	0 	is • • • • 0 0 	0 0 	0 • 	• 0 0 • 	0 	• 	•• 1 0 	• 'DUO • .0 	• 	I. 	• 	••O• • 0 • 0 •  	0 	N 0 	UDDD 
An
nu
a l
 p
ro
d.  
 
Qu
a n
t it
y  
(5
)
 '• IOD.u.• 0 	• 11 	0 	II 	IDDu . 	. • 0 0 • DODD • ODD 	1 —...., •:_t. 
 
000 . 0 • 	. 
(E)  
°P°3  D
IN 
0 0 0 0 	.0 0 0 	N 0 • 	0 0 	0 •O• 	• • 0 • • 	OD D. 
• 8 
Ite
m
  o
f m
an
- 
uf
ac
tu
re
  (d
e-
 
sc
Op
t io
n)
  (2
)  
•
• 
(I)  
JE2A 
. m 0 0 00 . 	0 	0 g. 	0 	• 	• . • 	›. 	• 	0 	0 	• 	›. 	. 	. 
5 	8. 	C.3, 	ig li E 	A 	s 	La . 	2, 	A i 	' 
21. Nature and quantum of lumpsum payment 
. 
Rupee/Foreign Exchange 
(whichever is applicable) 
. 
Name of foreign currency in which 
payment is proposed to be made 
No. of Instal- 
ments in which • 
payment will 
be made 
(a) Technical know-how fees.  DEDEDDDDDDD DO 0 0E10 	• 
(b)Payment for design, engineer- 
ing, consultancy, etc. DDD0000000 000000000000DD DUD  
(c) Payments, if any, for the use of . 
any patents, brand names, trade 
'marks and the like. 0 	IN 0 DOD 0 	0 • • • si . . 
(d) Any other payment of lump- 
sum nature 	. 	 . • DDODDUOUU U[:JDD..UDD.D.DD EJDU 
22: (a) Whether a recurring annual royalty is propased, if so, 
the perzeniage of royalty (gross of taxes) computed as 
a proportion of the ex-factory value of annual produc-
tion (net of excise duties) after deducting the landed 
cost of imported components and the standard bought 
out components, if any. 
(b) Kindly indicate the total estimated gross amount of 
royalty (i.e. before taxation) payable to the foreign 
collaborator during the duration of the collaboration. 
(Rs.) 
•(c) Are separate rates of royalty envisaged on internal 
sales and exports? If so, furnish the figures/percentage 
000 
0000000000 
(i) Internal sales 	 0000000000 000 
(ii) Exports 	 0000000000 000 
23. Proposed duration of the agreement (years) 	 • DO 
24. Period for which royalty payment will be made (years) 	 DO 
25. If this application is for the extension of existing collabo-
ration agreement please indicate the period for which the 
collaboration has already run and attach a copy of the 
previous apprO/als and agreements. 	 DO 
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Also, please indicate whether you have set up any R & D 
Cell to absorb the know-how and the progress achieved in 
this regard. Please also indicate particulars of the status of 
absorption, adaptation, assimilation and improvement of 
the technology already imported. Adequate justification 
for aquisition of new technology. Whether it is for cost 
reduction, quality improvement, material conservation, 
increase in productivity, design, addition of new items etc. 
• may be furnished. 	• 
26. Total payments made (gross of taxes) (Rs.) 
(a) Lumpsum 
• (b) Royalty 
(c) Other payments, if any 
Are the. items proposed to be manufactured patented in 
India; if so, the date of commencement and expiry of the 
patents 
27. If the Indian company proposes to use any foreign brand 
. 	name for.internal sale and/or exports please indicate "Y" 
else "N" 
clocoompoo 
0000000000 
0000000000 
000000 000000 
28. Please specify the names of the countries, if any, to which exports are excluded. 
Name of country to which exports excluded If export excluded under Govt. regulations 
.indicate "1" -else indicate "2" 
• • 
000 INEE0 BOEs- 000 • 
000 0 0•000•01100mo 
00000.000.ocj0000000. - 
000 00 00 0.00 000 
. 
0 Om 0 0000 0 
• 
•o...o.ouot:000000mo m 
• 
29. Please indicate if the letter of intent/industrial licence/registration with DGTD/SSI/or capital goods clearance granted for 
' 	this item contains any stipalation in regard to exports. 
Item Name 
I 
NIC * Code 
2 
Unit 
3 
Quantity 
4 
-; 
 
Value (Rs.) 
5 
%age of prod. 
6
000000 
0000•0 
•IIREER 
a00000 
• 0 MI E 
IO
D
U
JO
  Li  I 
rim 
00DDDDD• 
00DDDDD00 
00.0000000 
0 00 
BEI 
• 
ElmEl 
• 
11. 
000110 
D0•0000000  
00.0000000  
0000 
REFIRE 
0E00 I n
oc
an
n 
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30. Export commitments/obligation which the applicant is prepared to undertake. 
NIC Code of item 
Description of item 
Years 
1 
Units 
2 
Quantity 
. 
. 	3 
Percentage of 
• Production 
4 
. Value(FOB) (Rs.) 
5 
1st year 
0
  0
 0
 0
.  
0000DDD.DD 0 0 N C) 0 • 0 OCJ 0 • 
2nd year DU M0000 OIMMO 0001M oomommmoom 
3rd year • 0 0000000 1110 • MO 0000M 000 
4th year . 00 . 0000000000 DODD • 0 00 DODD 
5th year 000000.000 OM DND• . •momo op. 
Total 00 0 DODD • 011••00000 1111 00 	00 0 	• • 
_ 	. 
31. Effect on balance of payments during the period of collaboration agreement: 
A. Foreign Exchange Earning= (Rs.) 
.(i) Foreign exchange earnings based on f.o.b. value of 
• export obligation 	• 	• 
(ii) Foreign exchange savings anticipated as a result of 
import substitution vis-a-vis the products 
. Total 
B. Approximate value/quantity of existing imports. 
C. Foreign Exchange outgo on: (Rs.) 
(a) Import of machinery and equipment (cif) 
(b) Import of raw materials & components (cif) 
(c) Dividends and pouts (net of taxes, i.e. gross amount 
indicated in Cot. 20(c) above minus Indian taxes 
payable) 
(d) Lumpsum payments (net of taxes, i.e. gross amount 
indicated in Col. 21 above minus Indian taxes 
payable) 
00E100000E10 
0000000000 
.0000000000 
0000000000 
0000000000 • 
0000000000 
0000000000 
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(e) Royalty payments (net of taxes based on Col. 22 
above) taking into account the value of production 
in Col. 15 above 
(f) Number of foreign technicians: 
(i) Proposed to be employed in man-months 
(ii) Payment to foreign technicians (net of taxes) 
(Rs.) 
(g) Other payments, if any (Rs.) 
Total C: (Except for (f) (i)) (Rs.) 
32. Net foreign exchange inflow (A-C) 
33. Whether the foreign collaborator has other collaborations - 
with any other party in India for the same or similar 
products: 'Y' or 'N'. If so, give details as annexure. • 
0000000000 
00=00000 
°mono:too 
oommomo 
mocioap000 
000mmocio 
34. Give an accourft of the attempts made to explore alter- • 
native sources foe. acquisition of technology inclliding 
indigenous sources and the techno-economic considera-
tions for preferring the particular collaboration which has 
been applied for. 
35. In the choice of technology, have you given appropriate 
• weightage to the least pollutant alternative, consistent with 
• costs? If so, details thereof. 
36. Please confirm that the foreign collaborator is agreeable 
that the technical know-how/product design/engineering 
design can also be made available to other Indian parties. 
should it become necessary, on terms and conditions as 
may be agreed to by all the parties concerned, including 
foreign collaborator subject to the approval of the Govern-
ment. 
37. What steps does the applicant propose to take for research 
and development in respect of the technology involved, 
engineering, design, training of Indian technical personnel, 
and other measures for the absorption, adaptation and 
development of they imported technology. Give specific 
details. 
Date: 	 Signature of the Applicant • 
Place: 	 Designation 
PART - B 
(To be ruled by Approval Authority) 
1. Terms of foreign collaboration 
(Information to be furnished in cases where foreign col-
laborator proposes to invest in equity capital of the Indian 
Company). 
(a) Amount of foreign equity (in rupee equivalent) 
	
000000000E1 • 
(b) What percentage it would constitute of the total paid-
up capital of the Indian company? 
	 MOO 
2. Nature and quantum of lumpsum payments: 
. 
Rupees/Foreign Exchange 
(whichever applicable) 
. 
Name of foreign currency in which 
paymemt is proposed to be made 
No. of instal-
ments in which 
the payment 
will be made 
(a) Technical.know-how fees 
(b) Payments for design, engi-
neering consultancy, etc. 
(c) Payments if any, for the use 
. of any patents, brand names, 
-trade marks and the like 
(d) Any other payment of lump- 
sum nature 
DD 
• 
• DDDD CXJDEJ DDDDrnrnDDE]EJ. 
El 	• I: 	• • • EN: • • 
EDDDDDDDD 
• 
• 
DDDQDED DGDDD 
• 
, 
DDDDDDDQD 
m • 
uc:J.EJ000QDD • • 
3. (a) Whether a recurring annual royalty is proposed, if so, 
the %age of royalty (gross of taxes) computed as a 
proportion of the ex-factory value of annual produc-
tion (net of excise duties) after deducting the landed 
•cost of imported components and the standard bought 
Out components, if any. 
(b) Are separate rates of royalty envisaged on internal 
sales and exports. If so, furnish the figures/percentage. 
ECM 
(i) Internal Sales 
(ii) Exports 
4. Proposed duratia of the agreement (Years) 
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5. Period for which royalty payments will be made (Years) 
	
00 
6. Please specify the names of the countries, if any, to which exports are excluded. 
Name of country to which exports excluded . 	If export excluded under Government regulation 
indicate "1" else indicate "2" 	. 
' 
0 ONEN011100111111•00011111[21M011 
0•01110MM10111••11101M,2111••0 II 
7. Export commitment/obligation which the applicant is prepared to undertake. 
. Description of item 
Years 
1 
Units 
2 
Quantity 
3 
%age of Production 
4 
Value(FOB) (Rs.) 
5 
Lst .year 
0
  0
 0
  0
  0
 
0000.00000 III • IN 	• 000 00 • 
2nd year • • N••0000• • DDUDO.UNU 
3rd year 0000: ON OUUU00000U • ONC3m•Elms(2 
4th year •00. 0000.00000 0000 N000U00000  
5th year DUOD NO ••=1 ECONI 	•  • ODNuUD000  
Total 0 00 	MI • II • DDUONDDUD  
Source: SBP Board of Consultants and Engineers (1995), SBP 's Handbook of Foreign 
Collaborations and 1000 Technologies from Abroad, Delhi: SBP Consultants & 
Engineers Pvt. Ltd., pp. 77-94. 
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Appendix II 
QUESTIONNAIRES USED TO COLLECT RESEARCH DATA 
I CONFIDENTIAL'  
International Joint Ventures as an International Business Mode: A Study of 
Australian-Indian Joint Ventures in India 
PARENT COMPANY QUESTIONNAIRE 
INTERVIEW 0 FIRM 
RESPONDENT 
PART-A 
COMPANY BACKGROUND 
1. Location of Headquarters: 
2. Main Product Line(s)/ Services: 
3. Number and names of countries in which you operate: 
4. How long has your company been involved in its Indian operation? 
5. What was the initial entry mode to the Indian market? 
El Exporting 
0 Licensing 
E1 Wholly owned subsidiary 
0 International joint venture 
Other (please specify) 
6. How old is the LTV? 
( please provide a photocopy of the organisation chart of your company, if possible) 
COMMENTS (if any): 
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WHY INDIA 
What are the factors that influenced you to invest in the Indian market? 
E:1 a) large market 
O b) widespread use of English 
El c)Common heritage of legal system and institutional setting 
0 d) Low labour cost 
O e) Availability of finance 
El 0 Existence of Indian business contacts 
O g) Proximity to Australia (Located within the same Asia-Pacific region) 
O h) Both Australia and India are Commonwealth members 
Di i) Ongoing economic liberalisation (post-cold war) 
1:1 j) Special incentives for foreign investors 
Ei k) Promotional activities on India (Recent emphasis by the Australian 
government and business) 
El 1) Niche market for company product(s) 
O m) Use of NRI 
O n) Recent trend towards westernisation of Indian culture 
n o) India has considerable economic links with other trading nations that 
provide a conduit for an expanded trade to third parties. 
O p) Accessing technology 
D q) Other (please specify) 
I 	I MOST IMPORTANT 
 
I 	I NEXT MOST IMPORTANT 
 
COMMENTS (if any) 
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PART-B 
GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS AS MOTIVATORS TO CHOOSE IJV MODE 
Pt Did geopolitical variables (viz., the time dimension, such as historical events; 
place dimension, such as geographic distance and size; and the demographic 
dimension, such as population size and ethnicity) impact on your firm's decision to 
form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes r] 	Some impact 	No impact at all Li 
Pi.ia Did the colonial legacies that are still reflected in the anti-west attitude impact 
on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yesEl Some impact El No impact at all El 
P1.1b Did the cold-war legacies such as India's pro-socialist stand and protectionist 
role played by India to regulate foreign investment during the cold war period impact 
on your firm's decision to form an I.Ws in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely ye0 Some impactsLj No impact at al 
Pi.ic Did the collapse of the Soviet Union impact on your firm's decision to form an 
UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact El 	No impact at all n 
P1.1d Did India's geopolitical realignment through improved relationships with the 
US and its allies (e.g., Australia) impact on your firm's decision to form an UV in 
India with an Indian partners? 
Definitely yesE 	Some impact n 	No impact at all 
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P1.2a Did geographic distance between Australia and India impact on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partners? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact 11 	No impact at all 
P1.2b Has the absence of common membership of Australia and India in any of the 
active regional forum impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with 
an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact Ei 	No impact at all 
Pi.aa Has the very large poor segment in the Indian population impacted on your 
firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact fl 	No impact at all Ell 
P1.3b Has the relative absence of non-resident Indians (NRIs) in Australia impacted 
on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes ill 	Some impact Li 	No impact at all El 
P1.3c Has the Neo -Swadeshi ( indigenisation) movement in India impacted on your 
firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact El 	No impact at all LII 
P1.3d Have the religious rivalry and fundamentalism in India impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact LI 	No impact at all El 
COMMENTS (if any): _ 
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PART-C 
OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS MOTIVATING THE FORMATION OF 
IJVs 
P2 Have other host-country environmental elements (apart from geopolitical factors), 
such as its . economic environment, cultural setting, legal structure, politics, firm's 
access to market information and human resource management practices impacted on 
your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact 0 	No impact at all El 
P2.1a Has the level of inflation in India impacted on your firm's decision to form an 
UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yesill 	Some impact n 	No impact at all 0 
P2.1b Has the exchange rate fluctuation in India impacted on your firm's decision to 
form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact El 	No impact at all 0 
P2.1c Did the possibility to minimise the environmental-specific transactions costs 
(e.g., tax, tariffs and other import duties imposed by the Indian government) impact on 
your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact 11 	No impact at all n 
P2.1d Has the highly competitive state of Indian market impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes[ 	Some impact n 	No impact at all [-I 
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P2.1d Has the uncertain demand condition mainly due to a large poor segment of 
Indian population impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an 
Indian partner? 
Definitely yesn 	Some impact 111 	No impact at all 
P2.1e Has your requirement for rapid market access in India impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact El 	No impact at all 
p2.2. Has the minimisation of political risks in India associated with the uncertainty 
due to the change of governments impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in 
India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes0 	Some impact 	No impact at all 111 
P2.2b Has the minimisation of political risks in India associated with ongoing 
separatist movements and their destructive impacted on your firm's decision to form 
an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes0 	Some impact 111 	No impact at all 1-1 
P2.20 Has the minimisation of political risks in India associated with the ongoing 
religious rivalry impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an 
Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact 111 	No impact at all ri 
P2.2d Has the minimisation of political risks in India associated with the protest from 
the environmentalists against specific foreign investments impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes E 	Some impact J 	No impact at all 
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P2.3a Has the high level of import duties, tariffs and quotas imposed by Indian 
government impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian 
partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact L 	No impact at all 
P2.3b Has the taxation law in India impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in 
India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact El 	No impact at all 
P2.3c Has the foreign investment policy in India impacted on your firm's decision to 
form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yesill 	Some impact j 	No impact at all 
P2.3d Has the insurance industry in India with a public sector monopoly impacted on 
your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes ill 	Some impact 	No impact at all El 
P2.3e Has the lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights in India impacted on 
your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes ill 	Some impact 	No impact at all H  
P2.3f Has the Indian law allowing automatic approval of upto 51% equity 
participation (since 1993) in a number of selected industries impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact 111 	No impact at all 111 
P2.3g Has the changing legal and regulatory environment impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes0 	Some impact El 	No impact at all F7 
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P2.4a Has low labour productivity in India impacted on your firm's decision to form 
an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact El 	No impact at all 
P2.4b Has the difficulties related to the dismissal of workers because of the absence of 
consistent exit policy in India impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in 
India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact ri 	No impact at all I=1 
P2.4c Has the reputation of Indian labour force as being 'militant and obstructionist' 
impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yesEl 	Some impact n 	No impact at all 111 
P2.41 Have the difficulties in finding high quality local staff impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes0 	Some impact fl 	No impact at all 111 
P2.5 Has the lack of necessary market information in India impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes ill 	Some impact 111 	No impact at all 
P2.6a Have the 'distance, and unfamiliarity of Australian companies with Indian 
culture impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian 
partner? 
Definitely yes ill 	Some impact D 	No impact at all 
P2.6b Have the difficulties in dealing with corruption and bureaucracy in India 
impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes ill 	Some impact 	No impact at all r-7 
COMMENTS (if any): 
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PART-D 
ORGANISATIONAL-SPECIFIC FACTORS MOTIVATING THE FORMATION 
OF IJVs 
P3 Have the organisational-specific factors, such as the attainment of economies of 
scale; trans'action cost minimisation; accessing the distribution network; sharing 
technology and other resources; human resource management; and inter-partner 
learning impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian 
partner? 
Definitely yes E1 	Some impact [2] 	No impact at all El 
P3.1 Has the quest for economies of scale impacted on your firm's decision to form an 
UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact 	No impact at all El 
P3.2 Has the quest for the organisational-specific transactions cost minimisation 
impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes ill 	Some impact El 	No impact at all ri 
P3.3 Has the quest for access to a distribution network impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes[ l 	Some impact 	No impact at all 
P3.4a Has the sharing of technology impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV 
in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes ill 	Some impact 111 	No impact at all ri 
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P3.4b Has the sharing of establishment costs and other resources impacted on your 
firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes E] 	Some impact 	No impact at all 111 
P3.5a Has the HR related issue, such as managing selection, promotion and 
compensation impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Indian 
partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact El 	No impact at all El 
P3.5b Has the meeting of appropriate training requirements impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact 	No impact at all 
P3.5c Have other HR related problems, such as resolving wage dispute, managing 
labour unrests and deciding working hours impacted on your firm's decision to form 
an UV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes u 	Some impact 	No impact at all 111 
P3.6 Has the quest for inter-partner learning (e.g., exchange of technological knowhow 
and management style) impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with 
an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact El 	No impact at all n  
COMMENTS (if any): 
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PART-E 
FORMATION PROCESS 
P4 How extensive was the involvement of your firm throughout the UV negotiation 
process? 
Significant El 	Moderate 	Minimal El 
P4.1a Who made the first approach to form the UV? 
Parent firm 	 Host firm El 
P4.1b From where did you receive information about your prospective partners? 
P4.1c With how many Indian firms did you initially begin to select a partner for an UV 
operation? 
P4.1d How much time did you spend in preparing for the formal negotiations with 
your Indian partner? 
Months Days 
 
   
P4.1e Did you consider the needs of your firm during the preparatory stage? 
Yes El 
	
NoEl  
P4.1f Did you consider the needs of your partner during the preparatory stage? 
Yes CI 	No El 
P4.1 g Did you introduce any additional arguments/resources beyond the immediate UV 
objective during the bargaining? 
Yes ri 	No Ell 
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134.in On how many occasions did you meet with your partner before you finalised 
your negotiations? 
P4.1i On how many occasions did you visit India to meet with your partner before 
finalising the negotiations? 
P4.11 How extensive was your financial investment in the preparatory stage of the 
negotiation? 
A$ 
P4.1k Did you organise any pre-contract training for the participants from your 
company to enable them to better negotiate with their Indian counterparts (with 
emphasis on learning Indian management style and culture)? 
P4.11 Which management level was entrusted with the responsibilities of directly 
negotiating with the Indian counterparts? 
Senior Middle Junior 
 
Mix 
134.2a In which city was the final negotiation held? 
P4.2b What was the rationale for the selection of the venue? 
P4.2c What was/were the language/s used during the formal negotiation and the 
preparation of documents? 
P4.2d Did you face any major difficulties during the final negotiation? 
P4.2e If Yes (ref: 134.3e) , how did you overcome it/them? 
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P4.21 Did you sign a separate licensing agreement for technology transfer? 
Yes I 	I 	No I 	I 
 
134.2g If yes, did the negotiation run separately or simultaneously? 
P4.2h How long did it take to get the approval from the Indian government? 
P4.21 Were any special efforts required to get the approval? 
Yes I 	I 	No 
P4.2j If yes, please specify. 
I 	I 
 
P4.3a Did you employ anyone from your company or from outside to assist in 
understanding the legal aspects of negotiation during the preparatory stage? (please 
specify). 
P4.3b Did you engage any law firm from India and/or Australia to propose necessary 
alterations after taking appropriate scrutiny of the draft documents before signing 
them? (if any, please specify the firms) 
P4.3c Did you interpret the document according to the Australian law? 
COMMENTS (if any): 
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PART-F 
IMPLEMENTATION STAGE 
P5.1 Is the choice of an appropriate partner an important pre-condition for the success 
of the UV between Australian and Indian firms in India? 
Definitely yesn 	To some extentEl 	Not at all 1=1 
p5.2a Do you consider the sharing of decision making between UV partners to be an 
important pre-condition for the success of IJVs between Australian and Indian firms 
in India? 
Definitely yesp 	To some extentEl 	Not at all CI 
P5.2b Which partner influences most in the major decision making processes in this 
IJV? 
I 	I Exclusively made/guided by policy guidelines of the foreign parent 
I 	I Exclusively made/guided by policy guidelines of the host management 
I 	I Jointly made/guided by policy guidelines of the both partners 
I 	I Made by the UV with some policy guidelines from the partners 
P5.2c Has flexibility of control had positive impacts on the IJV success? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact 	No impact at all 111 
P5.2d Has the level of equity share had an impact on the level of control over the 
UV? 
Definitely yesill 	To some extentEl 	Not at all CI 
P5.28 What are the existing equity levels (in %) of the UV? 
Parent firm I 	 Host firm 
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P5.2f Has the level of technology contribution had an impact on the level of control 
over the UV? 
Definitely yes:: 	Some impact [-: 	No impact at all 0 
P5.29 Has the structure of the UV board of directors had an impact on the UV 
success? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact 0 	No impact at all El 
P5.2h What is the structure of the UV board of Directors representing parent and host 
firms? 
Total members ri Parent firm ri Host firm ri 
Chaired by HCNI 	I PCN I 	I 
 
P5.21 Do you consider that control through sharing of UV personnel is a pre-condition 
for UV success? 
Definitely yes n Some impact [II 	No impact at all n 
P5.21 What is the current ratio of personnel between the Host and Australian partners 
in the UV? 
Host : Parent = 
P5.2k How many persons at each level below are drawn from each partner? 
Mangement levels Number of persons drawn by 
Host firm Australian parent 
CEO 
Production/Tecnical Managers 
Marketing Managers 
Personnel/HR Managers 
Accounts and Finance Managers 
Other Managers 
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P5.3a Has the appropriate selection of LTV personnel had an impact on the UV 
success? 
Definitely ye s0 	Some impact Ell 	No impact at all F7 
P5.3b Do you consider the use of experienced parent country nationals (PCN) to India 
as a pre-condition for a successful LTV operation? 
Definitely yesEl 
	
To some extentO 	Not at all 
P5.3c What is the average management experience of the PCN managers installed in 
the UV? 
Years I 	1 
P5.3d IS it important to provide specialised training for the expatriate managers on 
Indian culture and management practice before you sent them to the UV? 
Definitely yes El 	To some extents 	Not at all LI 
ps.s. Is it important to provide specialised training for the Indian managers on 
Australian culture and management practice before they are sent to the LTV? 
Definitely yesEl 	To some extentp 	Not at all n 
P5.3f IS it important to offer special compensation allowance (Including relocation) to 
the expatriate managers working in India? 
Definitely yes ill 	To some extentill 	Not at all 111 
P5.3g Do you pay any special allowance to the expatriate managers working in the UV 
in India? 
Yes LII 	 No 111 
P5.3h Do you consider the use of host country nationals (HCNs) in key UV positions 
as a pre-condition for the UV success? 
Definitely yes E 	To some extentO 	Not at all 
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P5.4a Do you consider the inter-partner learning (e.g., exchange of technical knowhow 
and management style) as an important issue that impacts upon the success of the 
Australian-Indian joint venture in India? 
Definitely yes0 
	
Some impact 	No impact at 
P5.4b Are you satisfied with the level of learning you achieved from your partner? 
Yes El 	 No LI 
P5.4c If not, why? 
P5.4d Do you have a technology sharing agreement with your partner? If so, could you 
please specify the inter-partner learning scenario as follows: 
LI Is your partner the net gainer in terms learning from technology sharing? 
El Are you the net gainer in terms of learning from technology 	sharing? 
El Inter-partner exchange of knowledge of technology is evenly shared? 
P5.5a Is the building of a separate UV culture (a hybrid of local and the parent culture) 
one of the most important pre-conditions for the success of an Australian firm joint 
venturing with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yesE 	To some extentO 	Not at all LI 
P5.5b IS a separate UV culture evolving in your UV? 
135.6a For how many years do you envisage the UV being operational? 
Years 1 	1 
P5.6b Do you have any other 'Ws with Indian firms? 
Yes 	 No 
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P5.6c If so, in which product market? 
P5.6d Do you envisage joint venturing with Indian firms other than the existing one? 
Yes 0 	No El 
P5.6e If so, in which product market? 
P5.7a Have you faced any difficulties from the environmental-specific factors in 
managing the UV, such as 
CI historical events, such as colonial, cold war legacies and post-cold-war 
scenario 
El geographic location 
CI host-country demographic characteristics 
CI host-country macroeconomic environment 
El host-country political situation 
111 host-country legal and regulatory environment 
0 nature of the HR practice in the host country 
Li lack of necessary market information 
El cultural difference and diversity between the host and parent countries 
CI bureaucracy/corruption 
0 other (please specify) 
P5.7 b IS the assistance from the local partner important in resolving environmental-
specific difficulties? 
Definitely yes El 	To some extentill 	Not at all 0 
464 
P5.7c Have you ever used any assistance from the local partner to overcome any of the 
above-mentioned (P5.8a) difficulties? (If yes, how often?) 
P5.8a Have you faced any difficulties in managing organisational-specific factors in 
relation to the UV operation, such as 
achieving economies of scale 
transactions cost minimisation 
accessing wider distribution channels 
sharing of resources and capabilities 
human resource management 
n other (please specify) 
P5.8b Is the assistance of the local partner important in resolving organisational-
specific difficulties? 
Definitely yesEl 	To some extents 	Not at all ri 
P5.8c Have you ever used any assistance from your local partner to overcome any of 
the above-mentioned (P5.9a) difficulties? (If yes, how often?) 
COMMENTS (if any): 
Would you like to be forwarded a summary copy of the results of this study? (Yes/No) 
n 
n 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION 
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I CONFIDENTIAL' 
International Joint Ventures as an International Business Mode: A Study of 
Australian-Indian Joint Ventures in India 
HOST COMPANY QUESTIONNAIRE 
INTERVIEW El FIRM 
RESPONDENT 
PART-A 
COMPANY BACKGROUND 
1. Location of Headquarters: 
2. Main Product Line(s)/ Services: 
3. Number and name of countries in which you operate: 
4. How long has your company been involved in Indian operation? 
5. How old is the UV? 
( please provide a photocopy of the organisation chart of your company, if possible) 
COMMENTS (if any): 
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1 
RATIONALE FOR SELECTING AN AUSTRALIAN PARTNER 
What are the factors that influenced you to choose an Australian partner? 
11 a) Convenience of using English 
O b) Common heritage of legal system and institutional setting 
El c) Availability of finance 
O d) Existence of Australian business contacts 
0 e) Proximity to India (Located within the same Asia-Pacific region) 
0 f) Both Australia and India are Commonwealth members 
0 g) Promotional activities on Australia (Recent emphasis by the 
Australian and Indian governments and businesses) 
0 h) Niche market for company product(s) 
11 i) Use of NRLs 
0 j) Australian multiculturalism 
O k) Australia has considerable economic links with other trading nations 
that provide a conduit for an expanded trade to third parties. 
0 I) Australian partner preferred UV with Indian partners 
[1] m) Other (please specify) 
MOST IMPORTANT 
NEXT MOST IMPORTANT 
COMMENTS (if any): 
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PART-B 
GEOPOLITICAL FACTORS AS MOTIVATORS TO CHOOSE IJV MODE 
Pi. Did geopolitical variables (viz., the time dimension, such as historical events; 
place dimension, such as geographic distance and size; and the demographic 
dimension, such as population size and ethnicity) impact on your firm's decision to 
form an IJV in India with Australian partners? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact El 	No impact at all E] 
Ptia Did colonial legacies that are still reflected in the anti-west attitude impact on 
your firm's decision to form an IJV in India with Australian partners? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact 	No impact at all El 
P1.1b Did the cold-war legacies such as India's pro-socialist stand and the 
protectionist role played by India to regulate foreign investment during the cold war 
period impact on your firm's decision to form an IJV in India with an Australian 
partner? 
Definitely yes I=1 	Some impact El No impact at all El 
Pi.ic Did the collapse of the Soviet Union impact on your firm's decision to form an 
IJV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact li 	No impact at all fl 
P1.1d Did India's geopolitical realignment through improved relationships with the 
US and its allies (e.g. Australia) impact on your firm's decision to form an IJV in 
India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes [ 	Some impact 1:1 	No impact at all pi 
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P1.2a Did geographic distance between Australia and India impact on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact El 	No impact at all Li 
P1.2b Has the absence of common membership of Australia and India in any of the 
active regional forums impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with 
an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact El 	No impact at all El 
P1.3a Has the very large poor segment in the Indian population impacted on your 
firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact j 	No impact at all El 
Pi .3b Has the relative absence of non-resident Indians (NRIs) in Australia impacted 
on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes LI 	Some impact j 	No impact at all El 
P1.3c Has the Neo-Swadeshi ( indigenisation) movement in India impacted on your 
firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 	Some impact 	No impact at all El 
P1.3d Has the religious rivalry and fundamentalism in India impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El Some impact 	No impact at all El 
COMMENTS (if any): 
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PART-C 
OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS MOTIVATING THE FORMATION OF 
IJVs 
P2 Have other host-country environmental elements (apart from geopolitical factors), 
such as its cultural setting, legal structure, politics, firm's access to market 
information and human resource management practices impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact 	No impact at all El 
P2.1a Has the level of inflation in India impacted on your firm's decision to form an 
UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact LI 	No impact at all Ei 
P2.1b Has the exchange rate fluctuations in India impacted on your firm's decision to 
form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact LI 	No impact at all Ei 
P2.1c Did the possibility to minimise the environmental-specific transactions costs 
(e.g., tax, tariffs and other duties) impact on your firm's decision to form an UV in 
India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes ill 	Some impact El 	No impact at all LI 
P2.1d Has the highly competitive state of Indian market impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an IJV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 	Some impact 
	No impact at all 
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P2.1e Has the uncertain demand conditions due to the large poor segment of the 
Indian population impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an 
Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact El 	No impact at all 
P2.1f Has your requirement for rapid and wider market access impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact E1 	No impact at all 
P2.2a Has the minimisation of political risks in India associated with the uncertainty 
due to the change of governments impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in 
India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 	Some impact 	No impact at all ri 
P2.2b Has the minimisation of political risks in India associated with ongoing 
separatist movements and their destructive activities impacted on your firm's decision 
to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 	Some impact 	No impact at all 
P2.2c Has the minimisation of political risks in India associated with the ongoing 
religious rivalry impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an 
Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 	Some impact LI 	No impact at all 
P2.2d Has the minimisation of political risks in India associated with protests from the 
environmentalists against specific foreign investments impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes [ 	Some impact 111 	No impact at all LI 
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P2.3a Has the high level of import duties, tariffs and quota imposed by Indian 
government impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an 
Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact 0 	No impact at all El 
P2.3b Has the taxation law in India impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in 
India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact El 	No impact at all El 
P2.3c Has the foreign investment policy in India impacted on your firm's decision to 
form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact 0 	No impact at all El 
P2.3d Has the insurance industry in India with a public sector monopoly impacted on 
your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact 0 	No impact at all El 
P2.3e Has the lack of enforcement of intellectual property rights in India impacted on 
your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact 0 	No impact at all ri 
P2.3f Has the Indian law allowing automatic approval of up to 51% equity 
participation by foreign companies (from 1993) in a number of selected industries 
impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact 111 	No impact at all El 
P2.3g Has the changing legal and regulatory environment in India impacted on your 
firm's decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact 0 	No impact at all El 
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P2.4a Has low labour productivity in India impacted on your firm's decision to form 
an DV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact El 	No impact at all El 
P2.4b Have the difficulties related to the dismissal of workers because of the absence 
of a consistent exit policy in India impacted on your firm's decision to form an DV in 
India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes': 	Some impact fl 	No impact at all 
P2.4c Has the reputation of Indian labour force as being 'militant and obstructionist' 
impacted on your firm's decision to form an IJV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact 111 	No impact at all El 
P2.4d Have the difficulties in finding high quality local staff in India impacted on your 
firm's decision to form an DV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 	Some impact 	No impact at all 
P2.5 Has the lack of necessary market information in India impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an IJV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 	Some impact El 
	
No impact at all LI 
P2.6a Has the 'distance' and unfamiliarity of Australian companies with Indian culture 
impacted on your firm's decision to form an DV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 	Some impact 111 
	
No impact at all 
P2.6b Have the difficulties in dealing with corruption and bureaucracy in India 
impacted on your firm's decision to form an IJV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes Some impact fl 	No impact at all 
COMMENTS (if any): 
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PART-D 
ORGANISATIONAL-SPECIFIC FACTORS MOTIVATING THE FORMATION 
OF IJVs 
P3 Have the organisational-specific factors, such as the attainment of economies of 
scale; transaction cost minimisation; accessing the wider distribution network; sharing 
technology and other resources; and inter-partner learning impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an DV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes ci 	Some impact J 	No impact at all n 
P3.1 Has the quest for economies of scale impacted on your firm's decision to form an 
DV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes 	Some impact El 	No impact at all El 
P3.2 Has the quest for the organisational-specific transaction cost minimisation 
impacted on your firm's decision to form an IJV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes[] 	Some impact 1=1 	No impact at all LI 
P3.3 Has the quest for accessing wider distribution networks impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an LTV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yesp 	Some impact fl 	No impact at all 
P3.4a Has the sharing of technology impacted on your firm's decision to form an DV 
in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes ill 	Some impact LI 	No impact at all 
P3.4b Has the sharing of establishment and other costs impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an DV in India with an Indian partner? 
Definitely yes 	Some impact LI 	No impact at all Li 
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P3.5a Has the HR related issue, such as managing selection, promotion and 
compensation impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an 
Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact El 	No impact at all El 
P3.5b Has the meeting of appropriate training requirements impacted on your firm's 
decision to form an UV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact J 	No impact at all El 
P3.5c Have other HR related problems, such as resolving wage disputes, managing 
labour unrest and deciding on working hours impacted on your firm's decision to form 
an LTV in India with an Australian partner? 
Definitely yes ri 	Some impact El 	No impact at all El 
P3.6 Has the quest for inter-partner learning (e.g. management skills, technical 
knowhow etc.) impacted on your firm's decision to form an UV in India with an 
Australian partner? 
Definitely yes ill 	Some impact Ei 	No impact at all El 
COMMENTS (if any): 
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PART-E 
FORMATION PROCESS 
P4 How extensive was the involvement of your firm throughout the UV negotiation 
process? 
Significant 	Moderate El 	Minimal El 
P4.1a Who made the first approach to form the joint venture? 
Parent firm El 	Host firm El 
134.1b From where did you receive information about your prospective partner? 
P4.1c With how many foreign firms did you initially begin negotiations to select a 
partner for an UV operation? 
P4.1d How much time did you spend in preparing for the formal negotiations with 
your Australian partner? 
Months 	 Days 
P4.10 Did you consider the needs of your firm during the preparatory stage? 
Yes El 	No El 
P4.1f Did you consider the needs of your partner during the preparatory stage? 
Yes 111 	No 
P4.1 g Did you introduce any additional arguments/resources beyond the immediate UV 
objective during the bargaining? 
Yes ri 	No El 
134.in On how many occasions did you meet with your partner before you finalised 
your negotiations? 
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P4.1i On how many occasions did you visit Australia to meet with your partner before 
finalising the negotiations? 
P4.11 HOW extensive was your financial investment in the preparatory stage of the 
negotiation process? 
A$/Rs 
P4.1k Did you organise any pre-contract training for the participants from your 
company to enable them to better negotiate with their Australian counterparts (with 
emphasis on learning Australian management style and culture)? 
134.11 Which management level was entrusted with the responsibilities of directly 
negotiating with the Australian counterparts? 
Senior 
 
Middle 
 
Junior 
 
Mix 
134.2a In which city was the final negotiation held? 
P4.2b What was the rationale for the selection of the venue? 
P4.2c What was/were the language/s used during the formal negotiation and the 
preparation of the documents? 
P4.2d Did you face any major difficulties during the final negotiation? 
Yes I 	I 	 No 
134.2e If Yes (ref: 134.3e) , how did you overcome it/them? 
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P4. f Did you sign a separate licensing agreement for technology transfer? 
Yes! 	I 	 No 
P4.2g If yes, did the negotiation run separately or simultaneously? 
P4.2h How long did it take to get the approval from the Indian government? 
P4.2i Were any special efforts required to get the approval? 
Yes! 	I 	No 
P4.2j If yes, please specify. 
I 	I 
 
ID4.3a Did you engage anyone from your company or from outside to assist in 
understanding the legal aspects of negotiation during the preparatory stage? (please 
specify) 
P4.3b Did you engage any law firm from India and/or Australia to propose necessary 
alterations after taking appropriate scrutiny of the draft documents before signing 
them? (if any, please specify the firms) 
P4.3c Did you interpret the document according to the Australian law? 
Yes! 	I 	 No 
COMMENTS (if any): 
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PART-F 
IMPLEMENTATION STAGE 
P5.1 Is the choice of an appropriate partner an important pre-condition for the success 
of UVs between Australian and Indian firms in India? 
Definitely yes El 	To some extent El 	Not at all 
135.2a Do you consider the sharing of decision making between UV partners to be an 
important pre-condition for the success of the IJV between Australian and Indian 
firms in India? 
Definitely yes 	To some extent E1 	Not at all 1:1 
P5.2b Which partner influences most in the major decision making processes in this 
UV? 
I 	I Exclusively made/guided by policy guidelines of the foreign parent 
I 	I Exclusively made/guided by policy guidelines of the host management 
I Jointly made/guided by policy guidelines of the both partners 
Made by the UV with some policy guidelines from the partners 
P5.2c Has flexibility of control had positive impacts on the UV success? 
Definitely yes0 	Some impact 	No impact at all El 
P5.2d Has the level of equity share had an impact on the level of control over the 
UV? 
Definitely yes[I] 
	
To some extentill 	Not at all 
P5.20 What are the existing equity levels (in %) of the UV? 
Parent firm I 	I 	 Host firm 
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P5.2f Has the level of technology contribution had an impact on the level of control 
over the UV? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact 0 	No impact at all 0 
P5.2g Has the structure of the UV board of directors had an impact on the UV 
success? 	. 
Definitely yes El 	Some impact El 	No impact at all 0 
P5.2h What is the structure of the UV board of Directors representing parent and host 
firms? 
Total members [T  Parent firm ri Host firm n 
Chaired by HCNI 	I 	PCN I 	I 
P5.2i Do you consider that control through sharing of UV personnel is a pre-condition 
for UV success? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact n No impact at all 
P5.2j What is the current ratio of personnel between the Host and Australian partners 
in the UV? 
Host : Parent = 
P5.2k How many persons at each level below are drawn from each partner? 
Mangement levels Number of persons drawn by 
Host firm Australian parent 
CEO 
Production/Tecnical Managers 
Marketing Managers 
Personnel/HR Managers 
Accounts and Finance Managers 
Other Managers 
: 
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P5.3a Has the appropriate selection of UV personnel had an impact on the UV 
success? 
Definitely yesI 	Some impact 111 	No impact at all El 
P5.3b Do you consider the use of experienced parent country nationals (PCN) to India 
as a pre-condition for a successful UV operation? 
Definitely yesill 
	
To some extents 	Not at all El 
P5.3c What is the average management experience of the PCN managers installed in 
the UV? 
Years I 	I 
P5.3d IS it important to provide specialised training for the expatriate managers on 
Indian culture and management practice before you sent them to the UV? 
Definitely yesn 	To some extentE 	Not at all El 
P5.3e Is it important to provide specialised training for the Indian managers on 
Australian culture and management practice before they are sent to the UV? 
Definitely yes[ 
	
To some extentn 	Not at all El 
P5.3f IS it important to offer special compensation allowance (Including relocation) to 
the expatriate managers working in India? 
Definitely yes 0 	To some extentO 	Not at all El 
P5.3g Do you pay any special allowance to the expatriate managers working in the UV 
in India? 
Yes n 	No El 
P5.3h Do you consider the use of host country nationals (HCNs) in key UV positions 
as a pre-condition for the UV success? 
Definitely yes ill 	To some extentill 	Not at all El 
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P5.4a Do you consider the inter-partner learning (e.g., exchange of technical knowhow 
and management style) as an important issue that impacts upon the success of the 
Australian-Indian joint venture in India? 
Definitely yes 0 	Some impact El 	No impact at all n 
P5.4b Are you satisfied with the level of learning you achieved from your partner? 
Yes El 	N0 El 
P5.4c If not, why? 
P5.4d Do you have a technology sharing agreement with your partner? 
Yes 1:1 	No CI 
P5.4e If yes, could you please specify the inter-partner learning scenario as follows: 
El Is your partner the net gainer in terms learning from technology sharing? 
Are you the net gainer in terms of learning from technology sharing? 
El Inter-partner exchange of knowledge of technology is evenly shared? 
P5.5a Is the building of a separate UV culture (a hybrid of local and the parent culture) 
one of the most important pre-conditions for the success of Indian firms joint 
venturing with the Australian partner? 
Definitely yesp 
	
To some extent El 	Not at all 
P5.5b IS a separate UV culture evolving in your UV? 
Yes El 	 No El 
135.6a For how many years do you envisage the UV being operational? 
Years 
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P5.6b Do you have any other IJVs with Australian firm? 
Yes LI 	 No El 
P5.6c If yes, in which product/service market? 
P5.6d Do you envisage joint venturing with Australian firms other than the existing 
one? 
Yes El 	 No E} 
P5.6e If yes, in which product/service market? 
P5.7a Have you faced any difficulties from the environmental-specific factors in 
managing the UV, such as: 
1:1 historical events, such as colonial, cold war legacies and post-cold-war 
scenario 
El geographic location 
El host-country demographic characteristics 
El host-country macroeconomic environment 
El host-country political situation 
• 111 host-country legal and regulatory environment 
El nature of the FIR practice in the host country 
LI lack of necessary market information 
cultural difference and diversity between the host and parent countries 
El bureaucracy/corruption 
fl other (please specify) 
P5.7 b Is assistance from the local partner important in managing environment-specific 
difficulties? 
Definitely yes ill 	To some extent El 	Not at all El 
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P5.7c Have you ever rendered assistance to the Australian partner to overcome any of 
the above-mentioned (P5.8a) difficulties? (If yes, how often?) 
P5.8a Have you faced any difficulties in managing organisational-specific factors in 
relation to the UV operation, such as 
achieving economies of scale 
transactions cost minimisation 
accessing wider distribution channels 
sharing of resources and capabilities 
human resource management 
other (please specify) 
P5.8b Is assistance from the local partner important in managing organisational-
specific difficulties? 
Definitely yes El 	To some extent El 	Not at all 
P5.8c Have you ever rendered any assistance to your Australian partner to overcome 
any of the above-mentioned (P5.9a) difficulties? (If yes, how often?) 
COMMENTS (if any): 
Would you like to be forwarded a summary copy of the results of this study? (Yes/No) 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION 
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I CONFIDENTIALI 
International Joint Ventures as an International Business Mode: A Study of 
Australian-Indian Joint Ventures in India 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR IJV MANAGEMENT 
INTERVIEW ri FIRM 
RESPONDENT 
PART-A 
COMPANY BACKGROUND 
1. Location of UV: 
2. Corporate form: 
El Private Limited (Pvt. Ltd.) 
El Public Limited (Public Ltd.) 
El Deemed Public Limited 
1=1 Public Limited with Shares Listed on the Stock Exchange 
3. Main Product Line(s)/ Services: 
4. How old is the UV? 
5. Export Orientation 
0 100% export oriented 
0 50-99% export-oriented 
0 10-49% export oriented 
0 No export 
485 
6. Provide an estimate of the size of the UV at the end of the last financial year 
Number of Employees 
Total Assets (A$/Rs) 
Annual Total Sales (A$/Rs) 
Annual Total Exports (A$/Rs) 
Annual Total Profit/Loss (A$/Rs) 
7. Contribution of technology (if any) by 
Parent firm: 
Host firm: 
( please attach a photocopy of the organisation chart of your company, if possible) 
COMMENTS (if any): 
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PART-B 
IJV IMPLEMENTATION 
P5.1 Is the choice of an appropriate partner an important pre-condition for the success 
of the UV between Australian and Indian firms in India? 
Definitely yesE-1 
	
To some extentEl 	Not at all El 
P5.2a Do you consider the sharing of decision making between UV partners to be an 
important pre-condition for the success of the UV between Australian and Indian 
firms in India ? 
Definitely Yes Fl 	To some extentEl 	Not at all 
P5.2b Which partner influences most in the major decision making processes in this 
UV? 
Exclusively made/guided by policy guidelines of the foreign parent 
Exclusively made/guided by policy guidelines of the host management 
Jointly made/guided by policy guidelines of the both partners 
Made by the UV with some policy guidelines from the partners 
I 	I 
I 	I 
I 	I 
I 	I 
P5.2c Has flexibility of control had positive impacts on the UV success? 
Definitely yes[ 	Some impact 	No impact at all El 
P5.2d Has the level of equity share had an impact on the level of control over the 
UV? 
Definitely yesill 	To some extentEl 
	
Not at all El 
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135.2e What are the existing equity levels (in %) of the UV? 
Parent firm I 	I 	 Host firm 
P5.21 Has the level of technology contribution had an impact on the level of control 
over the UV? 
Definitely yes Ej 	Some impact El 	No impact at all 
P5.2g Has the structure of the UV board of directors had an impact on the UV 
•success? 
Definitely yes E 	Some impact 	No impact at all 
P5.2h What is the structure of the UV board of Directors representing parent and host 
firms? 
Total members El Parent firm ri Host firm IT 
Chaired by HCNI 	PCN I 	I 
P5.21 Do you consider that control through sharing of UV personnel is a pre-condition 
for UV success? 
Definitely yes n 	Some impact I 	No impact at all ri 
P5.2j What is the current ratio of personnel between the Host and Australian partners 
in the IJV? 
Host : Parent = • • 
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P5.2k How many persons at each level below are drawn from each partner? 
Mangement levels Number of persons drawn by 
Host firm Australian parent 
CEO 
Production/Tecnical Managers 
Marketing Managers 
Personnel/HR Managers 
Accounts and Finance Managers 
Other Managers 
P5.3a Has the appropriate selection of UV personnel had an impact on the UV 
success? 
Definitely ye 	Some impact n 	No impact at all ri 
P5.3b Do you consider the use of experienced parent country nationals (PCN) to India 
as a pre-condition for a successful UV operation? 
Definitely yes o 	To some extentill 	Not at all El 
P5.3c What is the average management experience of the PCN managers installed in 
the UV? 
Years I 	1 
P5.3d IS it important to provide specialised training for the expatriate managers on 
Indian culture and management practice before you sent them to the UV? 
Definitely yes[ 
	
To some extentu 	Not at all 111 
P5.3e Is it important to provide specialised training for the Indian managers on 
Australian culture and management practice before they are sent to the UV? 
Definitely yes ill 	To some extents 	Not at all El 
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P5.3f Is it important to offer special compensation allowance (Including relocation) to 
the expatriate managers working in India? 
Definitely yes El 	To some extentn 	Not at all 
P5.39 Do you pay any special allowance to the expatriate managers working in the UV 
in India? 
Yes El 	 No 11 
P5.3h Do you consider the use of host country nationals (HCNs) in key UV positions 
as a pre-condition for the UV success? 
Definitely yes ill 	To some extentill 	Not at all El 
P5.4a Do you consider the inter-partner learning (e.g., exchange of technical knowhow 
and management style) as an important issue that impacts upon the success of the 
Australian-Indian joint venture in India? 
Definitely Yes El 	To some extent 	Not at all El 
P5.4b Are you satisfied with the level of inter-partner learning within the UV? 
Yes 	 No LI 
P5.4c If not, why? 
P5.4d Is there any technology sharing agreement in the UV between the partners? 
Yes LI 	 No El 
P5.4e If yes, could you please specify the inter-partner learning scenario as follows: 
El Is the Australian partner the net gainer in terms learning from technology 
sharing? 
LI Is the Indian partner the net gainer in terms of learning from technology 
sharing? 
LI Inter-partner exchange of knowledge of technology is evenly shared? 
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P5.5a Is the building of a separate UV culture (a combination of local and the parent 
culture) one of the most important pre-conditions for the success of Indian-Australian 
joint venture? 
Definitely Yes 0 	To some extent El 	Not at all E 
P5.5b Is a separate UV culture evolving in the UV? 
Yes 0 	No 0 
P5.7a Have you faced any difficulties from the environmental-specific factors in 
managing the UV, such as 
El historical events, such as colonial, cold war legacies and post-cold-war 
scenario 
E geographic location 
El host-country demographic characteristics 
0 host-country macroeconomic environment 
El host-country political situation 
0 host-country legal and regulatory environment 
El nature of the HR practice in the host country 
0 lack of necessary market information 
0 cultural difference and diversity between the host and parent countries 
0 bureaucracy/corruption 
p other (please specify) 
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P5.7b Is the assistance of the local partner important in resolving any environmental-
specific difficulties? 
Definitely Yes 	To some extent Ei 	Not at all El 
P5.7c Have you ever used any assistance from the local partner to overcome any of the 
above-mentioned (135.8a) difficulties? (If yes, how often?) 
P5.13a Have you ever faced any difficulties in managing organisational-specific factors 
in relation to the UV operation, such as 
n achieving economies of scale 
transactions cost minimisation 
ri accessing wider distribution channels 
sharing of resources and capabilities 
human resource management 
other (please specify) 
P5.8b IS the assistance of the local partner important in resolving organisational-
specific difficulties? 
Definitely Yes El 	To some extent 	Not at all El 
P5.8c Have you ever used any assistance from the local partner to overcome any of the 
above-mentioned (P5.9a) difficulties? (If yes, how often?) 
COMMENTS (if any): 
Would you like to be forwarded a summary copy of the results of this study? (Yes/No) 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION 
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Appendix III 
AN EXPLANATORY NOTE ON THE INTERPRETATION OF RESPONSE 
SETS WITH RESPECT TO THE PROPOSITIONS DEALING WITH THE 
AUSTRALIAN FIRMS' MOTIVATION TO JOINT VENTURE 
Responses from both the Australian firms and their Indian counterparts are taken into 
consideration in order to examine the influence of environmental and organisational-
specific variables on the Australian firms' decisions to joint venture with local 
partners for investment in India. The rationale for considering data collected from 
both partners is elaborated upon below. 
This study commences from the presumption that the decision to enter the Indian 
market has already been taken by the respective Australian firms. The emphasis of 
this research is to reveal why the Australian firms have chosen "TVs with local 
partners as a modus operandi. The propositions have been structured with an aim to 
test whether a range of conjectured factors influences the decision taken by Australian 
firms to joint venture with an Indian partner. Clearly, the primary emphasis is on 
responses from the Australian firms. However, it is presumed that the responses from 
the Indian partners on the importance of the same factors can augment understanding 
of the motivation to joint venture. Hence, the analysis to follow considers both 
partners' responses. 
In this respect, it is critical to examine the respondents' particular contexts. For the 
Australian parents, the part of the questionnaire that dealt with the environmental as 
well as organisational variables was aimed at focusing primarily on the inhibitive 
issues which supposedly discouraged them from investing more extensively in India. 
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However, some of the positive issues were also considered to reflect the attractiveness 
of the market. The UV mode might have been chosen to minimise uncertainty and 
riskiness through the active collaboration of their local partners, and to exploit the 
opportunities available in India. 
Throughout the interpretation of the data from both the Indian and Australian 
partners, four scenarios may arise. These are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Possible Scenarios Arising from the Responses on the Importance of Factors 
Influencing the Motivation to Joint Venture 
Possible 
scenario 
Responses of all or the majority of the 
Australian firms Indian partners 
Scenario 1 Importance No Importance 
Scenario 2 Importance Importance 
Scenario 3 No Importance Importance 
Scenario 4 No Importance No Importance 
• Scenario 1 This scenario is represented by the case of all or a majority of 
Australian respondents attributing moderate to significant importance to a factor, 
while the Indian respondents attribute little or no importance to this factor. In this 
case, with the active collaboration of the Indian partners, the Australian firms are 
poised to overcome problems or limitations. This scenario recognises the Indian 
firms' advantages in dealing in India. In this respect, the Indian firms do not 
require assistance from their foreign UV partners. The Indian firms' abilities to 
manage inhibitive factors, and their expertise in optimising on the exploitation of 
the favourable ones, are perceived to complement the limitations of the Australian 
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firms. This scenario is likely to be more common in the data supporting the 
propositions. 
• Scenario 2 In this situation, all or the majority of both the Australian and Indian 
partners assign moderate to significant importance on the impact of a specific 
factor. There are two types of issues to consider in this respect. If the factors are 
inhibitive, both the partners are likely to seek assistance from each other to 
overcome them. However, if the factors are facilitative, the Australian partners 
may optimise the available opportunities using the expertise of their Indian 
counterparts. In this case, the scenario is mutually supportive and tends to confirm 
the propositions. 
• Scenario 3 In this situation, all or the majority of the Australian partners do not 
attribute importance to the specific factor, whereas moderate to significant 
importance is attributed by all or the majority of the Indian partners. Here, the 
scenario tends not to support the proposition concerned. Recall that the 
propositions are couched in the context of the Australian firms' decisions to joint 
venture. However, this factor may have had a complementary effect on the 
decision of the Indian firm. 	For example, the Indian firm might find the 
Australian parent capable of contributing to its portfolio through sharing 
technology, other valuable resources and managerial expertise. This may also 
create an enhanced business relationship between the partners. 
• Scenario 4 	In this situation, the responses from all or the majority of the 
Australian firms as well as their Indian counterparts do not confirm the influence 
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of the factor on their decision to joint venture. In this case, the evidence is 
unlikely to offer support for the proposition concerned. 
Identifying these four scenarios is critical for the data collection as well as the 
interpretation of the data with respect to the propositions dealing with the Australian 
firms' motivations to joint venture. Propositions, as mentioned before, are framed 
from the Australian firms' perspectives. To respond to these propositions, one might 
consider the Australian firms' responses exclusively. However, the responses from 
the Australian firms can be augmented with those from the Indian firms to better 
reflect the importance of the factors considered and how they might influence the 
Australian firms' decisions. That is, while on face value, the Australian and Indian 
responses might appear to be different, when consideration is taken of their particular 
perspectives, these seemingly different responses might well offer support on the one 
hand or no support on the other, of the propositions. 
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Appendix IV 
PUBLISHED WORK RELEVANT FOR THIS THESIS 
As-Saber, S.N., Dowling, P. J. and Liesch, P. W. (1998), The Role of Human 
Resource Management in International Joint Ventures: A Study of Australian-Indian 
Joint Ventures, International Journal of Human Resource Management, Vol. 9(5), 
October, pp. 751-766. 
This work is placed in a pocket attached to the inside back cover. This has been done 
in accordance with the University of Tasmania Research Higher Degrees Handbook 
(1998). 
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The role of human resource management 
in international joint ventures: a study of 
Australian-Indian joint ventures 
Sharif N. As-Saber, Peter ]. Dowling and Peter W. Liesch 
Abstract Little has been reported to date on human resource aspects of international 
joint ventures (IJV s) between Australia and India. On the basis of nine case studies, this 
paper examines the influence of HR practices on selecting the IJV as an entry strategy to 
invest in India and the role of efficient HR management in ensuring IJV success. The case 
findings suggest that there is a very moderate HR-related influence on the entry mode 
decision, whereas HR management plays a significant role in IJV success. The paper also 
identifies several HR issues in relation to Australian-Indian joint ventures which emerged 
during the study. 
Keywords Human resource practices, international business entry mode, international 
joint venture management, Australia, India 
Introduction 
Human resource management has increasingly been recognized as a critical segment of 
international business operations (Dowling et al., 1994; Milliman et al., 1991; Schuler 
et al., 1993). Effective use of available human resources (HR) in a volatile business 
environment is particularly critical for the success of any such operation. As one of the 
most challenging inter-firm linkages to manage, the international joint venture (IN) is 
often considered"as an entity with a complex set of human resource practices (Dowling 
et al., 1994). Because of a significant level of interaction among employees from the 
collaborating firms, IJV partners need to take utmost care in dealing with human 
resource issues. In order to achieve success, partners in an IJV need to reach an 
understanding on the role of human resource practices. 
For Australian firms joint venturing with local partners in India, human resource 
management is one of the core issues, with a significant level of complexity. The Indian 
government's policy of regulating HR practices, along with a preference for using host-
country or local nationals (HCNs) by the parent companies, has contributed to the 
evolution of a unique set of HR practices within Australian-Indian joint ventures. A 
research project conducted by the authors in nine such joint ventures over the last two 
years has revealed several special features relating to the HR practices maintained by 
these entities. On the basis of the research conducted, this paper focuses on the human 
resource management practices in Australian-Indian joint ventures. 
Human resource management in international joint ventures: a review 
IJVs are entities where two or more different streams of HR practices from different 
cultural backgrounds meet each other. The ability to manage human resources in a 
multicultural context has significant impact upon IJV performance (Schuler et al., 1991; 
0958-5192 © Routledge 1998 
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Nam, 1995). The importance of complying with local HR practices vis-a-vis the urge 
from the parent (foreign, in this case Australian) company to maintain a desired level of 
parent-country practices is likely to create difficulties in managing human resources 
within an IJV environment. Typically, a separate set of HR practices is required to be 
endorsed by the IJV partners that represents an accommodation between the HR 
practices of each company. Lorange (1986) considers that the IJV must have its own, 
strong, fully-fledged HR function with clear methods of working closely with each 
partner. Appropriate staffing of the IJV using PCNs (parent-country nationals), HCNs 
and TCNs (third-country nationals); developing and maintaining a separate HR policy 
mix adopting from both the parent and host environments; and using management 
development to establish a shared vision and mindset towards a joint HR culture are 
important for a successful IJV operation (Schuler et al., 1993; Nam, 1995). Geringer 
and Hebert (1989) consider it important to develop an integrated teamwork culture, 
rather than an 'us-them' culture while operating in a cross-cultural environment. 
Intensive on-the-job training may reduce the psychic distance and help build up a team 
spirit in such cross-cultural settings. This may also be done through reciprocal 
arrangements between the foreign companies and their overseas operations to exchange 
managers and engineers (Zeira and Pazy, 1985). Lei and Slocum (1991) state that there 
are three key aspects of HR management which are important for efficient IJV 
operation: training and developing managers in negotiation and conflict-resolution 
skills; acculturation of managers to work with a foreign partner; and the harmonization 
of management styles (i.e. the flexibility of managers to cope with unfamiliar HR 
practices). Along with these, control through staffing and staff loyalty is another 
important issue to consider (Schuler et al., 1992; Schaan, 1988; Dowling et al., 
1989). 
In addition, various country-specific HR issues are required to be taken into account 
while doing business in India. It is argued that local circumstances have a significant 
impact on international business operations with regard to management of human 
resources (Schuler and Sluijs, 1992; Monks, 1996). The Indian regulatory environment 
is a major concern with a relatively large number of laws regulating HRM practices 
(Lawler et al., 1995). For instance, it is not easy to dismiss employees, once hired, 
under Indian labour law (The Economist, 1994a, 1994b ). There is also the problem of 
availability of quality people. Although India has a large pool of well-educated people 
(Asian Business Review, 1995), since the economic liberalization of the early 1990s, it 
has become very difficult for foreign companies to find high-quality local staff. This is 
because of the unprecedented increase in demand for skilled people following a rapid 
rise in the level of foreign and local investment in India. Despite the availability of 
cheap labour, low labour productivity is a common complaint among existing 
manufacturers in India. A poor selection decision may result in low productivity. 
According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (1995a), the low 
amount of capital invested per worker and a work culture which does not encourage 
high-performance work practice are mainly responsible for the low level of 
productivity. Labour unrest is another problem when doing business in India. The 
labour-force in India has a reputation for being militant and obstructionist (Thakur, 
1993). In addition, most of the Indian labour unions have strong links with political 
parties and many politicians are current or former union leaders (Clarke and Von 
Glinow, 1996). 
Local culture and management style is another important HR consideration. India is 
considered to be one of the few countries with a heterogenous cultural setting and a 
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relatively large degree of dissimilarity and diversity among different groups or 
subcultures (Fatehi, 1996). It is a country with a complex cultural array, having a 
massive population base, which is predominantly agrarian, with fourteen recognized 
languages, seven major religions and numerous castes. Diversity, therefore, is the root 
of a complex cultural disposition in India that has a significant impact on the Indian 
management style (Sharma, 1984; Husain, 1994). Australia, on the other hand, as an 
industrialized developed country, has a cultural set-up different from India's. According 
to Grant (1982: ix, 5), Australia is a nation loyal to the West and historically comprised 
of 'convicts and immigrants'. With a huge land mass and a relatively homogenous but 
small population, Australia is a 'Western culture - developed and wealthy, without a 
peasant class' (Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, l995b:. 7). 
However, it is to be noted that, despite British origins, Australia is somewhat different 
from Great Britain and the rest of Europe and the US (Dowling and Nagel, 1986; 
Dowling and Boxall, 1994). Australian culture, therefore, is uniquely 'Australian' but 
with a strong Western influence. Such differences between the Australian and Indian 
cultural environments are important for Australian firms to consider when investing in 
India. 
It has been argued that, in relatively unfamiliar and culturally distant locations, 
investing firms are likely to adopt the IJV mode as a preferred entry option (Awadzi, 
1987; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Benito and Welch, 1994; Barkema et al., 1996). 
According to Benito and Welch (1994), 'in the culturally less familiar locations there 
tends to be less confidence and a stronger feeling of needing local partners in order to 
successfully adapt'. Kogut and Singh (1988) argue that the IJV option is less costly than 
acquisition in terms of organizational integration in a distant culture. IJV s also create 
the opportunities for inter-partner learning (Kogut, 1988; Hamel, 1991). According to 
Doz and Sheun (1988), companies often form joint ventures to levec:1ge their 
capabilities and to learn from one another. Superior information exchange among the 
partners is the core of such a learning process (Harrigan, 1986). 
Similarly, one of the major motivations for Australian companies to form IJVs in 
India is in order to manage various HR-related issues with the active collaboration of 
their local partners (As-Saber et al., 1996). Because of their experience and familiarity 
with the local business environment, it is relatively easy for the local partners to handle 
these issues efficiently. For example, an experienced local partner may make a useful 
contribution in identifying a suitable workforce for the IJV. Also, the IJV may use the 
existing human resources (internal labour market) of the local partner which has a 
known efficiency level. IJVs which utilize these local contacts are able to minimize the 
need to send high-cost expatriate managers to India. Overcoming cultural difficulties 
through the active collaboration of the local IJV partner and enriching each other 
through inter-partner learning are also important considerations. In addition, with the 
assistance of the local expertise of their Indian partner, the IJV will be more able to deal 
with different HR issues, such as training requirements, wage disputes, labour unrest 
and working hours. 
Background to the study 
In recent years, India has become more prominent for business executives and 
researchers from around the world. The end of the cold war era, and the subsequent 
economic liberalization process, has transformed the Indian market into an attractive 
destination for foreign investment (Tait, 1995). There has been a particular enthusiasm 
754 Sharif As-Sabe1; Peter Dowling and Peter Liesch 
among foreign investors to establish IJVs with Indian partners (As-Saber et al., 1996). 
The breakdown of communism in Eastern Europe and the demise of the Soviet Union 
has dramatically changed the international strategic order by bringing an end to the cold 
war era. This transformation has redefined India's strategic position in both the global 
and regional context. Pakistan has lost its importance as the protector of Western 
interests and, with Western governments and firms ever vigilant for new markets, India, 
with its enormous market potential, has moved towards the West. In addition, India has 
attracted special attention from the US in order to counterbalance the supremacy of 
China in the region (Gordon, 1993). 
The repositioning of the Indo-West relationship has improved the Australian 
relationship with India. Moreover, India's ongoing economic liberalization has ushered 
in a more favourable investment climate for foreign companies. Also, Australia's 
proximity to India and the recent emphasis by the Australian government on the 
potential of the Indian market have attracted many Australian companies to invest in 
India (East Asia Analytical Unit, 1994). Nonetheless, Australian companies, like their 
Western counterparts, have not considered the business environment in India to be 
adequately supportive of foreign investment. This has been reflected in the recent trend 
of reliance on IJV s among Australian investors as a preferred modus operandi to service 
the Indian market (Hook, 1995). 
However, studies addressing various aspects of Australian-Indian joint ventures are 
relatively sparse. Moreover, few studies have given adequate attention to HR issues in 
IJVs (Gordon, 1993; Gurry, 1993; Mathur, 1994; Vicziany, 1993, 1994; As-Saber et al., 
1996; Dowling et al., 1996). The increasing numbers of Indo-Australian IJVs along 
with a dearth of knowledge about the HR implications of IJVs in this region have 
prompted the need for this study. 
Research propositions 
During the research process, HR issues were looked at from two major perspectives: to 
what extent do HR practices in India influence the decision of Australian companies 
to joint venture with an Indian partner while investing in India? and, at a subsequent 
stage, how dependent is the IJV on the efficient management of HR for its success? 
These perspectives, along with the existing literature and available information, were 
used to frame the propositions. Propositions help identify the relevant information about 
the 'unit of analysis' (e.g. type of organization to be studied). It is argued that without 
such propositions, a researcher might be tempted to try to collect 'everything', which is 
impossible (Yin, 1989: 31). The propositions framed for this study are: 
P 1 The nature of human resource management practices in India influences the decision 
taken by Australian firms to joint venture with Indian firms in order to enter the 
Indian market. 
P2 The success of Australian firms joint venturing with Indian partners depends upon 
the efficient management of human resources. 
These propositions were examined during the research process. 
Research methodology 
Case-study method was used to conduct the research. Yin (1989: 3) considers the case-
study method as a process to investigate 'a contemporary phenomenon within its real 
life context'. A combination of deductive and inductive processes was used in order to 
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capture the complexity and dynamism of the context of a real-life situation. This allows 
the researchers to look at the scenario more realistically and with flexibility (Perry and 
Coote, 1994). Prior theories were employed as 'templates' for measuring the empirical 
case-study outcomes. In this sense, the existing theory helps to interpret the results 
(Manicas, 1989). 
For this research, nine cases were studied. For this type of study, there is no ideal 
number of cases (Yin, 1989). However, Eisenhardt (1989) advocates between four and 
ten cases for such a study. Australian firms were considered as foreign partners in all 
the case studies. India was selected as the host country because of the recent interest of 
Australian companies in joint venturing in India. Also, the Indian culture and business 
environment is familiar to one of the authors. 
Cases were selected from across different industries, rather than concentrating on a 
particular industry. A total of seventeen lndia-based lndo-Australian IJVs were selected 
for initial contact from the list published by the Australian Trade Commission's 
directory (Austrade, 1995). From this initial contact, positive responses were received 
from eight companies with nine IJVs (one Australian parent has two INs with Indian 
partners). All available IJVs were selected for the study. It was considered appropriate 
to select these cases from different industries because this would strengthen the extent 
of generalization from the available data. According to Gersick (1988), a strategy of 
diverse sampling may be adopted to enhance or improve any generalizations from the 
research findings. Also, the respondents are assumed to 'represent' the larger pool of 
respondents, so that data from a smaller number of respondents are assumed to 
represent the data that might have been collected from the entire pool (Yin, 1989). 
Multiple sources of evidence were used in order to develop construct validity. This 
corroboratory mode of data collection encouraged the development of converging lines 
of inquiry. Throughout the study, a chronological order from the identifying of 
problems to the final conclusions was maintained. Yin (1989: 102-3) refers to this 
process as the 'chain of evidence'. Primarily, data were collected from face-to-face 
interviews in different locations in India and Australia. Interviews were conducted at 
nine Australian firms to examine the level of HR-related impact on their motivation to 
joint venture with Indian partners while investing in India. However, to examine the 
role of HR factors in achieving IJV success, interviews were conducted at nine IJVs 
along with all their Australian and Indian partners. In-depth interviews were conducted 
with at least one senior manager from each of the respondent firms. Based on 
respondents' views, data gathered were categorized according to the major HR 
ingredients relevant to the respective proposition. Direct observations as well as 
secondary information were used in analysing these findings. 
Limitations of the study 
There are a number of limitations of case-study research (Parkhe, 1993; Dick, 1990) 
and several may be identified in this study. First, as noted earlier, the selection of cases 
was constrained by a relatively small initial population. Second, because of the 
considerable geographic distance of all the companies under study from the researchers, 
only a limited amount of time could be spent in each of the firms. Third, some of the 
measures employed are perceptual in nature. which could lead to a concern about 
the subjectivity of responses. 
According to Yin (1989), the problems of lack of rigour and possible research bias 
can be overcome by careful case design and protocol. This research investigated a real 
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business situation. Multiple case studies help analyse each of the cases in the light of 
others to strengthen the reliability and validity of the findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The cases 
The following case studies form the basis of the sample for this study. For the sake of 
confidentiality. the real names of the INs and their parents are not used: 
Case one: M -Tel M-Tel is a joint venture between Tel-Australia and M-Corp (India). 
The IJV is located in the Indian city of Calcutta. M-Tel is a cellular service provider for 
the Calcutta region. It is a two-year-old IJV with total assets of approximately A$20 
million and employs 103 people. 
Case two: Tel-Comm Tel-Comm is a tripartite joint venture among Tel-Australia, ILF 
Ltd (India) and an Indian public-sector enterprise primarily responsible for the overseas 
telecommunications service. This IN is a service provider for India-wide voice and 
data networks using 'very small aperture terminals' (VSATs). It is a two-year-old IJV 
with total assets of approximately A$10 million. Based in Delhi, the company employs 
sixty-two people. 
Case three: A eo Control (India) Pvt. Ltd This is a joint venture between Aco Controls 
Pty Ltd (Australia) and an Indian investor. This is a manufacturing IJV producing 
lighting control gears. Located in Mumbai (Bombay), the IJV has been in operation for 
one year and employs fifteen people. Total assets of this IN are approximately 
A$100,000. 
Case four: T-Dry (India) Pvt. Ltd This is a joint venture between T-Dry Building 
Protection Systems Pty Ltd (Australia) and an Indian investor, which was formed in 
1992. As a provider of building protection systems, this is a manufacturing firm. Based 
in the Indian city of Banga1ore, this IJV employs seven people. With total assets of 
approximately A$10,000, this IJV registered annual total sales of approximately A$2 
million in 1995-6. 
Case five: PB Friction Ltd This is a joint venture between F.I. Products Pty Ltd 
(Australia) and Brakes India Ltd. Based in the Indian city of Calcutta, it is a 
manufacturing IJV. The main product line involves the manufacturing of friction 
materials for railway brakes. With an authorized capital of approximately A$4 million, 
this IJV has not yet commenced full operations. The initial agreement was signed a year 
ago and most of the IJV personnel are yet to be hired. 
Case six: G S Co. Ltd. (GSCL) GSCL is a joint venture between MF Pty Ltd 
(Australia) and G and B Co Ltd of India. It is in the business of providing solutions in 
'imagineering', i.e. developing imaginative engineering software solutions. It also 
develops software in the mechanical CAD/CAM area and provides consultancy services 
in CAD/CAM development and re-engineering. Based in Pune, the IJV employs 125 
people. It has been operating since July 1995. With total assets of approximately A$1 
million, it registered total sales of A$2.4 million during 1995-6. 
Case seven: GP Ltd (GPL) Gi'L is a joint venture between the TP Group (Australia) 
and G and B Co Ltd of India. An information technology provider, GPL is involved in 
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the distribution of computer products and telecommunication networking and has been 
operating since April 1995. The IJV has its headquarters in Mumbai and employs 400 
people located in twenty-four branches throughout India. With total assets of 
approximately A$2 million, it registered a total profit of A$4 million during 1995-6. 
Case eight: IW Pumps Ltd This IJV between Warm Pump International Ltd 
(Australia) and Indus Ltd of India is based in Delhi and is involved in the manufacture 
of slurry pumps that are used for ash/dust-handling systems for coal-based thermal 
power stations and steam generating units. The IJV is four years old and has 480 
employees. With total assets of approximately A$200,000, it has annual sales of 
approximately A$550,000. 
Case nine: Bangalore Exploration Ltd This joint venture between CRAB Exploration 
Pty Ltd (Australia) and the Bombay Cement Companies Ltd (BCC) of India is based in 
Bangalore. The IJV involves mineral exploration and future mining. It has been 
operating for one year and employs thirteen people. It has not yet registered any 
sales. 
Case-study analysis 
In this study, it has been assumed that the Australian firms initially decided to invest in 
India in order to exploit the potential Indian market. In this section of the paper we 
examine the influence of HR-related factors on the motivation of these firms to select 
the IJV mode as an entry strategy and the effect of efficient management of various HR 
issues on IJV success. The data collected are analysed in two sections. The first section 
deals with the nature of HRM practices in India that influenced the decision of 
Australian firms to form IJVs with Indian firms in order to enter the Indian market 
(Proposition P1). The second section deals with the findings related to the role of 
efficient HR management as a precondition for IJV success in India (Proposi-
tion P2). 
Proposition P1 
The decision-making process regarding the choice of an appropriate entry mode was 
crucial for the Australian parents wishing to invest in India. This study examines the 
influence of the nature of HRM practice in India on the decision of Australian firms to 
adopt the IJV mode. HR practice in India was examined as an environment-specific 
variable. In addition, a number of organization-specific HR issues were taken into 
consideration. Nine parent companies were interviewed separately for each of the joint 
venture involvements. Nine major HRM issues were taken into consideration to 
examine the validity of proposition P1• Of these, five are environment specific: viz., 
cultural difference and unfamiliarity; low labour productivity in India; lack of consistent 
exit policy; 'militant and obstructionist' nature of Indian labour-force; and the lack of 
high-quality local staff. The remaining four issues are organization-specific: selection, 
promotion and compensation; training and development; managing labour unrest, wage 
dispute and working hours; and inter-partner learning. Table 1 summarizes the results 
of the study with regard to the influence of these factors on the decision to joint 
venture. 
Table 1 shows that the findings do not totally support the proposition derived from 
the literature that the minimization of HR-related environment-specific risks in India 
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Table 1 Frequency of HR-related factors which influenced the decision of Australian 
firms to joint venture 
Level of impact on the entry-mode decision* 
HR-related factors influencing the 
decision to form an /JV 
Environment-specific: 
Cultural distance and unfamiliarity 
Low labour productivity in India 
Lack of consistent exit policy in India 
'Militant and obstructionist' nature of 
Indian labour force 
Lack of high-quality local staff 
Organization-specific: 
Selection, promotion and 
compensation 
Training and development 
Managing labour unrest, wage dispute 
and working hours 
Inter-partner learning 
Notes 
Significant 
2 
2 
I 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
3 
Some No NIA 
impact impact 
3 3 
3 4 
2 6 
- 7 
I 5 
5 
4 2 
3 2 
6 
*Level of impact shown is on the basis of respondents' views. Numerals used denote the number of 
firms falling within respective categories. 
NIA =not available 
would be one of the major motivations for the Australian companies to form IJVs. Of 
the five environment-specific factors, cultural difference and unfamiliarity and low 
labour productivity in India were considered of moderate to significant importance by 
most of the respondents, whereas the remaining three were not considered important 
enough to influence the Australian firms' motivation to joint venture. While most of the 
Australian companies acknowledged their awareness of these inhibitive issues, they did 
not consider them as a major factor during the entry-mode decision-making process. 
They also did not regard these HR issues as too difficult to manage. However, 
organization-specific HR issues had a greater impact on the entry-mode decision. As 
shown in Table 1, most of the companies responded between 'significant impact' and 
'some impact' in relation to all four organization-specific variables. In this respect, the 
firms intended to manage the organization-specific HR issues with active support from 
their local partners, which, in turn, acted as a motivation to form IJVs. Nevertheless, 
during the study it was found that more traditional factors, such as sharing of resources, 
access to distribution channels, transaction cost minimization and compliance with 
government regulations (e.g. in the telecommunication industry, foreign investors are 
allowed to invest only as a minority equity holder with a local partner) played a more 
important role in the decision to select the IJV mode. Thus, Proposition P1 appears to 
be only partially supported. 
Proposition P2 
Effective management of various HR-related issues may affect IJV success. Ten major 
HRM issues were taken into consideration to examine the validity of proposition P2• 
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These include freedom of decision making by the IJV management; appropriate 
selection of IJV personnel; use of experienced PCNs; training of expatriate managers 
about Indian culture; training of Indian managers about Australian culture; joint training 
of HCNs and PCNs; provision of special compensation to expatriates; using HCNs in 
key IJV positions; inter-partner learning; and building a separate IJV culture. On the 
basis of data collected from three different entities (Australian parents, host companies 
and IJV management), it was found that most of the HR-related issues listed were given 
some consideration in respect of IJV success. Table 2 summarizes the findings in 
relation to the HR issues affecting the success of Australian-Indian IJVs. 
Although there is an apparent similarity of responses for each of the three groups, 
some subtle differences are apparent which are important for the overall study. In terms 
of freedom of decision making by the IJV management, the responses of the parent and 
host companies are very similar. However, IJV managers are unanimously in favour of 
significant freedom of decision making. A similar response-set is apparent with respect 
to the building of a separate IJV culture. For the factor 'use of experienced PCNs', IJV 
managers expressed stronger support than did the parent and host companies. 
It is important to note that the Australian firms' concern at the motivation stage 
regarding cultural differences and unfamiliarity was endorsed during the 
implementation stage while addressing the training issues. Most of the respondents 
agreed that the training of Australian managers about Indian culture and conducting 
joint training of HCNs and PCNs are important pre-conditions for IN success. 
According to one of the Australian respondents, 'we are always aware of the 
importance of training an international manager about the host country culture. In a 
complex cultural context in India, it was more obvious to do'. Despite such 
acknowledgements, it was revealed during the interviews that most of the Australian 
firms did not organize any comprehensive training for their expatriates. Rather, they 
organized pre-departure briefing sessions which might not be sufficient to serve the 
purpose. The training of Indian managers on Australian culture was acknowledged only 
by the majority of the parent companies as being of moderate to significant importance, 
whereas most of the host companies and IJV management did not consider this factor 
important. As a possible explanation, it may be argued that the Australian managers 
might have faced difficulties in understanding Indian management style because of the 
lack of sufficient knowledge of the complex nature of Indian culture. The findings 
regarding the Australian firms' unwillingness to conduct comprehensive training for its 
expatriates on Indian culture partially support this rationale. Whereas, the Indian 
managers, already exposed to Western culture, are generally comfortable in dealing 
with their Australian counterparts. All the IJV managers had a similar background -
they were either educated in the West or had prior experience with Western business 
culture. Nonetheless, the quest to build a separate IJV culture is consistent with the 
findings with respect to the Australian partners' concern for cultural differences and 
unfamiliarity during the motivation stage. In addition, the quest for inter-partner 
learning was found to be more important during the implementation stage than was 
anticipated during the motivation stage. Overall, there appear to be considerable data in 
support of Proposition P2• 
Other HR-related findings 
Together with the above findings, the study examined some aspects of HRM practices 
in the context of Indo-Australian IJVs. These are as follows: 
i' il!: 
li', 
I. 
I 
Thble 2 Frequency of HR-related factors which affected IJV success 
HR-related factors affecting IJV success Significance rating1 for Signifcance rating1 for Significance rating1 
Australian parents Indian host~ for IJVs 
Significant Moderate No impact NIA Significant Moderate No impact NIA Significant Moderate No impact 
Freedom of decision making by the UV 7 2 
management 
Appropriate selection of UV personnel 8 I 9 I 
Use of experienced PCNs 4 2 2 5 I 3 
Training of expatriate managers about Indian 5 3 5 2 2 
culture 
Training of Indian managers about Australian 4 3 9 
culture 
Joint training of HCNs and PCNs 8 I 6 3 
Provision of special compensation to expatriates 5 4 7 2 
Using HCNs in key UV positions 7 I I 9 
Inter-partner learning 8 I 10 
Building separate IN culture 6 2 8 2 
'Significance rating shown is on the basis of respondents' views. Numerals used denote the number of firms falling within respective categories 
1The number of host companies is ten because of two host partners for the Tel-Comm IJV 
NI A =not available 
9 
8 
8 
6 
2 6 
7 
8 
8 
9 
9 
NIA 
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Use of HCNs The study found that most of the key IJV positions are staffed by 
HCNs. Out of nine IJVs, only two CEOs are PCNs. However, these two expatriates also 
considered that it was a better option to use HCNs than employing PCNs in key IJV 
positions because of their familiarity and experience with the Indian market and culture. 
For the parent companies, additional reasons for using HCNs included avoiding extra 
costs to relocate expatriates and the reluctance of many Australian managers to live in 
India. According to one of the respondents from the parent companies, 'in the Indian 
business environment, the right Indian will know more than an Australian manager 
could learn in years on the job'. Most of the host companies do not support employing 
PCNs because of the availability of experienced HCNs at a lower cost. This is 
consistent with the observations of Dowling et al. (1994) on the use of HCNs. 
According to Dowling et al., the use of HCNs may be a better option when it is aimed 
at the elimination of language and other barriers, reduction of hiring costs, improvement 
of the continuity of management, since HCNs are likely to stay longer in the position, 
and creating high morale among HCNs as they see their career potential. This is also 
consistent with other research which reports that many multinationals operating in India 
entrust key positions to local management talent (Jacob, 1992; Vicziany, 1993). 
Use of expatriates (PCNs) Despite the prevalence of using HCNs in the key IJV 
positions, a majority of respondents from all three groups agreed that employing 
experienced PCNs is useful at the beginning of IJV operations. This may help to 
promote inter-partner learning, bridge cultural differences and improve mutual 
understanding. For technology-based IJVs, the use of PCNs as technical experts is 
essential at the beginning of technical operations. It was indicated by the majority of the 
respondents that once a decision is made to sehd PCNs to the IJV, the quality of 
the expatriates must be high to ensure IJV success. According to Datta and Rasheed 'a 
venture is very unlikely to succeed if parents are hesitant to assign their most qualified 
people or, worse still, if they view the IJV as a ''dumping ground'' for sidetracked or 
poorly performing managers' (1993: 264). The importance attributed to sending 
experienced PCNs to the IJVs by the parent firms is reflected in the following 
comments made by one of the Australian respondents: 'whenever we send an expatriate 
to a foreign operation, we try to send the best possible person for the job. If we don't 
find a suitable person, we rather depend on the experienced HCNs.' 
Who will deal with corruption and bureaucracy? Indian bureaucracy is said to be 
'parochial and obstructionist' (Thakur, 1993). Corruption is also a serious problem (The 
Economist, 1995a). During the study, it was found that most of the Australian firms do 
not want to handle these issues directly as an Australian company. They consider it to 
be one of the major reasons to form IJVs and use host partners to deal with these 
issues. 
Negotiation It was apparent that the larger the size of the company, the longer it took 
to negotiate the IJV agreement. The negotiation process was found to be lengthier and 
more complicated when either of the parties belonged to the public sector irrespective 
of country background. This might be due to the bureaucratic decision-making pattern 
in those organizations which had multiple hierarchies involved in major decisions. 
CEO not a board member In all the IJVs studied (except one), CEOs were not 
members of the board of directors. According to Indian company law, a full-time board 
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member cannot hold a full-time management position in a company and receive 
compensation for both positions. Even if the CEO is appointed to both positions (as a 
part-time director and the CEO), it would not be possible to draw salaries for both 
positions (Taxmann, 1995). Thus, there is a negative incentive for CEOs to serve as 
board members. 
Higher demand for experienced local managers With the rapid growth of the 
Indian economy, the demand for skilled managers is increasing at a rapid pace. This is 
affecting the salaries of local managers. According to a survey of global compensation 
trends (Koretz, 1996), India has been experiencing a rapid increase in managerial 
compensation packages during the last few years. The survey also projected a 23 per 
cent rise in Indian management salaries during 1997. These survey results corroborate 
the findings of the present study that to hire qualified people the IJVs had to pay higher 
salaries. Although the availability of skilled people was not given much consideration 
by most parent companies during their entry-mode decisions, during the implementation 
stage the problem of hiring and retaining staff became a critical issue. This study found 
that continuous pay increases along with a commitment to improve working conditions 
were two pre-conditions to retain experienced staff. This scenario is particularly 
common in high-growth industries such as telecommunications and computer software 
development. 
IJV control In a study of East-West joint ventures, Geringer (1993) found HR 
management often represented a 'crucial strategic control mechanism' in IJVs. 
Influencing the staffing of IJV s is particularly important in this respect. Two of the nine 
CEOs of the Indo-Australian IJVs studied were PCNs. With the other seven IJVs, the 
selection of the CEO was made with the prior approval of both the host and foreign 
partners. In most of the cases Australian parents played significant roles in selecting 
people for key IJV positions, such as the IJV general managers and financial 
controllers. 
Overcoming HR-related problems All respondents in the study agreed unanimously 
that, to resolve HR-related problems, the role of the local partner is critical. The local 
partner's familiarity and experience with Indian HR practices was considered essential 
to overcome these problems. However, it was revealed that assistance from the local 
partner is more critical for managing the environment-specific HR issues than for 
managing the organization-specific ones. According to one of the Australian 
respondents: 
one of the major motivations to joint venture was to get necessary assistance from the 
local partner in managing HR issues. We have been using such assistance since the IJV 
is operational. However, we are much more comfortable to deal with the organization-
specific issues than to manage the environmental ones. The HR environment in India is 
volatile and complex. That's why we strongly need assistance from an experienced local 
partner familiar with the local environment. Organization-specific variables are not as 
complex as the environmental ones are. These are more specific and readily under-
standable. So, we, along with our local partner, can equally contribute to manage these 
variables. 
1,~ 
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Conclusion 
Managing human resources is critical for conducting international business. It is 
important to scan environment-specific HR-related issues such as host-country labour 
law, labour productivity and availability of quality people before deciding upon the 
entry-mode strategy to an overseas market. Organization-specific HR issues, such as 
selection, promotion, compensation and training, are equally important to consider at 
this initial stage. Once the business is established, various HR issues need to be 
managed effectively for a successful international operation. This study has attempted 
to unravel these aspects in relation to nine Indo-Australian IJVs. The enormous market 
potential of India, along with the ongoing liberalization of the Indian economy, has 
attracted many Australian companies to invest in India. The trend is to set up IJVs with 
Indian partners. This study looked at the influence of environment-specific and 
organization-specific HR issues on the decision of Australian companies to select the 
IJV as an entry mode to India. IJV success factors were examined from a comparative 
study of the HR-related information collected from three different groups of 
respondents: Australian parent firms, Indian host firms and IJVs. The study found that 
the nature of HR practices in India (which include both environment-specific and 
organization-specific HR variables) had some influence on the motivation to form IJVs 
with Indian partners. However, the critical role of HR-related issues on IJV success was 
better established. The study also examined a number of core issues that might be useful 
in better understanding the current HR scenario in Australian-Indian INs. 
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